'*? 


UCSB   LIBRARY 

CHRISTIAN    ETHICS. 

BY  DB.   ADOLF  WUTTKE, 

LATE  PBOFESSOB  OF  THEOLOGY  AT  HALLE. 

WITH     A     SPECIAL     PREFACE, 
BY  DR.  RIEHM, 

EDITOR  OF  THE   "STUDIEN    UND   KBITIKEN." 


TKANSLATED  BY 

JOHN    P.    LACROIX. 


VOLUME  I- HISTORY  OF  ETHICS. 


EDINBURGH : 
T.   &   T.   CLARK,    GEORGE    STREET. 

MDCCCLXXIII. 


Entered   according  to   Act  of  Congress,  in   the  year  1873,  by 

NELSON  &   PHILLIPS, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington. 


LETTER   OF  AUTHORIZATION. 


DECLARATION. 


WE,  the  representatives  of  the  family  of  the  late  Dr. 
Adolf  WuttJce,  Professor  of  Theology  at  Halle  on  the  Saale, 
have  thankfully  accepted  the  proposition  of  Professor 
JOHN  P.  LACROI^:  to  translate  into  English  the  deceased 
author's  Christliche  Bittenlehre  (Wiegandt  &  Grieben,  Berlin, 
1864-5),  and  we  gladly  second  the  wish  of  the  esteemed 
translator  by  expressly  and  formally  authorizing  him,  on 
our  part,  to  publish  the  work  in  the  English  language. 

MRS.  PROFESSOR  WUTTKE, 

DR.  EDTJARD  RIEHM, 
(as  Guardian  of  the  children). 

HALLE,  March  8,  1872. 


NOTE    OF   TKANSLATOB. 


IN  my  labor  upon  this  translation  I  have  aimed  at  the 
truest  practical  reproduction,  sentence  by  sentence,  of  the 
thoughts  of  the  author.  This  method  I  deliberately  preferred, 
rather  than  incur  the  risk  of  impairing  the  clearness  of  thought 
by  entirely  recasting  the  forms  of  speech.  In  a  few  cases  I 
have  employed  unusual  compounds,  rather  than  resort  to  para- 
phrases or  to  an  undue  multiplication  of  subordinate  clauses. 
On  the  whole,  I  am  persuaded  that  those  who  are  best  ac- 
quainted with  the  difficulties  of  the  original  will  be  most 
indulgent  toward  the  style  of  the  version.  This  first  volume, 
although  only  the  Introduction  to  the  entire  work,  is  yet  a 
complete  whole  in  itself,  viz.,  a  survey  of  the  whole  current 
of  the  ethical  thought  of  humanity  from  the  earliest  dawn 
of  scientific  reflection  down  to  the  latest  results  in  Christian 
theology. 

The  motives  that  led  me  to  undertake  the  translation  have 
been  various.  Esteemed  teachers  exhorted  me  thereto,  as 
soon  as  notices  of  the  work  began  to  appear.  German 
scholars  spoke  to  me  enthusiastically  of  its  unparalleled 
excellence.  My  chief  motive,  however,  has  been  a  com- 
pound of  gratitude  and  hope, — gratitude  to  the  devout 
thinker  whose  work  had  been,  to  me,  the  medium  of  so 
much  spiritual  good, — and  a  hope  of  helping  others  to  the 
same  good.  For,  in  fact,  no  other  human  production  has 
lifted,  for  me,  so  many  vails  from  shadowy  places  in  Revela- 
tion and  Providence;  none  has  worked  so  effectually  in  defin- 
itively directing  my  mind  and  heart  toward  that  Light 
which  stands,  serene  and  ever-brightening,  over  against  the 
comfortless  spectacle  of  the  successive  and  rapid  extinguish- 
ment of  every  effort  at  social  reform  which  does  not  kindle 
its  torch  at  the  central  Source  of  all  light.  And  no  labor 


VI  NOTE   OF  TRANSLATOR. 

that  I  have  ever  performed  has  been  attended  with  such  a  joy- 
ous consciousness  that  the  very  toil  itself  was  self -rewarding. 
As  to  the  specific  merits  of  the  work,  I  am  happy  to  refer 
the  reader  to  the  considerate  words  of  the  distinguished  the- 
ologian of  Halle,  Dr.  Riehm,  in  the  special  preface  which  he 
has  prepared  for  this  translation.  I  could  also,  were  it  desir- 
able, fill  many  pages  with  words  of  highest  praise  from  the  most 
respectable  and  the  most  diverse  sources.  And  the  praise  is 
bestowed  not  only  upon  its  scientific  worth,  but  largely  also 
upon  the  spirit  of  its  author.  All  critics  accord  in  testifying 
that  we  have  to  do  here  with  a  man  singularly  endowed 
with  keenness  of  philosophic  insight  and  with  devoutness  of 
Christian  faith. 

Whether,  however,  there  is  need  here  in  America — where 
there  is  so  strong  a  proclivity  to  run  away  after  every  glitter- 
ing theological  or  social  novelty,  and  where  there  are  so  many 
evidences  that  the  general  consciousness  both  of  preachers 
and  of  people  is  not  thoroughly  enough  grounded  upon  the 
central  truths  of  the  Gospel — of  a  work  such  as  this  (a  work 
which,  in  so  masterly  a  manner,  brings  the  whole  moral  life 
into  vital  relation  to  its  only  possible  Source,  and  which  sweeps 
away  so  thoroughly  every  social  or  religious  theory  which 
does  not  stand  the  touch-stone  of  plain  Bible-truth),  it  is  for 
others  to  judge.  We  have  been  led  to  augur  favorably,  how- 
ever, both  from  our  own  studies  in  the  field  and  also"  from  the 
expressed  views  of  many  of  our  most  progressive  teachers  of 
ethics,  viz.,  that  there  is  a  loud  call  for  something  more  solidly 
philosophical  and  more  thoroughly  evangelical  than  is  afforded 
by  our  common  text-books  on  Moral  Science  ;*  and  we  feel 
pretty  confident  that  few  who  once  drink  of  the  fresh  thought- 
stream  here  opened  will  be  disposed  to  dissent  from  the  well- 
known  utterance t  of  Dr.  Hengstenberg,  that  Wuttke's  Ethics 
ought  to  have  its  place  in  every  pastor's  library. 

J.  P.  L. 

*  See  Dr.  Warren's  Introduction  to  Vol.  II. 

t  See  Evangelhche  Kirchenzettung,  (Berlin),  Sept.  4, 1861. 


SPECIAL  PREFACE  TO  THIS  TRANSLATION.' 


THE  author  of  the  work  which  here  appears  in  English,  Dr. 
Carl  Friedrich  Adolf  Wuttke,  has  won  for  himself  a  disl^n- 
guished  place  in  the  evangelical  Church  and  theology  of  Ger- 
many. A  few  items  as  to  his  life  and  activity,  and  as  to  the 
spirit  and  character  of  his  endeavors,  may  serve  to  call  atten- 
tion to  a  work  which  is  widely  circulated  and  much  read 
throughout  Germany. 

Born  in  Breslau,  November  10,  1819,  in  humble  life,  the 
young  Wuttke  obtained  his  preparatory  education  under  cir- 
cumstances of  great  difficulty  and  self-denial.  In  1840  he 
entered  the  University  of  Breslau  in  view  of  studying  the- 
ology, but  he  found  very  little  satisfaction  in  the  theology  that 
was  there  taught.  The  superficial  Rationalism  which  then  pre- 
vailed in  Breslau  violently  repelled  him,  and  drove  him  at  once 
and  forever  to  a  position  of 'antagonism  to  this  stand-point.  As 
neither  his  religious  nor  his  scientific  wants  found  satisfaction 
in  his  theological  teachers,  he  endeavored  to  satisfy  the  latter, 
at  least,  by  turning-  his  attention  primarily  and  chit- fly  to  phi- 
losophy. To  this  end  he  possessed  dialectic  talents  of  unu- 
sual excellence,  and  he  received  from  the  celebrated  and,  then, 
fully  mature  Braniss  fruitful  inspiration.  His  academic 
career  he  bega.ii  in  1848,  in  Breslau,  as  Doctor  and  pritat- 
docent  of  philosophy.  His  preferred  field  was  the  Philosophy 
of  Religion.  This  led  him  to  thorough  studies  in  the  history 
of  religions.  A  fruit  of  his  studies  he  has  embodied  in  his 
'•'•History  of  Heathenism  in  respect  to  religion,  knowledge,  art, 

*  Dr.  Riehm,  who  has  kindly  famished  me  this  general  preface,  and 
to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  many  valuable  suggestions  in  regard  to  my 
undertaking,  is  one  of  the  professors  of  theology  at  Halle,  and  also 
editor-in-chief  of  the  Studien  itnd  Kritiken. — TR. 


via       SPECIAL   PREFACE   TO  THIS  TRANSLATION. 

Morals  and  Politics,  (Breslau,  1852-53), — a  work  which  estab- 
lished his  reputation  as  a  scholar.  Utilizing  his  extensive 
acquaintance  with  the  historical  material,  his  chief  endeavor 
was  to  give  here  a  faithful  objective  presentation  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter, and  to  avoid  doing  it  violence  by  forcing  it  into 
harmony  with  preconceived  theories, — and  his  success  was  so 
great  as  to  obtain  for  him  the  warm  recognition,  among  others, 
of  that  master  of  Indian  antiquities,  Dr.  A.  Weber  of  Berlin. 
At  the  same  time,  however,,  he  was  also  able  to  present  the 
religiose-historical  matter  in  a  clear  synoptical  order,  and  to 
elucidate  it  from  higher  religioso-philosophical  stand-points. 

The  more  he  pursued  his  studies  in  the  history  and  phi- 
losophy of  religions,  so  much  the  more  fully  and  renewedly 
he  became  convinced  that  the  highest  and  the  only  soul-satis- 
fying knowledge  of  the  truth  is  to  be  found  only  by  merging 
one's  self  into  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  into  the  therein-wit- 
nessed revelations  of  the  living  God;  hence  he  felt  himself 
more  and  more  attracted  back  to  the  field  of  theology.  In 
1853  he  obtained  the  degree  of  Licentiate  in  Theology,  and 
changed  his  field  of  instruction  from  philosophy  to  that  of 
theology;  having  been  called  to  Berlin,  in  November,  1854,  to 
an  extraordinary  professorship  of  theology,  he  found  an  en- 
larged and  appreciative  sphere  for  the  exercise  of  his  gifts. — 
In  virtue  of  his  firm  and  independent  nature — partly  inborn  and 
partly  developed  in  the  severe  school  of  experience — he  felt 
also  a  pressing  need  of  a  firmly-based  construction  of  his  theo- 
logical views,  and  of  a  clear,  distinct,  and  unambiguous  ex- 
pression of  the  same.  This  need  was  in  part  met  by  the 
Lutheran  form  of  doctrine.  It  is  true,  he  saw  very  clearly  the 
defects  and  imperfections  which  a  scientific  construction  and 
demonstration  of  this  doctrinal  formula  bring  to  light ;  taking 
into  consideration,  however,  its  essential  features,  he  found  in 
it  the  purest  and  truest  didactic  presentation  of  evangelical 
truth.*  To  preserve  this  form  of  the  truth  in  its  main  features, 

*  As  a  Gennan  Protestant,  Dr.  Wuttke  had  practically  only  two  choices 
in  his  Church-relations,  namely,  between  the  Lutheran  Church  and  the 
Reformed  or  Calvinistic  Church.  The  so-called  "United"  Church  of 
Prussia  has  little  more  than  a  legal  existence,  the  individual  societies 
having  mostly  remained  essentially  Lutheran  or  Reformed,  as  before 
the  union. — TB. 


SPECIAL  PEEFAGE  TO   THIS  TRANSLATION.  IX 

and  by  his  own  deeper  study  of  the  Scriptures  as  well  as  by 
earnest  systematic  thought  so  to  raise  it  to  a  new  scientific 
construction  that  it  should  express  the  truth  of  the  Bible  in  a 
still  richer  degree,  and  that  in  its  form  and  demonstration  it 
should  answer  the  requirements  made  upon  it  by  the  present 
stand-point  of  theology  and  philosophy,  and  that  it  might  be 
raised  to  a  more  full  development  also  in  fields  wherein  it  had 
as  yet  attained  only  to  an  imperfect  and  very  inadequate  ex- 
pression,— such  was  the  life-task  to  which  Dr.  Wuttke  felt 
himself,  with  ever- deepening  conviction,  called  by  God.  And 
this  life-task'he  endeavored,  in  the  greatest  conscientiousness 
and  in  the  most  unwearied  and  exhausting  labor,  to  fulfill* 
And  the  animating  spring  of  his  labor  was  the  consciousness  so 
repeatedly  expressed  by  him,  that  theology  is  intrusted  with 
the  preservation  of  sacred  treasures.  Fidelity  in  preserving  the 
intrusted  truth-treasure, — such  is  the  animating  spirit  of  his 
theologico-scieutific  labor ;  and  with  this  fidelity  are  connected 
the  limits  and  imperfections  of  the  same.  In  this  fidelity 
he  was  earnestly  resolute,  even  in  the  face  of  the  coryphei  of 
theological  and  philosophical  speculation,  in  rejecting  all 
views  and  thought-constructions  which  seemed  to  him  foreign 
to  the  spirit  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  however  much  they  might 
seem  to  be  characterized  by  profundity  or  by  loftiness  of 
thought,  and  however  much  they  might  bedazzle  by  brilliant 
ingenuity  and  by  their  artful  application  to  Biblical  ideas.  This 
fidelity  made  him  a  decided  opponent  of  all  efforts  which  he 
regarded  as  bent  on  seeking  an  accommodation  between  faith 
and  unbelief.  In  this  fidelity  he  deliberately  consented  to 
sacrifice  the  favor  and  approbation  of  the  majority  of  his  con- 
temporaries ;  and  he  neglected  no  opportunity,  where  he  felt 
the  duty  of  champidning  the  pure  evangelical  truth  and  of 
assailing  perversions  and  misrepresentations  of  the  same,  man- 
fully and  with  open  visor  to  enter  the  lists,  and  to  fight  it 
out  with  keen  weapons  and  without  respect  of  persons.  It 
is  true  he  has,  in  his  earnestness-,  not  always  awarded  due  honor 
to  the  views  of  the  ideally-inclined  theologians, ,  nor  to  the 
results  of  historical  and  critical  Scripture-examination.  For  his 
own  person,  however,  he  was,  in  this  work,  never  concerned, 
nor  for  the  interests  of  any  party,  but  solely  and  simply  for 
Christian  truth  and  for  the  kingdom  of  God. 


X  SPECIAL   PREFACE  TO  THIS  TRANSLATION. 

In  this  sense  and  spirit  he  exercised  his  office  of  theological 
teacher  in  Berlin.  One  can  well  imagine  how  glad  the  late 
Dr.  Hengstenberg  was  to  have  found  in  him  so  able  a  co- 
laborer,  and  also  that  he  became  warmly  and  intimately  at- 
tached to  his  younger  colleague.*  But  also  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Berlin  faculty,  though  in  part  of  different  churchly 
and  theological  tendencies,  fully  appreciated  his  scientific 
ability  and  his  faithful  and  fruitful  academic  activity;  and 
they  expressed  their  esteem  publicly  by  conferring  upon  him, 
in  1860,  the  doctorate  of  theology. 

In  the  autumn  of  1861  he  accepted  a  call  to  an  ordinary 
professorship  of  systematic  theology  in  our  university  at 
Halle.  Although,  as  the  representative  of  a  strictly  churchly 
theology,  he  stood  here  somewhat  isolated,  still  the  positive 
evangelical  tendency  (a  tendency  based  on  faith  in  the  reve- 
lations and  redemptive  acts  of  God  as  witnessed  in  the  Script- 
ures) of  the  other  members  of  .the  faculty  (and  among  them 
the  universally  known  and  revered  Dr.  Tholuck}  afforded  a 
broad  and  firm  basis  for  a  richly  productive  official  co-opera- 
tion. Highly  esteemed  by  his  colleagues  for  his  straight-for- 
wardness, reliableness,  punctuality,  and  conscientious  fidel- 
ity in  all  his  official  duties,  he  ^xercised,  here,  his  calling 
as  teacher  in  a  circle  of  hearers,  at  first  relatively  narrow, 
but  which  soon  grew  visibly  larger,  especially  in  the  case  of 
his  lectures  on  Christian^  ethics ;  and  he  had  the  joy  of  seeing 
the  seed,  he  had  sown,  spring  up  and  bear  fruit  in  many  youth- 
ful hearts, — until  on  the  12th  of  April,  1870,  after  a  brief 
sickness,  it  pleased  the  Lord  whom  he  served- to  permit  him, 
unexpectedly  early,  to  pass  from  faith  to  sight. 

Along-side  of  his  more  specific  professional  activity,  Dr. 
Wuttke  was  always  ready  to  serve  the  church  by  special  ad- 
dresses, in  ecclesiastical  and  other  assemblies,  on  weighty 
questions  of  the  day.  Quite  a  number  of  these  addresses 
have  been  published  in  Hengstenberg's  ' '  Evangelical  Church 
Journal."  To  one  of  them,  which  was  delivered  in  1858,  at 
a  church-diet  at  Hamburg,- is  due  the  preparation  of  his 
widely-popular  and  excellent  work,  "The  German  Popular 

*  Dr.  Wuttke,  however,  was  free  from  the  ultra-confessionalism  of 
Hengstenberg  ;  he  even  favored  the  "  Union."  See  Neue  evangelischt 
Kirchenzeitung  of  May  7,  1870. — TR. 


SPECIAL  PREFACE  TO  THIS  TRANSLATION.        XI 

Superstition  of  the  Present,"  which  appeared  in  1860  in  its 
first,  and  in  1869  in  a  new  and  enlarged  second,  edition. 
This  work  combines  laborious  selection  with  a  lucid  grouping 
of  the  abundant  material,  and  is  inspired  by  a  vital  interest 
for  the  health  of  the  German  national  life  and  for  the  healing 
of  its  defects  by  the  divine  power  of  the  Gospel. 

For  the  judgment  and  appreciation  of  some  portions  of  the 
work  here  presented  to  the  public,  it  will  not  be  out  of  place 
to  observe  that  the  author  took  a  lively  and  active  part  also 
in  the  political  life  of  the  nation.  As  early  as  during  the 
revolutionary  storm  of  1848  he  defended  for  a  while,  as  editor 
of  a  conservative  journal  in  KSnigsberg,  the  cause  of  legal 
order  and  of  the  government.  And  during  his  activity  among 
us, — though  in  other  respects  living  in  the  greatest  seclu- 
sion,— he  frequently  appeared  publicly,  in  political  meetings 
in  Halle  and  in  other  towns  of  the  province  of  Saxony,  as  the 
spokesman  of  the  constitutional  party ;  and  once  he  took  part 
also  in  the  labors  of  the  national  diet,  to  which  the  confidence 
of  his  fellow-citizens  had  called  him. 

The  work  here  given  to  the  English-reading  public,  Chris~ 
tian  Ethics,  which  appeared  in  1861-'62  in  its  first,  and  in 
1864-'65  in  its  second,  revised  and  enlarged,  edition,  is  Dr. 
Wuttke's  only  considerable  theological  work.  He  has  here 
entered  upon  a  field,  the  cultivation  of  which,  his  special  life- 
task  as  above  indicated,  must  have,  pressed  upon  him  with 
very  great  urgency.  Upon  no  other  field  had  the  scientific 
treatment  of  the  theology  he  represented,  remained  to  such  a 
degree  imperfect  and  unsatisfactory.  Although  Christian 
ethics,  after  the  precedent  of  Danoeus  on  the  Calvinistic  side, 
had  been  raised  by  Calixtus  to  the  dignity  of  an  independent 
theological  science,  nevertheless  the  prevalent  one-sidedly 
dogmatic  interest  hindered  and  prevented  its  thorough  de- 
velopment. And  when  finally,  sinfce  the  last  decade  of  the 
last  century,  a  more  lively  scientific  interest  was  turned  to 
the  subject,  then,  unfortunately,  Christian  ethics  became  in- 
volved in  an  almost  slavish  dependence. upon  the  philosophic- 
al systems  of  a  Kant,  a  Fichte,  a  Fries,  a  Hegel,  and  a  Herbart, 
as  they  successively  rose  and  followed  each  other.  From 
this  cramping  pupilage,  ethics  was  indeed  emancipated  by 
the  Reconstructor  of  the  collective  body  of  German  theology, 


Xli       SPECIAL   PREFACE  TO  THIS  TRANSLATION. 

Schleiermacher,  and  also  radically  renovated  from  the  basis  of 
the  specifically  Christiarily-etliical  principle.  But  in  Schleier- 
macher, as  well  as  in  Rothe,  Christian  ethics  appeared  rather 
in  the  garb  of  theologico-philosophical  speculation ;  it  was  not 
based  directly  upon  the  Holy  Scriptures ;  on  the  contrary,  these 
highly  deserving  men  endeavored  to  be  just  to  the  positive 
Biblical  basis  of  evangelical  Protestantism  by  undertaking  to 
reconstruct  the  contents  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  directly  out  of 
the  Christian  consciousness^  in  a  word,  these  ethical  systems 
stood  in  no  manner  of  close  connection  with  ecclesiastical 
dogmatics.  On  the  other  hand,  Harless  had  produced  an 
ethics  based  directly  upon,  and  derived  from,  the  Scriptures ; 
but  in  his  method  he  had  disdained  the  learned  structure 
and  the  dialectical  procedure  of  modern  science.  WuttTce 
was  the  first  theologian  who  made  the  attempt,  upon  the 
foundation*  of  the  Lutheran  dogmatical  ground-views  as 
enriched  and  vitalized  by  personal  self-immersion  in  the 
study  of  the  Scriptures,  to  carry  out,  by  means  of  the  dialec-^ 
tical  method,  (which  theology  had  assumed  at  the  time  of  the 
supremacy  of  philosophy),  a  strictly  scientific,  organic  struct- 
ure of  Christian  ethics,  which  should  embody  in  itself  the 
fruits  of  precedent  labors  upon  this  field,  and  also  polemic- 
ally elucidate  its  relation  to  the  various  other  ethical  sys- 
tems. In  this  work,  however,  he  makes  no  other  use  of  this 
dialectical  method  than  simply  to  purify  theological  ethics 
from  all  elements  foreign  or  hostile  to  the  Biblico-ecclesias- 
tical  ground-thoughts,  and  to  bring  these  ground-thoughts  to 
more  complete  expression  by  process  of  inner  self-develop- 
ment. Hence  the  great  majority  of  churchly-minded  theolo- 
gians could,  with  great  reason,  welcome  in  Wuttke  the,  until 
then,  lacking  scientific  standard-bearer  upon  the  field  of 

*  That  in  the  construction  of  his  ethical  system,  Dr.  Wuttke  did  not 
allow  the  Lutheran  symbols  to  construe  the  Bible,  but  on  the  contrary 
measured  them  by  the  Bible,  and  freely  criticized  them  where  found 
defective,  we  have  both  his  own  reiterated  avowal  (as  where,  §  80,  he 
declares  it  his  purpose  to  write,  not  on  ethics  of  this  or  that  Church, 
but  a  Christian  Ethics ;  and  where,  in  his  preface,  p.  4,  he  declares  the 
governing  principles  of  his  labors  to  be  ''honest  loyalty  to  the  Gos- 
pel ") ;  and  also  his  actual  contrasting  of  the  Lutheran  and  the  Reformed 
ground-views  (see  §  87),  and  his  ample  admission  that  the  Lutheran 
view  needs  to  be  complemented. — TB. 


SPECIAL   PREFACE   TO  THIS  TRANSLATION.      Xlll 

ethics ;  and  consequently  his  work  met  with  an  astonishingly 
rapid  circulation  and  a  thankful  reception.  But  also  those 
who — as  the  writer  of  this  preface  * — stand  in  many  respects 
upon  the  ground  of  other  theological  convictions,  and  who  do 
not  fully  agree  with  many  views  and  judgments  expressed  in 
the  work,  have  every  reason  highly  to  prize  tfiis  system  of 
Ethics,  and  for  the  following  reasons:  because  of  its  firm 
Biblical  foundation, — because  of  its  sharp  and  clear  vindica- 
tion and  presentation  of  the  ethical  ground-thoughts  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures  against,  and  in  the  face  of,  various  wide- 
spread errors  and  prevalent  thought-currents  of  the  day, — 
because  of  its  thoroughly  carried-out  aim,  in  connection  with 
all  the  rigor  of  a  scientific  method,  to  present  in  broad  and 
clear  light  the  sublime  directness  and  simplicity  of  the  truth 
of  the  Gospel, — because  of  the  richness  of  the  subject-matter 
which  it  presents,  and — to  mention  especially  one  single 
feature — because  of  the  exceedingly  valuable,  and  hitherto 
almost  entirely  lacking,  history  both  of  the  science  of  ethics 
and  also  of  the  ethical  consciousness  itself. 

I  doubt  not,  therefore,  that  this  work,  will  meet  with  a 
heai-ty  welome  also  in  America  and  in  England,  and  that 
too  in  theological  circles  which,  while  not  sharing  the  special 
ecclesiastical  views  of  the  author,  will  yet  not  fail  worthily 
to  appreciate  his  conscientious  fidelity  to  Scripture-truth  and 
the  scientific  significancy  of  his  labors ;  and  I  feel  confident 
that  the  work  will  prove  serviceable  in  the  promotion  of  a 
healthy  and  practically-fruitful  theological  knowledge. 

DK.  EDUAKB  RIEHM:, 
Professor,  in  ordinary,  of  Theology  at  Halle. 

HALLE,  March  1«A,  1872. 

*  I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  P.  Schafffor  the  following:  "  Dr.  Riehm  is  a 
liberal  Unionist  of  the  critical  school  of  Hupfeld,  his  predecessor." — TB. 


AUTHOR'S   PREFACE 
TO    THE    FIEST    EDITION 


THE  theology  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  aimed 
at  giving  special  prominence  to  the  ethical  phase  of 
Christianity ;  and  yet,  strangely  enough,  the  scientific 
treatment  of  Christian  ethics  has  shown,  as  com- 
pared to  the  other  branches  of  theology,  a  far  infe- 
rior productiveness,  and  in  fact  a  degree  of  barren- 
ness. This  phenomenon  is  not  explainable  from 
any  precedent  over-fruitfulness.  nor  from  any  un- 
questioning satisfaction  with  any  already-attained 
relatively- definitive  perfection  of  the  science,  nor 
from  the  imposing  pre-eminence  of  any  exceptionally 
great  author;  on  the  contrary,  every  competent 
theologian  knows  perfectly  well  that  no  other  branch 
of  theology  is  so  far  from  having  reached  any,  even 
relatively,  settled  completeness  and  generally-ac- 
cepted form  and  contents,  as  precisely  the  science  of 
ethics.  Even  the  very  idea,  contents,  and  bounda- 
ries of  ethics,  are  as  yet  in  many  respects  so  unsettled 
that  the  different  presentations  of  the  science  have 
often  only  very  remote  resemblances  to  each  other; 


2  A.UTHOK'S  PEEFACE   TO   FIKST   EDITION. 

and  there  are  some  recent  theologians  who  look  upon 
the  ethical  field  as  something  like  an  ownerless  pri- 
meval forest  wherein  they  are  at  liberty  to  roam  at 
simple  discretion  and  to  give  free  scope  to  all  sorts 
of  pet  speculations.     We  would  of  course  not  wish 
to  shut  the   field   of  theology  against   philosophical 
thought;    on  the  contrary,  we   regard    its  scientific 
completion  as  possible  only  on  condition  of  its  per- 
meation  with    mature    philosophical    thought-labor. 
In  view,  however,  of  the  not  only  manifold,  but  also 
(in  very  deep-reaching  and  essential  ground-princi- 
ples) self-contradicting  philosophical  systems  of  the 
time,  we  could  not  advise  Theology — that  guardian 
of  sacred  treasures — to  cast  itself  away,  in  character- 
less self-forgetfulness,  into  the  arms  of  the  first  tran- 
siently-shining philosophical  system,  and  to  seek  its 
glory  only  in  a  pliable  self-conformity  to  the  rapidly- 
passing  Protean  forms  of  the  philosophies  of  the  day. 
Remarkable  indeed,  though  not  precisely  very  praise- 
worthy, is  the  metamorphic  capability  of  those  theo- 
logians who  have  kept  pace  in  their  theology  with 
the  entire  history  of  philosophy  from  Kant  down  to 
Hegel,  afad  have  furnished  the  public  at  each  decade 
with    an  entirely  different  form  of  theology.      It  is 
not   scientific   truthfulness   to   attempt   violently  to 
force  together  irreconcilable  elements ;  and  it  is  high 
time  that  the  day  were  past  when  men  presume  to 
introduce   Spinozistic   and   other  kindred  Hegelian 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION.  3 

conceptions  into  Christian  ethics  as  its  own  contents 
proper.  We  fully  recognize  the  high  services  of 
precisely  the  latest  forms  of  philosophy,  for  the  sci- 
ence of  ethics ;  but  we  must  guard  against  allowing 
theological  ethics,  as  conscious  of  its  divinely  re- 
vealed contents,  and  as  basing  itself  upon  the  holy 
Scriptures,  to  be  cramped  and  thrown  into  the  back- 
ground by  these  philosophical  systems.  Precisely  the 
most  recent  developments  in  this  field  justify  us  in 
entertaining,  at  this  point,  a  prudent  distrust.  The 
manner  in  which  some  have  introduced  philosoph- 
ical, or  a  so-called  "  theological,  speculation  "  into  the 
field  of  Christian  ethics,  reminds  one  only  too  much 
of  the  feats  of  the  suitors  of  Penelope  in  the  house 
of  Ulysses,  who  presume  to  cast  their  footstools  at 
the  head  of  the  returning  master,  and  yet  prove 
incapable  even  of  bending  the  bow  of  the  hero,  to  say 
nothing  of  shooting  through  the  twelvefold  target. 

What  we  attempt  in  the  present  work  is  neither 
speculative  ethics  nor  yet  Biblical  ethics  in  the 
sense  of  a  purely  exegetico-historical  science,  but, 
in  fact,  a  system  of  theological  ethics  based  on 
the  substance  and  spirit  of  the  Bible,  and  con- 
structed into  a  scientific  form,  not  by  the  help  of 
a  philosophy  foreign  to  that  spirit,  but  by  the 
inner  self-development  of  the  spirit  itself.  Whether 
we  have  properly  comprehended  this  spirit,  and 

whether  we  have  faithfully  learned  from  the  general 

2 


4  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION". 

history  of  science,  including  also  philosophy,  others 
will  have  to  judge;  this  much,  however,  we  know, 
that  we  have  endeavored  to  acquire  such  learning 
only  in  honest  loyalty  to  the  Gospel.  And  the  fact 
that  we  have  omitted  to  employ  many  technical 
forms  that  have  been  imposed  upon  this  science  by 
ingenious  authors,  will,  we  hope,  be  regarded,  by 
those  who  have  grown  familiar  with  said  forms,  as  at 
least  an  indication  of  a  sincere  endeavor  on  our  part 
to  avoid  breaking  the  impression  of  simple  evan- 
gelical truth  by  any  element  foreign  to  the  spirit  of 
the  Scriptures,  however  much  it  may  enjoy  the  pres- 
tige of  profundity,  and  however  artfully  it  may  have 
been  fitted  upon  Christian  ideas. 
BERLIN,  Dec.  31,  1860. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

TO    THE    SECOND    EDITION. 


WITHIN"  a  surprisingly  brief  period  a  new  edition 
of  this  System  of  Ethics  has  become  necessary. 

To  many  critics  of  the  work  we  feel  ourselves 
thankfully  indebted ;  of  others,  however,  we  regret 
to  have  to  say  that,  instead  of  scientific  earnestness, 
they  have  manifested  only  passionate  hostility.  It 
is  true,  we  have  gone  at  our  work  with  honesty  aad 
plainness  of  speech,  and  have  touched  somewhat 
ungently  upon  certain  sore  places  in  the  more  recent 
forms  of  theology ;  and  the  tone  of  ill-will  in  which 
the  opposers  have  indulged  would  seem  to  indicate 
that  the  right  spot  has  been  probed ;  and  we  are 
in  fact  cheerfully  ready  to  be  subjected  to  the  most 
searching  criticism.  There  is  an  immense  difference, 
however,  between  actual  confutation  and  unworthy 
abuse.  Some  critics  have  charged  this  work  with 
being  an  "attentat"  against  the  "inalienable"  con- 


6  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 

quests  of  modern  science ;  this  sounds  almost  as  • 
badly  as  when,  in  times  past,  a  certain  class  of  the- 
ologians spoke  of  "attentats"  against  the  teachings 
of  the  Church  and  against  the  symbolical  books. 
There  is,  in-  fact,  in  the  field  of  contemporary  un- 
belief both  an  "orthodoxy"  which  does  not  stand 
a  whit  behind  the  intolerance  of  former  and  much- 
despised  ages  in  its  hereticating  of  dissenters,  and 
an  authority-faith  in  the  so-called  "  heroes  "  of  con- 
temporary science,  which  exalts  the  preventions  of 
the  said  science  to  infallibility  in  exact  proportion 
as  it  is  zealous  against  a  real  faith  in  the  Scriptures, 
and  tramples  their  claims  into  the  dust.  Just  such 
a  .deference  to  writers  who  let  only  their  own  light 
shine,  (a  light  kindled  not  at  the  divine  light,  but 
only  at  the  faintly-shining  wisdom  of  the  anti-Chris- 
tian world,)  still  weighs  down  like  an  Alp  upon  the 
theology  of  the  present  day,  and  especially  upon 
ethics ;  and  to  do  battle  against  a  spiritual  despotism 
of  this  character,  must  be  to  take  a  step  in  the 
direction  of  true  progress.  Incredulity  constitutes, 
in  fact,  in  our  day  no  slight  recommendation ;  will 
the  public,  therefore,  not  let  us  enjoy  the  advantage 
of  a  little  incredulity  as  to  the  Apostolical  calling 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION.  7 

of  certain  recent  authors  who  have  forced  the  Pan- 
theism of  Spinoza  into  the  doctrines  of  Christianity? 
We  are  not  unaware,  however,  that  only  that  one 
can  hope  for  favor  and  popularity  with  the  multitude 
of  to-day,  who  makes  amends  for  his  faith  in  the 
living  Christ  by  strewing  incense  upon  the  altars  of 
the  divinities  of  recent  literature, — who  fuses  to- 
gether the  Apostolical  doctrines  with  the  unqaestion- 
ingly  infallible-assumed  "  results  of  modern  culture," 
— in  a  word,  who  selects  the  golden  middle-way 
between  simple  evangelical  faith  and  God-denying 
unbelief:  the  tints  just  now  in  vogue  are  indefinite 
and  indesignable.  We  frankly  confess  that,  in  scien- 
tific respects,  we  can  less  readily  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  this  nondescript  olla-podrida  theology 
than  with  those  who  make  a  clean  sweep  of  Chris- 
tianity at  once.  Upon  firm  earth  one  can  walk  erect, 
in  water  one  can  swim ;  but  in  a  miry  marsh,  which 
mingles  earth  and  water  together,  one  can  neither 
walk  nor  swim.  We  must  submit  to  let  those  who 
imagine  that  they  stand  or  swim  upon  the  heights 
of  "  modern "  culture  look  disdainfully  down  upon 
us,  and  reproach  us  with  not  being  abreast  with  the 
times ;  let  them  do  that  to  which  they  are  called ; 


8  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 

we,  however,  have  a  sure  prophetic  word,  and  we 
think  we  do  well  to  give  heed  to  it  as  to  a  light  that 
shines  in  a  dark  place,  until  the  day  dawn  and  the 
morning-star  arise  in  the  hearts  of  all,  [2  Peter  i,  19]  ; 
and  we  feel  confident  that  in  so  doing  we  have  chosen 
the  "good  part,  which  will  not  be  taken  from  us" 
when  the  specious  fruits  of  the  un-Christian  culture 
of  the  day  shall  be  swept  away,  without  leaving  a 
trace,  by  the  streams  of  still  newer  progress.  To 
those  to  whom  appreciation  for  recent  science  is 
synonymous  with  an  unconditional  homage  to  every 
pretentiously-rising  system,  we  must  be  content  to 
appear  as  non-appreciative;  meantime,  however, 
may  we  not  suggest  that  these  gentlemen  would  do 
well  to  come  to  an  understanding  among  themselves 
as  to  precisely  which  of  the  more  recent  and  vio- 
lently inter-contradictory  systems  represents  the  real 
progress  proper,  and  as  to  how  long  it  will  do  so, 
before  we  be  peremptorily  required  to  disregard  the 
exhortation  of  the  Holy  One,  to  "hold  that  fast 
which  thou  hast,  that  no  man  take  thy  crown " 
[Rev.  iii,  11].  We  regard  it  as  the  first  scientific 
duty  of  a  true  truth-seeker  not  to  suffer  himself  to 
be  captivated  by  the  flickering  glare  of  great  names 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION.  9 

and  by  the  sham-gold  of  pretended  latest  discoveries, 
and  not  to  let  himself  be  intoxicated  and  carried 
away  by  the  indiscriminate  applause  of  the  multi- 
tude. We  greatly  rejoice  to  see  that  precisely  the 
most  recent  productions  upon  the  field  of  ethics 
(Harless,  Schmid,  Palmer)  give  proof  of  evangelical 
soundness,  and  we  shall  anxiously  await  to  see 
whether  the  rapidly-erring  and  deteriorating  "the- 
ology of  progress  "  will  not,  in  its  turn,  enter  upon 
this  field, — whether  Rothe,  who  (encouraged  and 
urged  on  by  the  well-calculated  applause  of  this 
party)  shows  as  yet  no  signs  of  hesitation  to  do 
service  in  the  ranks  of  the  sympathizers  with  Strauss 
and  Renan,  will  not  make  up  his  mind  to  turn  to 
the  service  of  sound  words,  or  whether  in  the  interest 
of  an  erroneous  system  he  will  drive  even  still 
deeper  the  wounds  which  he  has  already  inflicted 
upon  evangelical  faith, — to  which  at  bottom  his 
heart  belongs.  . 
HALLE,  August,  1864. 


CONTENTS. 


PAOK 

INTRODUCTION. 

I.  THE  IDEA  OF  ETHICS,  AND  THE  POSITION  OF  THIS  SCIENCE  IN 

THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENCE  IN  GENERAL 13 

§  1.  THE  IDEA 13 

§  2.  PHILOSOPHICAL  ETHICS 16 

§  3.  THEOLOGICAL  ETHICS 21 

II.  THE  SCIENTIFIC  TREATMENT  OF  ETHICS,  §4 27 

III.  THE  HISTORY  OF  ETHICS  AND  OF  THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS 

IN  GENERAL,  §  5 35 

A.  THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  THE    ETHICS   OF   HEA- 

THEN NATIONS,  §  6 37 

§    7.  THE  UNHISTORICAL  NATIONS;  THE  CHINESE 43 

§    8.  THE  INDIANS 47 

§    9.  THE  EGYPTIANS  AND  THE  SEMITIC  NATIONS 54 

§  10.  THE  PERSIANS 58 

§  1 1.  THE  GREEKS 62 

§  1 2.  SOCRATES 69 

§  13.  THE  CYNICS  AND  THE  CYRENAICS 72 

§§14-15.  PLATO 75 

§§  16-21.  ARISTOTLE ' 02 

§§  22-25.  THE  EPICUREANS  AND  THE  STOICS 126 

§  26.  THE  SKEPTICS  AND  THE  NEO-PLATONISTS  ;  THE  ROMANS  144 

B.  OLD  TESTAMENT  AND  JEWISH  ETHICS. 

§  27.  THE  CANON  OF  THE  OLD^TESTAMENT 151 

§  28.  THE  APOCRYPHAL  BOOKS,  THE  TALMUD. 169 

[ISLAMISM] 171 

C.  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS,  §  29 173 


12  CONTENTS. 

PAQB 

1.  THE  ANCIENT  CHURCH,  §§  30,  31 180 

2.  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.  §§  32 199 

§§  33,  34.  SCHOLASTICS  AND  CASUISTICS. 200 

§  35.  THE  MYSTICS  AND  THE  PHOTO- REFORMERS 223 

3.  THE  EPOCH  OP  REFORM,  §  36 233 

§  37.  THE  EVANGELICAL  ETHICS  OF  THE   SIXTEENTH  AND 

SEVENTEENTH  CENTURIES 2i:5 

§§  38,  39.  ROMISH  ETHICS 255,  OT3 

§  40.  PHILOSOPHICAL  ETHICS  BEFORE  KANT 217 

§  41.  DEISTIC  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS 301 

§  42.  THE  EVANGELICAL  ETHICS  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CEV- 

TDRY 324 

§43.  KANT ,. 327 

§  44.  FICHTE 338 

§  45.  SCHELLING  ;  JACOBI 341 

§  46.  HEGEL  AND  HIS  SCHOOL 345 

§  47.  THE  MOST  RECENT  PHILOSOPHY 355 

§  48.  THE  EVANGELICAL  ETHICS  OF  THE  NINETEENTH  CEN- 
TURY     359 

§  49.  ROMISH  ETHICS  .  .375 


CHRISTIAN   ETHICS. 


HSTTKODUCTIOlsr. 

I.   IDEA  OF  ETHICS,  AND  THE  POSITION  OF  THIS  SCIENCE 
IN  THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENCE  IN  GENERAL. 

SECTION  I. 

ETHICS,  as  belonging  to  the  sphere  both  of  philoso- 
phy and  of  theology,  is  the  science  of  the  moral,  and 
hence  Christian  ethics  is  the  science  of  Christian  mor- 
als. But  the  moral  lies  in  the  sphere  of  the  freedom 
of  rational  creatures,  as  in  contrast  to  mere  nature- 
objects.  Man,  as  a  rational  being,  has  the  end  of  his 
life,  not  as  one  realizing  itself  in  him  spontaneously 
and  with  unconditional  necessity,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
he  has  it  primarily  only  ideally,  in  his  rational  con- 
sciousness, so  that  he  cannot  attain  to  it  by  a  mere 
unconscious  letting  himself  alone,  but  only  by  a  per- 
sonally and  freely-willed  life-activity ;  but  also,  for 
that  very  reason,  he  can  fail  of  it  by  his  own  fault ; — 
and  the  essence  of  this  life-development  of  man,  as 
relating  to  the  realizing  of  his  rational  life-purpose,  is 
the  moral  /  that  is,  when  normal,  the  morally-good, 
and  when  guiltily-perverted,  the  morally-<5w7. 

So  much  merely  preliminarily ;  the  more  complete  demonstra- 
tion can  be  given  only  further  on.  The  sphere  of  freedom  is 
that  of  the  moral ;  whatever  is  moral  is  essentially  free,  and 
whatever  is  free  is  moral.  There  is,  indeed,  an  immorally- 


14  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  1. 

incurred  unfreeclom,  but  even  this  unfreedom  is  essentially 
different  from  the  unfreedom  of  nature.  He  who,  in  contradic- 
tion to  the  Christian  as  well  as  to  the  universally-human  con- 
sciousness, denies  moral  freedom  in  general,  and  places  even 
man's  moral  activity  into  the  sphere  of  unconditional  necessity, 
may  indeed  give  a  description  of  the  seemingly-moral,  but  he 
cannot  place  upon  man  a  moral  requirement;  in  the  presence  of 
the  "must"  the  "should"  disappears.  Such  a  denier  would  at 
least  have  to  regard  the  contradictory  and  almost  universal  con- 
sciousness of  freedom  as  also  posited  by  unconditional  necessity 
— thus  surrendering  all  right  to  assail  the  same.  We  may  there- 
fore here  preliminarily  presuppose  it  as  the  utterance  of  the 
general  human  consciousness  when  not  perverted  by  one-sided 
theories,  that  the  moral  lies  neither  in  the  sphere  of  cognition 
nor  of  natural  necessity,  but  in  the  sphere  of  the  freedom  of  the 
rational  will.  Where  there  is  no  freedom  of  will,  there  we  speak 
neither  of  the  morally-good  nor  of  the  morally-evil.  Moral 
willing,  however,  is  not  of  a  blind,  fortuitous,  but  of  a  rational, 
character;  that  is,  it  wills  a  rational  something,  something 
willed  by  God,  and  that  too  in  a  rational  manner — or,  indeed, 
it  wills  it  not ;  but  also  this  non- willing,  that  is,  the  morally- 
evil,  relates,  though  negatively,  to  a  rational  end. 

In  the  Scriptures,  the  ethical  phase  of  Christian  doctrine  is 
designated  as  "  the  knowledge  of  God's  will  in  all  wisdom  and 
spiritual  understanding  "  (Col.  i,  9) ;  that  is,  of  that  which  God 
"requires"  of  us  (Deut.  x,  12;  comp.  Phil,  iv,  8).  Of  other 
definitions  of  ethics  we  will  mention  but  the  more  important. 
Unquestionably  all  such  are  to  be  rejected  as  express  merely  an 
outward  collection  of  single  moral  thoughts,  as,  e.  g.,  "an  ordered 
digest  of  rules  by  which  man,  and,  more  specifically,  a  Chris- 
tian, is  to  shape  his  life;"  this  would  not  be  a  science,  but  only 
a  collection  of  material  for  a  science ;  moreover,  rules  are  only 
one  phase  of  the  moral  thought,  for  rules  must  have  a  basis,  an 
end,  and  an  inner  logical  unity,  all  of  which  lies  outside  of  this 
definition.  Many  writers  designate  ethics  as  the  description  of 
a  morally  normal  development.  But,  properly  speaking,  only 
that  can  be  described  which  is  real ;  not,  however,  that  which 
simply  ought,  but  is  not  necessitated,  to  become  real.  Even  the 
describing  of  the  person  of  Christ  as  the  ideal  of  the  moral, 
gives  only  a  part  of  Christian  ethics,  inasmuch  as  Christ  could 


§  1.]  DEFINITIONS   OF  ETHICS.  15 

not,  in  his  actual  life,  represent  all  the  phases  of  the  moral. 
And  besides,  ethics  has  not  merely  to  do  with  the  morally- 
normal,  but  it  has  also  to  treat  of  sin  and  the  contest  with  it  as 
an  actual  power ;  and,  moreover,  it  has  not  merely  to  describe, 
but  also  to  prove  and  to  establish. 

The  majority  of  theological  moralists  present  at  once  the  def- 
inition of  Christian  ethics ;  but  this  more  restricted  notion  can- 
not be  understood  without  the  more  comprehensive  notion  of 
ethics  in  general.  The  declaration  (Harless  and  others)  that 
ethics  is  the  theoretical  presentation  of  the  Christianly-normal 
life-course,  or  the  development-history  of  man  as  redeemed  by 
Christ,  is  both  too  narrow  and  too  broad  at  the  same  time:  too 
narrow,  inasmuch  as  ethics  must  unquestionably  speak  also  of 
the  non-normal  life-course,  and  that,  too,  not  merely  incidentally 
and  introductorily,  but  as  of  one  of  its  essential  elements;  and  too 
broad,  because,  in  fact,  many  things  belong  to  such  a  life-course 
which  belong  not  to  the  sphere  of  the  moral,  but  to  the  objective 
workings  of  divine  grace  upon  the  moral  subject.  Such  a  def- 
inition is  rather  that  of  the  order  of  Christian  salvation,  which, 
however,  is  not  wholly  embraced  in  the  notion  of  the  moral.  It 
is  true,  Christian  ethics  must  take  into  consideration  the  work- 
ings of  divine  grace,  but  only,  however,  as  its  presupposition ; 
the  becoming  seized  upon  by  the  influence  of  divine  grace  leads, 
indeed,  to  morality,  but  lies  not  itself  in  the  moral  sphere.  Ac- 
cording to  Schleierm acker,  Christian  ethics  is  "  the  presentation 
of  communion  With  God  as  conditioned  by  communion  with 
Christ,  the  Redeemer,  in  so  far  as  this  communion  with  God  is 
the  motive  of  all  the  actions  of  the  Christian,  or  the  description 
of  that  manner  of  action  which  springs  from  the  domination  of 
the  Christianly-determined  self-consciousness;"*  this,  however, 
is  "two  mutually  complementing  definitions,  each  of  which  ex- 
presses by  itself  only  one  phase  of  ethics. 

As  to  the  name  applied  to  the  science,  the  German  expression 
"  Sittenlehre,"  usual  since  the  time  of  Mosheim,  is  ambiguous, 
being  capable  of  being  understood  as  the  doctrine  of  customs 
instead  of  the  doctrine  of  the  moral.  The  term  ethics  is  the 
most  ancient,  as  dating  from  Aristotle  himself;  r)6of- radically 
related  to  edof,  from  the  root  e£w,  "to  set"  and  "to  sit,"  signifies 
in  Homer  the  seat,  the  dwelling-place,  the  home,  and  hence,  at 
*  Christl.  Sitte,  pp.  32,  33. 


16  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  2. 

a  later  period,  that  which  has  become  the  fixed  definite  home 
of  the  spirit — that  wherein  the  spirit  feels  itself  at  home  as  in 
its  own  peculiar  element,  and  hence  manner,  primarily  in  the 
sense  of  habit ;  that  is,  a  manner  of  action  as  having  become 
second  nature.  In  this  sense  the  word  f/dij  occurs  also  in  the 
New  Testament  (1  Cor.  xv,  33.)  But  the  signification  of  the 
word  advances,  further,  to  that  of  the  moral  proper,  as  objective- 
grown  custom,  which  presents  itself  to  the  individual  with  the 
authority  of  law ;  i)6of  is  therefore  a  spiritual  power  to  which 
the  individual  subordinates  himself,  as  in  contradistinction  to 
the  rude  lawlessness  of  man  as  uncultured  and  savage,  and 
which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  no  longer  a  power  foreign  and  opposed 
to  man,  appears  as  character.*  The  Romans  used  generally,  for 
this  idea,  the  term  mores,  and  hence  Cicero  and  Seneca  speak  of 
a  philosophia  moralis.  In  Germany  this  science  was  formerly 
called  "  Moral " — theologia  s.  philosophia  moralis — and  frequently 
also  theologia  s.  philosophia  practica.  But  after  the  word  "  Mor- 
al "  had  been  appropriated  by  the  advocates  of  deistic  illumin- 
ism,  and  degraded  into  the  most  spiritless  superficiality,  the 
term  became  involved  in  such  prejudicial  associations  that  later 
writers  preferred  to  avoid  it,  and  resorted  again  to  the  German 
term  used  by  Mosheim,  or  to  the  one  originally  used  by  Aristotle. 


SECTION  II. 

As  a  philosophical  science,  ethics  forms  a  part  of 
the  philosophy  of  the  spirit, — has  as  presuppositions 
speculative  theology  and  psychology,  and  stands  in 
the  closest  relation  to  the  science  of  history  as  the 
objective  realization  of  the  moral  life.  As  standing 
within  the  science  of  spirit,  it  presents,  as  in  contrast  to 
knowledge,  the  active  phase  of  the  rational  spirit-life, 
whereby  man,  as  having  come  to  rational  self-con- 
sciousness, makes  into  reality  that  which  exists  in 
him  primarily  only  as  an  idea,- — makes  his  spiritually- 
rational  nature  as  existing  objectively  to  him  into  a 
nature  freely-willed  and  posited  by  himself. 

*Aristot.,  Eth.  Nic.,  i,  13. 


§  2.]  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS.  17 

A.11  philosophy  has  to  do  essentially  with  three  objects :  the 
thoughts  of  God,  of  nature,  and  of  the  human  spirit.  Ethics,  as 
belonging  to  the  third  sphere,  has,  co-ordinate  to  itself  within 
this  sphere,  the  science  of  psychology  as  treating  of  the  nature 
of  the  individual  mind  and  of  its  development,  and  the  science 
of  history  as  portraying  the  development  of  the  collective  spirit ; 
it  is  in  some  sense  the  unity  of  the  two ;  it  is  psychology,  in  that 
it  presents,  in  fact,  the  highest  form  of  the  soul-life,  the  ration- 
ally-free life ;  and  it  is  history,  in  that  it  embraces  man  not  as 
isolated,  but  as  an  organic  member  of  the  whole,  and  considers 
his  activity  as  directed  toward  the  rational  shaping  of  collective 
humanity.  Ethics  gives  to  history  its  rational  goal;  and  all 
morality  has  the  perfect  shaping  of  universal  history  as  its  ulti- 
mate end.  A  real  understanding  of  history  is  not  possible  with- 
out ethics ;  universal  history  is  the  realization  of  the  moral — the 
good  and  also  the  evil — within  humanity ;  hence  history,  the 
actual  contents  of  which  lie  of  course  outside  of  the  sphere  of 
purely  philosophical  knowledge,  is  an  important  teacher  of 
morality — teaching  by  example  in  sacred  history,  and  by  cau- 
tion and  warning  in  profane. 

The  position  here  assigned  to  philosophical  ethics  takes  the 
definition  of  that  science  in  its  widest  sense,  and  embraces  also 
right  and  art.  While  the  view  which  merges  morality  essen- 
tially into  either  right  or  art  is  very  one-sided  and  a  mistaking 
of  the  nature  of  the  moral  in  general,  it  would  not  be  less  erro- 
neous entirely  to  shut  out  the  moral  from  these  two  spheres,  and 
to  place  it  simply  along-side  of  them ;  the  moral  is  rather,  as  the 
superior  element,  above  them,  and  right  and  art  have  truth  only 
in  so  far  as  they  are  special  realization-forms  of  the  moral ; 
there  is,  in  truth,  no  immoral  right  and  no  immoral  beauty,  al- 
though by  sinful  man  the  wrong  is  often  regarded  as  right,  and 
the  un-beautiful  as  beautiful. 

Schleiermacher,  in  his  Philosophical  Ethics,  gives  a  definition 
of  philosophical  ethics,  based  on  the  views  of  Fichte  and  Schel- 
ling,  which  entirely  differs  from  the  usual  one.  In  assuming  two 
chief  sciences,  that  of  nature  and  that  of  reason,  whereof  each 
may  be  treated  either  empirically  or  speculatively,  according  as 
the  reality  or  the  essence  of  the  object  is  more  directly  taken  into 
view,  he  obtains  four  sciences  in  all.  The  empirical  science  of 
nature  is  natural  history;  the  speculative  science  of  nature  is 


18  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  2. 

physics;  the  empirical  science  of  reason  is  history;  the  specu- 
lative science  of  reason  is  ethics.  Hence  ethics  "is  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  essence  of  reason,"  and  stands  in  the  same  relation 
to  history  as  speculation  to  experience,  and  is  hence  essentially 
the  philosophy  of  history.  Under  such  conditions  it  would  be 
more  correct  to  call  ethics  the  philosophy  of  the  spirit;  but 
Schleiermacher  evades  this,  no  less  manifest  than  necessary, 
consequence ;  logic  and  psychology  belong,  according  to  him, 
not  to  ethics,  for  psychology  corresponds  to  natural  history,  and 
hence  is  "  the  empirical  knowledge  of  the  activity  of  the  spirit- 
ual ;"  and  logic  belongs,  empirically-treated,  to  psychology,  and, 
speculatively-treated,  to  physics.*  Though,  by  means  of  this 
strange  conception  of  logic  and  psychology,  the  immeasurable 
sphere  of  ethics  as  fixed  by  the  first  definition  is  somewhat  re- 
duced, still  there  yet  remains  for  it  a  very  unusually  wide  field, 
and  it  embraces,  with  the  exception  of  physics,  the  whole  of 
philosophical  theology  and  of  the  philosophy  of  history ;  and 
as  natural  history  and  physics  have  like  extent  of  field,  differing 
only  in  point  of  view  taken,  so  the  fields  of  empirical  history 
and  of  ethics  are  also  co-extensive,  and  ethics  is  nothing  other 
than  the  speculative  consideration  of  history.  "  History  is  the 
example-book  of  ethics,  and  ethics  is  the  form-book  of  history ;" 
but  history  is,  when  so  viewed,  every  thing  which  is  not  mere 
nature ;  and  as,  in  the  highest  instance,  nature  and  reason  are  es- 
sentially identical,  nature  being  reason,  and  reason  nature,  hence 
"  in  the  highest  view  of  the  matter  ethics  is  physics  and  physics 
ethics,"  whereas  in  a  lower  view  of  the  matter  ethics  is  condi- 
tioned, as  to  contents  and  form,  by  physics,  and  physics  by  ethics. 
It  is  evident  at  once  that  according  to  these  definitions  ethics  is 
something  entirely  other  than  what  is  usually  understood  there- 
by in  the  scientific  world;  and  it  involves  not  a  little  courage 
to  undertake  to  justify  the  applying  of  the  term  ethics  to  this 
extensive  field.  This  scientifically-unjustifiable  extension  of  the 
field  of  ethics  has  occasioned  much  confusion ;  and  Rothe's 
"Theological  Ethics"  suffers  also  from  this  lack  of  limitation, 
whereas  Schleiermacher  himself  carefully  avoided  applying  to 
theological  ethics  this  philosophical  conception,  which  in  fact 
sprang  more  from  an  ingenious  thought-play  than  from  an  inner 
consequential  development  of  the  ground-principle.  Indeed, 
*  System  der  EtJMc,  edited  by  Schweizer,  1835,  §§  55,  tqq.,  60,  61,  87. 


§  2.]  SCHLEIERMACHER'S  VIEW.  19 

even  in  his  philosophical  ethics,  Schleiermacher  very  soon  intro- 
duces a  much  narrower  notion,  without  any  logical  justification 
thereto  in  his  system.  Thus  ethics  is,  presently,  made  to  ap- 
pear as  " the  scientific  presentation  of  human  action"  which 
manifestly  cannot  be  regarded  as  identical  with  the  notion  of 
the  "  speculative  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  reason."  But  also 
this  new  declaration  is  much  too  indefinite ;  it  is  not  action  in 
general,  but  moral  action,  that  belongs  to  ethics.  Should  we 
thus  find  this  narrower  definition  too  comprehensive  still,  then 
we  are  relieved  by  the  declaration  that  ethics  is  the  "  specula- 
tive knowledge  of  the  collective  activity  of  reason  upon  nature," 
and  are  at  once  thrown  into  a  field  so  narrow  as  to  be  obliged 
to  exclude  from  ethics  a  very  essential,  nay,  the  most  essential, 
part  of  this  science.  For  all  morality  is  not  embraced  in  an 
activity  of  reason  upon  nature;  in  however  wide  a  sense  "na- 
ture "  be  taken,  still  it  always  stands  over  against  reason  as  of  a 
different  character, — is  that  which,  in  empirical  respects,  consti- 
tutes the  field  of  natural  science,  natural  history,  etc.  The 
moral  cultivation  of  the  heart — humility,  truthfulness,  the  moral 
disposition  in  general,  the  whole  sphere  of  the  purely  spiritual 
life — belongs  not  at  all  to  this  activity  upon  nature.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  definition  is  also  much  too  comprehensive,  in- 
asmuch as  there  may  be  also  an  extra-moral  and  an  immoral 
interpenetration  of  reason  and  nature,  and  an  immoral  activity 
of  reason  upon  nature ;  but  should  it  be  said  that  this,  now, 
would  not  be  the  true  moral  reason,  then  this  would  vir- 
tually imply  that  the  moral  is  to  be  sought  elsewhere  than  in 
this  activity  of  reason  upon  nature, — would  place  it  in  reason  as 
such.  As,  in  the  view  of  Schleiermacher,  ethics  is  only  the 
speculative  reverse-side  of  history,  hence  he  requires,  consequen- 
tially enough,  that  it  be  presented  essentially  historically.  "  The 
style  of  ethics  is  the  historical;  for  only  where  manifestation 
and  law  are  given  as  the  same  is  the  view  taken  a  scientific  one. 
Hence  the  style  can  be  neither  imperative  nor  consultative.  The 
form  of  ethics  is  the  development  of  a  theoretical  view.  The 
formula  of  the  '  should '  is  entirely  inadmissible,  as  this  formula 
rests  upon  an  antagonism  to  the  law,  whereas  it  is  the  part  of 
science  to  present  this  antagonism  as  a  mere  appearance."  This 
position,  (harmonizing  with  the  view  expressed  in  his  "  Dis- 
courses on  Religion,")  which,  from  the  stand-point  of  Panthe- 

3 


20  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  2. 

istic  determinism,  is  quite  consequential,  we  simply  mention  in 
passing,  in  order  to  explain,  in  some  manner,  this  position  of 
ethics  in  Schleiermacher.  Even  as  the  other  speculative  science, 
namely,  physics,  does  not  present  what  should  be,  but  what 
really  is  and  must  be,  so  also  Pantheistic  ethics  has  to  do  only 
with  the  " is"  and  the  "must  be,"  but  not  with  the  "  should ;"  all 
reality  is  here  rational ;  all  disagreement  with  the  law  is  mere 
appearance ;  there  exists  nothing  else  than  what  must  be ;  hence 
ethics  has  simply  to  present  for  the  reason-life  the  laws,  even  as 
physics,  for  the  nature-life,  and  is  just  as  certain  of  the  agree- 
ment of  reality  with  these  laws  as  astronomy  is  certain  of  the 
occurrence  of  a  calculated  eclipse  of  the  moon.  On  the  con- 
trary, so  soon  as  by  the  admission  of  moral  will-freedom,  even 
the  possibility  of  an  antagonism  of  moral  reality  to  the  moral 
law  is  conceded,  ethics  presents  itself  at  once  with  the  should; 
for  the  moral  law  has  unconditional  validity,  whether  man  really 
fulfills  it  or  not.  Ethics  is  only  in  so  far  purely  historical  as 
perfect  morality  is  also  personal  reality ;  hence  Christian  ethics 
bears,  indeed,  essentially  also  a  historical  character,  because 
Christ  is,  for  it,  the  moral  ideal ; — for  others,  however,  it  bears 
the  form  of  the  "  should."  Pantheistic  ethics  makes  collective 
humanity  the  real  expression  of  the  moral  idea, — makes  human- 
ity its  Christ.  And  that  Schleiermacher's  philosophical  ethics 
is  by  no  means  free  of  a  Pantheistic  character,  is  undeniable. 

Hegel  conceives  of  ethics  as  one  of  the  phases  of  the  Philoso- 
phy of  the  Spirit,  and  more  specifically  as  the  sphere  of  the 
objective  spirit  in  contradistinction  to  that  of  the  subjective, 
which  embraces  anthropology,  the  phenomenology  of  the  spirit, 
and  psychology.  The  spirit,  as  having  come  to  itself  and  be- 
come free,  realizes  itself,  in  that,  as  free  rational  will,  it  posits 
itself  outwardly, — forms  for  itself  a  world  corresponding  to  itself, 
which  i*the  expression  of  the  spirit.  This  objective  reality  of 
the  free  spirit,  which  becomes  for  the  individual  subject  an 
objective  power  whereby  the  subject  is  determined  in  his  free- 
dom, and  which  consequently  is  to  be  recognized  by  the  indi- 
vidual, is,  as  of  a  universal  character,  for  the  individual,  law. 
Hence  this  will  of  objective  rationality  is  right,  which  becomes 
for  the  individual,  duty.  But  in  that  right  does  not  remain  a 
merely  objective  power,  but  makes  itself  immanent  in  the  indi- 
vidual subject,  so  that  the  individual  will  becomes  an  expres- 


§3.] 


HEGEL'S  VIEW.  21 


sion  of  the  general  will,  and  right  finds  in  the  subject  free 
recognition — becomes  subjective  disposition — so  the  notion  of 
right  transforms  itself  into  that  of  morality,  which  in  its  turn — 
by  not  remaining  merely  subjective,  but  by  forming  for  itself  in 
the  spheres  of  the  family,  of  civil  society,  and  of  the  state,  a 
complete  rational  reality,  wherein  the  free  spirit  finds  its  self- 
created  and  perfectly  self-answering  home — exalts  itself  to  eus- 
tomariness*  Hegel  styles  this  development  of  the  objective 
spirit,  not  ethics — to  which  he  surely  had  a  higher  right  than 
Schleiermacher  for  his  much  more  comprehensive  notion,  (inas- 
much as  the  ethical  is  the  highest  phase  of  this  development,) 
— but  the  philosophy  of  right.  The  entire  contents  of  this  phi- 
losophy of  right  fall  indeed  into  the  sphere  of  ethics  in  the  wider 
sense  of  the  term,  though  the  entire  contents  of  Christian  ethics 
do  not  fall  into  the  sphere  of  this  philosophy  of  right.  Ethics 
has,  according  to  the  Christian  view,  not  merely  to  create  an 
objective  world  of  rationality,  but  also  to  make  the  moral  per- 
sonality itself  a  perfect  expression  of  rationality ;  hence  many 
things  which  Hegel  treats  of  in  the  philosophy  of  the  subjective 
spirit  belong  to  ethics ;  and  this  is  doubtless  the  principal  reason 
why  Hegel  (much  more  cautious  and  less  arbitrary  in  his  notions 
and  their  definitions  than  Schleiermacher)  designates  the  science 
of  the  objective  spirit,  not  ethics,  but  the  doctrine  of  right. 


SECTION  III. 

As  a  theological  science  ethics  forms  a  part  of 
systematic  theology,  in  which  it  stands  in  closest 
connection  with  dogmatics,  and  has  dogmatics  as  its 
immediate  presupposition.  The  two  sciences  belong 
together  in  organic  unity,  and  cannot  be  entirely 
separated  from  each  other.  Dogmatics  presents  the 
essence,  the  contents,  and  the  object  of  the  religious 
consciousness ;  ethics  presents  this  consciousness  as  a 
power  determining  the  human  will.  Dogmatics  em- 
braces the  good  as  reality,  that  is,  as  it,  through  God, 
is,  or  becomes,  or,  by  the  fault  of  moral  creatures,  is 

*PMlosophie  des  Geistet,  §  481,  sqq.  ;  RecTitsphilosophie,  p.  22,  sqq. 


22  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  3. 

not ;  ethics,  on  the  contrary,  embraces  this  good  as  a 
task  for  the  free,  and  hence  moral,  activity  of  man ; 
that  is,  as,  on  the  basis  of  the  religious  consciousness, 
it  should  become  in  reality.  Dogmatics  presents  real- 
ity, in  the  sphere  of  the  divine  and  religious,  for  man, 
as  an  object  of  the  religious  consciousness ;  on  the 
contrary,  ethics  presents  the  religions  consciousness  as 
a  power  creating  a.  spiritual  reality ;  that  is,  it  pre- 
sents a  reality  as  going  out  from  man  as  a  religious 
subject.  Hence  dogmatics  bears  predominantly  an  ob- 
jective character — relates  toknowledge;  and  ethics  pre- 
dominantly a  subjective  character — relates  to  loilling. 

Theoretical  theology — in  contradistinction  to  practical  theol- 
ogy, -which  presents  the  ecclesiastico-pastoral  application  of  the 
subject-matter  given  in  theoretical  theology — is  partly  historical 
and  partly  systematic.  Ethics  has  indeed  a  historical  founda- 
tion, and  stands  in  constant  relation  to  history,  but  in  itself  it 
is  no  more  history  than  is  dogmatics ;  exegesis  and  Church  his- 
tory furnish  only  the  material  for  ethics.  The  separating  of 
ethics  from  dogmatics,  with  which  it  was  formerly,  and  up  to 
the  time  of  Danseus  and  (^alixtus,  intimately  involved,  is  diffi- 
cult, and,  in  fact,  not  without  violence,  entirely  practicable; 
both  sciences  reach  over  into  each  other  like  two  intersecting 
circles,  and  have,  under  all  circumstances,  some  territory  in  com- 
mon ;  the  general  foundations  of  ethics  are  based  in  the  corre- 
sponding thoughts  of  dogmatics. 

The  usual  and  quite  natural  statement,  that  dogmatics  shows 
what  we  should  believe,  and  ethics  what  we  should  do,  is  only 
proximatively  correct,  and  is  inadequate ;  for  also  the  moral  laws 
and  maxims  are  an  object  of  faith ;  and  "  what  we  should  be- 
lieve "  bears,  even  in  the  correct  expression  itself,  the  character 
of  a  moral  requirement.  Believing,  itself,  is  of  a  moral  character; 
ethics  cannot  confine  itself  to  the  mere  outward  action,  but  must 
have  to  do  also  with  the  inward,  with  the  disposition.  Accord- 
ing to  Harless,  dogmatics  presents  the  essence  of  the  objective 
ground  of  salvation,  and  of  the  objective  mediation  of  salvation, 
whereas  ethics  presents  the  subjective  realization  of  the  life-goal 


§  3.]  RELATION  TO   DOGMATICS-  23 

as  established  by  Christ;  dogmatics  presents  the  objective  sal- 
vation-power as  determining  the  Christian ;  ethics  presents  the 
personal  life-movement  of  the  Christian  toward  his  highest  life- 
goal  ;  ethics  gives  answer  to  the  question,  What  thinkest  thou 
of  Christ  ?  dogmatics  to  the  question,  What  thinkest  thou  of 
the  right  manner  of  the  Christian's  life  in  the  world  ?  This 
declaration  limits  the  two  sciences  quite  too  much :  dogmatics 
must  in  fact  speak  also  of  man  and  of  the  order  of  salvation ; 
and  ethics  must  speak  also  of  the  objective  law  and  of  sin. 
According  to  Schleiermacher's  theological  ethics,  ethics  pre- 
sents the  Christian  self-consciousness  in  its  relative  motion,  while 
dogmatics  presents  the  same  in  its  relative  rest ;  dogmatics  an- 
swers the  question,  What  must  fo,  because  the  religious  heart- 
state  it?  ethics  the  question,  What  must  become  out  of  the 
religious  self-consciousness  and  through  the  same,  because  the 
religious  self-consciousness  is?  This  antithesis  is  not  entirely 
to  the  point,  for,  on  the  one  hand,  dogmatics  treats  not  merely 
of  what  is,  but  also  of  what  becomes,  as,  e.  g.,  in  the  doctrines 
of  regeneration  and  of  eschatology ;  as,  on  the  other  hand,  ethics 
treats  not  only  of  what  becomes,  but  necessarily  also  of  what 
morally  is,  as  well  normally  as  abnormally.  Virtue  is  not  a 
mere  becoming,  but  an  ens,  as  Schleiermacher  himself  admits ; 
the  good  when  attained,  certainly  does  not  for  that  reason  cease 
to  be  an  object  of  ethics.  The  antithesis  of  motion  and  rest  is 
in  this  sphere  utterly  unapt.  Schleiermacher  presents  the  mat- 
ter also  thus :  the  dogmatical  propositions  are  those  which 
express  the  relation  of  man  to  God  as  an  interest,  namely,  as, 
under  its  manifold  modifications,  it  passes  over  into  conceptions; 
whereas  the  ethical  propositions  express  the  same  thing,  but  as 
an  inner  impetus,  op/z^,  an  impulse,  which  goes  out  into  a  cycle 
of  actions.  But  also  this  is  not  quite  correct;  for  also  ethics 
expresses  a  relation  of  man  to  God  in  conceptions  or  thoughts, 
which  do  not  per  se  include  in  themselves  an  inner  impetus,  as, 
e.  g.,  in  the  questions  as  to  the  moral  essence  of  man,  as  to  the 
moral  idea  per  se,  and  in  the  entire  doctrine  of  goods. 

The  difficulty  in  defining  the  difference  lies  less  in  the  general 
antithesis  than  rather  in  those  points  where  both  sciences  must 
treat  of  the  same  topics.  The  doctrines  of  the  moral  essence  of 
man,  of  the  divine  law,  of  sin,  of  sanctification,  of  the  Church, 
belong  strictly  to  dogmatics ;  but  ethics  must  necessarily  treat 


24  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  3. 

also  of  all  these  things,  so  that  it  might  after  all  seem  advisable, 
in  order  to  avoid  repetitions,  to  unite  both  into  one  science 
again,  as  was  formerly  the  case,  and  as  has  been  done  recently 
by  Nitzsch,  and  in  part  also  by  Sartorius.  But  the  separate 
treatment  of  ethics  rests  in  fact,  aside  from  weighty  practical 
reasons,  upon  a  wide-reaching  inner  difference ;  and  those  points 
which  fall  within  the  scope  of  both  sciences,  are  nevertheless 
treated,  in  each,  from  a  different  stand-point,  and  in  a  very  dif- 
ferent manner.  Both  of  them  present  a  life  of  the  spirit — of  God 
or  of  man — but  dogmatics  views  this  life  as  an  objective  fact, 
while  ethics  views  it  as  a  task  for  the  free  activity  of  the  rational 
subject;  hence  dogmatics  has  essentially  an  objective  and  real 
character,  while  ethics  has  a  subjective  and  ideal  one.  Dog- 
matics has  constantly  to  do  with  an  object  transcending  the 
individual,  with  God,  with  Christ,  with  man  in  general;  ethics 
has  to  do  primarily  always  with  the  individual  moral  person, 
and  with  the  totality  only  in  so  far  as  it  rests  upon  the  moral 
action  of  the  individual  personality.  What  dogmatics  teaches 
relates  not  to  me  as  this  single  person,  but  as  a  human  being  in 
general ;  -  what  ethics  teaches  concerns  me  precisely  as  a  person. 
Dogmatics  treats  of  sin  per  se,  as  an  objective  something  and  as 
an  historical  fact ;  ethics  treats  of  the  same  as  a  personal  malady 
and  as  guilt.  Dogmatics  treats  of  the  kingdom  of  God  as  an 
objective  organism ;  ethics  treats  of  the  same  in  so  far  as  the 
moral  subject  is  an  organic  member  thereof.  Dogmatics  treats 
of  sanctification  as  a  manifestation-form  of  the  kingdom  of  God ; 
ethics  treats  of  the  same  as  a  subjective  life-manifestation  of  the 
person.  "The  kingdom  of  God  comes  indeed  without  our 
prayer" — that  is  dogmatical;  "but  we  ask  in  this  prayer  that 
it  come  also  to  us" — this  is  ethical.  Dogmatics  sketches  the 
physical  chart  of  the  kingdom  of  God ;  ethics  sketches  the  ways 
and  dwelling-places  therein.  The  object  of  dogmatics  is  abso- 
lutely independent  of  the  freedom  of  the  individual  subject — is 
either  eternal  or  an  historical  fact — is  in  nowise  within  the  power 
of  man ;  the  object  of  ethics  is,  in  its  reality,  absolutely  depend- 
ent on  the  free  resolution  of  the  subject— is  per  se  a  pure  idea, 
the  realization  of  which  is  a  requirement  upon  the  free  activity 
of  man. — Dogmatics  presents  that  which  is,  or  was,  or  will  be; 
ethics  presents  that  which  should  be  or  should  not  be ;  hence 
dogmatics  presents  always  an  unconditionally-secured  result, 


§  3.]  ROTHE'S  VIEW.  25 

either  of  an  accomplished  or  of  a  destined  movement ;  ethics, 
however,  presents  a  task,  the  accomplishing  of  which  is  condi- 
tioned on  the  free  assent  of  man.  The  contents  of  dogmatics 
relate  essentially  to  knowledge  and  faith;  those  of  ethics  to 
volition.  Dogmatics  wills  that  man  accept  the  truth ;  ethics 
wills  that  he  do  it.  Hence  man's  relation  to  dogmatics  is  rather 
passive — womanly ;  and  to  ethics  rather  active — manly.  In  the 
sphere  of  dogmatics  there  is  a  revelation  of  the  divine  for  man ; 
in  that  of  ethics  a  revelation  of  the  divine  through  man,  who 
has  received  this  element  into  himself.  In  dogmatics  the  move- 
ment of  the  divine  goes  out  from  the  divine  middle-point  toward 
the  created  periphery ;  in  ethics,  on  the  contrary,  it  goes  back 
from  the  periphery  toward  God  as  the  middle-point.  In  dog- 
matics God  is  conceived  of  as  the  ground,  as  the  point  of 
departure ;  in  ethics  as  the  goal  of  the  life-movement ;  in  dog- 
matics man's  relation  is  more  epic;  in  ethics  more  dramatic. 
Dogmatics  is  predominantly  ontological  and  historical ;  ethics 
is  predominantly  teleological.  Both  sciences  treat  of  man  and 
his  activity — dogmatics,  however,  in  so  far  as  man  is  an  object 
for  God ;  ethics,  in  so  far  as  God  is  an  aimed-at  object  for  man. 
Dogmatics  is  related  to  ethics,  as  psychology  to  pedagogy,  as 
physiology  to  dietetics,  as  botany  to  horticulture,  as  animal 
sensation  to  motion.* 

From  all  this  it  is  apparent  that  ethics  has  dogmatics  neces- 
sarily as  its  presupposition — that  it  is  the  second  and  not  the 
first.  Ethics  is  faith  as  having  become  a  subjective  life-power 
— faith  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  operative  force.  The  popular  in- 
struction in  the  Scriptures  implies,  throughout,  this  relative 
position  of  dogmatics  and  ethics,  in  that  it  presents  the  moral 
command  after  the  subject-matter  of  faith,  and  bases  it  thereon; 
thus  already  in  the  Mosaic  legislation  (Exod.  xx,  2,  sqq.),  and 
thus  again  in  most  of  the  New  Testament  epistles.  (Comp.  also 
Matt,  vii,  21,  24,  sqq. ;  John  xiii,  17 ;  xv,  1,  sqq. ;  1  Cor.  xiii,  2 ; 
Col.  i,  4-10 ;  2  Tim.  iii,  14,  sqq. ;  Titus  i,  1 ;  James  i,  22,  sqq. ; 
ii,  14,  sqq.  ;  1  John  ii,  4.) 

Deviating  entirely  from  this  view,  BotJie  places  ethics  in  a 
wholly  different  field  from  dogmatics.  In  his  view  ethics  be- 
longs to  speculative,  and  dogmatics  to  historical,  theology ;  they 
do  not  stand  along-side  of  each  other,  do  not  run  parallel  to  each 
*  Comp.  Palmer:  Moral,  1864,  p.  21,  sqq. 


26  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  3. 

other,  but  belong  to  entirely  different  forms  of  theology.  The 
difference  of  the  two  sciences  lies  not  in  their  respective  objects, 
for  these  objects  are  in  fact  essentially  the  same,  but  in  the 
manner  of  their  scientific  treatment.  Dogmatics  is  the  science 
of  dogmas,  that  is,  of  the  ecclesiastically-authorized  articles  of 
faith,  and  hence  has  an  empirically-given  historical  object,  and 
is  therefore  essentially  historical,  and  not  at  all  speculative; 
speculative  theology  is,  on  the  contrary,  the  presupposition  of 
dogmatics.  But  ethics  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  eccle- 
siastical doctrines,  but  must  be  treated  purely  speculatively,  and 
is,  as  a  speculative  science,  a  presupposition  of  dogmatics.  The 
theology  of  the  evangelical  Church  has  had  from  the  very  be- 
ginning, in  the  introduction  of  moral  theology,  no  intention  of 
creating  a  second  science  along-side  of  dogmatics,  but  has  tended, 
though  without  being  clearly  conscious  of  it,  toward  a  specula- 
tive theology ;  and  this  science  would  necessarily  lead  out  beyond 
the  hitherto-observed  ecclesiastical  rut — would  progressively 
metamorphose  the  dogmas.*  This  view,  constituting  one  of  the 
many  eccentricities  of  the  Rothean  theology,  is  utterly  without 
sufficient  ground.  It  is  entirely  arbitrary  to  place  speculative 
theology  along-side  of  dogmatics,  and  to  declare  ethics  as  be- 
longing exclusively  to  the  former.  Both  sciences  admit  of  being 
treated  purely  theologically  or  purely  specnlatively,  though  in- 
deed all  their  contents  cannot  be  embraced  speculatively ;  and 
with  the  same  right  whereby  the  speculative  doctrine  of  God 
and  of  the  world  is  excluded  from  dogmatics,  may  also  the 
speculative  portions  of  ethics  be  excluded  from  this  science,  and 
ethics  be,  then,  declared  as  a  purely  empirical  science.  A  large 
portion  of  ethics  proper  lies  without  the  scope  of  a  purely  spec- 
ulative treatment,  as  is  in  fact  sufficiently  evinced  by  the  third 
part  of  Rothe's  ethics.  It  may  indeed  be  questioned  whether 
speculation  is  admissible  at  all  in  theology ;  if  it  is,  however, 
once  admitted,  then  it  is  quite  as  much  in  place  in  dogmatics  as 
in  ethics — as  indeed  not  an  insignificant  portion  of  the  Rothean 
ethics  is  nothing  other  than  speculative  dogmatics ;  and  there 
is  no  manner  of  justification  for  degrading  dogmatics,  as  in  con- 
trast to  the  historical  development  of  the  science,  into  a  merely 
dogmatico-historical  statement  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Church. . 

*  Ethik,  i,  88,  tqg.    All  references  to  Rothe  are  to  the  first  edition  of 
his  Ethik. 


§  4.]  THREE   FORMS  OF  ETHICS.  27 

And  in  that  Rothe  regards  the  dogmatical  field  as  not  at  all 
bordering  upon  the  ethical,  he  obtains  full  liberty  to  extend  im- 
measurably the  boundaries  of  ethics,  so  that  this  science  thus 
receives  a  compass  elsewhere  unparalleled,  even  in  Schleier- 
macher's  philosophical  system.  Not  merely  does  Rothe  preface 
his  ethics  with  a  thorough  presentation  of  the  whole  of  specula- 
tive theology  by  way  of  introduction  (in  which  connection  he 
reaches  far  over,  and  not  any  too  aptly,  into  the  field  of  natural 
philosophy),  but  also  he  receives  into  ethics  itself  many  entirely 
foreign  subjects,  e.  g.,  eschatology.  Moreover,  also  the  facts  of 
redemption  through  Christ  are  presupposed  in  this  ethics,  as  a 
Christian  one,  not  however  as  furnished  by  dogmatics,  but  by 
the  immediate  religious  consciousness.  Under  such  circum- 
stances it  seems  more  than  arbitrary  to  declare  the  scientific 
presentation  of  this  consciousness,  not  as  the  scientific  presup- 
position, but  as  a  sequence  of  ethics. 


H.   SCIENTIFIC  TREATMENT  OF  ETHICS. 

SECTION  IV, 

OF  the  three  possible  methods  of  presenting  ethics, 
the  empirical,  the  philosophical,  and  the  theological, 
the  first  and  most  ancient  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
mere  fore'-court  to  the  science  itself.  And  philosoph- 
ical ethics,  as  resting  upon  the  inner  necessity  of 
rational  thinking,  can  never,  even  when  it  is  inspired 
by  a  Christian  spirit,  entirely  assume  the  place  of 
theological  ethics,  and  displace  the  latter  as  a  lower 
stage  of  the  science ;  rather  can  it  only  be  the  scien- 
tific presupposition  and  support  of  the  same,  without, 
however,  taking  up  into  itself  its  actual  collective 
.contents;  for  theological  ethics  bears  in  its  founda- 
tion and  essence  predominantly  an  historical  character 
< — has  for  its  source  the  historical  revelation,  and  for 


28  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§4. 

its  essential  contents  the  (not  philosophically  neces- 
sary) thoughts  of  the  actual  existence  of  sin  and  of 
the  collective  history  of  salvation,  whereof  the  cen- 
tral point  is  the  historical  Christ  (who  is  at  the  same 
time  the  perfect  ideal  of  the  moral),  and  it  treats  also 
of  the  circumstances  of  humanity  and  of  individual 
man,  as  having  become  real  within  the  scope  of  Chris- 
tian history,  which  also,  as  the  results  of  free  action, 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  philosophically  necessary. 

A  merely  empirical  ethics,  furnishing  only  a  series  of  observa- 
tions and  rules,  as  with  the  Chinese,  the  Indians,  the  older 
Grecian  sages,  and  also  to  a  large  extent  inside  of  the  scope  of 
Christian  history,  is  only  a  collection  of  material  for  scientific 
ethics,  but  not  ethics  itself.  In  the  sphere  of  science  we  have 
to  do  only  with  the  antithesis  of  philosophical  and  theological 
ethics,  in  the  place  of  which,  however,  we  may  not,  as  Schleier- 
macher  does,*  substitute  the  antithesis  of  Christian  and  philo- 
sophical ethics.  Over  against  Christian  ethics  stands,  not 
philosophical,  but  non-Christian  ethics;  also  a  philosophical 
ethics  may  be  Christian,  and  a  Christian  ethics  philosophical ; 
a  believing  Christian  will  in  fact  never  otherwise  philosophize 
than  in  a  Christian  spirit. 

The  antithesis  between  philosophical  and  theological  ethics 
is  in  itself  simple  and  clear ;  for  philosophical  ethics,  only  that 
is  valid  which  is  developed  from  the  per  se  necessary  thought, 
with  inner  necessity ;  it  presents  the  moral  as  a  pure  revelation 
of  reason ;  theological  ethics,  on  the  contrary,  conceives  it  as  a 
revelation  of  faith  in  the  personal  God  and  in  the  historical 
Christ — as  an  expression  of  obedience  to  the  revealed  will  of 
God ;  hence  between  the  two  methods  of  presentation  there  is 
in  fact  not  merely  an  antithesis  of  method  and  source,  but  also 
of  compass.  Theological  ethics,  embracing  also  the  sphere  of 
the  historical  facts  of  free  will-determination,  transcends  the 
limits  of  philosophical  ethics.  The  two  could  only  then  be  per- 
fectly co-extensive  when  the  sphere  of  moral  freedom  should  be 
merged  into  that  of  unconditional  necessity ;  that  is,  when  the 
*  Christl.  Sitte,  p.  24. 


§4.]  THEOLOGICAL  ETHICS.  29 

rational  ground  and  presupposition  of  the  ethical  itself  should 
be  denied. — The  ethical  thoughts  which  relate  to  the  realized 
free  acts  of  man  and  of  Christ  can  be  treated  of  in  philosophical 
ethics  only  hypothetically,  so  that  philosophy  shall  apply  the 
results  obtained  in  the  sphere  of  pure  thought  to  the,  not  phil- 
osophically, but  historico-empirically  ascertained  conditions; 
that  is,  not  as  pure  but,  in  some  sense,  as  mixed  philosophy. 
But  if  also  the  historical  facts  of  Christianity  are  to  be  taken  up 
into  philosophical  ethics,  as  Palmer  assumes,*  then  its  difference 
from  theological  ethics  is  at  least,  not  to  be  placed  in  the  fact 
that  the  latter  bases  itself  upon  Scripture ;  for  indeed  philosophy 
cannot  come  at  these  facts  otherwise  than  from  the  Scriptures, 
and  is  then  in  fact  no  longer  purely  philosophical. 

While  purely  philosophical  ethics  can  develop  only  the  general 
moral  ideas,  but  not  their  application  to  definite  historically- 
arisen  relations,  on  the  other  hand,  a  purely  theological  ethics, 
as  absolutely  excluding  all  philosophical  treatment,  is  defective, 
at  least,  in  scientific  respects.  Theological  ethics  can  appropri- 
ate to  itself  philosophy,  and  it  is  all  the  more  scientific  the  more 
it  does  this ;  but  it  cannot  take  philosophy  as  its  exclusive  ground 
and  source  without  ceasing  to  be  theological.  Hence  theolog- 
ical ethics  is,  in  respect  to  extent  of  contents  and  to  the  means 
at  its  disposal,  richer  than  purely  philosophical  ethics.  The 
highest  perfection  of  Christian  ethics  is  a  vital  union  of  the  phil- 
osophical and  the  theological  manner  of  treatment,  namely,  in 
that  the  ideas  given  in  the  moral  reason  itself  are  treated  and 
speculatively  developed  as  such,  and  receive  from  Christian  rev- 
elation their  religious  confirmation ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  actual  truths  lying  in  the  sphere  of  the  free  activity  of  man 
himself  are  taken  up  from  revelation  and  from  historical  expe- 
rience. Such  a  presentation  of  ethics  preserves  its  Christianly- 
theological  character  by  the  fact  that,  in  view  of  the  constantly- 
renewed  alternation  of  philosophical  systems,  and  of  their  not 
unfrequently  weighty  and  essential  mutual  contradictions,  it 
does  not  make  the  validity  of  the  firmly-established  truths  of 
revelation  dependent  on  their  agreement  with  a  particular  phil- 
osophical system,  but,  on  the  contrary,  makes  the  acceptance 
of  philosophical  thoughts  and  of  their  sequences  dependent  on 
their  harmonizing  with  the  certain  truths  of  revelation.  If  this 
*  Moral,  p.  19. 


30  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  4. 

relation  is  otherwise  understood,  then  it  is  in  fact  no  longer  a 
theological,  but  a  philosophical,  system. 

This  antithesis  between  philosophical  and  theological  ethics 
is  entirely  rejected  by  Rothe,  in  that  he  presents  a  theological 
ethics  which  is  essentially  speculative,  and  in  that  he  definitely 
distinguishes  theological  speculation  from  philosophical,  and  re- 
quires of  theological  ethics  that  it  must,  as  a  science,  be  also 
speculative,  whereas  dogmatics  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things 
be  such.    Every  speculation  begins  with  a  proto-datum, — philo- 
sophical speculation  with  the  self-consciousness.     But  this  self- 
consciousness  is  not  mere  self-consciousness,  but  is  at  the  same 
time  in  some  manner  a  determined  one,  is  also  a  God-conscious- 
ness; the  religious  subject  recognizes  his  self-consciousness  not 
as  an  absolutely  pure  one,  but  as  always  at  the  same  time  affect- 
ed by  an  objective  determinateness,  namely,  the  religious.    Man 
is  never  otherwise  conscious  of  himself  than  as  being  conscious 
at  the  same  time  also  of  his  relation  to  God.     This  point  may, 
says  Rothe,  be  in  itself  controverted,  but  in  the  sphere  of  piety, 
,  that  is,  in  the  theological  sphere,  it  is  not  controverted :  "  we 
deny  to  no  one  the  right  to  question  the  reality  of  piety  itself, 
but  with  impiety  we  have,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  nothing  to 
do ;  there  can  be  a  system  of  theology  only  on  the  presupposi- 
tion of  piety ;  for  all  who  are  impious  our  system  of  speculation 
has  no  validity,  and,  as  related  to  them,  we  must  continue  in 
error."     According  to  this,  there  are  two  kinds  of  speculation, 
a  religious  and  a  philosophical ;  the  latter  has  its  point  of  de- 
parture in  simple  self-consciousness,  the  former  in  the  pious  self- 
consciousness ;   philosophical  speculation  conceives  the  "All" 
through  the  idea  of  the  ego,  theological  speculation  through  the 
idea  of  God,  but  both  are  d  priori ;  hence  theological  specula- 
tion is  theosophy  ;  it  begins  with  the  idea  of  God,  with  which 
idea  philosophical  speculation  ends;  the  evidence  is  the  same 
in  both.     Speculative  theology  must  be  essentially  different  for 
every  peculiar  form  of  piety,  inasmuch  as  the  starting-point, 
namely,  the  peculiarly-determined  pious  consciousness,  is  differ- 
ent.    Hence  there  is  also  a  peculiarly  Chnstianly- speculative 
theology,  and  likewise  for  every  Church  a  special  one,  and  hence 
also  a  special  evangelico-Christi&n  theology;   and  this  special 
speculative  theology  has  in  fact  validity  only  for  this  particular 
Church — is  for  the  others  without  significancy.     This  theolog- 


§4,]  ROTHE'S   METHOD.  31 

ical  speculation,  however,  is  not  in  any  way  bound  by  the  dog- 
mas of  the  Church  in  which  it  originates,  but  is  independent  of 
them — knows  itself  as  co-etaneous  with  them ;  nay,  it  must  in  its 
every  nature  be  Jieterodax ;  its  purpose  is  in  fact  to  develop  the 
consciousness  of  the  Church  still  further,  and  to  reconstruct  the 
existing  dogmatical  definition?.  In  the  circle  of  theological 
sciences  speculation  occupies  the  first  and  highest  place.  The 
difference  between  theological  and  philosophical  ethics  becomes, 
now,  perfectly  plain.  Both  are  speculative ;  but  philosophical 
ethics  proceeds  from  the  moral  consciousness  purely  as  such ; 
whereas  theological  ethics  proceeds  from  the  same  as  it  exists 
in  the  Christian  individual  belonging  to  a  particular  Christian 
Church,  that  is,  as  a  peculiarly-determined  religious  conscious- 
ness, and  from  the  historically-given  ideal  of  morality  in  the 
person  of  Christ. 

This  view  appears  to  us  entirely  erroneous.  We  cannot  possi- 
bly admit  any  other  than  a  purely  philosophical  speculation,  at 
least  as  of  a  scientific  character.  In  the  first  place  it  is  incor- 
rect, in  point  of  fact,  that  philosophical  speculation  always 
proceeds  from  self-consciousness  as  in  contradistinction  to  theo- 
logical speculation,  which  is  made  to  proceed  from  the  God- 
consciousness.  Spinoza  starts  directly  from  the  idea  of  God, 
and  his  philosophy  will  surely  not  be  called  a  theological  spec- 
ulation; in  like  manner  also  Schelling.  Hegel  begins  with  the 
idea  of  pure  being;  and  this  is  certainly  also  not  identical  with 
self-consciousness. — Theological  speculation,  Rothe  holds,  differs 
only  in  its  beginning,  from  philosophical,  in  that  this  beginning 
is,  in  it,  somewhat  more  determined  and  more  rich  in  contents, 
namely,  as  being  already  a  religiously-determined  self-conscious- 
ness. This  is  the  view  of  Schleiermacher,  who  also  proceeds 
from  the  religiously-determined  self-consciousness;  however, 
Schleiermacher  does  not  undertake  to  base  thereon  a  system  of 
speculation,  but  simply  a  theological  description  of  the  pious 
conditions  of  the  soul,  and  to  argue  toward  their  presupposi- 
tions, which  in  fact  cannot,  in  any  sense,  be  called  speculation. 
Rothe — herein  less  consequential  than  Schleiermacher — goes 
beyond  him  in  two  respects :  first,  in  that  he  carries  the  relig- 
ious detenninateness,  the  self-consciousness,  even  into  the  con- 
fessional phase ;  and,  secondly,  in  that  he  undertakes  to  make 
this  purely  empirical  fact  the  foundation  of  a  system  of  specu- 


32  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  4. 

lation.  The  original  self-consciousness  upon  which  Rothe  bases 
speculative  theology,  and  more  specifically  ethics,  is  not  merely 
religiously  determined  in  general  (as,  e.  g.,  with  Schleiermacher, 
a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence),  but  also  Christianly-relig- 
iously,  nay,  even  evangelically-Christianly,  etc.,  and  only  on  the 
basis  of  such  a  quite  specific  determinedness  is,  in  his  view,  a 
theological  speculation  possible.  This,  however,  is,  properly 
speaking,  not  a  theological  speculation,  but  a  Christian,  a  Prot- 
estant, a  Lutheran,  or  a  Reformed  speculation,  and  has  in  fact 
validity  only  for  this  special  ecclesiastical  circle ;  others,  belong- 
ing to  another  Church,  may  construct  their  own  peculiar  specu- 
lations— with  the  speculations  of  others  they  have  no  concern, 
nor  others  with  theirs ;  and  yet  all  this  is  assumed  to  be  not 
merely  science,  but  in  fact  speculative  science.  We  can  find  in 
it,  however,  only  arbitrary  assumption,  and  can  recognize  such 
products  neither  as  speculative  nor  as  scientific,  neither  as  Chris- 
tian nor  as  evangelical.  In  the  first  place,  a  real  science,  and 
hence  above  all  a  true  speculation,  cannot  rest  upon  a  merely 
fortuitous  ground,  but  only  upon  an  absolutely  certain  one.  A 
speculation  which  concerns  itself  not  as  to  whether  its  starting- 
point,  its  foundation,  is  certain  and  true,  is  manifestly  worthless. 
Now  the  pretended  theological  speculation  of  Rothe  bases  itself 
upon  an  entirely  fortuitously-determined  religious  consciousness, 
without  inquiring  as  to  its  legitimacy,  and  then  speculates  there- 
upon unsuspectingly,  further.  Again,  as  the  starting-point  of 
this  speculation  is  of  a  fortuitously-determined  character,  hence 
it  can  never  have  any  validity  save  for  the  definite  and  limited 
circle  of  persons  who  in  fact  chance  to  recognize  this  starting- 
point, — has,  in  fact,  no  general  significancy,  as  indeed  Rothe  him- 
self expressly  admits ;  and  hence  there  is  absolutely  no  possibility 
of  harmony  between  the  speculative  theologians  of  different 
Churches ;  they  must  simply  let  each  other  alone,  and  deliver 
themselves  in  monologues;  and  he  who  speculates  from  the 
Protestant  consciousness  must  renounce  all  hope  that  a  Roman 
Catholic  Christian  may  understand  him,  and  in  any  degree  enter, 
into  his  line  of  thought — for  he  cannot  do  so.  But  this  is  a 
positive  contradiction  not  merely  to  all  speculation,  but  in  fact 
to  all  science ;  nay,  to  the  very  nature  of  truth  in  general,  and 
to  morality  itself.  Truth — and  every  science  claims  to  be  its 
expression — can  never  be  particular,  but  necessarily  claims  vnir 


§  4.]  ROT11E   CRITICISED.  33 

versal  validity ;  every  real  science  purposes  to  convince  all  men 
•who  are  rational  and  at  all  capable  of  scientific  thought;  hence 
to  renounce  all  hope  of  convincing  other  men,  for  the  reason 
that  they  chance  to  find  themselves  otherwise  confessionally- 
determined,  would  be  positively  immoral.     No  real  science  in 
general  is  at  liberty  to  construct  itself  upon  a  fortuitously-given 
basis,  and  to  regard  other  equally  fortuitous  bases  as  equally 
valid  and  unassailable.     I  cannot,  without  treason  to  the  truth, 
speculate  evangelically-Cliristiauly  simply  because  I  find  myself 
in  my  earlier  religious   self-consciousness   evangelically-Chris- 
tianly  determined,  but  only  for  the  reason  that,  for  convincing 
grounds,  I  have  recognized  this  evangelically-Christian  conscious- 
ness as  per  se  true,  as  universally  valid  truth,  and  which  there- 
fore excludes,  as  erroneous,  every  contradictory  view.     And  for 
the  simple  reason  that  the  truth,  in  its  very  idea  and  essence, 
can  and  may  never  be  merely  subjective,  but  must  have  objective 
and  universal  validity,  and  because  all  men  should  come  to  a 
knowledge  of  the  truth  (1  Tim.  ii,  4),  I  absolutely  dare  not  con- 
struct a  system  of  speculation  which,  on  principle,  excludes  the 
hope  of  persuading  other  persons  of  different  confessions,  which 
purposes  to  have  for  such  no  convincing  power,  and  does  not 
regard  them  as  called  equally  with  me  to  recognize  the  truth, 
which  as  truth  must  be  absolutely  valid  for  them  also.    Without 
a  firm  and  absolutely  verified  basis  there  can  be  no  science.     A 
speculation  upon  a  chance,  fortuitous  basis  is  idle  play  without 
purpose  and  without  worth.     There  would,  in  fact,  be  as  m:my 
mutually-excluding  and  equally-entitled  speculations  as  there 
are  such  chance  presuppositions;  and  what  would  be  the  sig- 
nificancy  of  a  science  which  aims  not  at  convincing  those  in 
error,  but  only  at  furnishing  an  interesting  entertainment  for 
the  already  convinced  ?     If  the  assumed  foundation  is  not  to  be 
itself  an  object  of  a  preliminary  scientific  examination,  then  in 
fact  any  and  every  one  would  be  fully  entitled  to  say :  I  find 
myself  not  merely  so  or  so  religiously,  but  also  so  or  so  morally, 
determined, — I  find  in  my  moral  self-consciousness  this  particu- 
lar desire  and  this  particular  aversion,  and  on  the  basis  of  this 
determinedness  I  propose  to  construct  a  system  of  speculative 
ethics!     The  distinction  between  philosophical  and  theological 
speculation  in  Rothe's  sense  would  in  fact  be  simply  the  dis- 
tinction  between   science   and   unscientific  arbitrariness.     We 


34  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  4. 

fully  admit  that  only  a  moral  spirit  caji  truly  speculate  upon 
the  moral,  and  only  a  Christianly-pious  spirit  upon  religion ; 
but  that  a  person  is  moral  or  pious  is  only  an  individual  fact, 
but  not  a  scientific  basis  of  a  system, — is  a  moral  presupposition, 
but  not  a  material  principle  of  the  speculation  itself;  piety  is 
only  the  subjective  condition,  the  impulse  toward  and  the  power 
for  speculation,  but  not  the  scientific  foundation  thereof. — The 
strange  contradiction,  that  this  speculation,  though  proceeding 
from  a  determined  ecclesiastical  consciousness  as  the  unassaila- 
ble and  unquestionable  basis,  yet  at  the  same  time  claims  to  be 
entitled  to  pass  out  beyond  the  ecclesiastical  consciousness,  and 
even  sets  up  heterodoxy  as  one  of  its  requirements  (a  require- 
ment which  Rothe  himself  meets  in  a  high  degree),  we  need  not 
here  further  elucidate. 

Rothe  presents  theological  speculation  as  co-etaneous,  along- 
side of  philosophical.  Now,  however,  if,  as  he  expressly  affirms, 
philosophical  speculation  in  proceeding  in  its  development  nec- 
essarily arrives  at  the  idea  of  God,  and  there  ends,  that  is,  pre- 
cisely at  the  point  where  theological  speculation  begins,  then, 
in  fact,  speculation  may,  from  this  idea  of  God  as  obtained  in  a 
purely  scientific  manner,  simply  advance  further,  so  that  conse- 
quently we  now  have  a  theological  speculation  resting  not  upon 
a  fortuitous  and  empirical  presupposition,  but  upon  a  scientific 
result, — to  which  the  one  assumed  by  Rothe  bears  only  a  rela- 
tion of  premature  over-haste.  The  entire  distinction  between 
theological  and  philosophical  speculation,  we  must  consequently 
declare  as  scientifically  unfounded ;  and  we  cannot,  with  Rothe, 
look  upon  the  difference  between  philosophical  and  theological 
ethics  as  the1  difference  between  a  speculation  without  presup- 
positions and  a  speculation  with  presuppositions,  but  only  as 
the  difference  between  a  speculative  and  a  non-speculative  ethics, 
or  an  ethics  resting  essentially  on  history.  Purely  philosophical 
ethics  knows  nothing  of  Christ,  of  redemption,  nor  even  of  sin 
as  a  reality,  and  hence  cannot  possibly  answer  the  full  idea  of  a 
Christian  ethics,  although  it  may  and  should,  in  that  which  it  is 
competent  to  embrace,  be  of  a  very  Christian  character:  and  as 
the  entire  moral  life  of  the  Christian  rests  upon  redemption  and 
spiritual  regeneration,  hence  there  is  not  a  single  point  in  this 
life,  where  a  purely  philosophical  ethics  could  suffice.  Hence 
the  view  of  Schleiermucher,  that  Christian  and  philosophical 


§  5.]  METHOD   OF  THE   AUTHOR.  35 

ethics  are  of  exactly  of  the  same  compass,  we  must  regard  as 
incorrect.*  In  his  Philosophical  Ethics  he  himself  expressly  de- 
clares that  the  notion  of  evil  has  no  place  in  it,  but  is  only 
obtained  from  the  experience  of  real  life ;  but  in  Christian  ethics 
this  notion  is  an  essentially  co-deter  mining  element  of  the  whole.! 

Theological  and  philosophical  ethics  do  not  mutually  exclude 
each  other,  but  stand  in  intimate  connection,  and  may  go  hand 
in  hand ;  we  must  admit  both  of  them,  each  in  its  own  field, 
and  each  with  the  task  of  combining  the  other  as  much  as  pos- 
sible in  itself.  But  for  each  of  the  two  manners  of  treatment, 
we  must  lay  claim  to  universal  validity.  Whether  we  have 
recognized  a  truth  philosophically  or  theologically,  we  regard 
this  much  as  settled,  that  it  is  a  truth  not  merely  for  us  Protest- 
ant or  Roman  Christians,  but  for  all  men  who  seek  truth  at  all ; 
and  those  who  do  not  admit  it,  we  can  regard  only  as  in  error. 
This  is  not  intolerance,  but  simple  fidelity  to  the  truth ;  every 
truth  is,  in  this  sense,  intolerant, — claims  the  right  to  be  accepted 
of  all  men. 

Ethics  is  frequently  so  treated  that  philosophical  ethics,  as 
pure,  precedes,  and  Christian  ethics  as  applied  ethics,  follows. 
This  is  not  correct ;  Christian  ethics  is  not  a  mere  application 
of  philosophical,  but  has,  in  so  far  as  it  rests  on  history,  an 
essentially  other  character,  and  other  ground-thoughts  peculiar 
to  itself. — We  purpose  here  to  present  a  System  of  Christian 
ethics,  which,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  to  embrace  all  the  phases 
of  the  Christianly-moral,  must  be  essentially  theological;  but  in 
the  inner  organizing  and  in  the  developing  of  the  ground- 
thoughts,  philosophical  considerations  must  furnish  the  deeper 
scientific  foundation. 


HI.  HISTORY  OF  ETHICS  AND  OF  THE  MORAL  CON- 
SCIOUSNESS   IN    GENERAL, 

SECTION  V. 

CHRISTIAN  ethics  cannot  be  understood  without  its 
history,  nor  the  latter  without  the  history  of  the  sys- 
tems lying  anterior  to  and  outside  of  Christianity. 

*  Christl.  Sitte,  JSeil,  p.  4.  t  Ibid.,  pp.  35,  36. 

4 


36  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  5. 

But  the  history  of  ethics  presupposes  a  knowledge  of 
the  historical  development  of  the  moral  consciousness 
in  general,  whereof  ethics  proper  is  simply  the  scien- 
tific fruit. 

The  mistakes  committed  in  a  large  portion  of  the  field  of 
more  recent  ethics,  spring  largely  from  non-attention  to  the  his- 
tory of  this  science ;  and  yet  no  other  theological  science  has  so 
long  and  rich  a  history,  and  so  many  relations  to  the  history  of 
the  human  mind  anterior  to  and  outside  of  Christianity,  as,  in 
fact,  this  very  one ;  Greek  philosophy  has  had,  upon  the  devel- 
opment of  Christian  ethics,  a  wide-reaching  influence.  But  the 
history  of  ethics  cannot  be  separated  from  the  history  of  the 
moral  spirit  in  general,  out  of  which  ethics  sprang,  and  of  which 
it  is  simply  the  scientific  form ;  also  the  moral  consciousness  it- 
self has  a  history,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  of  much  higher 
importance  than  that  of  the  history  of  mere  ethics.  Not  every 
moral  consciousness  has  produced  an  ethical  system,  for  only 
the  more  gifted  nations  have  risen  to  science  at  all,  and  ethics 
is  one  of  the  most  difficult ;  but  the  moral  consciousness  of  a 
people,  even  though  not  developed  into  a  scientific  form,  is  to 
be  looked  upon  as  the  historical  basis  for  another  higher  and 
ultimately  scientific  national  consciousness.  Even  as  botany 
considers  the  germination  and  foliation  no  less  than  the  blos- 
soms and  fruit, — as  the  history  of  religious  doctrines  presupposes 
the  history  of  the  religious^  life,  as  the  history  of  philosophy  pre- 
supposes and  develops  further  the  history  of  civilization, — so  also 
the  history  of  ethics  cannot  be  given  without,  at  the  same  time, 
taking  into  consideration  the  history  of  the  moral  consciousness 
itself;  the  ethical  thoughts  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  are  not  to  be 
understood  merely  from  themselves,  but  largely  only  in  the  light 
of  the  moral  spirit  of  the  Greeks  in  general. 

The  history  of  ethics  itself,,  though  frequently  touched  upon, 
has  not  as  yet  been  sufficiently  presented.  The  most  complete 
work  is  that  of  Stdudlin  .*  u  History  of  the  Ethics  of  Jesus," 
1799-1823,  4  vols.,  of  which  the  work,  "History  of  Christian 
Morals  since  the  Revival  of  the  Sciences,"  which  appeared  as 
early  as  1808,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  continuation;  and  to  it  is 
to  be  added  the  same  author's  "  History  of  Moral  Philosophy," 
1822  (and,  as  a  short  compendium,  the  "History  of  Philosoph- 


§  6.]  HISTORIES  OF  ETHICS.  37 

ical,  Hebrew,  and  Christian  Ethics,"  1816).  The  rich  body  of 
matter  scattered  through  these  works,  is  much  diluted  and  not 
always  reliable,  and  is  constructed  into  no  vital  unity.  The 
superficial  Rationalistic  stand-point  precludes  a  proper  under- 
standing whether  of  philosophical  or  of  theological  ethics.  It 
is  stated  as  a  high  merit  of  the  ethics  of  Jesus,  that,  in  it,  are 
combined  the  "  better  elements  of  the  Platonic  and  Stoic  sys- 
tems;" the  portraiture  of  the  "wise  Teacher"  of  morals,  Jesus, 
is  about  as  insipid  as  well  possible.  Rousseau's  "  excellent " 
moral  discussions  are  lauded  to  the  skies,  while  Luther  is  treated 
as  a  person  of  narrow  prejudice;  the  doctrine  of  the  inspiration 
of  the  Scriptures  is  repeatedly  declared  as  dangerous  to  moral- 
ity. The  "History  of  Moral  Philosophy"  and  several  minor 
treatises  on  the  history  of  special  ethical  subjects  (the  oath, 
marriage,  the  conscience)  are  very  superficial  and  inaccurate. 

De  Wette  wrote  a  "  Christian  Ethics,"  1819 ;  (more  briefly  pre- 
sented in  his  "  Compendium  of  Christian  Ethics,"  1833,  in  which 
the  history  of  ethics  constitutes  far  more  than  half  of  the  whole 
book ;  the  first  work,  because  of  the  negligent  printing,  is  almost 
useless  for  unprofessional  persons,  and  is  very  dependent  on 
Staudlin,  even  to  his  typographical  errors,  though  in  particular 
parts  surpassing  him). — (Meiner's  "History  of  Ethics,"  1800, 
utterly  worthless.  Marheineke's  "  History  of  Christian  Ethics," 
etc.,  1806, — only  a  fragment.)  E.  Feuerlein's  "  Ethics  of  Chris- 
tianity in  its  Historical  Chief-Forms,"  1855,  furnishes  only  un- 
equal and  often  unclear  or  inadequate  outlines ;  the  same  author 
published  a  "  Philosophical  Ethics  in  its  Historical  Chief- 
Forms,"  1856-59.  Neander's  "History  of  Christian  Ethics," 
1864,  enters  also  upon  Greek  ethics,  though  here  from  a  some- 
what antiquated  stand-point,  and  is  somewhat  ununiform,  break- 
ing off  the  historical  development  by  an  unhappy  classification, 
and  furnishing  rather  single  points  than  a  connected  pres- 
entation. 

A.— MORAL   CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  ETHICS   OF  HEA- 
THEN NATIONS. 

SECTION  VI. 

The  most  of  historical  heathen  nations  have  indeed 
collections  of  ethical  life-rules,  based  almost  always 


38  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  6. 

upon  religion,  but  before  the  golden  age  of  Greek 
philosophy  they  had  no  ethics  proper. — The  ground- 
character  of  all  heathen  ethical  consciousness  and  of 
heathen  ethics  is,  that  the  starting-point  and  the  goal 
of  the  moral  is  not  an  infinite  spirit,  but  either  the 
impersonal  nature-entity,  or  a  merely  individually- 
personal  being.  The  starting-point  is  not  the  infinite 
God,  and  the  goal  is  not  the  perfection  of  the  moral 
personality  in  a  kingdom  of  God  as  resting  upon  the 
moral  perfection  of  the  individual  person,  and  in  the 
communion  of  the  person  with  the  infinite  personality 
of  God,  but  it  is  always  merely  a  limited  something, — 
either  a  merely  earthly  civic  perfection  with  the  rejec- 
tion of  a  trans-mundane  goal  (the  Chinese),  or  the 
giving-up  of  personal  existence  altogether  (the  In- 
dians), or  a  merely  individual  perfection  irrespective 
of  the  idea  of  a  kingdom  of  God  embracing  the  indi- 
vidual personality  as  a  vital  member  (the  Egyptians, 
Persians,  Greeks,  and  Germans). — There  is  through- 
out a  lack  of  the  knowledge  of  true  moral  freedom; 
either  it  is  rejected  on  principle,  or  it  is  ascribed  only 
to  a  few  specially-gifted  ones,  while  the  rest  of  man- 
kind are,  as  barbarians,  incapable  of  any  moral  free- 
dom and  perfection.  Hence  there  is,  further,  a  general 
lack  of  a  knowledge  of  humanity  as  called,  in  its  total- 
ity, to  the  accomplishing  of  a  moral  task.  It  is  uni- 
formly only  one  people,  or  an  aristocratic  class  of  a 
people,  that  is  morally  active ;  the  slave  is  incapable 
of  true  morality.  But  where  humanity  itself  is 
regarded  as  called  to  morality — with  the  Buddhists — 
there  the  moral  task  is  an  essentially  negating  one, — 
is  directed  to  the  annihilating  of  personal  existence. 
There  is  throughout  a  lack  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
moral  depravity  of  the  natural  man,  and  hence  of  the 


§  6.]  ESSENCE   OF   HEATHENISM.  39 

necessity  of  a  spiritual  new-birth  ;  morality  is  not  so 
much  a  struggle,  as  rather  a  simple  development. 
There  is  indeed  a  consciousness  of  immoral  conditions 
of  humanity,  yea,  of  a  natural  unaptness  for  the  good  ; 
but  these  conditions  are  almost  always  attributed  to 
mere  civic  and  individual  degeneracy,  and  this  unapt- 
ness  is  confined  to  barbarians  and  slaves.  And  the 
idea  of  the  highest  good  is  embraced  either  merely 
negatively,  or  is  referred  to  earthly  weal,  or  is  left 
entirely  in  doubt, — at  best  is  sought  in  merely  indi- 
vidual perfection. 

The  heathen  moral  consciousness  can  be  understood,  evidently, 
only  in  the  light  of  the  religious  consciousness  upon  which  it 
always  rests.  That,  of  the  majority  of  heathen  nations,  we 
possess  only  loosely-connected  moral  precepts  and  observations, 
moral  adages  and  practical  life-rules,  but  not  ethical  systems 
proper,  is  no  obstacle  to  our  knowledge  of  their  moral  conscious- 
ness, inasmuch  as  systems  always  bear  in  fact  traces  of  the  sub- 
jective character  of  their  authors,  whereas,  the  popular  collec- 
tions in  question,  based,  for  the  most  part,  on  divine  authority, 
are  an  objective  unclouded  expression  of  the  consciousness 
dominant  in  a  people. 

It  is  the  essence  of  heathenism  to  possess  the  idea  of  God  only 
under  some  form  of  limitation,  to  conceive  of  God  as  a  being  in 
some  degree  limited  ;*  and  to  this  corresponds  also  the  moral 
consciousness.  Where  God  is  conceived  of  as  an  unspiritual 
nature-being,  there  morality  bears  essentially  the  character  of 
un-freedom,  as  it  were  of  impersonality, — is  either  a  mechanical 
adapting  of  self  to  universal  nature,  an  absolutely  goal-less 
passive  subordinating  of  self  to  the  ever-uniform  unchangeable 
order  of  the  world  (China),  or  a  subordinating  of  the  personal 
human  spirit  to  the  divine  being  conceived  of  as  nature,  with 
which  the  free  personality  is  in  essential  contradiction  (India). 
Wliere  God,  however,  is  conceived  of  as  a  limited  individual 
spirit,  and  then  consequentially  as  plurality,  there  the  personal 
human  spirit  stands  not  in  perfect  moral  dependence  upon  Him, 
*  See  the  author's  OescTi.  d.  Heidentums,  i,  §  11  sqq. 


40  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  6. 

but  is  relatively  co-ordinate  with  Him, — has  not  God's  will  as 
its  unconditional  law ;  the  foundation  of  the  moral  becomes 
predominantly  subjective  and  unsettled ;  the  self-love  and  the 
self-seeking  pride  of  the  strong  subject  appears  as  the  legitimate 
chief-motive  of  the  moral  life  (West-Asia  and  Europe). 

With  the  prevalence  of  such  views  the  goal  of  moral  effort, 
the  highest  good,  can  also  be  embraced  only  as  a  limited  some- 
thing. Among  the  naturalistic  nations,  the  Chinese  and  the 
Indians,  this  goal  has  no  positive  contents  at  all,  for  the  personal 
spirit  as  placed  under  the  dominion  of  an  impersonal  nature- 
power  cannot  aim  to  attain  to  any  thing  positive  which  did  not 
already  exist;  its  goal  can  only  be  the  greatest  possible  self- 
denial  of  the  personal  spirit  as  over  against  nature.  In  China 
the  moral  spirit  can  attain  to  nothing  which  has  not  already 
always  existed  by  nature  and  hence  with  necessity ;  it  behooves 
not  to  create  a  spiritual,  moral  kingdom,  but  to  uphold  the 
eternal  kingdom  of  necessarily-determined  order  as  already  ex- 
isting by  nature  without  any  personal  act, — to  subordinate  to, 
and  keep  in  passive  harmony  with,  it,  one's  own  worthless  indi- 
vidual existence. — In  India,  with  the  Brahmins  as  well  as  with 
the  Buddhists,  where  the  consciousness  of  the  personal  spirit 
has  awakened  to  a  much  higher  validity,  moral  effort  assumes  a 
truly  tragic  character,  in  that  the  total,  violent  contradiction  of 
the  personal  spirit  to  the  personality-overwhelming  divine 
nature-entity  comes  to  consciousness.  The  ultimate  goal  of  the 
moral  spirit  is  here  not  only  not  a  positive  entity,  nor  indeed 
even  the  upholding  of  an  eternally-uniform  world-order,  but  the 
passing  away  of  personal  existence  into  the  general  indetermi- 
nate nature-existence ;  the  highest  good  is  complete  self-annihi- 
lation through  moral  effort. — With  the  Occidental  Indo-Germanic 
nations  the  personal  spirit  is  indeed  no  longer  merged  into  the 
impersonal  nature-existence,  for  the  divine  is  itself  conceived  of 
as  personality.  But  because  of  the  merely  limited  individuality 
of  the  divine, — which  rises  to  the  height  of  an  infinite  personal 
spirit  only  ifl  the  last  results  of  philosophy,  not  recognized  by 
the  masses  of  the  people, — the  certainty  of  the  moral  goal  falls 
away  also.  The  personal  spirit  looks  not  to  cease  to  be,  to 
vanish  in  the  mechanical  whirl-din  of  the  great  world-machine, 
as  in  China,  nor  to  melt  away  into  the  incomprehensible  and 
ineffable  proto-Brahnia  or  nirvana  as  in  India,  on  the  contrary, 


§  6.]  IDEA  OF   HUMANITY  OBSCURED.  41 

it  looks  to  attain  to  a  positive  result,  but  it  finds  therefor  no 
assured,  firm  footing ;  and,  as  in  this  life  the  moral  hero  sinks 
tragically  under  the  envious  disfavor  of  the  gods  or  of  fate,  so 
also  is  the  lot  he  has  earned  in  the  next  world  of  an  entirely 
doubtful  character ;  Achilles  would  fain  exchange  his  lot  in  the 
lower  world  for  the  position  of  a  servant  upon  earlh,  and  Soc- 
rates is  not  fully  confident  whether  for  his  philosophical  virtue 
he  will  attain  to  the  enjoyment  of  converse  with  the  great  dead. 
At  best,  doubting  hope  looks  only  to  a  merely  individual  well- 
being,  and  the  idea  of  a  real  kingdom  of  God,  which  has  its 
roots  in  the  earthly  life  of  moral  man,  and  its  crown  in  a  trans- 
mundane  perfection,  and  of  which  the  essence  is  the  history  of 
humanity,  remains  unknown  even  to  the  most  highly  enlight- 
ened heathendom. 

The  moral  freedom  of  the  person  is  indeed  actually  denied 
only  by  a  few  of  the  more  consequential  philosophers  of  India, 
but  yet  it  ia  nowhere  recognized  in  its  full  truth.  With  the 
Chinese,  it  is  smothered  under  the  weight  of  all-dictating  State- 
law  ;  with  the  Brahminic  Indians  a  radical  Pantheism  admits , 
only  for  the  less-clearly  and  less-logically  thinking  classes  of  the 
masses,  a  very  limited  form  of  freedom ;  but  to  the  more  edu- 
cated consciousness  all  initiatorily-active  freedom  appears  as  ille- 
gitimate, as  per  se  sinful,  or,  more  consequentially  still,  as  mere 
appearance.  Impersonal  Brahma  is  the  solely  real  existence, 
and  all  individuality  is  but  an  absolutely  dependent,  immediate 
manifestation-form  of  this  One,  utterly  devoid  of  free  self- 
determination. — The  Greek  even  in  the  highest  philosophy,  far 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  national  consciousness,  concedes  free 
moral  self-determination  not  to  man  as  man,  but  only  to  the 
free  Greek ;  the  barbarian  has  only  a  half-humanity,  is  utterly 
incapable  of  true  virtue,  and  is  not  called  to  free  service  under 
the  moral  idea,  but'  only  to  an  unfree  service  under  the  free 
Greek.  Even  Aristotle  knows  nothing  of  a  general  morality 
for  all  men. 

One  of  the  most  hampering  limits  of  heathen  morality,  is  its 
total  lack  of  the  idea  of  humanity.  The  religion  of  the  Bud- 
dhists,— the  sole  one  which  transcends  the  limits  of  nationality, 
and  even  in  many  respects  approximates  Christian  views, — has 
indeed  conceived  the  thought  of  humanity  as  equally  called  in 
all  its  representatives  to  truth  and  morality,  and  has  sent  out 


42  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  •  [§  6. 

missions  beyond  its  national  boundaries,  but  it  has  done  this 
only  because,  religiously  and  morally,  it  bears  a  predominantly 
negating  character ;  in  the  consciousness  of  the  nullity  of  all 
being,  fall  away  also,  as  null,  the  limits  between  nations;  but 
this  morality  aims  not  to  build  up  a  spiritual  kingdom  of  moral 
reality,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  liberate  the  moral  spirit  from  all 
reality  as  being  per  se  null, — even  from  its  own  personal  exist- 
ence. 

The  consciousness  of  a  guiltily-incurred  moral  depravity  of 
unredeemed  humanity,  which  gives  to  Christian  morality  a  so 
deeply  earnest  back-ground,  finds  in  heathendom  but  faint  and 
even  delusory  echoes.  To  the  Chinese  all  reality  is  good;  the  sea 
of  life  is  mirror-smooth,  at  worst,  is  but  superficially  disturbed 
by  light  waves  \vhich  the  shortest  calm  suffices  to  settle  again. 
To  the  Indian  all  existence  is  equally  good  and  equally  evil, — 
equally  good,  in  that  all  reality  is  the  divine  existence  itself, — 
equally  evil,  in  that  it  is  at  the  same  time  an  untrue  and  an 
illegitimate  self-alienation  of  the  solely-existing  Brahma,  or, 
with  the  Buddhists,  an  expression  of  absolute,  nullity.  The 
guilt  lies  not  on  man,  but  on  God  and  on  existence  in  general ; 
man  suffers  from  the  untruthfulness  of  reality,  but  has  not  him- 
self guiltily  occasioned  it. — The  Persian  conceives  of  evil  in  the 
world  much  more  earnestly  and  with  higher  moral  truthfulness. 
Humanity  is  really  morally  corrupted,  and  is  so  because  of  a 
moral  guilt,  because  of  a  fall  from  the  good ;  and  man  has  the 
task  of  morally  battling  against  the  evil  and  for  the  good.  But 
this  fall  lies  yon-side  of  human  action  and  of  human  guilt, — lies 
in  the  sphere  of  the  divine  itself.  Not  the  rational  creature,  not 
man,  has  guiltily  fallen,  but  a  god ;  the  divine  is  itself  hostilely 
dualistic,— the  good  god  is  from  the  beginning  opposed  by  the 
guilty  evil  one,  and  the  real  world — not  merely  the  moral  one, 
but  also  nature — is  the  work  of  two  mutually  morally-opposing 
divine  creative  powers.  In  this — no  longer  naturalistic,  but 
moral — dualism  there  lies  a  much  higher  truth  than  in  the 
Indian  doctrine  of  unity,  according  to  which  the  distinction  of 
the  world  from  God  is  explained  away  into  a  mere  appearance, 
into  a  self-deception,  either  of  Brahma,  or,  and  more  consequen- 
tially, of  man;  and  man  has,  in  the  Persian  view,  a  much  higher 
personal  moral  task.  But  in  that  this  view  throws  the  weight 
of  the  guilt  from  man  and  upon  the  divinity,  the  moral  struggle 


§  7.]  IDEA  OF  THE   MORAL   OBSCURED.  43 

lacks,  after  all,  its  true  ground  and  truth. — With  the  Greek  even 
this  (in  its  principal  nerve  paralyzed)  earnestness  of  the  Persian 
is  thrown  into  the  shade  by  the,  in  other  respects,  higher  theory 
of  an  inner  harmony  of  existence.  That  which  in  the  Christian 
world-view  is  the  moral  goal,  is  conceived  here  as  the  essence 
indestructibly  inherent  in  reality,  so  that  the  moral  activity  has 
only  to  develop  the  per  se  essentially  faultless  germ  of  the  spir- 
itual essence  of  man,  in  order  to  attain  to  the  highest  good. 
Of  a  positive  struggle  against  a  potent  reality  of  evil  in  man, 
even  the  most  enlightened  philosophers  have  no  consciousness ; 
and  whatever  reality  of  such  an  evil  in  existence  forces  itself 
upon  the  sound  feelings  and  judgment,  is  sought  for,  by  the  in- 
tensified self-complacence  of  the  most  highly-cultivated  Greeks, 
not  in  the  moral  essence  proper  of  man,  but  yon-side  of  man 
in  the  world  of  the  gods,  which  world  appears  itself  in  the 
morally  better-feeling  poets  as  morally  tarnished,  as  an  object  ot 
just  censure, — or  yon-side  of  the  god-world  in  irrationally  dom- 
inating fate, — or  in  the  extra-Greek  world  of  mankind,  which, 
as  barbarous,  is  also  involved  in  moral  degradation. — By  far  the 
highest  view  of  the  moral  and  of  guilt,  appears  among  the  an- 
cient Germanic  nations,  the  world-view  of  whom  was  indeed 
more  fully  developed  only  in  Christian  times,  and  not  unaffected 
by  Christian  influences. 

SECTION  VII. 

The  obscured  and  only  very  partially  developed 
moral  consciousness  of  savage  nations  lies  outside  of 
the  field  of  history ;  *  the  more  tender  consciousness 
of  the  half-civilized  nations,  especially  of  the  Peruvi- 
ans and  Mexicans — the  former  of  whom  especially 
developed  social  morality  to  a  degree  of  one-sided 
maturity,! — appears  rather  as  potent  custom  than  as 
a  clearly  self-conscious  consciousness.  The  very  defi- 
nitely and  detailedly  developed  moral  consciousness 
of  the  Chinese,  as  expressed  in  numerous  and  in  part 
sacred-esteemed  writings,  is  devoid  of  higher  ideas, 

*  Gesch.  des  ffeident.,  i,  p.  40  sgq.,  p.  163  sqq. 
t  Ibid.,  251  sqq.,  303  sqq. 


44  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  7. 

and  .is  rather  merely  soberly  empirical,  purely  polit- 
ical, and  directed  predominantly  onl}r  to  outward  pur- 
poses. The  essence  of  this  morality  is  an  effortless 
conformance  to  an  eternally-changeless  world-order, 
a  remaining  in  the  just  middle-course ;  there  is  no 
consciousness  of  a  forfeited  perfection  of  the  human 
race,  nor  of  a  perfection  yet  morally  to  be  attained 
to.  There  is  pre-supposed  the  unclouded  goodness  of 
human  nature,  the  entire  agreement  of  the  ideal  and 
of  reality.  There  is  no  call  for  a  sanctifying  of  an 
unholy  reality, — there  needs  only  that  the  individual 
existence  of  man  be  modeled  upon  pure  human  pat- 
terns, and  conformed  to  never  entirely  erroneous,  arid 
always  uniform  common  custom.  The  bright  point 
in  Chinese  morality  is  obedience,  in  the  family  and  in 
the  State;  its  ground-character  is  passive  persistence 
in  the  constantly  homogeneous,  goal-less  movement  of 
the  universe, — a  steady  pulse-beat  the  significance  of 
which  lies  not  in  the  goal,  but  in  the  movement  itself. 

The  Chinese,  whose  religious  views  constitute  a  barren  and 
tame,  but  clear  and  consequential  Naturalism,  have  special  in- 
terest for  moral  life-rules ;  the  ancient  books  of  their  religion, 
the  Kings,  which  were  collected  and  digested  by  Confucius  in 
the  sixth  century  before  Christ,  contain  in  the  main  simply  a 
very  detailed  system  of  morals ;  so  also  nearly  all  their  later  re- 
ligious, philosophical,  and  historical  writings. 

The  life  of  the  All  bears  every-where,  even  in  its  spiritual 
phase,  a  nature-character;  there  is  no  history  with  a  spiritual 
goal  to  be  attained  to  by  moral  activity,  but  only  a  nature- 
course  with  a  constantly  uniform  character  manifesting  itself  in 
constant,  unvaried  repetition ;  morality  looks  not  forward,  but 
simply  backward  to  that  which  has  been  and  will  always  remain 
as  it  is,  and  all  reformatory  action  upon  an  occasionally  some- 
what deteriorated  present  is  but  a  mere  return  to  the  previous 
better.  Instead  of  progress  the  goal  of  moral  effort  is  uniformly 
simply  a  conserving,  or  a  return  to  the  past.  There  is  no  ideal 


§  7.]  CHINESE  MORALITY.  45 

yet  to  be  reached,  but  the  ideal  has  already  always  existed,  and 
has  never  suffered  but  slight  becloudings ;  humanity  is  already 
perfect  from  the  very  beginning,  without  history  and  without 
development ;  morality  never  looks  to  the  creating  of  something 
which  has  not  already  been, — at  best  aims  only  at  remedying  a 
slight  but  never  deeply  seated  disorder.  Good  is  not  that  which 
in  the  nature  of  things  ought  first  to  become,  but  that  which 
already  is  from  the  beginning ;  the  highest  good  is  not  a  goal 
and  end,  but  it  is  that  itself  which  eternally  is ;  man  has  and 
enjoys  it  as  already  given  from  the  start ;  it  is  the  Paradise  into 
which  he  is  placed  by  nature  herself,  and  which  he  has  never 
really  lost, — at  the  worst,  only  a  few  thorns  and  thistles  have 
insinuated  themselves  into  it,  which  however  can  only  render 
the  Paradisaical  life  of  the  "  Celestial  Kingdom "  only  a  little 
more  incommodious  for  man,  but  not  by  any  means  banish  him 
out  of  it,  and  in  fact  are  very  readily  to  be  got  rid  of.  The 
stream  of  world-history  flows  on  of  itself  without  the  co-opera- 
tion of  man ;  man  has  simply  to  yield  himself  to  it,  to  adapt 
himself  unresistingly  to  the  eternally-unvarying  order  of  the 
world,  to  join  himself,  as  a  passively  revolved  wheel,  into  the 
constantly  uniform-moving  clock-work.  Hence  morality  has  no 
high  goal,  but  requires  only  repose  and  order,  and  a  passive 
submission  to  the  minutely-tutorial  civil  law  and  to  the  equally 
valid  laws  of  custom ;  there  is  no  violent  struggle,  but  only  a 
quiet  persisting  and  laboring.  The  highest  symbol  of  morality 
is  the  natural  sky,  with  its  eternally-unvarying  orderly  revolu- 
tion. As  the  real  world  is  the  mutual  interpenetration  of  the 
two  primitive  principles,  heaven  and  earth,  and  the  equilibrium 
and  mean  between  the  two,  so  consists  ajso  morality  in  the  pre- 
serving of  equilibrium,  in  the  observing  of  the  just  mean;  the 
middle  way  is  always  the  best.  Hence  ethics  is  by  no  means 
rigid  and  severe, — aims  not  at  high  reality-transcending  ideals, 
is  of  a  mild  gentle  nature,  sober,  practical,  temperate,  without 
high  inspiration ;  it  requires  of  man  scarcely  any  thing  which 
could  be  difficult  to  him,  or  which  would  involve  much  self- 
denial;  he  is  not  required  to  divest  himself  of  his  natural  char- 
acter, but  has  only  to  observe  measure  in  all  things.  Man,  that 
is,  of  course,  only  the  Chinaman,  is  consequently  already  capac- 
itated by  nature  to  fulfill  perfectly  all  the  requirements  of 
morality,  and  there  are  in  fact  also  absolutely  perfect,  sinless 


46  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  7. 

men.  Virtue  is  of  easy  practice,  for  it  is  the  natural  expression 
of  the  soul-life,  and  has  not  to  contend  against  any  evil  rooted 
in  the  heart,  and  it  meets  in  fact  with  no  actual  hostility  to  it- 
self in  the  world ;  it  awakens  not  displeasure,  but  always  love, 
esteem,  and  honor;  for  mankind  is  in  fact  generally  and,  as  a 
whole,  good ;  actual  evil  is  always  a  mere  exception ;  the  gate 
is  wide,  and  the  way  is  broad  which  leads  to  life,  and  many 
are  those  who  walk  upon  it. 

As  being  a  mere  expression  of  general,  natural  world-order, 
morality  stands  in  direct  connection  with  the  course  of  nature. 
The  observance  of  the  just  mean  preserves  equilibrium  in  the 
All,  and  every  disturbance  of  this  equilibrium  by  sin  re-echoes 
through  the  whole,  and  effects,  directly,  disturbances  in  nature, 
especially  when  the  offending  one  is  the  vicegerent  of  heaven, 
the  emperor, — who  is  called  by  his  very  office  to  the  presenting 
of  a  moral  ideal,  of  a  pattern  of  virtue.  Drought,  famine,  inun- 
dations, pestilence,  and  the  like,  are  not  so  much  positively  in- 
flicted punishments  of  a  personally-ruling  God,  as  rather  direct 
natural  consequences  of  the  sins  of  the  emperor,  and  of  the  peo- 
ple as  imitating  him.  Instead  of  an  historical  connection  and  an 
historical  working  of  sin  upon  coming  generations,  as  in  the 
Christian  world-theory,  there  is  here  a  natural  connection  and  a 
natural  working  of  sin  upon  contemporary  nature  and  the  con- 
temporary generation.  This  naturalistic  parallel  to  the  Chris- 
tian doctrine  of  inherited  sin,  has  a  deeply  earnest  significancy. 
Man  in  his  moral  activity  has  to  do  not  merely  with  himself, 
but  with  the  totality  of  the  universe ;  by  sinning,  he  disturbs 
the  order  and  the  harmony  of  existence  in  general ;  every  sin  is 
an  outrage  against  the  All,  and  consequently  also  against  the 
highest  manifestation  thereof,  namely,  the  Middle  Kingdom ;  all 
sins  are  crimes,  all  are  hurtful  to  the  public  weal ;  in  the  Chinese 
view  nature  suffers  by  sin ;  in  the  Christian,  history. 

The  focus  of  the  moral  life  is  the  family;  in  it  manifests  it- 
self directly  the  divine  life, — which  consists  in  the  antithesis  of 
the  male  or  active  and  of  the  female  or  passive,  in  heaven-force 
and  earth-material,  and  in  the  union  of  the  two.  The  family 
life  is  a  living  worship  of  God,  and  the  family  duties  are  the 
highest,  and  have  the  unconditional  precedence  of  all  others ; 
to  the  obedience  of  children  to  parents  all  other  obedience  must 
give  way.  What  heaven  is  for  the  world,  that  the  father  is  for 


§  8.]  THE   CHINESE  STATE.  47 

the  children,  and  reverence  toward  parents  is  a  religious  virtue. 
Hence  marriage  is  a  moral  duty  from  which  no  virtuous  man 
can  excuse  himself;  the  celibate  interrupts  the  ranks  of  the 
family  and  commits  an  outrage  on  his  ancestors. 

But  the  full  realization  of  morality  appears  in  the  state,  which 
is  simply  the  all-sidedly  developed  family.  The  emperor,  as  the 
son  and  vicegerent  of  heaven  not  governing  arbitrarily  but  by 
eternally  valid  heavenly  laws,  is  the  father  and  teacher  of  the 
people, — not  merely  protecting  right,  but  also,  as  a  pattern  of 
virtue,  guiding  and  conserving  the  morality  of  the  people.  In 
China  every  thing  is  the  State,  and  the  State  is  everything ;  it  is 
the  great  ocean  into  which  all  the  streams  of  the  spirit-life  ulti- 
.raate,  and  morality  itself  stands  absolutely  under  the  guardian- 
ship of  the  State.  Not  as  man,  but  only  as  a  citizen  of  the  State 
and  a  member  of  the  family,  has  the  Chinaman  a  moral  life ;  all 
morality  is  accomplished  by  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the  State ; 
and  between  civil  and  moral  law  there  is  no  distinction. 


SECTION  VIII. 

The  Indians,  the  Brahminic  as  also  the  Buddhistic, 
conceived  morality,  on  the  basis  of  their  consequen- 
tially developed  Pantheism,  essentially  negatively. 
All  finite  reality,  and  above  all,  that  of  the  human 
personality,  is  null,  untrue,  and  illegitimate, — either 
because,  with  the  Brahmins,  it  is  only  the  self- 
estranged  divinity,  or  because,  with  the  Buddhists, 
the  essence  of  all  existence  in  general  is  nihility; 
hence  the  ground-character  of  morality  is  self-denial, 
world-renunciation, — a  passive  endurance  instead  of 
creative  activity.  The  moral  goal,  the  highest  good, 
is  not  a  personal  possession,  but  a  surrendering  of 
personality  to  the  impersonal  divine  essence  or  to 
nihility.  There  is  no  realizing  and  no  shaping  of  a 
moral  kingdom  based  on  personality,  nor  even  a  pre- 
serving of  existing  reality,  but  a  dissolving  of  the 
same.  All  reality,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  finite  formation, 


48  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  8. 

is  evil, — not,  however,  through  the  guilt  of  man,  but 
in  virtue  of  its  very  essence  from  the  beginning ;  and 
there  is  no  other  redemption  than  its  annihilation. 
But  while,  in  the  purely  Pantheistic  doctrine  of  the 
Brahmins,  the  thought  of  the  development  of  the 
world  out  of  God  recognizes  in  fact  in  existence  a 
divine  and  hence  relatively  good  substratum,  and  re- 
gards mankind  as  emanated  from  God,  as  participant 
in  this  divine  substance  in  different  degrees,  accord- 
ing as  they  stand  at  different  distances  from  the  divine 
pro  to-foun  tain, — the  distinctions  of  caste, — on  the  other 
hand,  the  doctrine  of  the  Buddhists  annihilates,  to- 
gether with  the  divine  proto-Brahma,  also  these  con- 
centric circles  around  the  ungodded  middle-point, 
and  requires  equal,  absolutely  world-renouncing  mo- 
rality of  all  men,  even  irrespective  of  the  limits  of 
nationality,  and  changes  the  positive  self-torture, 
which  appears  among  the  Brahmins  as  the  acme  of 
pious  morality,  into  a  quietistic,  self-denying  patience 
resting  upon  hopeless  grief  at  the  nihility  of  all 
existence. 

s 

The  Brahminic  Indians  have,  in  their  books  of  law,  ancient 
and  rich  collections  of  moral  doctrines.  Almost  equally  esteemed 
with  the  Vedas,  and  attributed  to  a  divine  origin,  is  the  book 
of  the  Laws  of  Manu,  the  parts  of  which  belong  to  very  differ- 
ent ages,  though  the  most  recent  belong  certainly  anterior  to 
the  fourth  century  before  Christ ;  the  moral  precepts  proper  are 
as  yet  unseparated  from  the  religious  and  civil.  Also  the  Vedas 
and  the  later  philosophical  and  legal  writings  contain  much 
moral  matter. 

Basing  himself,  in  contrast  to  the  nature-dualism  of  the  Chi- 
nese, upon  the  unity  of  the  universe  as  divine,  the  Brahmin 
regards  the  real  world  merely  as  a,  neither  necessary  nor  strictly 
legitimate,  but  rather  mere  dream-like  self-alienation  of  primi- 
tive Brahma,  which  is  destined,  after  an  essentially  purposeless 


§  8.]  BEAHMINIC   MORALITY.  49 

continuance,  to  be  absorbed  back  into  its  source.  Hence  moral- 
ity has  no  positive  aim,  but  rather  simply  looks  to  an  escaping 
from  individual  existence,  a  dissolving  of  personality  into  the 
impersonal.  The  continuance  of  personality  through  metemp- 
sychosis is  punishment,  not  reward.  Existing  reality  is  not,  as 
in  China,  good  as  such,  but,  as  separate  existence,  is  evil,  and 
is  good  only  in  its  general  divine  substance ;  only  the  latter,  but 
not  the  former,  may  be  held  fast  to.  The  moral  subject  is  not 
man  as  such  ;  there  is  in  fact  no  unitary  humanity,  but  only  dif- 
ferent, narrower  or  wider,  circles  around  the  divine  middle- 
point,  classes  of  men  differing  essentially  by  nature  both  spirit- 
ually and  morally,  and  of  whom  the  lowest  stand  even  below 
many  brutes,  and  are  absolutely  incapable  of  the  moral  life ;  to 
teach  to  these  latter  the  Vedas  or  the  Laws,  is  a  crime  worthy 
of  the  deepest  damnation.  Only  the  three  highest  castes  are 
capable  of  a  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and  hence  also  of  morality. 
But  also  with  these  the  moral  duties  and  capacities  are  very 
different,  and  the  Indian  speaks  not  of  the  moral  duties  of  man, 
but  always  only  of  the  duties  of  the  castes.  The  vaifja's  highest 
good  is  riches ;  his  virtue,  industrious  acquiring ;  the  xatrija's 
highest  good  is  power,  and  his  highest  virtue,  courage;  and 
onlv  the  Brahmin  is  capable  of  the  highest  morality ;  but  this 
morality  directs  itself,  not  transformingly  and  productively, 
upon  reality,  but  only,  disdainingly  and  renouncingly,  away 
from  the  same, — not,  however,  in  order  to  virtualize  a  free,  self- 
conscious  personality  as  over  against  nature,  but  in  order  to 
merge  back  the  personal  spirit,  as  illegitimate,  into  the  imper- 
sonal essence  of  the  universe.  The  highest  virtue  is  renuncia- 
tion, not  indeed  merely  of  sensuous  enjoyment,  of  earthly  weal, 
but  of  one's  own  self-conscious  personality ;  and  the  acme  of 
this  morality  is,  consequently,  self-annihilation  as  sought  through 
persistent  self-torture,  to  the  end  that  Brahma  alone  may  exist. 
The  highest  good  of  the  true  man,  that  is,  of  the  Brahmin,  is  to 
become  at  one  with  Brahma,  not  in  the  sense  of  a  moral  life- 
communion  of  the  personal  spirit  with  a  personal  God,  but  as 
a  dissolving  of  the  per  se  illegitimate  personal  spirit  into  the 
general,  the  impersonal.  That  which  is  in  the  present  state  the 
sum  and  substance  of  all  wisdom,  namely,  to  know  that  "-I  am 
Brahma,"  attains  to  full  truth  by  the  dissolving  of  the  ego  into 
Brahma ;  the  goal  of  morality  is,  "  Brahma  alone  is,  not  I ;" 


50  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  8. 

and  as  man,  even  now,  while  in  deepest  sleep, — wherein  he 
knows  nothing  of  the  world  and  of  himself, — is  nearer  to  divin- 
ity than  when  in  his  waking  hours,  so  the  goal  of  virtue  is  the 
total  falling  to  sleep  of  the  personal  spirit,  the  exhaling  of  the 
dew-drop  that  trembles  on  the  lotus-leaf.  The  holding  fast  to 
personality  is  the  essence  of  all  evil.  Nothing  can  nor  should 
permanently  endure  but  the  divine  essence  alone,  which  tolerates 
nothing  other  than  itself,  and  for  which  all  reality  of  the  world 
is,  at  best,  only  a  dream-phantom,  a  transient  hallucination ; — 
even  in  the  eyes  of  the  deeper  instructed  of  men,  the  world  in 
general  is  only  a  false  imagination  of  the  foolish,  and  does  not 
really  exist  at  all.  The  Chinese  aim,  in  morality,  simply  to  con- 
serve the  already-existing ;  the  higher  nations  aim  at  transform- 
ing it  into  a  more  spiritual  reality ;  the  Indians  aim  at  dissolving 
it  into  nonentity.  The  West-Asiatic  nations  see  the  truth  in  the 
future,  and  long,  hopefully,  and  through  moral  effort,  for  a  bet- 
ter reality  than  is  offered  by  the  present ;  the  Indians  look  sadly 
into  the  present,  with  indifference  into  the  future,  and  with  sat- 
isfaction only  into  the  past,  when  as  yet  nothing  else  existed 
but  unitary  Brahma,  and  into  that  future  which  simply  returns 
to  the  condition  of  this  past.  The  Chinese  work  for  the  present ; 
the  higher  nations,  for  the  future ;  the  Indians  work  not  at  all, 
but  simply  endure  and  perish  ;  they  aim  not  at  implanting  the 
free  moral  spirit  into  reality,  but  at  tearing  it  away  from  the 
same, — not  at  transfiguring  reality  by  the  spirit,  but  at  emanci- 
pating the  spirit  from  the  same.  Indian  morality  is  less  a  crea- 
tive working  than  a  sacrificing,  and  hence  is  essentially  identical 
with  the  practice  of  religion,  of  which  the  highest  phase  is  self- 
mortification — aiming  at  a  total  annihilation  of  personal  exist- 
ence. The  way  which  the  world  has  traveled  out  from  primitive 
Brahma,  this  way  it  must  travel  back  again;  nature  herself 
accomplishes  this  by  death;  man  accomplishes  it  by  morally- 
pious  self-annihilation.  That  which  is  with  nature  the  natural 
goal,  is  with  man  a  moral  end.  Even  as  Brahma  developed 
himself  out  of  his  pure  transparent  unity  into  the  world  of 
plurality,  so  must  man  fold  himself  back  out  of  his  isolated 
existence  again  into  unity ;  man,  the  highest  fruit  of  mundane 
existence,  must  gather  himself  out  of  the  dispersion  of  Brahma 
in  the  world,  back  into  unity, — must  give  up  his  separate  exist- 
ence. Man  must  die  away,  not  indeed  to  sin,  or  merely  to 


§  8.]  MORTIFICATION — ASCETICISM.  51 

sensuousness,  but  to  himself, — must  cease  to  be  a  real  person- 
ality, must  renounce  every  feeling,  every  volition,  every  thought, 
which  contains  any  thing  whatever  other  than  Brahma  alone. 
The  fearful  self-tortures  of  the  Indians  are  not  penance  for  sins, 
but  the  highest  virtue-exercises  of  saints.  A  vital  consciousness 
of  guilt,  the  Indian  is  utterly  devoid  of;  the  evil  of  existence  is 
not  his  own,  is  not  the  fault  of  man  in  general.  Whatever  is 
and  transpires,  is  directly  Brahma's  act.  It  is  true,  evil  inheres 
by  nature  in  all  existence,  but  it  is  not  to  be  imputed  to  man, 
and  there  is  no  other  redemption  from  the  same  than  the  de- 
struction of  the  finite,  even  of  one's  own  being.  The  entire 
scope  of  morality  bears  a  negating  character ;  the  truly  know- 
ing one  needs  not  merely  not  to  do  any  positive  works,  but  he 
avoids  them  from  principle,  because  they  belong  simply  to  the 
realm  of  folly. 

For  man,  even  in  so  far  as  he  is  an  object  of  the  moral  activity, 
the  Indian  has  no  concern ;  he  has  a  higher  love  for  nature, 
which  stands  nearer  related  to  the  nature-divinity,  and  consti- 
tutes the  narrowest  circle  around  the  divine  center-point.  In 
nature  he  beholds  his  mother,  and  he  loves  it  reverently  as  the 
most  direct  and  most  unclouded  revelation  of  Brahma.  The 
same  Indian  who  can  heartlessly  see  a  pariah  famish  without  so 
much  as  stretching  out  to  him  a  helping  hand,  reverently  avoids, 
as  a  severe  sin,  the  breaking  of  a  grass-blade,  or  the  swallowing 
of  a  gnat ;  a  Brahmin  allows  himself  not,  without  ground,  to 
break  even  an  earth-clod. — Marriage  and  the  family-life  in  gen- 
eral can  only  be  a  transition-stage  for  the,  as  yet,  morally  imma- 
ture. The  Brahmin  who  has  risen  to  true  knowledge  must 
leave  father  and  mother,  wife  and  child,  and,  dead  to  the  world 
and  to  himself,  live  henceforth  only  in  solitary  contemplation 
of  Brahma, — standing  for  years,  in  the  forest,  upon  the  same 
spot,  emotionless  as  a  tree-trunk,  and  seeking  or  accepting  only 
the  scantiest  food ;  every  thing  finite  must  have  become  abso- 
lutely indifferent  to  him,  until,  vegetating  on  like  a  plant,  and 
fading  away,  he  attains  to  the  long-sought  death.  For  society 
and  politics,  only  those  who  belong  to  the  inferior  castes  can 
have  any  further  interest, — for  the  Brahmin  himself  these  things 
have  no  attraction,  and,  higher  than  the  warrior-hero  and  than 
the  zealously-ruling  prince,  is  he  who  exchanges  a  crown  for  the 
life  of  the  hermit. 


52  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  8. 

More  remarkable  still  is  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Bud- 
dhists, whose  world-historical  and  influential  religion — an  off-shoot 
of  the  Brahminic — was  founded  by  the  Indian  prince  Sakya- 
Mvni  in  the  sixth  century  before  Christ, — the  sole  heathen 
religion  which  sent  out  missions  beyond  the  national  limits, — 
so  that  within  a  few  centuries  it  extended  itself  throughout  all 
middle,  southern,  and  eastern  Asia,  as  far  as  into  Japan.  The 
sacred  books  of  the  Buddhists  are  chiefly  of  moral  contents,  for 
here  religion  passes  over  almost  entirely  into  morality. 

While  in  Brahminisni  the  ground  and  essence  of  all  existence 
is  the  one  absolutely  indeterminate  and  un-positive  proto- 
Brahma,  Buddhism  goes  a  step  further,  and  declares  this  inde- 
terminate, empty  substratum  to  be  nonentity  itself.  All  things 
are  sprung  of  nonentity ;  hence  nonentity  is  the  contents  of  all 
being, — hence  all  reality  is  per  se  null,  and  finds  its  truth  only 
in  that  it  returns  to  nothing.  As  the  beginning,  so  is  also  the 
end  of  all  being,  and  hence  also  that  of  man  and  of  his  moral 
efforts,  nonentity.  Every  thing  is  vain,  in  heaven  and  upon 
earth ;  heaven  and  earth  themselves  are  vain,  and  upon  the 
ruins  of  a  crumbling  world  sits,  eternally  enthroned,  empty 
Naught.  The  moral  element  of  this  atheistical  religion  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  Buddhist  is  really  and  truly  in  earnest  with 
the  comfortless  thought,  and, — in  striking  contrast  to  the  lust- 
ful, pleasure-seeking  atheism  of  modern  times, — presents  to  man 
the  God-forsaken  world  as  in  fact  really  such,  and  forbids  to 
him  all  enjoyment  of  the  same, — that  he  has  no  joy  in  it,  but 
makes  deep  grief  at  all  existence  the  foundation  of  all  morality. 
The  Buddhist  is  fully  conscious  of  what  it  signifies  to  place  na- 
ture above  spirit,  to  seek  God  only  in  nature  and  in  the  world 
in  general.  Not  being  able  to  rise  to  the- conception  of  a  per- 
sonal God,  he  disdains  the  impersonal  nature-God,  and  chooses 
rather  to  live  without  God  in  the  world, — only,  however,  as  one 
who  has  no  hope  at  all.  Buddhism  in  its  pure  form  is  a  religion 
of  despair,  and  its  ethics  answers  to  this  character,  and  is  essen- 
tially different  from  the  Brahminic.  Here  no  divine  proto- 
Brahma  unfolds  himself  into  a  world  ;  and  hence  the  different 
castes  of  mankind  have  no  longer  any  essential  meaning ;  no 
one  man  stands,  by  nature,  nearer  to  the  divinity  than  another, 
but  all  men  are  equal ;  there  is  no  plant-like  branching-out  of 
a  divine  proto-germ,  but  only  a  homogeneous  sea  of  equally- 


§  8.]  BUDDHISTIC   MORALITY.  53 

worthless  sand-grains.  With  the  Brahmin  moral  freedom  is 
essentially  trammeled,  and  in  fact,  consequentially  regarded, 
annihilated,  by  the  fact  that  Brahma  alone  works  all  and  in  all ; 
but  for  the  Buddhist  no  such  limitation  exists.  No  divinity 
forcibly  interferes  with  human  action.  Moral  effort,  however, 
has  no  reality,  as  a  highest  good,  for  its  goal;  the  ultimate  goal 
is  annihilation ;  and  this  thought  is  here  much  more  deeply  and 
sadly  embraced  than  with  the  Brahmins.  While  with  the  Brah- 
mins, man  and  the  entire  world  sink  back  into  the  divine 
essence,  with  the  Buddhists  they  fall  into  utter  annihilation ; 
and  the  goal  of  all  life  and  effort  is  a  traceless  extinguishment — 
nirvana.  The  Buddhist  strives  not ;  he  only  patiently  endures 
the  pain  of  inner  nothingness,  that  falls  to  the  lot  of  all  living 
existence.  The  entire  history  of  the  world  is  but  one  grand 
tragedy ;  in  deep  pain  worries  on  all  that  lives,  until  it  succumbs 
to  death,  and  the  consciousness  of  this  pain  is  the  beginning 
and  the  end  of  all  wisdom.  In  comparison  with  this  acme  of 
all  wisdom,  namely,  the  knowledge  of  the  four-fold  misery  in- 
herent in  the  world,  that  is,  birth,  old  age,  disease,  and  death, 
all  other  questions  lose  their  importance.  All  reality  is  vain 
and  irrational;  this  is  the  basis  of  all  morality.  Hence,  man 
should  break  loose  from  all  love  to  real  existence, — should  re- 
nounce all  earthly  pleasure ;  the  only  feeling  that  beseems  the 
sage  is  that  of  pain  and  compassion.  For  a  positive  moral  -act- 
ing, aiming  at  the  production  of  a  reality,  there  is  here  no  place ; 
man  strives  only  to  urge  his  way  out  of  this  world  of  pain,  for 
misery  is  the  essence  of  the  world,  and  all  moral  wisdom  con- 
sists in  the  greatest  possible  breaking  away  from  all  liking  for 
the  same.  In  the  God-void  world,  man  feels  homeless, — finds 
therein  no  rest  and  no  satisfaction ;  his  future  is  annihilation ; 
his  present,  the  renouncing  of  all  joy.  The  world-renunciation 
of  the  Brahmin  is  rather  active  and  manly,  for  by  the  throwing 
off  of  his  finite  existence  he  returns  into  Brahma.  The  world- 
renunciation  of  the  Buddhist  is  rather  passive  and  womanly, — 
does  not  rise  to  positive  self-torture  and  to  real  self-destruction ; 
on  the  contrary,  the  Buddhist  waits,  still  and  patient, — supports 
the  misery  of  life  in  unmurmuring  pain,  until  his  existence  falls 
away ;  the  characteristic  of  this  world-theory  is  a  quiet,  gentle 
grief,  for  the  thought  of  the  empty  nothingness  of  all  things 
cannot  inspire  to  manly  action ;  and  the  pain  of  existence  should 


54  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  9. 

not  be  additionally  heightened  by  voluntary  act.  Man  is  simply 
to  disdain  the  world, — not  because  he  compares  it  with  a  better 
sinless  one,  but  because  evil  and  misery  are  inseparable  from  it. 
Separated  from  all  the  world,  and  as  a  homeless  wanderer,  or  as 
a  hermit  in  forest  or  desert,  the  pious  man  should  live  in  beggar- 
garb,  devoid  of  adornment,  utterly  possessionless,  entirely  isolat- 
ed, indifferent  to  joy  and  grief,  and  dead  to  all  emotions.  Mar- 
riage, as  productive  of  new  existence,  is  per  se  of  evil,  and  is 
absolutely  forbidden  to  the  saint;  the  family  bonds  have  no 
significancy  for  him,  and  sensuous  enjoyment  is  in  his  eyes  a 
pure  folly.  The  most  ancient  and  pure  doctrine  of  Buddhism 
requires  such  renunciation  of  all  men,  and  it  is  only  a  deteriorated 
form  of  later  times  that  conceded  that  all  did  not  need  to  lead 
this  spiritual  life,  but  that  a  portion  of  the  people  might  con- 
tent themselves  with  an  inferior  severity. 

Buddhistic  ethics  contains  but  few  positive  precepts ;  almost 
all  of  them  are  negative ;  virtue  consists  essentially  in  omitting ; 
"  thou  shalt  not,"  is  the  almost  unvarying  beginning  of  the  pre- 
cepts; all  of  them  aim  simply  at  preventing  the  spirit  from 
taking  delight  in  existence, — forbid  worldly  pleasure,  but  do 
not  create  a  moral  reality ;  and,  as  relating  to  other  living  crea- 
tures, beast  as  well  as  man,  they  guard  against  all  multiplication 
of  the  already  so  widely-prevalent  misery.  Hence  there  goes 
here,  hand  in  hand,  with  the  intensest  world-despising,  the 
greatest  gentleness  toward  all  living  beings;  no  creature  may 
be  tormented,  nor  even  slaughtered;  in  order  to  alleviate  the 
pain  of  another  creature,  man  should  rather  himself  endure  it. 
Hence  the  Buddhists  have  been,  in  fact,  the  gentlest  of  heathen 
nations;  but  their  gentleness  is  not  so  much  an  expression  of 
active  love  as  rather  merely  of  compassion, — is  simply  a  non- 
interfering,  a  sparing,  but  not  a  positive  helping.  The  dumb, 
patient  enduring  of  pain,  a  complete  indifference  to  joy  and  sor- 
row, is  not  the  heroic  pride  of  a  deeply  self-conscious  personal- 
ity, but  the  womanly,  submissive  patience  of  a  heart  broken 
with  pain. 

SECTION  IX. 

The  moral  consciousness  of  the  Egyptians  and  of 
the  Semitic  nations,  especially  of  the  Assyrians  and 
Rulnjlonians,  is,  as  yet,  only  very  imperfectly  and  par- 


§  9.]  EGYPTIAN  THEOLOGY.  55 

tially  known,  so  that  a  very  definite  characterizing  of 
it  is  not  yet  possible.  So  much  appears  to  be  reliably 
ascertained,  that  among  these  nations  (which  consti- 
tute the  transition  from  naturalistic  East- Asia  to  the 
Occidental  nations  among  whom  the  divine  is  con- 
ceived of  as  a  personal  spirit)  both  the  moral  bases 
and  the  essence  of  the  moral  subject  and  of  the  moral 
task,  are  conceived  in  a  higher  and  more  spiritual 
manner  than  was  the  case  among  the  earlier  nations, 
— in  a  manner  which  brings  personality  to  a  greater 
validity.  The  Pantheistico-naturalistic  character  of 
the  religious  and  moral  world-theory  is  overcome,  and 
a  morally  dualistic  one  struggles  more  definitely  into 
the  fore-ground.  Morality  passes  over  from  the  mere 
preserving  and  persisting  of  the  Chinese,  and  .from 
the  self-renouncing  of  the  Indians,  into  a  struggle 
against  evil,  as  super-humanly  originated,  though  not 
exclusively  dominant,  and  as  in  fact  ultimately  to  be 
overcome. 


Egypt  stands  on  the  dividing-line  between  the  naturalistic 
and  the  personally-spiritual  world-theory ;  the  divine  is  indeed 
primarily  and  originally,  as  yet,  a  pure  nature-power,  but  it 
struggles  up  into  spiritual  personality,  and  such  a  personality  is 
recognized  also  in  man ;  among  the  Semitic  nations  this  con- 
sciousness comes  into  the  fore-ground  more  prominently  still. 
The  presupposition  of  the  moral  is  no  longer  the  perfect  and 
uniform  goodness  of  existence,  as  -with  the  Chinese,  nor  the 
essential  evilness  of  the  same,  as  with  the  Indians,  but  an  inner 
moral  antagonism  of  existence.  Over  against  the  personal- 
become  good  divinities,  stands  evil  as  a  divine  entity  different 
from  them,  and  which  is  primarily  less  spiritual,  and  expressive 
rather  of  mere  nature-character;  and  man  in  his  moral  struggle 
stands  in  the  midst  of  this  antagonism, — has  to  determine  him- 
self for  the  divine  good,  and  against  the  not  less  divine  evil. 
Thus,  in  virtue  of  the  contest  of  the  antagonism  dominant  in 
the  world,  the  moral  subject  becomes  more  nearly  independent. 


56  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  9. 

and  free,  than  among  the  purely  naturalistic  nations ;  his  moral 
task  becomes,  by  far,  more  earnest  and  arduous, — calls  far  more 
emphatically  for  personal  self-determination.  Hence  these  na- 
tions have  produced  grander  world-historical  characters  than 
the  earlier  ones, — have  become  world-historically  militant  na- 
tions. And  the  goal  of  the  militant  struggle  is  the  ultimate 
victory  of  the  good  over  the  evil  ~by  the  personal  spirit,  which  is 
also  itself  not  destined  to  be  dissolved  back  into  a  general  im- 
personal nature-existence,  but,  triumphing  over  mere  nature, 
preserves  its  own  personality. 

But  this  breaking-forth  of  the  rational  spirit  and  of  its  moral 
task  into  greater  distinctness,  manifests  itself  otherwise  among 
the  Egyptians  than  among  the  Semitic  nations.  It  is  among 
the  Egyptians  that  the  personal  nature  of  the  moral  spirit  comes 
first  to  full  self-consciousness.  The  spirit  is  a  something  other 
than  nature  and  higher  than  it, — is  not  destined  to  servitude 
under  it,  but  to  personal,  free  moral  self-determination  and  to 
personal  immortality,  over  against  death-dominated  nature. 
But  this  antithesis  of  the  moral  personal  spirit  to  nature  does 
not  as  yet  rise,  in  the  earthly  life,  to  complete  victory.  Even  as 
Osiris  succumbs  to  the  evil  divinity,  Typhon,  so  must  man  ulti- 
mately succumb  in  the  struggle  with  unspiritual  nature, — only, 
however,  in  order  to  attain  in  the  yon-side  to. the  full  enjoyment 
of  spiritual  personality.  The  morning-twilight  of  the  freedom 
of  the  rational  spirit  dawns  in  Egypt,  but  it  is  not  as  yet  day. 
It  is  only  through  struggle,  through  suffering  and  dying,  that 
the  spirit  becomes  free, — in  the  world  of  the  gods  as  well  as  in 
the  world  of  man.  Osiris  becomes  a  true  ruler  only  in  the  next 
world,  and  so  with  man  also ;  only  out  of  death  spring  forth  life 
and  victory.  Also  over  the  Egyptian's  moral  life  a  dusky  vail 
is  thrown,  a  melancholy  breath  poured  out, — as  with  the  Indi- 
ans, though  relieved  by  a  brighter  hope.  To  the  Indian  all 
moral  life  is  but  a  rapidly  passing  meteor,  vanishing  away  with- 
out trace ;  to  the  Egyptian  it  is  a  conflict,  painful  indeed,  but 
resulting  in  an  ultimate  permanent  victory  of  the  moral  person. 
Man  has  not  as  yet  complete  freedom  and  complete  personal 
validity,  but  he  will  have  them  after  death  if  lie  only  struggles 
manfully  here  below ;  and  he  is  conscious  of  entire  personal  re- 
sponsibility for  his  life  and  his  fortune  after  death.  His  per- 
sonally-moral life  falls  not  a  prey  to  a  universally-dominating 


§  9.]  EGYPTIAN   MORALITY.  57 

nature-necessity,  but  to  the  personal  decision  of  the  first  personal 
victor  (Osiris)  over  nature  and  over  death.  By  Osiris,  the 
king  of  the  yon-side  world,  where  alone  true  life  first  begins, 
man's  moral  life  is  judged — weighed  in  the  scales  of  righteous- 
ness. In  personal  communion  with  Osiris,  the  just  man  lives, 
happy  thenceforth.  Osiris,  the  highest  representative  of  spirit- 
ual divinity,  the  forerunner  and  pledge  of  immortality,  the  first- 
born among  those  who  have  died  and  are  now  living  after  death, 
is  also  the  highest  representative  of  Egyptian  morality,  the 
ground-character  of  which  is,  a  persistent  battling  for  righteous- 
ness. The  ostrich-feather,  the  symbol  of  truth  and  righteous- 
ness, is  one  of  the  highest  badges  of  honor. — But  it  is  only  in 
the  next  world  that  true  righteousness  is  realized ;  here  upon 
earth  rule  as  yet,  invincibly,  the  powers  of  evil.  Hence  the 
Egyptian,  in  contrast  to  the  Chinese,  turns  all  his  love  and  his 
interest  to  the  yon-side  life.  The  dwellings  of  the  living  were 
for  the  most  part  paltry  huts ;  the  dwellings  of  the  dead  are 
monuments  of  the  highest  art  and  of  an  unparalleled  zeal  for 
labor;  the  tombs  hewn  out  the  rocks,  and  the  pyramids  intended 
for  the  sepulchers  of  kings,  belong  among  the  wonders  of  the 
ancient  world,  and  bid  defiance  to  the  ravages  of  time.  The 
present  life  is,  as  with  the  Indians,  lightly  esteemed,  not,  how- 
ever, because  of  the  nullity  of  all  existence  in  general,  but  be- 
cause it  is  contrasted  with  a  higher  life,  which,  as  the  highest 
good,  is  a  richly  promising  moral  goal.  Reminders  of  death 
attend  the  Egyptian  wherever  he  turns,  and  the  mummies  and 
the  images  of  the  dead  were  an  eloquent  memento  mori  even  at 
his  most  convivial  banquets).  "  The  Egyptians,"  says  Diodorus 
(i,  51),  "regard  the  time  of  this  life  with  very  little  esteem ;  the 
dwellings  of  life  they  designate  as  inns,  but  the  graves  as  ever- 
lasting mansions." 

The  heathen  Semitic  nations,  especially  the  Assyrians  and 
Babylonians,  base  themselves,  in  religion  and  morality,  entirely 
on  the  ground  of  the  subjective  spirit,  of  the  individual  person- 
ality. The  general  unity  of  naturalism  they  have  given  up,  but 
they  have  not  as  yet  risen  to  that  of  the  infinite  spirit.  The 
spirit  appears  only  in  the  multiplicity  of  single  forms ;  hence 
these  nations  never  appear  in  history  as  a  unity,  but  always  as 
a  plurality.  In  religion  as  well  as  in  morality  there  is  manifested 
the  reckless  independence  of  the  (now,  for  the  first  time,  vigor- 


58  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  10. 

ously  and  mightily  self-conscious)  subjective  spirit,  from  any 
and  all  unconditional  objective  authority,  whether  of  nature  or 
of  spirit, — an  untaniedness  and  intractableness  of  the  strong  in- 
dividual will,  daring  deeds,  but  also  a  violent  wildness  of  the 
unbent  will  and  of  the  passions, — a  highly  excited  turmoil  with- 
out goal  or  purpose.  Man,  as  a  personal  individual,  comes  into 
the  fore-ground  as  possessed  of  paramount  rights.  Morality  is 
devoid  of  any  certain  basis  and  rule ;  the  strong  individual  will 
breaks  through  all  barriers.  It  is  the  era  of  great  heroes,  and 
of  great  tyrants  and  God-despisers, — from  Nimrod  who  began 
to  be  a  mighty  one  upon  earth,  a  mighty  hunter  before  Jehovah 
(Gen.  x,  8),  to  Nebuchadnezzar,  who  daringly  exalted  himself 
against  God.  The  moral  consciousness,  as  bewildered  by  an 
over-intense  self-consciousness,  manifests  predominantly  a  defi- 
ance on  the  part  of  this  strongly  egotistical  subject  against  all 
objective  power,  even  against  God;  cruelty  and  coarse  sensu- 
ousness  characterize  even  the  rites  of  religion,  and  hence  much 
more  also  the  moral  life.  Nineveh  and  Babylon  attained,  in 
ante-Christian  times,  to  the  culminating-point  of  the  godless, 
pleasure-seeking,  luxurious  life.  Eeligion  and  morality  stand 
here  in  the  most  violent  contrast  to  those  of  India ;  the  rude, 
the  violent,  the  tumultuous,  tolerates  no  law,  no  regulated  order. 


SECTION  X. 

To  a  higher  stand-point,  though  not  to  a  higher 
development  thereof,  than  the  earlier  nations,  rise  the 
merely  transitorily  world-historical  Persians.  The 
violent  dualism  of  two  mutually  morally-opposed  per- 
sonal gods,  calls  also  morality  to  an  earnest  moral 
struggle  against  ante-mundane,  god-sprung  evil ;  the 
moral  personality  comes  much  more  emphatically  into 
the  fore-ground  than  ever  before ;  the  moral  task  be- 
comes more  difficult,  but  it  has  the  certain  promise 
of  ultimate  victory  over  evil,  not  merely  in  a  yon-side 
life,  but  within  the  scope  of  history  itself.  Morality 
has  here,  for  the  first  time  in  heathendom,  a  positive 
goal  inside  of  the  field  of  history,  namely,  the  realiz- 


§  ]Q.]  PERSIAN   THEOLOGY.  59 

ing  of  a  kingdom  of  the  good  upon  earth ;  and  the 
Persians  are  the  sole  heathen  people  who  make  a 
definite  prophecy  the  foundation  of  their  religiously- 
moral  striving.  Hence  the  essence  of  Persian  moral- 
ity consists  in  a  definitely  hope-inspired  conscious 
struggle  against  evil  as  potent  in  the  world,  as  well  as 
in,  and  upon,  man  himself,  and  which,  both  in  its 
guilty  origin  and  in  its  effects,  appears  as  a  not  nat- 
ural but  moral  and  utterly  illegitimate  corruption, — 
in  a  progressive  purification  of  man  from  every  thing 
which  springs  from  all-invading  and  all-infecting  evil, 
— in  a  word,  in  struggling  against  the  world  of  Angra- 
mainyus.  Man  stands  forth  with  his  moral  will,  legit- 
imated and  victorious,  over  against  a  potently  ruling 
divinity. 

The  Persians,  whose  world-historical  sigriificancy  proper  ex- 
tends from  Cyrus  to  Alexander  the  Great,  have  not  been  able 
within  this  short  period  to  develop  their  religiously-moral  con- 
sciousness into  a  scientifically  matured  form.  The  chief  source 
for  the  same — the  Avesta — is  far  inferior  in  contents  and  devel- 
opment of  thought  to  the  so-rich  and  deeply-suggestive  sacred 
writings  of  the  Indians ;  and  yet  the  moral  view,  as  a  whole,  is 
a  higher  one.  The  real  world,  in  which  man  has  morally  to 
work,  is  here  no  longer  the  immediate  divine  essence  itself,  but 
it  has  come  into  existence  essentially  by  a  personal,  divine  act. 
The  spirit,  in  its  personal  reality,  is  no  longer  a  mere  moment- 
ary phenomenon  upon  the  alone-eternal  nature-ground,  as  in 
China  and  India,  nor  is  it  fettered  and  hemmed  by  nature,  as 
over-potent  in  this  life,  as  is  the  case  in  Egypt ;  but  it  is  already 
the  higher  creative  power  over  nature,  although  not  as  yet  a 
perfectly  free  and  omnipotent  Creator.  Hence  the  world,  in  its 
relation  to  the  moral  spirit,  is  no  longer  a  foreign  and  hetero- 
geneous element,  but  as  a  spirit  product,  is  unhostile  and  even 
congenial  to  the  spirit ;  man  begins  to  feel  at  home  in  the  world, 
and  hence  he  places  no  longer  the  goal  of  his  moral  striving 
merely  in  the  yon-side,  but  he  conceives  it  as  to-be-attained-to 


60  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  10. 

within  the  field  of  history.  This  goal  of  moral  effort  is,  however, 
not  to  be  reached  by  a  mere  simple,  natural  development  of 
man,  but  by  a  constant  and  earnest  struggle  against  positively 
extant  evil.  Evil  is  no  longer,  as  with  the  Buddhists  and,  in 
part  already,  with  the  Brahmins,  the  substance  of  the  world, — 
inheres  not  in  the  essence  of  existence  as  inseparable  therefrom, 
but  has  in  fact  become,  through  the  moral  fault  of  the  personal 
spirit, — is  a  guilty  fall  from  the  originally  good.  This  is  a 
thought  more  strongly  approximative  of  the  Christian  world- 
theory  than  we  have  as  yet  met  with  in  our  development  of  the 
history  of  the  moral  consciousness.  Wherever  evil  is  regarded 
as  naturally  necessary,  there  the  vitality  of  the  morally  evil  is 
paralyzed ;  the  Chinese  entertain  not  this  view,  simply  because 
they  conceive  of  evil  in  general  only  very  superficially ;  the  In- 
dians conceive  of  it  far  more  profoundly  and  earnestly,  but  they 
recognize  not  the  moral  root  of  the  same ;  the  Persians  regard 
all  evil  as  springing  exclusively  from  personal  act.  This  act, 
however,  is  not  an  historical  one,  but  a  pre-historical  one ;  not  a 
human  act,  but  a  divine  one.  The  unitary  divinity  per  se,  how- 
ever, cannot  do  evil,  as  is  attributed  to  the  Indian  Brahma,  but 
the  good  God,  Ahura-Mazda,  remains  free  of  all  evil ;  it  is  an- 
other no  less  personal  god,  that  by  free  self-determination,  chose 
the  evil  and  now  thrusts  his  world  into  the  world  of  Ahura- 
Mazda,  and  is  involved  in  all  real  evil  whose  proto-source  he  is, 
— namely,  Angra-mainyua,  that  is,  "the  evilly  disposed,"  the 
author  of  death,  of  falsehood,  of  all  impurity,  and  of  all  hurtful 
creatures, — the  spirit  which  constantly  denies  the  good. 

Although,  according  to  this,  man  has  thrown  off  the  guilt  of 
evil  reality  from  himself  upon  the  world  of  the  gods,  still  he 
conceives  of  his  moral  nature  and  life-task,  in  regard  to  this 
evil,  more  highly  thap  did  the  earlier  nations.  Man,  as  created 
good  by  the  good  god,  is  placed,  with  complete  personal  free- 
dom, in  the  midst  of  the  moral  antagonism  of  the  world,  and 
has  now  actually  to  accomplish  in  his  own  person  the  moral 
task  of  coming  constantly  into  closer  communion  with  Ahura- 
Mazda,  and  to  contend  against  Angra-mainyus  and  all  his 
works.  Morality  is  a  struggle,  and  rests  not  upon  mere  natural 
feelings  and  impulses,  but  upon  the  distinct  consciousness  of 
the  holy  will  of  the  good  god, — upon  the  Word  expressly  re- 
vealed to  men.  By  this  view,  morality  is  made  to  throw  off  all 


§  10.]  PERSIAN   MORALITY.  61 

nature-character,  and  is  placed  in  the  purely  spiritual  sphere, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  subjective  caprice  of  the  Semitic  na- 
tions is  overcome,  and,  for  the  moral,  an  objective  law  obtained, 
a  law  that  is  to  be  received  purely  spiritually.  The  revealed 
holy  Word  is  the  mightiest  weapon  against  Angra-mainyus. — 
This  moral  struggle  is  a  much  more  vigorous  one  than  in  Egypt, 
for  it  is  joyously  and  hopefully  conscious  of  final  victory,  even 
within  the  sphere  of  history.  The  Egyptian  regards  his  god — 
who  is  at  the  same  time  his  moral  example — as  defeated  for  the 
present  world,  and  driven  to  the  future  world ;  the  Persian  feels 
himself  called  even  here  to  a  courageous  co-militancy  with 
Ahura-Mazda,  who  persistently  struggles  against  evil,  and  does 
not  succumb  to  it,  not  even  in  the  present  world.  The  Persian 
regards  himself  as  a  co-worker  with  God,  and  does  not  mourn- 
fully long  for  the  next  world;  for  his  moral  effort,  he  has  a 
high  object,  namely,  to  combat  against  a  god  and  the  evil  crea- 
tion of  that  god, — also  a  high  goal,  namely,  the  redemption  of 
a  world  from  evil, — and  also  a  high  confidence  in  victory,  for 
there  will  ultimately  come  the  Rescuer,  £aoschyan9,  that  is,  the 
Helper,  who  will  accomplish  the  victory.  It  is  not  by  mere 
chance  that  the  Persians — who  usually  showed  themselves  hos- 
tile to  foreign  religions,  and  especially  to  all  sensuous  idolatry — 
manifested  constantly  a  high  regard  for  the  Jews,  in  whose  higher 
idea  of  God  they  met  in  fact  with  a  somewhat  related  element. 

In  correspondence  to  its  religious  presupposition,  Persian 
morality  bears  primarily  a  negating  character,  though  in  a 
wholly  different  manner  than  among  the  Indians.  While  the 
system  of  the  latter  is  directed  against  existence,  and  especially 
against  the  personal  nature  of  man,  Persian  morality  on  the  con- 
trary directs  itself,  with  the  most  complete  consciousness  of  the 
validity  of  the  personality,  negatingly  against  every  thing  which 
belongs  to  the  world  of  Angra-mainyus.  Self-purification  from 
every  thing  which  stands  really,  or  even  merely  symbolically,  in 
relation  with  evil,  death,  or  corruption, — the  killing  of  poison- 
ous and  hurtful  animals,  and  the  like,  are  not  merely  moral 
requirements,  but  even  acts  of  worship,  and  the  Avesta  gives, 
on  these  points,  very  precise  and  detailed  directions. 

But  also  the  positive  phase  of  the  moral  life  is  much  more 
highly  developed  in  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Persians 
than  in  that  of  the  earlier  nations.  The  Persians  acquired 


62  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.*  [§11. 

among  their  contemporaries  the  reputation  of  high  moral  ear- 
nestness as  in  contrast  to  the  luxuriousness  of  the  Semitic 
nations.  They  were,  in  their  prime,  a  very  vivacious  and  vigor- 
ously active  people ;  indolence  springs  of  Angra-rnainyus ;  labor, 
especially  agriculture,  internal  improvements,  etc.,  are  required 
by  the  good  god,  and  are  sacred  duties ;  this  is  somewhat  as  it 
is  in  Chinese  morality,  but  from  a  different  reason ;  the  Chinese 
labor  for  the  present,  the  Persians  for  the  future. — The  moral 
relation  to  other  men  is  here  kindly  and  noble ;  a  high  esteem 
for  the  personality,  in  every  respect,  forms  the  basis  of  social 
virtue.  Honesty,  strict  truthfulness,  and  a  high  feeling  of  per- 
sonal honor,  distinguish  Persian  morality  very  widely  from 
East-Asiatic.  It  is  a  morality  of  vigor  and  manliness. 

Where  evil  is  no  longer  regarded  as  a  merely  abstract  some- 
thing, as  a  quality  of  existence  in  general,  but  as  a  concrete 
guilt  reality,  not  a  mere  neutrum,  but  as  borne  by  personality, 
there  only  can  the  moral  struggle  against  the  same  be  really 
earnest.  The  Chinaman  labors  quietly  and  busily  in  mechan- 
ical persistence;  the  Indian  patiently  endures;  the  Egyptian 
mourns,  and  longs  to  pass  out  of  this  world ;  the  Shemite  riots 
and  enjoys ;  but  the  Persian  battles  with  a  manfully-moral  ear- 
nestness. The  defective  phase  of  his  moral  consciousness  is 
essentially  this,  that  he  throws  evil  off  from  himself  upon  the 
sphere  of  the  gods, — that  he  has  not  recognized  the  evil  of  his 
own  heart. 

SECTION  XI. 

The  moral  consciousness  of  the  Greeks  is  very  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  the  Persians ;  though  rising  above 
it,  it  yet  seems  to  throw  the  approximation  to  the 
Christian  view,  that  lay  in  the  Persian  consciousness, 
farther  again  into  the  back-ground.  The  heathen 
mind  could  not  remain  stationary  at  Persian  dualism  ; 
the  Greeks  endeavor  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation 
of  the  antagonism  of  the  universe,  by  throwing  this 
antagonism  into  the  past,  and  by  regarding  the  pres- 
ent ae  an  expression  of  the  harmony  of  existence  as 
effected  at  the  very  beginning  of  history  by  a  victory 


§  11.]  GREEK   VIEWS.  63 

of  the  persona]  spirit  over  the  nature-powers  that  op- 
posed it;  the  dualism  of  hostile  antagonism  gives 
place  to  a  dualism  of  love.  No  evil  god  and  no 
nature-power  hostile  to  the  personal  spirit,  offer  ob- 
struction to  the  moral  activity.  Morality  is  not  a 
struggle,  but  a  progressive  development  of  man  as 
per  se  good  and  pure ;  by  following  his  own  inwardly 
harmonious  nature,  by  enjoying  the  intrinsically  beau- 
tiful existence  of  the  world,  and  by  exalting  sensu- 
ous enjoyment  by  means  of  spiritual  culture,  and  by 
equally  developing  all  the  phases  both  of  his  sensuous 
and  of  his  spiritual  life,  man  arrives  at  the  harmoni- 
ous perfection  of  his  personality, — at  the  highest  goal 
of  moral  effort.  The  beautiful  is  per  se  the  good  ;  in 
enjoying  and  creating  the  beautiful,  man  is  moral. 
The  battle  is  not  against  a  world  of  evil  that  is  to  be 
destroyed,  nor  in  championship  of  a  moral  idea  that 
is  to  be  realized ;  but  its  end  is  simply  to  develop  the 
full  personality  of  the  hero.  The  Greek  battles  for 
the  sake  of  battling ;  the  battle  is  even  enjoyment,  is 
heroic  play.  The  Greek  ideal  is  the  vigorous,  youth- 
ful personality, — in  the  world  of  gods,  the  youthful 
Apollo,  in  the  world  of  heroes,  Achilles,  until,  at  the 
close  of  Grecian  history,  it  assumes  a  world-historical 
form  in  Alexander  the  Great.  But  the  entire  ideal 
element  inheres  in  the  person  of  the  hero ;  a  perma- 
nent moral  world-historical  reality,  the  Greeks  could 
not  create;  they  lacked  the  positively  world-historical 
purpose;  Alexander's  world-conquering  deeds  aimed 
at,  and  were  able  to  effect,  only  an  exaltation  of  the 
person  of  the  hero,  and  necessarily  ended  in  anarchy 
at  his  death,  and  the  Greeks  became  an  easy  prey  to 
that  nation  which  aimed  with  iron-persistency  at  the 
positive  purpose  of  a  unitary  historical  reality,  and 


64  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  11. 

absolutely  subordinated  the  person  to  the  same.  The 
moral  idea  is,  with  the  Greeks,  more  an  object  of 
artistic  enjoyment  than  of  moral  realization.  For  the 
positive  basis  of  the  higher  moral  life,  the  family, 
their  moral  consciousness  is  extremely  defective,  and 
the  idea  of  man  as  man,  has  not  as  yet  come  to  con- 
sciousness ;  only  the  Hellene,  but  not  the  barbarian, 
is  regarded  as  a  truly  moral  personality.  Slavery  is 
the  indispensable  foundation  of  the  free  state. 

The  precedent  antagonism  of  existence,  which  conies  to  con- 
sciousness in  all  heathen  religions, — primarily  as  an  antithesis 
of  nature  and  spirit,  which  rises  with  the  Persians  to  a  moral 
character, — is,  with  the  Greeks,  not  indeed  entirely  overcome 
(heathenism  in  fact  never  rises  beyond  it),  but  in  fact  reduced 
to  harmony,  a  harmony,  however,  which,  as  viewed  from  a  Chris- 
tian stand-point,  must  be  regarded  as  delusive.  The  conscious- 
ness of  this  antagonism  comes  to  expression  in  myths  concerning 
ancient  combats  between  the  spiritual  gods  and  Titanic  nature- 
powers;  the  gods  came  off  victorious,  and  the  present  world 
expresses  the  peaceful  reconciliation  of  the  earlier  antagonisms ; 
every-where,  both  in  the  world  of  gods  and  of  men,  spirit  and 
nature  are  in  harmonious  union ;  there  is  nowhere  mere  spirit, 
and  nowhere  mere  nature.  What  appears  as  a  hostile  power 
over  the  personal  spirit,  was  already  vanquished  anterior  to 
human  history;  no  inimical,  evil  god  disturbs  the  beautiful 
harmony  of  existence ;  the  Titans  have  been  thrust  into  Tar- 
tarus. The  foundation  of  Greek  morality  is  therefore  joy  in 
existence, — love  as  enjoyment ;  man  has  not  to  sacrifice  his  ex- 
istence and  his  wishes,  but  only  to  heighten  the  former,  and  to 
fulfill  the  latter,  in  so  far  as  they  express  the  character  of  har- 
mony, of  the  beautiful;  he  has  not,  as  with  the  Indians,  to 
renounce  the  world,  but  on  the  contrary  to  enjoy  it,  as  bearing 
every-where  the  stamp  of  the  beautiful,  and  to  remain  in  genial 
peace  therewith, — has  not,  as  the  Persian,  to  battle  against  its 
reality  as  permeated  with  evil,  but  simply  to  pluck  from  it  the 
fruits  of  happiness.  Greek  morality  is  the  morality  of  him  who 
is  complacently  self-satisfied,  without  any  severe  inner  struggle. 

The  Hellene  has,  in  his  consciousness  of  the  harmony  of  ex- 


§  11.]  IDEAL    VERSUS  REAL.  65 

istence,  on  the  one  hand  a  powerful  stimulus  to  virtue;  he 
endeavors  to  preserve  this  harmony,  and  hence  is  in  general 
amiable,  frank,  and  honorable ;  to  a  certain  degree  he  shows  also 
magnanimity  toward  his  enemies, — respects  the  moral  personal- 
ity ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  has  in  this  consciousness  also 
the  tendency  to  make  light  with  the  moral ;  he  believes  himself 
already  to  have  attained  to  the  good,  and  not  to  need  to  under- 
go a  severe  struggle  for  its  possession, — believes  himself  to  have 
already,  in  his  natural  proclivities,  also  the  right.  Hence  he  is 
inclined  to  take  life  unseriously ;  even  unnatural  lusts  pass  for 
allowed,  if  they  only  appear  under  the  form  of  the  beautiful. 
The  beauty  of  the  manner  beautifies  the  sin,  and  the  worship 
of  Aphrodite  lends  to  sensuality  itself  a  religious  sanction. 
Greek  effeminacy  and  luxuriousness — despised  only  by  the  Spar- 
tans— became  even  a  by-word  among  the  Romans ;  and  even 
the  dark  passions  of  hate  and  revenge  found  in  the  Greek  con- 
sciousness little  condemnation ;  no  Greek  took  offense  at  the 
barbarous  mistreatment  of  the  hero  Hector.  The  most  virtuous 
citizens  were  not  respected,  but  banished;  sycophants  were 
honored,  and  the  friends  of  truth  hated  or  killed. 

A  high  sense  for  beauty  raises  indeed  the  moral  consciousness 
to  a  high  and  harmonious  conception  of  moral  beauty,  and  the 
poets  sketch  moral  ideals  with  master-hand;  but  these  ideals 
are  more  for  esthetic  enjoyment  than  for  moral  imitation.  Even 
morality  becomes  to  the  Hellene  a  matter  of  mere  spectacle,  and 
in  no  heathen  nation  is  the  contrast  between  the  ideal  and  the 
real  life  so  great,  as  in  that  one  which  conceived  the  ideal  the 
highest.  For  the  practical  life  the  requirements  of  the  moral 
consciousness  were  other  than  for  poetry;,  the  same  people 
which  admired  female  ideals,  such  as  Penelope,  Antigone,  and 
Electra,  as  presented  in  song  and  upon  the  stage,  placed  woman- 
hood and  marriage,  and  the  family-life  in  general,  much  lower 
in  real  life  than  did  the  Chinese  or  the  ancient  Germans ;  and  it 
was  not  merely  in  the  censured  license  of  the  frivolous  world, 
but  also  in  the  moral  views  of  the  most  highly  cultured,  that 
talented  concubines  (especially  after  the  example  of  Aspasia, 
notorious  for  her  connection  with  Pericles,  and  also  honored  by 
Socrates)  stood  higher  than  house-wives  proper,  and  became  the 
real  representatives  of  female  culture,  and  ideals  of  female  grace. 
Sparta,  by  its  legislation,  overthrew  on  principle  the  proper  life 


66  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  1L 

of  the  family ;  the  penal  laws  against  bachelors  which  finally 
became  a  necessity,  furnish  proof,  how  popular  this  anti-family 
legislation  was.*  Solon  found  it  necessary  in  the  interest  of  the 
State  to  protect  by  penal  enactments  the  merest  natural  duties 
of  the  marriage-state,  at  least  within  the  bounds  of  a  minimum 
requirement ;  t — so  great  was  already  in  his  day  the  general  dis- 
inclination to  wedlock,  which,  though  forming  the  foundation 
of  all  true  morality,  was  regarded  in  the  Golden  Age  of  Greece 
as  little  better  than  a  necessary  evil.  The  bringing  about  of 
abortion  and  the  exposing  of  new-born  children,  was  a  right  of 
parents,  which  was  not  only  protected  by  laws,  but  even  defend- 
ed by  the  most  esteemed  philosophers.  The  perverseness  not 
only  of  frivolous  practice,  but  of  the  general  moral  conscious- 
ness, is  manifested  most  strikingly  in  the  prevalence  of  unnatural 
vice,  as  apologized  for  even  by  philosophers  themselves ;  and 
the  dark  picture  of  St.  Paul  not  merely  of  Greek  morality  it- 
self, but  also  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Greeks  (Rom.  i, 
21  tqq.~),  is  perfectly  corroborated  by  historical  reality.  In  cer- 
tain efforts  of  recent  date  to  clarify  the  Christian  world-view  by 
the  help  of  the  "classical"  one,  these  facts  ought  not  to  be  left 
out  of  sight.  The  heathen  Germans  stand  in  this  respect  very 
much  higher  than  the  Greeks. 

However  fully  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  worth  and  dig- 
nity of  the  personality  is  developed,  still  the  dignity  of  true 
manhood  is  conceded  only  to  the  free  Hellenes,  who  constituted 
by  far  the  smallest  number  of  the  Greek  population.  (In  Attica 
at  its  highest  prosperity  there  were  400,000  slaves,  in  Corinth 
460,000).  The  barbarian  and  the  slave  have  no  right  to  the  full 
dignity  of  personality.  Freedom  without  slavery  is,  in  the  eyes 
of  a  Greek,  an  absurdity.  The  generally  prevalent  mild  treat- 
ment of  their  slaves  was  more  an  expression  of  natural  kind- 
heartedness  and  of  personal  interest  than  of  conceded  right ;  the 
Spartan  slave-massacres  were  the  expression  of  an  undisputed 
right  of  the  State  and  of  the  free  citizens ;  even  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle are  unable  to  conceive  of  a  State  and  of  political  freedom 
without  the  personal  unfreedom  of  slavery.  The  so-called  no- 
tion of  "  humanitarianism  "  limits  the  practice  of  this  virtue  to 
the  possessors  of  slaves ;  and  the  higher  the  right  and  the  might 
of  the  free  citizens  are  placed,  so  much  the  more  complete  and 
*  Plato:  Symp.,  p.  192.  f  Plutarch:  Solon,  c.  20. 


§  11.]  IDEAL  ADVANCE.  67 

striking  becomes  also  the  rightlessness  of  the  slaves.  That 
slaves  are  but  domestic  animals  possessed  of  intelligence  was  a. 
general  maxim,  recognized  even  by  philosophers. 

Though  the  reality  of  the  moral  consciousness  and  of  the 
moral  life  of  the  Greek  is  in  many  respects  far  below  that  of 
other  heathen  nations,  still  the  moral  idea  that  underlies  this 
reality  is  a  higher  one.  That  which,  in  the  Christian  world- 
view,  forms  the  presupposition  of  all  truly  moral  life,  namely, 
the  reconciliation  of  the  contradiction  and  of  the  antagonism  in 
the  world  of  reality,  the  higher  right  and  the  higher  power  of 
the  personal  spirit  over  unfree  nature,  this  is  recognized  by  the 
Greeks,  though  indeed  with  heathen  perversions,  in  a  higher 
manner  than  is  the  case  among  the  earlier  heathen  nations. 
Only  man  as  redeemed  by  the  historical  redemption-act  from 
the  power  of  his  sinful  naturalness,  and  as  now  for  the  first 
having  risen  to  a  truly  free  moral  personality,  is  capable,  accord- 
ing to  the  Christian  view,  of  accomplishing  true  morality; — 
also  the  Hellene  makes  the  reconciliation  of  the  antagonism,  the 
actual  harmony  of  human  nature  and  of  existence  in  general, 
the  presupposition  of  morality,  and  conceives  this  reconciliation 
as  one  that  falls  indeed  before  human  history,  but  yet  is  accom- 
plished by  the  free  act  of  the  personal  spirit;  whereas  with  the 
earlier  nations  (where  the  consciousness  of  the  inner  antagonism 
and  contradiction  is  also  recognized)  the  right  of  the  personal 
spirit  is  either  rejected,  or  else  thrown  for  its  realization  into 
the  far  future,  either  into  the  life  after  death,  or  at  least  toward 
the  close  of  the  world's  history.  It  is  true,  this  thought  of  a 
reconciliation  is  made  possible  only  by  the  fact  that  the  con- 
sciousness of  moral  guilt  is  kept  away  from  the  antagonism  that 
is  to  be  reconciled,  and  that  this  antagonism  is  conceived  rather 
as  of  a  primitive  cosmical  character,  and  moreover  that  not  man 
but  the  personal  gods  enter  into  the  sphere  thereof,  and,  bat- 
tling, overcome, — so  that  there  is  left  for  man  nothing  further 
than  the  enjoyable  repetition  of  the  same  in  artistic  pl<iy  ;  the 
Olympic  games  are  a  commemoration  of  the  battles  of  the 
Titans ;  and,  accordingly,  the  entire  moral  life  becomes  to  the 
Greek  an  artistic  play ; — nevertheless  the  ground-thought  is  still 
of  high  significancy, — the  thought  that  only  man  as  having 
become  free  through  the  reconciliation  of  the  antagonism  of  real 
existence  is  capable  of  morality.  But  that  the  carrying-out  of 

6 


68  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  11. 

this  thought  is  weakened  down  on  all  sides,  that  the  Greek  does 
not  in  his  moral  consciousness  rise  out  of  his  esthetic  play  to 
full  earnestness  of  life,  this  is  in  fact  simply  the  heathen  charac- 
ter of  this  consciousness.  And  even  in  the  fact  that  to  the 
Hellene,«rnorality  appears  so  easy,  there  lies  a  presentiment  of 
the  true  thought,  that  to  the  morally  emancipated  man  the 
moral  law  appears  no  longer  as  a  yoke  or  burden,  but  is,  on  the 
contrary,  the  direct,  unforced,  bliss-inspired  and  blissful  life- 
outgush  of  sanctified  human  nature.  To  no  nation  of  heathen- 
dom does  morality  become  so  light  a  task  as  to  the  Hellenes. 
The  Hellene  knows  no  moral  code  of  laws  compelling  the  moral 
subject  to  obedience,  with  objective  authority;  and  even  the 
moralizing  philosophers  themselves,  in  striking  contrast  to  the 
Chinese,  the  Indians,  and  even  the  Persians,  tarry  almost  exclu- 
sively in  the  sphere  of  general  thoughts,  and  give  only  seldom 
definite  precepts  for  the  details  of  life.  The  moral  subject  bears 
the  law  within  himself,  and  bows  himself  under  no  foreign 
objective  law.  And  this  is  in  fact  but  a  heathen  perversion  of 
the  per  se  true  thought,  that  with  the  spiritually-regenerated  the 
law  of  God  is  written  in  their  hearts, — that  to  them  liis  yoke  is 
easy  and  his  burden  light.  As  the  Chinese  and  Persian  con- 
sciousness shows  some  resemblance  to  that  of  the  Hebrews,  so 
the  Greek  consciousness  has  analogies  to  the  Christian,  espe- 
cially as  the  latter  is  presented  by  that  Apostle  who  labored 
among  the  Greeks.  That  with  the  Greeks  the  analogical  thought 
rests  upon  an  untrue  foundation,  and  worked  hurtfully  in  its 
carrying-out, — that  it  led  to  sinful  presumption,  and  created  a 
morality  actually  inferior  in  many  respects  to  that  of  the  Chi- 
nese, the  Indians  and  Persians, — this  evinces  not  the  fallacious- 
ness of  the  thought  per  se,  but  only  the  perversity  of  the  natural 
man,  who  turns  all  the  truth  attainable  by  him  into  the  service 
of  sin,  and  thus  confirms  the  weighty  utterance  that  only  he 
"whom  the  Son  makes  free  is  free  indeed."  He  who  is  in- 
wardly unfree,  and  yet  imagines  himself  free,  is  morally  in 
greater  danger  than  he  who  is  unfree  and  also  knows  himself  as 
such.  -The  Greek  appears  morally  more  responsible  and  more 
guilty  than  the  other  heathen,  because  he  has  a  higher  knowl- 
edge; and  the  Apostle's  moral  sentence  upon  the  heathen 
[Rom.  i,  18  sqq.]  falls  upon  the  Greeks  with  much  greater  force 
than  upon  the  other  heathen. 


§  12.]  PRINCIPLES   OF  SOCKATES.  69 

SECTION  XII. 

To  a  philosophical  form,*  the  moral  consciousness 
of  the  Greeks  rose,  with  some  distinctness,  for  the 
first,  through  Socrates  /  before  him  we  find  little  more 
than  a  practical  morality  expressed  in. disconnected 
moral  maxims,  without  further  proof  or  development. 
Socrates,  who  speculated  less  on  metaphysical  ques- 
tions than  simply  on  the  good,  not  only  bases  the 
moral  upon  philosophical  knowledge,  but  finds  in  fact 
in  this  knowledge  the  essence  and  the  highest  degree 
of  the  moral.  To  know  is  the  highest  virtue,  and  out 

O  j 

of  this  virtue  follow  directly  and  with  inner  necessity 
all  the  others ;  a  contradiction  between  knowledge 
and  volition  is  inconceivable;  practically,  morality 
manifests  itself  in  the  subordinating  of  the  irrational 
desires  to  rational  knowledge,  and  especially  in  obe- 
dience^to  civil  laws.  Unconscious  of  the  might  of  evil 
in  the  natural  man,  Socrates  conceives  the  moral  es- 
sentially only  as  measured  by  a  rational  calculating 
of  outward  fitness  to  ends.  His  significancy  for  moral 
philosophy  lies  in  his  calling  attention  to  rational 
knowledge  as  the  source  of  the  moral,  and  to  the  no 
longer  arbitrarily  subjectively-determined  good  as  the 
end  of  rational  effort. 

The  Greeks  occupy  themselves  very  early  with  the  nature  of 
the  moral ;  the  most  ancient  so-called  Wise  Men  are,  for  the 
most  part,  moralists.  It  was  very  long,  however,  before  the 
Greeks  reduced  their  isolatedly-presented,  and  rather  empiric- 
ally-based, moral  maxims  to  any  sort  of  unity  and  order.  Phi- 
losophy proper  occupied  itself  primarily  with  purely  metaphys- 
ical questions,  and  the  moral  views  expressed  were,  with  the 
earlier  philosophers,  for  the  most  part,  a  mere  supplement  of 

*  Wehr  en  pfennig :  Verschiedenlieit  d.  eth.  Princ.  b.  d.  Hdlenen,  1856. 


70  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  12. 

observations  and  life-rules  but  loosely  connected  with  their  spec- 
ulations proper. 

Socrates  was  the  first  who,  as  it  was  said,  called  philosophy 
from  heaven  to  the  sphere  of  the  earth ;  it  is  with  him  essen- 
tially moral,  and,  from  merely  metaphysical  speculations,  he 
turns  away  with  a  certain  displeasure ;  even  in  his  consideration 
of  the  idea  of  God,  greater  prominence  is  given  to  the  moral 
phase  of  the  divine  activity.  With  him  the  knowledge  of  the 
good  is  the  chief  end  of  philosophy;  but,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  here  ethics  springs  exclusively  from  philosophy,  the  element 
of  knowledge  far  outweighs  in  it  the  element  of  the  heart.  The 
ethics  of  Socrates  is  a  coldly  rational  calculating ;  it  has  not,  as 
has  Christian  ethics,  an  historical  basis  and  presupposition,  but 
is  invented  purely  d  priori.  Man  is  by  nature  thoroughly  good, 
— is,  in  his  freedom,  not  simply  at  first  as  yet  undecided,  but  he 
has  by  nature  a  decided  tendency  to  the  good,  just  as  reason  has 
a  natural  affinity  for  the  truth.  Evil  is  by  no  means  to  be  ex- 
plained from  mere  volition,  but  only  from  error.  The  human 
understanding  can  err,  and  the  act  resulting  from  error  is  the 
evil ;  without  error  there  would  be  no  evil,  and  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  that  man  should  not  also  will  that  which  he  has  rec- 
ognized as  good.  It  needs,  therefore,  only  that  men  be  brought 
to  a  knowledge  of  the  good,  and  then  they  will  also  act  virtu- 
ously. The  motive  to  the  moral  is  not  love,  but  knowledge;  to 
instruct  is  to  make  better ;  the  philosopher  is  also  the  virtuous 
man,  and  only  the  philosopher  can  practice  true  virtue;  the 
ignorant  man  is  also  immoral.  Self-knowledge — the  yvudi 
aeavrdv — is  the  presupposition  of  all  morality, — not,  however,  in 
the  sense  familiar  to  Christians,  of  a  knowledge  of  the  heart  as 
inclined  to  sin,  but  only  in  the  sense  of  a  knowledge  of  the  log- 
ical nature  of  the  thinking  spirit;  in  his  dialogues,  Socrates 
does  not  think  of  bringing  men  to  a  knowledge  of  their  moral 
guilt,— he  simply  aims  to  convince  them  as  to  how  little  they 
as  yet  leiww.  Hence  ethics  is  with  him  a  one-sided  doctrine  of 
knowledge.  There  is  properly-speaking  only  one  virtue,  and 
this  is  wisdom,  that  is,  knowledge ;  and  all  other  virtues  are 
only  different  forms  of  this  one  virtue.* 

*  Aristotle :  Eth.  Me.,  vi,  13 ;  iii,  6, 7 ;  Eth.  Hud.,  i,  5 ;  vii,  13 ;  Magn. 
Mor.,  i,  1,  9;  ii,  6;  Xen. :  Mem.,  i,  1,  16 ;  iii,  9,  4,  5;  iv,  6,  6;  Plato: 
Lack.,  p.  194  »qq. ;  Apol.,  p  26;  Diog.  L.,  ii,  31. 


§  12.]  PLATO   ON  THE   GOOD.  71 

Practically,  wisdom  manifests  itself  mainly  in  self-mastery, 
that  is,  in  governing  by  knowledge  all  appetites,  dispositions, 
feelings,  and  passions.  Man  must  always  remain  master  of  him- 
self,— must  in  all  circumstances,  however  different,  always  act 
strictly  according  to  his  knowledge  and  in  harmony  with  him- 
self,— must  not  let  himself  be  led  by  unconscious  desires ;  and, 
inasmuch  as  a  man's  knowledge  cannot  be  taken  from  him,  and 
as  the  changeable  movements  of  feeling  are  under  the  control  of 
knowledge,  hence  man  has  in  this  faculty  of  knowledge  also 
complete  hajyiness,  and  the  wise  man  is  necessarily  also  happy; 
and  this  happiness  depends  exclusively  on  himself.  Therein 
consists  the  freedom  of  the  sage. — Knowledge,  virtue,  and  hap- 
piness are  consequently  not  essentially  different  from  each  other, 
— are  simply  different  phases  of  the  same  thing.  In  that  Soc- 
rates essentially  identifies  the  good  with  knowledge,  he  raises  it 
above  the  arbitrary  caprice  of  the  individual  subject,  seeing 
that  truth  is  not  dependent  on  the  good  pleasure  of  said  subject. 
Thus  the  good  has  a  validity  independently  of  the  individual,  and 
all  rational  men  must  recognize  the  same  thing  as  good.  Hence 
the  moral  idea  has  attained  to  contents  of  a  general  and  neces- 
sary character;  and  Socrates  recognizes  the  objective  signifi- 
cancy  of  the  same,  in  that  he  ascribes  right  wisdom  to  God 
alone.* 

These  general  thoughts  form  the  scientific  basis  of  the  subse- 
quent currents  of  philosophy.  Socrates  himself  does  not  rise 
beyond  them  and  enter  into  details.  Whenever  the  question  is 
as  to  giving  to  these  general  thoughts  more  definite  contents, 
he  refers  to  the  laws  of  the  State,  in  the  fulfilling  of  which  man 
fulfills  the  requirements  of  morality.  Hence  his  morality  is 
merely  Greek  civic  virtue, — has  no  higher  ideal  contents.  To 
obey  the  laws  of  the  State  is  the  sum  of  all  duties ;  a  diKaiog  is 
the  same  as  a  vo^t/xog.  To  do  good  to  one's  friends,  and  evil  to 
one's  enemies,  is  a  moral  requirement,!  though  indeed  to  suffer 
wrong  is  better  than  to  do  it, — the  doing  of  evil  to  one's  enemies 
being  in  fact  not  a  wrong,  but  a  legitimate  retaliation.! 

In  general  the  tendency  of  Socrates  is  toward  a  dry,  prosaic 
utilitarianism.  His  moral  views,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  ideal- 
ized by  Plato,  are  devoid  of  all  ideal  enthusiasm.  And  in  his 

*  Plato:  Apol.,  p.  23.  t  Xen. :  Mem.,  ii,  6,  35. 

t  Plato :  Rep.,  i,  p.  335 ;  Onto,  p.  49. 


72  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  13. 

own  moral  life  he  by  no  means  rises  beyond  ordinary  Greek 
morality ;  and  it  required  all  the  superficiality  of  modern  deistic 
"  illuininisni,"  to  undertake  to  place  Socrates  as  a  moral  ideal 
by  the  side  of  Christ.  In  Plato's  Symposium,  Socrates  surpasses 
all  the  others  in  drinking,  and  even  outquaffs  the  whole  com- 
pany without  getting  intoxicated  himself;  and  yet  even  this 
Platonic  Socrates  is  already  considerably  idealized.  In  Xeno- 
phon*  he  goes  with  a  friend  to  a  hetaera,  who  is  sitting  as  a 
model  for  a  painter,  and  instructs  her  in  the  art  of  enticing  men. 
The  manner  in  which  it  has  been  attempted  to  justify  this,  is 
not  of  the  most  happy.  If,  in  such  a  case,  Socrates  knows  of 
nothing  better  than  to  indulge  in  plays  of  dialectical  skill,  evi- 
dently his  judgment  of  the  matter  itself  is  not  very  condemna- 
tory. And  in  other  respects  his  bearing  toward  lasciviousness,t 
gives  evidence  of  deep  erroneousness  of  moral  consciousness  even 
in  the  philosopher  himself.  Of  moral  and  family  love,  Socrates 
has,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  of  him  goes,  scarcely  a  presenti- 
ment. When  his  wife  comes,  with  her  child,  into  the  prison,  to 
take  leave  of  her  husband  after  his  condemnation  to  death, 
Socrates  simply  turns  to  his  friends,  and  says  dryly,  "  Let  some 
one,  I  pray  you,  take  the  woman  away  from  here,  to  her  house;" 
and  she  is  led  out  by  a  slave;  and  in  his  last  long  farewell 
speech  to  the  world,  Socrates  bestows  upon  wife  and  children 
not  a  single  word.  For  his  virtues,  such  as  they  were,  he  is 
worthy  of  praise,  but  still  he  manifestly  does  not  rise  above  mere 
Greek  virtue. 

SECTION  XIII. 

From  Socrates  there  sprang  np  several  mutually- 
differing  schools,  the  peculiarity  and  difference  of 
Avhich  lie  especially  in  their  ethical  views. —  The 
Cynics  (through  Antisthenes)  develop  the  doctrine  of 
Socrates  as  to  the  ethical  significancy  of  knowledge, 
into  one-sided  prominence  in  its  practical  application. 
Knowledge  works  directly  the  good ;  virtue,  as  rest- 
ing exclusively  on  knowledge,  is  the  highest  goal  of 
human  life.  It  manifests  itself  essentially  in  the 

*  Mem.,  iii,  11.  t 2bid.,  i,  3,  U,  15. 


§  13.]  THE  CYNICS  AND   CYRENAICS.  73 

struggle  against  irrational  desires ;  desirelessness  is 
the  highest  virtue. —  Over  against  the  Cynics,  the 
Cyrenaics  (through  Aristippus)  emphasize  the  other 
phase  of  the  wisdom-life,  namely,  happiness.  Happi- 
ness is  the  highest  good,  and  therefore  the  highest 
goal  of  the  moral ;  virtue  is  only  a  means  to  this  end. 
And  happiness  consists  in  the  feeling  of  pleasure,  in 
enjoyment.  Hence  enjoyment  is  the  goal  of  the  moral 
striving ;  in  it  alone  man  becomes  free,  because  in  it 
the  desires  that  press  and  disturb  him  come  to  quiet. 

Both  of  these  schools  undertake  to  find  an  objective  ground 
for  the  moral;  in  fact,  however,  neither  of  them  finds  any  thing 
more  than  a  strictly  subjective  one ;  the  Cynics  take  their  start- 
ing-point in  subjective  knowledge,  and  in  the  will  as  determined 
thereby;  the  Cyrenaics,  in  feeling.  Both  schools  are  equally 
one-sided  developments  of  tendencies  that  existed  in  germ  in 
Socrates.  If  knowledge,  virtue,  and  happiness  are  essentially 
the  same  thing,  then  it  is  indifferent  which  of  these  phases  is 
made  the  starting-point, — whether  it  be  said  that  virtue  consists 
in  an  unconditional  obedience  to  knowledge,  or  in  the  striving 
after  happiness ;  and  hence  the  Cynic  is  right  when  he  asserts, 
that  in  following  knowledge  we  need  not  inquire  as  to  the 
sensation  of  pleasure  or  displeasure,  for  true  happiness  follows 
from  virtue  of  necessity ;  and  if  sensation  should  seem  to  con- 
tradict this,  then  it  is  simply  to  be  despised  as  a  false  one.  The 
Cyrenaic  is  likewise  consequential  when  he  asserts,  that  in  fol- 
lowing the  feeling  of  happiness  we  need  not  inquire  as  to  philo- 
sophical knowledge,  for  as  happiness  follows  from  virtue  of 
necessity,  hence  in  the  feeling  of  pleasure  we  have  certain  proof 
that  we  are  practicing  virtue,  and  hence  also  that  we  correctly 
understand  the  good. 

The  Cynics  give  exclusive  predominance  to  the  rational  tend- 
ency in  Socrates ;  there  is  for  the  good  in  the  widest  sense  of 
the  word  no  other  decisive  criterion  than  knowledge.  And  the 
knowledge  of  the  good  and  the  manner  of  action  that  rests  ex- 
clusively upon  this  knowledge,  are  the  sole  thing  which  has  real 
worth  for  man.  Only  the  good  in  this  sense  is  beautiful,  and 


74  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  13. 

only  evil  is  deformed ;  whatever  else  is  pleasant  for  the  senses 
or  feelings  is  entirely  worthless ;  and  even  all  knowledge  that 
does  not  relate  to  the  good  is  useless.  True  freedom  consists 
in  perfect  indifference  to  whatever  lies  outside  of  the  individual 
spirit.  All  evil  rests  upon  error, — has  its  source  in  false  impres- 
sions and  ideas,  but  not  at  all  in  the  heart.  The  wise  man  is, 
in  virtue  of  his  knowledge,  free  from  all  evil. — The  independ- 
ence of  the  personal  spirit  is  here  most  one-sidedly  conceived 
of,  as  a  contemptuous  turning-away  from  all  objective  reality, — 
as  an  over-confident  trusting  in  one's  (evidently  very  immature 
and  fortuitous)  subjective  knowledge,  as  a  complete  self-isolation 
of  the  persistently  opinionated  subject.  Hence  there  result  an 
absolute  indifference  to  all  outer  existence,  even  to  all  historical 
reality  and  to  social  custom,  a  throwing  off  of  all  reverence  for 
the  Objective  reality  of  the  spirit  as  developing  itself  in  history. 
However  much  of  truth  may  lie  in  the  ground-thought  of  Cyn- 
icism, still  its  practical  development  on  the  basis  of  its  defective 
presuppositions  leads  almost  necessarily  to  a  caricature, — to  an 
unbridled  insolence  of  the  immature  spirit,  giving  birth  to  such 
phenomena  as  that  of  Diogenes.  There  is  manifested  in  this 
school  the  pride  of  easily-satisfied  self-righteousness,  the  haughty 
self-isolation  of  the  subject  as  breaking  loose  from  all  objective 
realization  of  the  rational  spirit. 

The  Cyrenuics  pushed  to  its  extreme  the  other  phase.  A 
happiness  which  I  do  not  feel  as  pleasure,  is  none  at  all.  If 
virtue  makes  happy,  then  I  must  at  once  also  feel  it.  Hence 
that  whick  is  truly  good,  must  at  once  evince  itself  as  such  in 
the  sphere  of  the  sensibilities ;  and,  conversely,  -that  which  im- 
presses me  pleasurably  must  be  good,  otherwise  there  would  be 
another  form  of  happiness  than  that  produced  by  virtue.  Hence 
between  one  pleasure  and  another  there  can  be  no  essential  moral 
difference ;  consequently  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  of  displeasure 
is  a  perfectly  safe  guide  in  the  sphere  of  the  moral.  Hence  the 
chief  point  in  practical  wisdom  is,  to  procure  for  one's  self  the 
feeling  of  pleasure;  from  this  principle  the  inquiry  must  first 
take  its^start.  By  observation,  for  example,  I  find  that  temper- 
ateness  is  a  virtue,  because  intemperateness  occasions  suffering. 
Hence  true  wisdom  as  founded  on  this  basis  consists  in  the 
rational  governing  of  the  measure  of  each  particular  pleasure, 
and  not  in  the  knowledge  of  any  general  principles ;  such  prin- 


§  14.]  PRINCIPLES  OF   PLATO.  75 

ciples,  other  than  the  one  just  given,  do  not  exist,  but  each  en- 
joyment is  governed  by  its  own  particular  measure,  which  is 
discovered  for  the  most  part  simply  through  experience. 

SECTION  XIV. 

Plato  gives  to  Greek  ethics  a  deeply  suggestive 
scientific  basis  and  form.  The  world  is  an  expression 
of  the  divine  ideas,  a  thing  of  beauty.  That  which 
answers  to  the  divine  idea,  namely,  the  god  like,  is 
good.  Man  has  the  task,  in  virtue  of  his  rational 
spirituality,  to  realize  the  good,  consciously  and  with 
freedom  ;  the  essence  of  virtue  is,  pleasure  in  the  good 
as  being  the  truly  beautiful, — love.  As  expressing  in 
itself  the  harmony  of  the  soul,  virtue  is  also  the  con- 
dition of  true  happiness ;  not  the  direct  pleasure-feel- 
ing, however,  but  rational  knowledge,  decides  as  to  the 
good,  and  such  knowledge  works  the  same  directly. 
Hence  virtue  is  neither  indifferent  to  pleasure,  nor 
does  it  consist  therein,  but  it  produces  it.  However, 
all  virtue,  because  of  the  imperfection  essentially  in- 
herent in  existence,  remains  ever  imperfect  in  the 
earthly  life ;  the  corporeal  nature  of  man  itself  is  a 
hinderance. — Virtue  is  in  its  essence  unitary,  but  be- 
cause of  its  relation  to  the  manifold  soul-powers  and 
life-manifestations,  it  manifests  itself  fourfoldly,  as 
wisdom,  manliness,  temper ateness,  and  justness,  of 
which  the  first  is  the  fundamental  one,  and  dominates 
the  others. — Morality,  however,  is  not  a  something  be- 
longing merely  to  the  individual  person,  but  has  its 
full  reality  only  in  the  moral  community-life,  the 
State,  which  rests  not  so  much  on  the  family  and  on 
moral  society,  as  rather  constitutes,  itself,  the  exclu- 
sive form  of  the  moral  society-life,  and  in  fact  itself 
produces  the  family  and  all  other  moral  forms  of 


76  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  14. 

communion,  out  of  itself,  and  dominates  them  with 
unconditional  authority.  The  absolutism  of  the  State 
swallows  up  into  itself  every  right  of  the  moral  per- 
sonality and  of  the  family,  and  it  is  not  as  man,  nor 
as  a  member  of  the  family,  but  solely  as  citizen,  that 
the  individual  is  capable  of  realizing  true  morality. 
But  also  only  an  inferior  number  arc  capacitated 
thereto ;  and  therefore  these  few  who  are  capable  of 
true  wisdom  are  called,  by  this  very  fact,  to  the  unlim- 
ited governing  of  the  others.  The  moral  task  is 
consequently  not  a  general  one  for  humanity, — is 
not  the  same  for  all,  and  is  in  its  full  truth  not 
po&ible  for  all. 

Plato,  far  surpassing  Socrates  in  spiritual  profundity,  devel- 
oped with  creative  originality  the  thoughts  which  his  master 
had  possessed  rather  only  as  mere  presentiments,  into  a  scheme 
of  profound  speculation,  very  different  from  the  popular  moral- 
izing of  the  son  of  Sophroniscus.  His  ethical  thoughts,  which 
are  not  shaped  into  a  rounded  system,  are  expressed  more  es- 
pecially in  the  following  of  his  works :  Protagoras,  Laches.  Ghar- 
mides,  Euthyphron,  Gorgias,  Menon,  Philebus,  Puliticus,  and  in 
his  work  which  presents  the  realized  moral  organism,  the 
Republic  or  State. 

In  the  thought  of  the  rational  spirit,  which  Plato  conceives 
more  deeply  than  was  ever  done  before,  he  obtains  a  much  more 
solid  foundation  for  the  moral  than  did  the  earlier  philosophy. 
The  world  is  in  its  essence,  not  indeed  created,  but  formed  by 
God,  the  absolute,  rational  spirit, — is  the  most  perfect  possible 
expression  of  his  thoughts,  a  copy  of  the  divine  eternal  ideas. 
The  realization  of  an  idea  is  the  beautiful ;  hence  the  cosmos  is 
an  object  of  beauty.*  The  rational  immortal  spirit  of  man — his 
ideal  phase — has  the  task  of  realizing  the  beautiful,  the  ideal, 
and  the  highest  end  of  human  life  is  ideality,  that  is,  it  is,  to 
become  like  God;  this  God-likeness,  which  consists  in  justness 
and  in  sincere  piety,  is  the  good,  and  the  highest  good  is  God 

*  Especially  iu  his  Timaeus, 


§  14.]  MORALITY   OF   SOCRATES.  77 

himself.*  This  thought  of  God-likeness,  however,  Plato  does 
not  further  develop,  nor  indeed  could  he  do  so,  seeing  that  the 
God-idea  itself,  as  embraced  from  a  heathen  stand-point,  was 
too  unclear.  The  idea  of  the  good  is  here  not  derived  from  the 
idea  of  God,  but  conversely  it  is  undertaken  to  determine  the 
idea  of  God  from  the  idea  of  the  good,  as  being  fundamental 
and  per  se  certain.  Evidently  we  have  not  to  do  here  with  the 
Christian  thought  of  God-likeness.  The  thought  of  a  divine 
command  falls  back  behind  the  thought  of  the  idea  of  the  good 
as  innate  in  reason  itself.  This  mode  of  viewing  the  matter  lies 
in  the  nature  of  the  case,  seeing  that  in  fact  there  could  be  here 
no  question  of  any  other  revelation  of  the  divine  will.  The 
good  which  is  conceived  merely  in  a  general  and  rather  indef- 
inite manner  as  the  inner  harmony  and  order  or  beauty  of  the 
soul,  as  the  untrammeled  domination  of  reason,  and  hence  rather 
under  a  formal  than  a  material  aspect,f  is  per  se  a  something 
divine  and  true,  and  as  such  to  be  aspired  to ;  and  the  individ- 
ual pleasure-feeling  is  not  the  measure  of  virtue,  nor  the  good 
itself.  J  It  is  true,  virtue  alone  renders  truly  happy,  that  is,  works 
complete  inner  harmony  of  soul,  and  there  is  no  happiness  with- 
out virtue,  for  virtue  itself  is  simply  such  a  harmony  or  beauty 
of  soul,  §  and  to  do  wrong  is  the  greatest  of  all  evils,  greater 
than  to  suffer  wrongs,!  but  happiness  is  not  one  and  the  same 
with  every  chance  pleasure-feeling.  IF  It  is  not  this  feeling,  in 
its  dependence  on  the  accidentalities  of  outer  circumstances  and 
of  the  frame-of-niind,  but  only  the  idea  of  the  good,  that  can  be 
known  and  truly  identified  ;**  hence  the  pleasure-feeling  cannot 
be  the  decisive  criterion  as  to  the  good,  and  the  good  cannot 
be  aspired  to  merely  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure. — The  knowl- 
edge of  the  idea  of  the  good — which,  like  the  consciousness  of 
any  and  of  every  idea,  is  not  the  product"  of  a  reflective  course 
of  thought,  that  is,  not  derived  knowledge,  but  on  the  contrary 

*  Rep.,  pp.  500,  505  sqq.,  613  (Steph.);  Thecet.,  176;  Menon,  p.  99; 
EutJiyphron,  p.  13. 

t  Gorgias,  p.  504  sqq.  ;  Phileb.,  64,  65. 

\  Gorgias,  p.  4!>5  sqq. ;  Phaed.,  p.  237  sqq. 

§  Gorgias,  470  sqq.,  504-509 ;  Menon,  p.  87  sqq./  Rep.,  pp.  352, 444,  563, 
585;  Phil.,  pp.  40,  64. 

|  Gorgias,  pp.  4'>9  sqq.,  477,  527. 

If  PMl.,  p.  11  sqq. ;  Gorgias,  p.  494  sqq. 

*»  Gorgias,  pp.  464,  500 ;  Menon,  p.  87  sqq. 


78  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  14. 

a  direct  reason-knowledge,  and  the  highest  of  all  that  can  be 
known — is  the  foundation  and  presupposition  of  virtue;  with- 
out knowledge  there  is  no  virtue ;  virtue  is  not  a  natural  quality 
of  man,  but  is  learned  and  appropriated  by  learning.*  And  the 
knowledge  of  the  good  leads  with  inner  necessity  to  the  prac- 
ticing of  that  which  is  recognized  as  good ;  evil  rests  essentially 
upon  error,  and  is  never  committed  with  consciousness  and  in- 
tentionally ;t  herein  Plato  perfectly  harmonizes  with  Socrates. 
The  will  has,  over  against  knowledge,  no  discretion  whatever, 
but  is  the  direct  and  necessary  expression  thereof.  The  lower, 
sensuous  desires  can  indeed  withstand  reason,  but  the  will  of 
the  spirit  itself  cannot  do  so.  That  also  the  heart— the  spirit- 
ual essence  of  man  himself — may  have  a  natural  tendency  to 
evil,  Plato  has  not  the  least  conscious  suspicion.  Nevertheless 
an  obscure  presentiment  of  the  entrance  of  corruption  into  the 
universe  does  find  expression  in  his  notion,  that  the  present  en- 
chainment of  the  spirit  to  a  body  is  not  an  original  and  normal, 
but  a  guiltily-incurred  state  of  things.  In  fact,  according  to 
Plato,  the  soul  existed  as  a  rational  personality  once  before  in  a 
bodiless  state,  and  only  in  consequence  of  a  moral  transgression 
was  it  joined  to  a  trammeling  corporeality,  so  that  it  is  now,  as^ 
it  were,  fettered  in  a  cell  or  a  dark  cavern.J  Also  for  still  an- 
other reason,  the  good,  though  indeed  the  highest  end,  is  yet 
never  fully  attainable  in  the  earthly  life.  For  inasmuch  as  the 
real  world  is  not  solely  and  purely  the  work  of  the  absolute 
God-will,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  product  of  two  factors, — 
whereof  the  one  is  the  formless  proto-material  which  is  in  fact 
a  relative  nonentity  (jaj  6v),  and  the  other  the  ideal  God-will, — 
and  as  the  former,  because  not  posited  by  God  himself,  does  not 
perfectly  yield  to  the  formative  working  of  God  when  impress- 
ing his  ideas  upon  it  (even  as  the  impress  of  a  seal  never  reflects 
perfectly  clearly  every  feature  of  the  same), — so  the  world  is 
not  an  absolutely  perfect  one,  but  only  the  best  possible  one, — 
is  not  the  pure  and  mere  expression  of  the  rational  spirit,  but 
there  lingers  in  it  a  never  entirely-overcomable  irrational  resid- 
.  unm, — an  evil .  lying  in  the  essence  of  the  world  itself,  which 
though  not  sprung  from  the  fault  of  moral  creatures,  is  yet  the 

*  Menon,  p.  87  »qq. 

t/Vxtf.,  pp.  345,  352  sqq.,  358;  Menon,p.  95;   Gory.,  p.  468. 

$  Timaeus,  p.  41 ;  Phaedrus,  p.  246  sqq. ;  Rep.,  p.  514  sqq. 


§  14.]  PLATONIC   LOVE.  79 

ground  and  source  of  all  moral  guilt, — a  proto-evil.*  So  also  is 
there  in  man  himself  a  primitive  antagonism  never  entirely 
overcomable  in  the  present  life,  namely,  between  reason  and  the 
lower  animal  desires,  which  latter  should  in  fact  be  morally 
dominated  by  reason.f  In  Plato,  therefore,  there  is  lacking  to 
the  moral  consciousness  that  joyous  confidence  which  character- 
izes Christian  morality.  "Evil  can  never  be  annihilated,  for 
there  must  always  be  something  over  against  the  good;  it  can- 
not, however,  have  its  seat  among  the  gods,  but  it  inheres  in 
mortal  nature ;  therefore  man  should  strive  as  soon  as  possible 
to  flee  hence  and  to  escape  thither."  f  "  True  philosophers  are 
minded  to  strive  after  nothing  other  than  to  decease  and  be 
dead,  seeing 'that,  so  long  as  we  still  have  the  body,  and  our 
soul  is  united  with  this  evil  [the  body],  we  can  never  attain  to 
that  whereafter  we  aspire ;"  §  and  they  lay  not  violent  hands  upon 
themselves  simply  because  they  are  placed  by  God  in  this  life  as 
upon  a  watch,  which  they  are  not  at  liberty  to  abandon  at  will.|| 
Hence  morality  consists  primarily  in  this,  that  man  turns 
himself  to  the  ideal,  the  spiritual,  and  away  from  the  merely 
sensuous.  This  is,  however,  only  one  phase  of  morality,  the 
ideal ;  the  other  phase  is  the  real  one.  Even  as  God,  in  im- 
pressing his  ideas  upon  matter,  shaped  the  world  into  an  object 
of  beauty,  so  must  also  man  actively  merge  and  imprint  himself 
into  the  actual  world-existence,  and  shape  it  into  beauty.  Hence 
virtuousness  is  delight  in  the  beautiful.  And  the  beautiful  is 
harmony,  not  merely  sensuous  but  also  spiritual.  The  essence 
of  virtue  is,  as  this  delight  in  the  beautiful,  love,  or  eras, — a 
thought  that  is  developed  by  Plato  with  very  great  emphasis 
(especially  in  his  Phaedrus,  Lysis,  and  Symposium).  This  is, 
however,  by  no  means  the  Christian  idea  of  love — that  love  in 
which  man  knows  himself  at  one  with  another  in  virtue  of  com- 
munion with  God, — but  it  is  a  love  to  the  manifestation,  to  the 
beautiful.  Not  the  divine  per  se  is  loved,  but  the  concrete,  and 
even  essentially  sensuous  manifestation.  It  is  not  a  love  of  soul 
to  soul,  but  one  that  clings- to  the  sensuous  form.  Hence  it  has 
in  Plato's  state  no  significancy  for  the  family.  It  is  true,  eras 
exalts  itself  from  the  sensuous  to  the  spiritual,  to  soul-beauty  ;T 

*  Tim.,  p.  46  sqg.,  54;  PoUt.,  269;  Rep.>  611  sqq.  ;  PAaedrus,  246  sqq. 
t  Rep.,  436  sqq.,  589  ;   Gorg.,  505.  J  Theaet.,  p.  176. 

§  Phaedo,  p.  63  sqq.  \  Ibid.,  p.  62.  Tf  Symp.,  209  sqq. 


80  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  H. 

the  sensuous  element,  however,  remains  the  basis,  and  does  not 
receive  its  worth  simply  from  the  spiritual.  The  beautiful  is 
per  se,  and  in  all  of  its  manifestations,  a  revelation  of  the  divine, 
and  the  divine  is  accessible  to  us  only  under  the  form  of  the 
beautiful ;  where  beauty  is,  there  is  also  the  divine.  This  is  the 
characteristically  Greek  stand-point ;  beauty  and  grace  excuse 
all  sin  ;  even  the  frivolous  is  recognized  as  good,  provided  it  is 
only  beautiful.  The  recognition  of  love  under  every  form,  even 
under  that  of  unnatural  vice,  is  so  characteristic  of  the  Greek, 
that  even  Plato  attempts  a  philosophical  justification  thereof, 
which  is  far  from  complimentary  to  Greek  ethics.*  In  love,  here, 
predominates  by  no  means  self-denial,  as  is  the  case  with  Chris- 
tian love,  but  simply  pleasure;  I  love  another  not  for  his  sake, 
but  for  my  own  sake.  This  love  knows  nothing  of  a  self-sacri- 
ficing suffering,  but  only  a  self-enjoying,  at  farthest  only  a  suf- 
fering of  longing  and  jealousy.  It  is  true,  mere  sensuous  love  as 
directed  to  merely  fleshly  enjoyment,  is  blamed  :f  but  where  a 
higher  spiritual  love,  not  merely  to  the  body  but  also  to  the 
soul,  exists,  and  in  the  beautiful  the  divine  element  is  recog- 
nized, there  sensuous  love,  even  when  it  assumes  the  form  of  a 
misuse  of  sex,  finds  its  justification,  and  becomes  a  virtue,  and 
even  a  religious  enthusiasm.!  "  Beautifully  enacted,  it  is  beau- 
tiful; otherwise,  however,  shameful."§  The  very  circumstance 
that  Plato  speaks  so  repeatedly  and  so  extensively  and  with 
visible  approval  of  this  absolutely  vicious  love  [Rom.  i,  27], 
while  at  the  same  time  he  scarcely  touches  upon  the  morally 
close-related  mere  sexual  love,  and,  in  his  long  discourses  on 
eros,  honors  wedlock  love  with  not  a  single  word,  and  further 
that  he  attempts  to  repress  |  the  feeling  that  instinctively  im- 
presses itself  upon  him,  that  there  is  something  shameful  there- 
in, by  the  help  of  strangely  ingenious  turns  of  thought  and 
disguises  and  enthusiastically  poetical  expressions,  which  can- 
not but  make  upon  the  modern  reader  a  truly  distressful 
impression, — all  this  is  a  notable  and  significant  index  of  the 
moral  bewilderment  of  the  Greek  spirit. 

Plato's  development  of  the  idea  of  the  moral  is  as  follows  : 

*  Symp.,  p.  181  sqq.,  216  sqq. ;  Phaedrus,  p.  250  sqq. 

t  Gorg.,  p.  494;  Pkaedrus,  p.  250;  Symj>.,  p.  180  gqq. 

J  Phaedrm,  p.  251  sqq.  §  Symp.,  p.  183. 

|  PAaedrus,  p.  237  sqq.  ;  comp.  230,  242  ;  Symp.,  p.  183. 


§  14.]  THE   PLATONIC   VIRTUES.  81 

Virtue,  as  essentially  constituting  a  unity,  appears  primarily  as 
wisdom,  aoittia,  consisting  in  a  knowledge  of  the  truth  and  of  the 
good ;  upon  wisdom  as  the  chief  virtue,  depend  all  the  othei 
virtues.  Now,  in  that  wisdom  brings  to  the  consciousness  what 
really  is,  and  what  is  not,  to  be  feared  in  our  moral  efforts  and 
in  our  struggle  against  hostile  powers,  it  develops  our  natural 
zeal  in  acting  into  the  virtue  of  manliness  or  courage,  avSpeia. 
And  in  that  it  teaches  us  what  is  the  inner  harmony  of  the  soul, 
and  what  is  the  proper  subordination  of  sensuous  and  irrational 
desires  to  reason,  it  develops  the  virtue  of  temperateness  or  prn- 
dence,  autypcxrvvri,  which  preserves  the  right  inner  order  of  the 
soul  through  the  domination  of  reason  over  all  lower  life-forces 
and  pleasure-desires ;  these  lower  desires  are  not  crushed  out, 
but  simply  kept  within  proper  limits,  and  placed  in  the  service 
of  reason.  In  that  wisdom  guides  to  outward  activity  the  har- 
mony of  the  inner  soul-life  in  its  relation  to  other  men,  it 
develops  the  virtue  of  justness,  which  preserves  harmony  with 
and  among  men,  in  that  it  respects  the  rights  of  each  individ- 
ual; it  presupposes  the  other  three  virtues,  and  indeed  gives 
them  their  proper  force  and  significancy.*  To  justness  belongs 
also  piety  or  holiness,  OGIOTW,  which  preserves  man  in  his  proper 
relation  to  the  gods; — Plato  uses  here,  constantly,  the  plural.f 
A  more  full  development  of  the  virtues  Plato  has  not  given ; 
and  the  necessity  of  precisely  the  four  ones  actually  given  is 
based  more  on  the  nature  of  the  State  than  on  that  of  the  moral 
person.  A  special  treatise  on  duties  is  not  given ;  and,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  notion  that  an  inwardly  harmonious  and  hence 
virtuous  soul  finds,  of  itself,  the  proper  course  in  each  particular 
conjuncture,!  such  a  treatise  appears  indeed  as  superfluous. 
That  morality  is  not  conceived  of  as  of  a  merely  individual 
character,  but,  on  the  contrary,  as  realizing  itself  essentially 
in  moral  communion,  is  a  great  advance  of  the  moral  con- 
sciousness; but  in  that  this  thought  is  carried  out  in  the 
most  rigid  one-sidedness,  and,  as  it  were,  with  a  theoretical 
passionateness,  and  in  that  it  lacks  the  proper  historical  and  re- 
ligious bases,  Plato  has  arrived,  in  his  enthusiastically  and  per- 
sistently pursued  ideal  of  a  State,  at  a  positive  caricature,  which 
has  brought  upon  the  great  philosopher,  in  the  .eyes  of  those 

*  Protag.,  pp.  332,  349  ;  Sep.,  p.  428  »qq.,  442  sqq.,  591. 

t  Euthyphron,  p.  6  sqq. ;  Gorg.,  pp.  507,  522.       J  Potit.,  pp.  294,  297. 


82  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  14. 

who  look  upon  the  real  world  with  practical  sobriety,  the  ap- 
pearance of  ridiculousness,  or  at  least  the  reproach  of  an  utterly 
unpractical  theorizing  ;*  and  it  has  often  been  undertaken  to 
rescue  the  reputation  of  the  great  man  by  simply  holding  his 
state-theory  as  a  mere  ideal  not  in  the  least  designed  for  realiza- 
tion. But  both  this  reproach,  and  also  this  attempt  at  vindi- 
cating his  honor,  do  injustice  to  the  philosopher.  Unquestion- 
ably his  work  on  the  -State  is  the  most  mature  and  the  most 
fully  perfected  of  his  writings, — one  upon  which  he  wrought 
with  the  highest  and  most  enthusiastic  preference.  (His  work 
on  the  Laws  has  greater  reference  to  the  real  world,  which  as 
yet  was  very  different  from  his  ideal  State,  and  expresses  rather 
a  preliminary  expedient,  until  the  true  state  finds  a  bold  crea- 
tor.) That  his  ideal  of  a  state  was  not  intended  by  him  for 
realization,  has  no  good  evidence  in  its  favor,  and  is  on  the 
whole  incredible;  on  the  contrary,  it  cannot  be  doubted  but 
that  Plato  made  repeated  attempts,  and  with  well-grounded 
hopes,  at  realizing  his  state-theory  by  the  help  of  Dionysius  the 
Younger  in  Syracuse  ;t  and  his  own  declarations  as  to  the  prac- 
ticability of  his  state-theory  confirm  thi^.J  From  our  own  social 
views  these  theories  differ  very  widely,  it  is  true;  but  to  a  Greek, 
and  especially  to  the  state-institutions  of  the  Doric  tribes,  which 
were  regarded  by  Plato  with  great  admiration,  they  were  by  no 
means  foreign,  and  they  have  already  in  the  laws  of  Sparta  an 
actual  prototype  in  very  essential  points.  Precisely  in  its  con- 
trasts to  the  Christian  view  of  moral  communion,  to  the  idea  of 
the  Christian  Church  and  of  the  Christian  state,  the  Platonic 
state  is  very  instructive. 

Not  individual  man,  but  the  state,  is  the  moral  person  proper, 
by  which  all  the  morality  of  the  individuals  is  conditioned,  pro- 
duced, and  sustained.  Not  the  moral  individual  persons  mak'e 
the  state,  but  the  state  makes  the  moral  persons.  Without  the 
state,  and  outside  of  it,  there  is  no  morality  proper,  but  only 
unculture.  Hence  the  task  of  the  state  is  to  make  its  citizens 
into  morally  good  persons, — to  undertake  the  cure  of  souls.§ 
The  state, — which  in  its  inner  constitution  as  a  harmonious 

*  Made  as  early  as  by  Aristophanes,  and  even  by  Aristotle :  FblM.  ii, 
1-5,  12. 

t  See  K.  F.  Hermann:   Gesch.  u.  Syst.  d.plat.  Phil,  1S39,  i,  67. 
1  Hep.,  p.  471  tqq. ;  499,  502,  540;  Legg.,  709.  §  Gorg.,  p.  464. 


§  14.]  STATE-ABSOLUTISM.  83 

moral  organism,  answers  to  the  three  phases  of  the  soul-life  of 
man,  and  represents  (1)  reason  or  thought  and  knowledge,  and 
(2)  courage  or  zeal,  6v/j.og,  and  (8)  sensuousness,  in  the  three 
classes  of  society,  namely,  (1)  the  savans,  who  therefore  rule, 
(2)  the  warriors,  and  (3)  the  producers,  that  is,  the  instructing, 
the  protecting,  and  the  providing  classes,* — realizes  inner  har- 
mony, and  hence  at  the  same  time  justness  and  happiness,  in 
that  it  does  not  permit  each  individual  to  act  and  work  at  his 
personal  discretion,  and  to  select  his  own  life-calling,  but  on  the 
contrary  in  that  it  assigns  to  each  his  special  and  appropriate 
position  in  the  whole, — a  position  which  the  individual  must 
unquestioningly  accept  and  fulfill,  without  intermeddling  in  any 
manner  in  any  other  form  of  activity.  A  rigorous  separation 
of  ranks  and  of  professions  by  the  state  itself,  is  the  uncondi- 
tional presupposition  of  a  healthy  state-life.  The  rulers  have 
the  task  of  assigning  the  individuals  to  the  particular  classes, 
according  to  their  capabilities.!  The  productive  class,  which 
corresponds  to  sensuous  desire,  has  as  its  special  virtue,  temper- 
ateness  or  modesty,  which  it  realizes  by  keeping  itself  within 
its  proper  bounds.  Courage  and  wisdom  belong  to  the  two 
higher  classes;  these  two  are  the  gold  and  silver,  while  the  pro- 
ductive class  is  but  ignoble  brass.  The  producer  is  not  to  con- 
cern himself,  with  state  matters,  but  simply  to  attend  to  handi- 
craft and  agriculture.^  Slavery  is  presupposed  as  a  mere  matter 
of  course ;  however,  where  practicable,  only  non-Greeks  are  to 
be  sold  as  slaves.§ 

The  rulers  have  wisdom  as  their  essential  virtue ;  there  can 
never  be  in  the  state  but  a  few  of  them,  and  it  is  best  when 
there  is  but  one,  and  this  one  a  philosopher.  The  good  of  the 
whole  requires  the  exclusive  dominion  of  the  best, — an  absolute 
aristocracy  or  a  monarchy.  |  And  as  wisdom  can  find  the  right 
course  in  each  particular  case,  whereas  laws  must  always  be 
merely  general,  and  often  do  not  apply  to  particular  conjunc- 
tures, hence  the  power  of  those  who  rule  should  not  be  cramped 
by  many  laws,  but  must  have  scope  for  free  movement,  and 
must  decide  in  each  particular  case  with  entire  discretion ;  and 
the  wise  ruler  will  often,  without  law  and  against  the  will  of  the 

*  Sep.,  p.  369  sqq.,  412  sqq.,  435.  t  Ibid.,  pp.  412-415. 

\Polit.,  p.  -289  sqq.  ;  Sep.,  pp.  374,  397.  §  Rep.,  p.  469. 

|  Polit.,  p.  292  sqq.,  297  ;  Rep.,  pp.  473,  540. 

7 


84  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  14. 

citizens,  and  hence  with  force,  realize  the  weal  of  the  state,  and 
force  the  citizens  to  let  themselves  be  made  happy.* 

The  truly  free  personality  is  conceded  accordingly  only  to  the 
sage,  who  is  at  the  same  time  the  ruler ;  all  the  other  citizens 
of  the  state  are,  in  their  entire  life,  absolutely  subject  to  the 
state,  the  spiritual  essence  of  which  finds  its  expression  not  so 
much  in  abstract  law  as  in  the  perfected  personality  of  the  rul- 
ing sage.  Though  the  members  of  the  third  class  are  left  more 
free,  still  this  is  done  only  out  of  contempt ;  u  even  if  shoe- 
cobblers  are  bad,  still  they  bring  little  danger  to  the  state."! 
The  true  citizen,  the  one  possessing  the  virtue  of  wisdom  and 
manliness,  is  under  the  absolute  guidance  of  the  state ;  the  ab- 
solutism of  the  state  is  without  limitation.  The  two  higher 
classes,  as  the  proper  and  complete  representatives  of  the  spirit- 
ual essence  of  the  state,  the  sentinels  of  the  same,  are  reared  and 
educated,  and  determined  in  their  collective  life  by  the  state. 
In  their  education  first  importance  is  given  to  music  and  gym- 
nastics, in  order  that  they  may  learn  to  love  and  practice  har- 
mony; the  education  of  the  future  rulers — who  can  become 
rulers  only  at  the  age  of  fifty  years,  after  having  passed  the  test 
of  severe  trials — requires,  additionally,  special  acquaintance  with 
mathematics  and  philosophy.^  To  any  other  religious  culture 
than  that  given  by  philosophy,  Plato,  who  clearly  saw  the 
worthlessness  of  the  popular  religion,  could  not  refer.§ 

The  state  as  including  in  itself  and  guiding  all  morality,  and 
as  realizing  justness,  has  all  and  every  right;  the  individual 
citizen  of  the  state  has  rights  only  in  so  far  as  the  state  concedes 
them  to  him ;  even  to  his  life  he  has  no  right,  so  soon  as  he  is 
no  longer  capable  of  benefiting  the  state;  the  physicians  are 
charged  with  the  duty  of  letting  the  incurably  sick  perish  with- 
out help.]  The  state  alone  is  entitled  to  property;  private 
property  is  not  to  be  allowed.  The  producing  class  labors  not 
for  itself,  but  solely  for  the  state. IT  With  this  principle  Plato 
supposes  himself  to  have  quenched  at  once  all  the  sources  of 
contention  and  disquiet.  Even  the  act  of  poesy  stands  under 
the  rigid  censorship  of  the  state ;  and  dramatic  poetry  is  not  to 
be  tolerated  at  all.**  The  appropriate  meters  to  be  used  in 

*Pblit.,  pp.  293-296;  Sep.,  pp.  473,  540.  i  Ibid.,  p.  421. 

J  Ibid.,  p.  402  sqq.,  424,  519  sqq.,  535.  §  Ibid.,  p.  386  sqq. 

d;  P-  405 »qq.t  409.    U  Ibid.,  pp.  416, 464.    **  Ibid.,  p.  391  sqq. ,  568. 


§  14.]  PLATONIC   SEX-RELATIONS.  85 

poetry  are  carefully  prescribed,  and  of  musical  instruments  only 
the  cithara  and  the  lyre  are  allowed.* 

The  family  is  not  the  foundation,  but  only  a  branch  of  the 
state,  and  merges  itself  into  it.  Personality  has  here  no  right 
of  its  own.  No  one  consort  belongs  to  the  other,  but  both  be- 
long exclusively  to  the  state.  Wedlock  proper  is  consequently 
inadmissible,  on  the  contrary  the  citizen  is  obligated  to  the  be- 
getting of  children  in  the  interest  of  the  state ;  in  this  connec- 
tion personal  love  to  the  sex  has  no  validity,  but  only  civic 
duty.  The  citizen  is  not  permitted  to  choose  for  himself  the 
wife  (who  is  conceded  to  him  only  temporarily),  but  the  state 
gives  her  to  him, — ostensibly  by  lot,  but  in  reality  the  rulers  are 
to  "make  use  of  falsehood  and  deception,"  and  cunningly  to 
guide  the  lot  according  to  their  own  judgment,  so  as  always  to 
bring  together  the  most  suitable  pairs.  Men  are  under  obliga- 
tion to  beget  from  their  thirtieth  to  their  fifty-fifth  year ;  women 
to  bear  from  their  twentieth  to  their  fortieth  year.  This  of  it- 
self implies  that  there  is  to  be  no  permanent  marriage  relation ; 
on  the  contrary  a  change  of  wives  is  expressly  required ;  no  one 
is  permitted  to  regard  any  woman  as  his  own  exclusive  posses- 
sion.f  It  is  laid  down  as  a  principle  for  the  free  and  active 
citizens  proper,  "  that  all  the  women  should  be  in  common  to 
all  the  men,  and  that  no  woman  should  live  solely  with  one 
man,  and  that  also  the  children  are  to  be  in  common,  so  that  no 
father  shall  know  the  child  begotten  by  him,  and  no  child  its 
own  father."!  Hence  the  children  are,  immediately  after  their 
birth,  to  be  taken  away  from  their  mothers,  and  to  be  reared  in 
common  on  the  part  of  the  state,  and  the  greatest  possible  care 
is  to  be  taken  that  the  mother  shall  never  again  recognize  her 
child.  The  children  are  nursed  by  the  women  in  common  and 
interchangeably ;  feeble  and  physically  imperfect  children  arc 
to  be  exposed.§  After  the  lapse  of  the  determined  period  of 
life,  the  procreation  with  the  persons  specifically  assigned  by 
the  state,  and  as  having  taken  place  at  the  order  of  the  state,  is 
to  cease,  and,  from  this  time  on,  both  the  men  and  the  women 
may  fqrm  temporary  connections  with  each  other  on  the  princi- 
ple of  elective  affinity,  with  the  one  proviso  that  births  must  be 
prevented,  or,  where  this  cannot  be  done,  the  child  must  be  left 

*  Rep.,  pp.  398,  399.  t  Ibid.,  449  sqq. 

t  Ibid.  ,457.  §  Ibid. ,  457  sq q. 


86  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  14 

to  perish  without  food.* — The  woman  is  not  a  family-mother, 
but  only  a  state-citizen,  and  she  has  political  duties,  in  real  and 
even  magisterial  state-offices,  to  fulfill.  The  women  must  per- 
form the  same  work  as  the  men, — must  even  take  part,  entirely 
nude,  in  the  gymnastic  exercises, — must  march  out  in  war, 
though  in  battle  they  are  to  occupy  only  the  rear-ranks ;  for  in- 
deed between  men  and  women  there  is  no  other  difference  than 
simply  that  the  former  beget,  and  the  latter  bear,  and  that  the 
former  are  stronger  than  the  latter.f 

This  family-undermining  absolutism  of  the  state  has  to  do, 
however,  only  with  the  first  two  classes,  while  the  producing 
class  are  less  affected  by  this  care  of  the  state  for  them,  and 
may  act  with  greater  freedom.  The  great  task  toward  which 
all  moral  community-life  is  directed,  namely,  to  realize  the  idea 
of  the  body  politic,  by  means  of  the  moral  freedom  of  the  indi- 
vidual, Plato  was  unable  to  accomplish  otherwise  than  by  an 
unconditional  and  unquestioning  non-permission  of  the  free 
personal  self-determination  of  the  individual.  Objective  moral- 
ity entirely  swallows  up  the  subjective.  This  is,  however,  not 
peculiar  to  the  view  of  Plato,  but  is  the  Greek  tendency  in  gen- 
eral. Plato  manifests  rather  a  decided  progress  toward  the 
development  of  the  free  moral  personality.  While  in  the  legis- 
lation of  Sparta,  somewhat  as  in  that  of  the  Chinese,  the  imper- 
sonal law  held  ruthless  domination,  and  disallowed  of  the 
personal  self-determination  of  the  individual  in  very  essential 
things,  and  while  in  the  democracy  of  Athens  the  irrational 
caprice  of  the  masses  was  the  predominant  power  over  the  in- 
dividual, in  the  Platonic  state  the  personal  spirit  of  the  wisely 
taught  and  tested  regent  attains  to  domination.  From  -the 
stand-point  of  heathen  antiquity,  which  knows  of  no  right  of 
the  person  over  against  the  state,  but  concedes  the  absolute  right 
of  the  state  over  the  individual,  this  is  a  progress;  and  that, 
which  appears  therein  as  unnatural  and  as  a  harsh  one-sidedness 
indicates  not  so  much  the  untruthfulness  of  the  consequential 
pr<  >gress,  as  rather  the  untruthfulness  of  the  fundamental  view 
common  to  all  the  Greeks. 

That  the  spirit  of  wisdom  and  power  can  be  and  is  to  be 
poured  out  upon  all  flesh  [Joel  iii,  1],  and  that  there  is  no  dif- 
ference before  God,  but  that  all  are  equally  called  to  be  children 
*.%>.,  461.  Mbid.,  451  sqq.,  471,  540. 


§  15.]  PLATONIC   CASTE.  87 

of  the  truth  and  of  wisdom,  this  thought  is  unknown  to  entire 
heathendom,  and  therefore  also  to  the  greatest  of  heathen  phi- 
losophers. Of  a  morality  absolutely  valid  for  all  men  and  with- 
out exception,  Plato  knows  nothing ;  without  slavery,  society 
does  not  appear  to  the  Greek  as  possible ;  but  the  slave  is  not 
called  to,  nor  capable  of,  free  self-determination,  and  hence  also 
not  of  true  morality;  and  even  of  the  free,  only  a  relatively 
small  number  are  accessible  to  true  wisdom  and  virtue.  Capa- 
bility and  incapability  for  the  good  are  transmitted  through 
natural  generation  from  parents  to  children.*  The  reason  for 
this  dividing  of  humanity  into  a  minority  who  represent  reason, 
and  into  an  irrational,  passive  multitude  who  require  absolute 
guidance,  lies  not  exclusively  in  the  general  Greek  national  con- 
sciousness, but  also  in  the  philosophical  world-theory  of  Plato 
in  general.  The  primitive  dualism  of  existence  manifests  itself 
also  in  humanity.  Even  as  the  world  is  not  an  absolutely  pure 
and  perfect  expression  of  the  spirit,  and  as  the  rational  spirit  is 
not  an  absolute  power,  but  has  simply  to  shape  a  formless  proto- 
material  not  created  by  it,  and  to  impress  itself  upon  it,  without 
however  being  able  entirely  to  master  and  spiritually  transfigure 
it, — so  also  in  humanity  the  men  of  the  rational  spirit,  namely, 
the  philosophers,  stand  over  against  the  spiritually  dependent 
and  relatively  unspiritual  multitude,  whose  destination  it  is  to 
be  absolutely  guided  and  shaped  by  the  former. 

SECTION  XV. 

The  essential  advance  of  the  ethical  view  of  Plato 
beyond  earlier  theories  consists  in  this,  that  he  eman- 
cipated the  idea  of  the  good  from  all  dependence  on 
the  individual  pleasure-feeling,  that  he  conceived  it  as 
unconditionally  valid  and  lying  in  God  himself,  and 
that  consequently  he  regarded  morality  as  God-like- 
ness, as  an  image  of  God  in  man,  and  hence  as  a  phase 
of  the  ^spiritual  life  constituting  an  essential  part  of 
rationality  itself,  and  that  in  consequence  thereof  he 
conceived  morality  as  a  per  se  perfectly  unitary  life, 
and  reduced  the  plurality  of  moral  forms  of  action  to 

*Rep.,  459  «^.,  546. 


88  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  15. 

a  single  principle,  namely  wisdom. — But  the  charac- 
teristically heathen  dualism,  which  (though  reduced 
by  him  to  its  minimum)  is  yet  not  entirely  overcome, 
rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  rise  to  the  full  free- 
dom of  the  personal  spirit  in  God  and  in  man,  and 
hence  to  the  full  knowledge  of  the  moral  idea.  The 
real  personality  is  recognized  neither  in  its  rights  and 
power,  nor  in  its  guilt.  There  remains  in  all  exist- 
ence, even  in  the  most  highly  developed  moral  life,  a 
never  entirely  overcomable  residuum  of  an  unfree,  un- 
spiritual,  and  morally  spirit-trammeling  matter,  over 
which  God  himself  is  not  absolutely  master.  But  the 
limitation  of  the  moral  lies  not  in  the  guilt  of  the  per- 
sonal spirit,  but  in  the  unspiritual  (and  not  by  it 
entirely  controllable)  nature-ground  of  things.  The 
possibility,  and  therefore  also  the  requirements,  of  the 
moral  are  different  for  the  different  classes  of  men, 
but  even  the  most  free  is  not  entirely  free.  The  moral 
freedom  of  the  freest,  namely,  the  philosophers,  is  tram- 
meled by  the  fetters  of  a  corporeality  not  in  harmony 
with  the  moral  task,  that  of  the  rest  of  men  by  lack 
of  knowledge  and  of  moral  capacity,  and  that  of  the 
free  Greek  citizens,  additionally,  by  the  power  of  the 
rulers  as  extending  beyond  the  expressed  laws,  and 
that  of  the  unfree  Greek  citizens,  still  additionally,  by 
the  weight  of  the  entire  mass  that  presses  upon  them 
from  above.  From  this  progressively  and  descend- 
ingly  increasing  unfreedom  there  is  no  redemption 
within  the  sphere  of  historical  reality,  but  only  yon- 
side  of  history,  through  death. — Morality  bears,  neither 
in  its  progressive  realization  nor  in  its  guilty  perver- 
sion, the  character  of  historicalness, — is  in  no  respect 
a  power  essentially  modificatory  of  universal  history, 
and  consciously  aiming  at  such  modification  as  its 


§  15.]  PLATONISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY.  89 

end ;  and  even  the  ideal  state  is  and  remains  simply 
the  very  limited  activity-sphere  of  a  special  moral 
virtuosity  of  the  governing  individual  spirit,  without 
a  higher  world-historical  purpose  in  relation  to  the 
totality  of  humanity. — Also  the  moral  consciousness 
itself  rises  not  entirely  above  the  character  of  the 
merely  individual ;  the  connection  of  the  same  with 
the  God-consciousness  is  only  of  a  loose  character, — 
is  not  really  based  in  the  same. 

The  gain  accruing  to  moral  knowledge  through  the  labors  of 
Plato  is  not  to  be  lightly  estimated.  Light  and  order  are  given 
to  the  previously  dark  and  confused  mass.  There  is  henceforth 
no  more  question  of  merely  isolated  and  not  deeper-grounded 
moral  rules,  but  morality  has  acquired  a  firmer  basis, — has  come 
here  for  the  first  to  serious  self-examination.  In  fact,  Plato  oc- 
cupies himself  so  predominantly  with  the  foundation-laying 
thoughts  that  he  does  not  reach  the  task  of  carrying  out  a 
special  doctrine  of  virtue  or  duty.  In  these  ground-thoughts 
there  are,  in  so  far  as  is  possible  from  a  heathen  stand-point, 
some  approximations  to  a  Christianly-moral  consciousness;  and 
they  would  have  been  more  marked  still,  had  the  philosopher 
only  succeeded  in  severing  the  chain  which  still  held  the  already 
floating  ship  fast  anchored  to  the  soil  of  naturalism,  namely,  by 
overcoming  the  thought  of  an  unspiritual  pro  to-material  as 
oflering  a  hinderance  to  the  personal  God, — in  a  word,  had  he 
succeeded  in  changing  the  fttj  w  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the 
real  world,  into  an  OVK  bv.  But  neither  Plato  nor  the  heathen 
spirit  in  general  was  able  to  do  this.  Even  Aristotle  was  able 
only  silently  to  vail  the,  also  to  him,  troublesome  thought  of 
dualism,  but  not  scientifically  to  master  it.  But  wherever  the 
rational  spirit  is  not  absolutely  the  ground  and  life  of  every 
thing,  there  also  the  full  idea  of  morality  is  not  possible ;  for 
only  the  thought  of  the  complete  mastery  of  the  spirit  over 
every  thing  unspiritual,  and  the  confidence  of  untrnmineled  lib- 
erty, assure  to'morality  foundation-ground  and  courage. 

Though  in  the  recognition  of  the  limits  of  freedom  there  lies 
an  approximation  to  the  Christian  thought  of  the  natural  de- 


90  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  15. 

pravity  of  the  human  race,  yet  there  lies  in  it,  on  the  other 
hand,  also  an  all  the  greater  departure  from  the  same ;  for  these 
limits  are  not  placed  in  the  sphere  of  moral  guilt,  and  hence  of 
moral  freedom,  but  yon-side  of  morality  in  the  sphere  of  a 
nature-substratum  not  to  be  overcome  by  the  moral  spirit.  The 
hampering  of  morality  has  not  sprung  from  an  historical  act, 
and  hence  is  not  to  be  overcome  by  an  historical  act.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  moral  imperfection  of  the  world,  which  despite 
all  the  idealism  of  the  Platonic  world- view  comes  often  to  pain- 
ful expression,  leads  not  to  the  thought  of  a  needed  redemption. 
The  sage  emancipates  himself,  so  far  as,  in  view  of  the  imper- 
fection inherent  in  the  essence  of  all  existence,  it  is  possible, 
from  the  limitations  of  his  moral  life,  and  he  emancipates  others 
only  through  philosophical  instruction  and  through  absolutistic 
state-guidance,  but  not  through  a  sanctifying  communion- 
grounding  historical  act. 

In  the  idea  of  the  state  there  lies  indeed  the  presentiment, 
that  morality,  in  its  true  character,  is  not  a  merely  individual 
quality,  but,  on  the  contrary,  has  an  historical  signiflcancy  and 
task,  but  Plato  does  not  rise  beyond  the  mere  presentiment; 
and  when  he  is  on  the  very  point  of  passing  beyond  the  limits 
of  a  merely  individual  morality,  and  into  the  sphere  of  an  his- 
torical one,  he  hesitatingly  checks  his  step^nd  turns  back.  His 
State  forms  no  link  in  history,  and  has  no  history  as  its  goal. 
As  it  is  not  sprung  of  history,  but  only  of  the  ingenious  intellect 
of  a  theoretical  philosopher,  so  it  is  designed  to  be  nothing 
other  than  the  platform  upon  which  the  geniality  of  the  indi- 
vidual personality  of  the  philosophic  regent  may  find  scope  for 
itself.  Neither  people  nor  ruler  are  to  be  the  representatives 
of  an  historical  idea;  on  the  contrary,  the  people  is  only  the 
passive  material  for  the  formative  hand  of  the  state-artist,  and 
the  ruler  only  the  executor  of  a  philosophic  theory.  The  state 
itself  is  to  be  only  an  individual  organism  along-side  of  many 
other  state-organisms,  likewise  ruled  by  individual  geniality. 
Hence  it  must  also  be  only  very  small ;  even  a  thousand  citizens 
suffice.  The  thought  of  regarding  the  state  as  a  vital  member 
in  an  historical  collective  organism,  lies  very  far  from  Plato. 
Hence,  though  his  state  is  a  moral  organic  system,  yet  it  has  no 
world-historical  character ;  it  has  neither  behind  it  an  historical 
presupposition,  nor  before  itself  an  historical  goal.  That  hu- 


§  15.]  RELIGIOUS   DEFECTIVENESS.  91 

inanity  in  general  is  a  goal  of  the  moral  striving,  that  it  may  be 
brought  together  into  a  moral  unity,  that  a  state  of  peace  among 
all  nations  is  to  be  aimed  at — of  all  this  Plato  has  not  the  remot- 
est presentiment;  rather  does  war  appear,  even  for  his  ideal 
state,  as  in  accordance  with  order,  and  as  a  necessary  matter  of 
course ;  for  in  fact  Greeks  and  non-Greeks  are  enemies  by  na- 
ture.* Let  this  state-ideal  of  the  profoundest  Greek  philoso- 
pher, as  presented  without  any  trammeling  from  a  resisting 
real  world,  be  compared  with  the  Old  Testament  theocratic 
state  as  brought  to  realization  among  a  stubbornly  resisting 
people,  and  which  had,  from  the  very  beginning,  a  world-his- 
torical goal,  and  which  kept  in  view,  and  had  as  the  basis  of 
its  entire  organization,  the  thought  of  the  salvation,  and  hence 
also  of  the  peace'and  unity,  of  entire  humanity, — and  the  result 
will  be  very  suggestive. 

Most  manifestly  appears  the  weakness  of  Platonic  ethics  in 
its  relation  to  the  religious  consciousness.  The  beautiful  con- 
ception of  the  God-likeness  of  the  moral  man,  Plato  is  not  able 
to  carry  out ;  the  founding  of  the  moral  upon  the  divine  will  is 
foreign  to  him,  and  must  have  been  so,  for  the  Greek  knows 
nothing  of  a  revelation  of  this  will,  and  the  philosopher  could 
not  invent  one ;  he  was  only  able  to  refer  to  the  rational  con- 
sciousness of  man  himself;  but  to  raise  this  consciousness  to  a 
universally-extant  and  valid  one  Plato  did  not  venture  to  hope, 
and  hence  he  placed  simply  the  authority  and  even  the  strong 
dictatorial  power  of  the  philosophers,  in  the  stead  of  the  author- 
ity of  a  divine  revelation.  Also  his  profoundly-conceived  God- 
idea,  which  far  surpassed  all  previous  results  of  heathenism, 
Plato  did  not  venture  to  carry  out  in  its  entire  ethical  signifi- 
cancy,  and  to  make  it  consequentially  the  basis  of  the  moral. 
It  is  true  he  is  far  removed  from  the  folly  of  certain  modern 
theories,  which  present  morality  as  entirely  independent  of 
piety ;  he  in  fact  makes  piety  a  very  essential  element  of  all 
moral  life,  and  derives  even  from  the  idea  of  a  divine  judgment 
after  death,  a  very  potent  motive  for  morality  ;f  still,  piety  is 
with  him  not  the  foundation  of  all  the  virtues,  but  only  a  single 
one  of  the  same,  and  that  too  not  the  first  one,  but  only  a  form 
of  justness ;  and  even  such  as  it  is  he  ventures  not  to  refer  it 
djrectly  to  the  philosophically-recognized  God-idea,  but  only  to 
*  Rep.,  p.  373,  469  seq.  t  Gorg.,  p.  523  sgq. 


92  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  16. 

the  gods  of  the  popular  religion.  But  as  he  himself  exposes  the 
immoral  character  of  the  Greek  mythology  with  a  noble  indig- 
nation, and  on  that  account,  bitterly  censures  the  so  highly  and 
universally-revered  Homer,  nay,  even  would  have  his  poems,  for 
moral  reasons,  banished  from  his  ideal  state,*  it  is  consequently 
difficult  to  say  how  he  could  justify  and  require  piety  toward 
these  gods.  There  remains  here  a  wide-reaching  and  unbridged 
chasm  in  his  ethical  teachings. 


SECTION  XVI. 

The  completer  of  the  Platonic  philosophy,  and  of 
Greek  philosophy  in  general,  namely,  Aristotle,  who 
in  many  respects  passed  independently  beyond  Plato, 
and  who  was  less  idealistic  than  he,  and  more  devoted 
to  the  study  of  sober  reality,  presented  ethics  for  the 
first  time  as  a  special  systematically  carried-out  science, 
— in  connection  with  Physics  on  the  one  hand,  and  with 
Politics  on  the  other.  The  greatest  possible  repres- 
sion of  the  dualism  of  the  primitive  elements  of  exist- 
ence, as  still  yet  admitted  by  Plato,  leads  Aristotle 
not  to  a  deriving  of  the  moral  idea  from  his  more 
fully  developed  God-idea,  but  to  a  still  more  confident 
grounding  of  the  same  in  the  rational  self-conscious- 
ness, which  appears  here  less  clogged  than  in  Plato. 
A  sound  psychology  affords  for  ethics  a  scientifically 
firm  basis,  but  the  repression  of  the  Platonic  antith- 
esis of  the  ideal  and  of  reality  gives  it  a  morally 
feebler  character. 

Of  the  three  different  presentations  of  Aristotelian  ethics, 
only  the  Ethica  NicomacTieia  (that  is,  ad  Nicomachum)  is,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  trustworthy  results  of  criticism,t  to  be  regarded  as 

*  Sep.,  p.  377  tqq.,  386  tqq.,  598  sgq.,  605. 

t  Spengel,  in  his  Abhandl.  d.  Kgl.  Baierschen  Akad.,  philos.-philol. 
£l<us«,  1841,  iii,  2;  1846,  p.  171  tqq.  Brandis :  Aristotdes,  1851,  i, 
p.  Ill  tqq. ;  ii,  p.  1555  tqq. 


§  16.]  GOD-IDEA  OF  ARISTOTLE.  93 

a  genuine  work  of  Aristotle,  though  probably  not  prepared  by 
himself  for  publication,  but  only  sketched  for  personal  use  in 
his  lectures ;  while  the  Endemic  ethics  (Eid^ta)  is  very  probably 
a  work  of  Eudemus,  a  disciple  of  Aristotle,  and  is  derived 
mostly  from  the  first-mentioned  work,  with  some  original  addi- 
tions,— the  so-called  large  ethics  (//eydAa)  being  a  digest  from 
both.  In  his  Politics,  which  Aristotle  separates  from  ethics, 
though  as  subordinate  thereto,  morality  is  contemplated  in  its 
complete  realization  in  the  state  as  the  moral  community-life. 
Hence  this  work  is  evidently  to  be  reckoned  to  his  Ethics,  and 
to  be  regarded  as  its  carrying-out. 

Aristotle  gives  to  ethics  its  name — which  it  has  ever  since 
borne — and  a  scientific  form  which  served  as  a  model  for  the 
entire  Christian  Middle  Ages.  His  comprehensive  Sthica,  con- 
sisting of  ten  books,  contains  indeed  many  excellent  thoughts, 
and,  above  all,  gives  evidence  of  a  close  observation  of  reality, 
and  in  this  respect  is  by  far  more  sober  and  less  idealistic  than 
Plato ;  as  a  system,  however,  it  is  still  very  defective,  and  con- 
tains chasms  on  very  essential  points.  Only  relatively  few  gen- 
eral thoughts  are  really  scientifically  developed ;  by  far  the 
larger  part  is  treated  rather  empirically  and  aphoristically ; 
Aristotle  expressly  renounces  all  attempts  at  scientific  strictness 
of  demonstration  and  development,  for  the  reason  that,  in  his 
view,  the  subject  does  not  admit  of  this,  but  only  of  probability. 
Hence  the  form  of  presentation — in  direct  contrast  to  Plato's 
uniformly  spirited  and  either  scientifically  or  poetically  inspired 
style, — sinks  not  unfrequently  to  dry  common-sense  observa- 
tions, and  lingers  for  the  most  part  entirely  within  the  sphere 
of  the  popular  grasp.* 

Aristotle  does  not  rise  to  the  full  idea  of  the  absolute  God — 
an  idea  which  is  attained  to  only  in  the  thought  of  creation — 
but  he  halts  immediately  before  reaching  it;  he  pushes,  how- 
ever, still  further  into  the  back-ground  the  primitive  antithesis 
between  God  and  the  not  truly  real  proto-material  of  things, 
which  was  already  very  much  enfeebled  in  Plato,  without,  how- 
ever, entirely  overcoming  it.  He  is  loth  to  admit  a  primitive 

*  Compare  Biese :  Philos.  des  Arist.,  1838  sgq.,  2  vols., — a  studious 
presentation,  though  not  sufficiently  digested  philosophically.  Bran- 
dis:  Arist.,  2  AbtTi.,  1857  (especially  pp.  1335-1682);  profound  but  too 
detailed.  Trendelenburg :  Histor.  Bletr.  z.  PMl.,  ii,  1855,  p.  852  sqq. 


94  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  16. 

antithesis  of  being,  but  he  also  fails  to  pronounce  the  word 
which  alone  leads  beyond  it, — the  word  with  which  the  Old 
Testament  begins.  The  world  is  in  his  view  not  merely  the 
best  possible  one,  but  it  is  the  absolutely  perfect  expression  of 
the  will  of  the  rational  spirit.  Hence  he  gets  rid  also  of  that 
notion  of  Plato,  of  an  evil  that  pervades  all  real  existence,  and 
especially  humanity.  All  reality  is,  on  the  contrary,  good ;  also 
the  corporeality  of  man  is  no  longer  an  imprisonment  inflicted 
for  a  previous  guilt,  but  it  is  the  normal  organ  of  the  soul.  And 
of  an  historically-originated  depravity,  Aristotle  has  no  notion 
whatever.  It  is  true,  the  great  mass  of  the  populace  are  so 
qualified  by  nature  that  they  have  no  inner  tendency  toward 
virtue,  but  are  guided  by  sensuous  impulses  and  fear  (Eth. 
Nic.,  x,  10),  but  the  better-gifted  free-born  man  is  by  nature 
thoroughly  good,  and  hence  has  in  his  own  reason  the  pure 
fountain  of  moral  knowledge.  On  this  presupposition  Aristotle 
can  have  perfectly  free  and  confident  scope  on  the  basis  of  the 
subjective  spirit ;  and  notwithstanding  that  he  conceives  the 
idea  of  God  as  the  rational  absolute  spirit,  more  profoundly 
than  Plato,  still  he  connects  the  study  of  nature  and  of  the 
moral  spirit  much  less  closely  with  the  God-idea  than  does 
Plato.  From  the  very  circumstance  that  he  finds  in  the  real 
world  a  much  more  pure  expression  of  the  divine  thought  than 
Plato,  he  is  enabled  to  confide  himself  more  unquestioningly  to 
reality,  to  merge  himself  trustingly  into  the  real  world,  to  read 
in  its  traces  the  words  of  divine  truth ;  and  he  has  also  much 
less  need  of  the  supernatural  element,  which,  because  of  the 
God-opposed  undivine  substratum  of  the  universe,  was  highly 
necessary  in  the  system  of  Plato. 

Hence  in  Aristotle  morality  is  entirely  rooted  in  the  soil  of 
the  subject;  it  appears  less  as  the  holy  will  of  God  to  man,  than 
as  the  absolutely  normal  essence  of  the  spiritual  life,  as  called- 
for  by  the  rational  human  spirit  itself.  While  there  was  in 
Plato  at  least  the  foreshadowing  of  the  truth,  that  the  goal  of 
the  moral  striving  lies  in  God-likeness  and  in  the  pleasure  of 
God  in  man,  and  hence  bears  an  objective  character,  in  Aristotle 
the  subjective  character  comes  decidedly  into  the  fore-ground, 
namely,  in  the  thought  that  this  goal  is  the  personal  well-being 
of  the  moral  subject.  In  Plato  the  highest  and  truest  is  and 
remains  an  object  of  the  yon-side,  an  absolutely  ideal  somewhat 


§  16.]  ARISTOTLE   ON  THE   HEREAFTER.  95 

that  is  never  perfectly  presented  in  reality,  and  never  entirely 
to  be  attained  to, — in  Aristotle  all  ideality  becomes  also  real, 
and  all  that  is  true  a  quality  of  the  tins-side,  and  that,  too,  not 
as  brought  into  reality  from  without,  but  as  wrought  out  from 
within.  The  real  world  is  also  in  moral  respects  a  perfect  ex- 
pression of  the  idea,  and  no  longer  a  mere  feeble  impression 
thereof, — is  the  original,  is  an  organism  that  potentially  unfolds 
itself  with  its  own  inherent  power.  Hence  we  find  no  longer 
any  longing  and  thirsting  after  a  better  and  ideal  world,  no 
poetical  contemplating,  no  painful  consciousness  that  the  spirit 
is  fettered  and  bound  in  bands  of  unfreedom  by  an  uhspiritual 
substratum  of  the  universe ;  with  Aristotle  life  has  no  longer  a 
tragical  character;  from  his  world-theory  there  spring  no  longer 
any  dark  and  mysterious  tragedies ;  his  theory  is  a  quieting, 
genial  one ;  and  with  the  falling  away  of  the  longings  of  unsat- 
isfaction.  falls  away  also  poetry;  the  sober  prose  of  the  spirit  as 
contenting  itself  with  the  world  as  it  is,  takes  its  place.  And 
in  this  very  contentedness  there  lies  a  greater  antithesis  to  the 
Christian  world-theory  than  is  presented  in  the  Platonic  con- 
sciousness of  an  inner  antagonism  of  existence.  The  rather 
mystical  contemplativeness  of  Plato  gives  place  to  a  calculatingly 
•rationalistic  view. 

The  psychological  examination  of  the  presuppositions  of  eth- 
ics, is  much  more  largely  and  deeply  carried  out  by  Aristotle 
than  by  Plato,  and  constitutes  the  bright  point  in  his  philoso- 
phy ;  but  that  his  ethics  Jias,  in  fact,  predominantly  only  a  psy- 
chological character,  and  is  rooted  neither  in  religion  nor  in 
history,  is  its  weak  side.  While  Plato  makes  at  least  an  effort 
to  give  to  morality  an  ideal  character  transcending  reality,  the 
ethics  of  Aristotle  rather  confines  itself  with  unquestioning  sat- 
isfaction to  the  sphere  of  the  reality  of  man,  without  even  rais- 
ing the  query,  whether  this  reality  is  in  a  state  of  normal  purity, 
or  on  the  contrary  of  deterioration ;  and  it  is  characteristic  of 
their  respective  views  of  the  moral,  that  the  thought  of  personal 
immortality  which  stands  forth  so  prominently  in  Plato,  and 
which  gives  to  the  moral  striving  its  proper  tone  and  consecra- 
tion, retires  in  Aristotle  into  a  very  dubious  back-ground.  In 
fact,  he  directly  declares  it  as  absurd  (uTonov)  to  affirm,  that  no 
one  is  happy  until  after  he  has  died  (Eth.  Nic.,  i,  c.  11,  13) ;  he 
'snows  only  of  a  morality  of  the  this-side.  And  he  expressly 


96  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  17. 


declares  death  as  the  greatest  of  all  evils  (lio/Sfpuror 
"for  it  is  the  end  of  every  thing;  and  for  the  deceased  there 
appears  to  be  no  longer  either  any  good  or  any  evil  "  (Eth.  Nic., 
iii,  9),  and  hence  death  robs  man  of  the  highest  goods  (iii,  12). 

SECTION  XVII. 

All  striving  has  a  goal,  and  this  goal  is  for  the  ra- 
tional striving  a  good,  and  hence  the  highest  goal  is 
the  highest  good  ;  and  this  highest  good  is  a  perfect 
felt  well-being,  which  is  not  a  merely  passive  state, 
but  a  perfect  active  life  of  the  rational  spirit  ;  and 
hence  it  consists  essentially  in  virtue,  which  in  its 
turn  includes  per  se  in  itself  the  feeling  of  happiness. 
—  Virtue  itself  is  either  thought-virtue  or  ethical  vir- 
tue, according  as  it  relates  to  reason  or  to  sensuous- 
ness.  Thought-virtue  is  acquired  by  learning,  ethical 
virtue  by  practice.  As  the  good  consists  in  harmony, 
and  hence  in  a  proper  measure,  hence  the  non-good 
consists  in  a  too-much  or  a  too-little.  Hence  virtue 
is  always  the  observance  of  the  proper  mean  between 
two  unvirtues.  The  presupposition  of  all  moral  action 
is  the  perfect  freedom  of  the  will,  a  doctrine  to  which 
Aristotle,  —  in  opposition  to  the  view  of  Socrates  that 
the  knowledge  of  the  right  necessarily  leads  to  its 
practice,  —  holds  distinctly  fast. 

The  rational  spirit  is  not  a  reposing  or  merely  passively  moved 
entity,  but  an  activity.  The  thinking  spirit  is  at  the  same  time 
a  volitionating,  an  acting,  and  a  working  spirit.  All  volition- 
ating  aims  at  something  as  an  end,  namely,  in  all  cases,  that 
which  appears  to  him,  who  volitionates,  as  a  good.  Hence  the 
good  (TO  a-yaOoi')  is  primarily  that  whereon  the  striving  is  direct- 
ed in  view  to  its  attainment.  Now  there  are  many  and  different 
ends  and  goods,  whereof  some  are  related  to  others  merely  as 
co-adjutant,  as  means  to  higher  ends  and  goods.  But  if  the 
striving  is  a  rational  one,  that  is,  a  sure  and  consistent  one,  then 
there  must  be  a  last  end,  a  highest  good,  which  is  not  a  mere 


§  17.]  ARISTOTLE   ON   EUDAEMONISM.  97 

means  to  another  end,  but  which  is  aimed  at  for  its  own  sake, 
and  for  the  sake  of  which  alone  we"  aim  at  all  other  goods,  and 
which  is  hence  an  absolutely  perfect  end,  a  TeXetov,  which  has 
its  end,  TO  re/of,  within  itself.  Honor,  riches,  knowledge,  etc., 
are  goods,  though  they  are  not  sought  for  their  own  sake,  but 
ahvays  for  a  higher  purpose  to  which  they  are  but  the  means, — are 
but  the  partial  goods  of  one  perfect  good ;  and  this  good  is 
the  perfection  of  one's  own  existence  and  life,  the  well-being, 
ev6ai/j.ovia,  that  is,  the  vitality  of  the  life  as  perfect  in  itself,  and 
as  being  its  own  end,— C^W  rifaiag  evep-yeia.  This  well-being  is 
not  sought  in  the  interest  of  another  good,  but  for  its  own  sake, 
and  is  hence  the  highest  good  (Nic.,  i,  c.  1  sqq.;  comp.  Eud.,  i,  1). 
This  "eudaemonia"  is  by  no  means  one  and  the  same  with  our 
notion  of  happiness,  but  includes  the  same  in  itself.  Happiness 
is  only  the  one,  the  subjective  phase,  namely,  the  happiness- 
feeling  that  is  connected  with  this  u  eudaemonia,"  whereas  the 
"eudaemonia"  itself  has  essentially  and  primarily  an  objective 
significancy,  namely,  the  being  well-conditioned  or  blessed,  the 
possession  of  the  all-sidedly  perfect  life.  Hence  it  is  not  with- 
out meaning  when  a  special  examination  is  entered  upon  as  to 
whether  the  pleasure-feeling  is  included  in  the  "eudaemonia" 
(Me.,  i,  c.  9). — The  good  is  accordingly  by  no  means  a  mere 
idea  never  entirely  realizable  in  the  this-side,  as  with  Plato,  but 
it  is  a  full  reality  already  in  the  present  life, — finds  this  reality 
in  the  actual  being  and  life  of  the  sage ;  it  is  not  a  merely  ab- 
stract general  something,  but  a  definite  quality  inherent  in  indi- 
vidual existence;  not  a  yon-side  something  transcending  all 
special  goods,  but  one  that  is  realized  in  the  totality  itself  of 
these  goods  (Nic.,  i,  4).  This  totality,  however,  is  not  a  mere 
sum,  for  were  this  the  case  the  highest  good  might  be  increased 
by  some  newly  added  good,  but  it  is  a  unitary  whole,  whereof 
the  different  goods  are  but  the  special  forms  (Nic.,  i,  5). 

Well-being  as  a  purely  human  good  is  not  mere  life,  for  life 
exists  also  with  plants  and  animals,  nor  yet  the  mere  sentient 
life,  for  this  exists  also  with  animals ;  but  it  is  the  rationally- 
active  life,  and  hence  the  perfectly  active  life  of  the  rational 
spirit, — is  not  mere  being  and  determinatedness,  but  a  self- 
determining,  an  ivepyeia, — is  not  merely  a  good,  but  works  the 
good  on  and  on  (Nic.,  i,  6,  7).  This  implies  of  itself  that  the 
highest  good,  well-being,  is  not  outside  of  or  merely  subsequent 


98  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  17. 

to  virtue;  on  the  contrary,  virtue  itself  constitutes  a  part  of  the 
essence  of  the  highest  good,  which  in  fact  consists  in  activity, 
though  it  is  not  per  se  the  whole  highest  good ;  for  to  perfect 
well-being  belongs  also  the  happiness-feeling,  the  feeling  of  ^ 
pleasure,  which  results  upon  the  successful  issuing  of  the  virtu- 
ous activity.  Hence  this  happiness-feeling  is  not  a  something 
independent  of  virtue,  and  existing  outside  of  and  along-side 
of  it ;  on  the  contrary  the  virtuous  life  already  contains  happi- 
ness as  its  necessary  constituent ;  for  only  he  is  virtuous  who 
does  the  good  gladly,  who  has  joy  in  virtue.  In  so  far,  there- 
fore, one  may  indeed  say  that  the  highest  good  consists  in  the 
practicing  of  virtue,  and  of  all  the  virtues  (Nic.,  i,  7-9).  How- 
ever, Aristotle  admits  that  to  perfect  well-being  belong  also 
such  goods  as  are  not  already  directly  given  in  virtue  itself,  such 
as  are  even  independent  thereof,  as,  e.  g.,  earthly  affluence,  good 
descent,  beauty,  health,  a  happy  close  of  life,  etc.  (Nic.,  i,  9-11). 
With  this  very  true  concession  to  the  natural  consciousness  as 
unprejudiced  by  any  one-sided  system,  the  consequentiality  of 
Aristotle's  ethical  system  is  manifestly  broken.  For  if  there  are 
real  goods,  and  conditions  of  the  highest  good,  which  are  inde- 
pendent of  moral  perfection,  and  if  consequently  the  truly  vir- 
tuous man  may  possibly  be  without  the  highest  good,  then  there 
prevails  no  moral  world-order,  and  morality  is  deprived  of  its 
assurance ;  and  as  it  is  a  legitimate  goal  to  strive  for  the  high- 
est good,  hence  it  follows  that  man  must  strive  after  still  other 
possessions  outside  of  morality,  and  which  do  not  depend  there- 
on, and  which  he  can  consequently  acquire  only  in  extra-moral 
and  hence  immoral  ways.  But  as  Aristotle  does  not  recognize 
any  guilty  corruption  of  human  nature,  hence  the  above  conces- 
sion involves  him  in  an  absolutely  insolvable  dilemma,  in  a  vio- 
lent contradiction  with  his  own  system.  He  prefers,  however, 
to  be  in  contradiction  with  himself,  rather  than,  in  the  interests 
of  his  system,  to  deny  manifest  experience,  to  the  true  under- 
standing of  which  he  does  not  possess  the  key. 

But  wherein  now  consists  virtue,  and  hence  the  most  essential 
element  of  well-being  ?  In  man  there  is  a  two-phased  life,  sen- 
suousness  and  reason,  which  are  often  in  conflict  with  each  other. 
Sensuousness,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  purely  vegetative,  namely, 
the  nutritive  activity  of  the  physical  life,  but  sensuous  desire, 
may  be  and  should  be  governed  by  the  reason.  Virtue  assumes 


§  17.]  ARISTOTLE  ON  VIRTUE.  99 

accordingly  a  twofold  form ;  in  the  first  place  it  relates  to  the 
proper  condition  of  reason  itself,  and  in  the  second  place  to  the 
proper  condition  of  the  sensuous  nature,  as  consisting  in  the 
subordination  of  the  same  to  reason;   in  the  first  sense  it  is 
thought-virtue,  in  the  second  ethical  virtue  (aperi)  iiavorjuicr/  and 
ri6iK.fi).     The  former  is  mainly  wisdom  ;  the  latter  includes  tem- 
perateness,  liberality,  etc.     That  the  former  belongs  among  the 
virtues,  appears  from  this,  that  we  praise  it  in  a  person  as  his 
merit  (Xic.,  i,  13).     The  word  ethical  as  applied  here  to  virtue 
is  taken  in  its  narrower  sense,  as  relating  to  practical  habits.    It 
is  clear  at  a  glance,  that  this  division  of  the  virtues  is  entirely 
inadequate,  unless  the  one  or  the  other  class  of  virtues  is  taken 
in  a  wider  sense  than  is  strictly  admissible.     For  there  are  purely 
spiritual  virtues,  e,  g.,  humility,  truthfulness,  fidelity,  thankful- 
ness, which  are  in  no  way  connected  with  sensuousness,  and  are 
yet  not  intellectual  or  thought-virtues.    But  if  we  take  wisdom, 
as  in  Plato,  in  the  wide  sense  of  an  inner  harmony  of  the  rational 
soul  in  general,  then  very  manifestly  the  ethical  virtues  which 
consist  in  the  controlling  of  the  sensuous  nature,  would  not  be 
co-ordinate  but  subordinate  thereto. — The  thought-virtue  can 
be  taught  or  learned,  especially  by  abundance  of  life-experience ; 
on  the  contrary,  the  ethical  virtues  are  acquired  by  frequent 
repetitions  of  the  same  actions,  that  is,  by  habituation, — are  es- 
sentially facilities  in  acting,  acquired  by  practice.     By  nature 
we  have  no  virtue,  but  only  the  possibility  and  capability  there- 
of; and  the  capability  becomes  a  real  virtue  only  by  practice 
and  habit.     Hence  virtuous  actions  are  primarily  not  the  conse- 
quence, but  the  ground  and  presupposition  of  virtue.    It  is  only 
by  repeatedly  acting  virtuously  that  man  becomes  virtuous  (Nic., 
ii,  1,  2).     How  it  is  possible  to  act  virtuously  before  one  has 
virtue,  and  what  motive  man  can  have  to  act  virtuously  before 
he  is  virtuous,  Aristotle  asks  indeed,  and  he  recognizes  the  dif- 
ficulty of  the  question,  but  he  does  not  solve  it.    The  indication 
that  we  possess  virtue  is  this,  that  in  our  virtuous  acting  we 
feel  also  delight.     Virtue  is  neither  a  passion,  such  as  anger, 
fear,  love,  hatred,  etc.,  because  the  passions  are  natural  move- 
ments not  springing  from  our  will,  nor  bearing  as  yet  per  se  any 
moral  character,  nor  is  it  a  faculty,  for  this  is  given  by  nature, 
but  it  is  a  facility  (e&c),  that  is,  the  moral  manner  of  our  bear- 
ing toward  the  passions ;  and  indeed  it  is  that  particular  facility 

8 


100  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  17. 

whereby  man  becomes  a  good  man,  and  his  work  a  good  work 
(Nic.,  ii,  5).*  This  is  of  course  as  yet  a  very  insignificant  and 
purely  formal  definition.  In  order  to  give  it  some  contents, 
Aristotle  resorts  to  this  course :  In  every  matter  there  is  only  a 
single  form  of  the  right,  but  manifold  forms  of  the  wrong, — 
even  as  in  regard  to  a  mark  there  are  many  directions  for  shoot- 
ing by  it,  but  only  one  for  hitting  it,  for  which  reason  also  the 
right  is  much  more  difficult  to  find  and  to  do  than  is  the  un- 
right.  The  unright  in  a  manner  of  acting  is  either  a  defect  or 
an  excess ;  the  right  is  the  correct  measure,  and  hence  the  mean 
between  the  two.  Hence  virtue  is  (and  this  is  its  complete  def- 
inition) a  freely-willed  facility  in  observing  the  middle-way 
(fieaoTijf)  as  correctly  determined  for  us  by  reason  and  by  the 
judgment  of  the  judicious  (Nic.,  ii,  6;  iii,  8;  comp.  Eucl.,  ii,  3). 
[That  in  this  connection  only  the  ethical  virtues  are  meant,  ap- 
pears from  the  entire  context.  But  by  this  circumstance  the 
general  definition  of  virtue  becomes  again  more  unclear.]  The 
middle-way  is  in  all  things  the  best.  Virtue  aims  consequently 
not  at  a  mean  between  good  and  evil,  but  at  the  best,  and  the 
best  is  the  mean  between  too  much  and  too  little.  Thus,  brav- 
ery is  the  mean  between  cowardice  and  fool-hardiness;  temper- 
ateness,  the  mean  between  dissoluteness  and  insensibility  to 
pleasure-sensations ;  liberality  the  mean  between  prodigality 
and  niggardliness;  love  of  honor  stands  mid-way  between  un- 
bounded ambitiousness  of  fame  and  an  absolute  indifference  to 
the  opinion  of  others ;  evenness  of  temper,  between  irascibility 
and  stupidity,  etc.  (Nic.,  ii,  7).  From  this  it  follows  that  any 
two  mutually-opposed  faults  stand  to  each  other  in  a  much  more 
violent  contrast,  than  does  either  of  the  two  to  the  correspond- 
ing virtue  (Nic.,  ii,  8). 

It  is  very  manifest  that  this  merely  quantitative  distinguish- 
ing of  good  and  evil  does  not  touch  the  essence  of  morality  at 
all,  and  in  its  practical  application  undermines  all  certainty  of 
the  moral  judgment,  which  is  thereby  transferred  from  the 
sphere  of  the  conscience  into  that  of  the  calculating  understand- 
ing. In  this  view  evil  is  not  qualitatively,  that  is,  essentially, 
different  from  the  good,  but  it  differs  only  in  number  and  de- 
gree; hence  there  is  between  the  two  no  radical  antithesis,  but 
only  a  gradual  transition ;  in  fact  the  transition  from  one  vice 
•  Comp.  Trendelenburg :  Histor.  £eitr.,  i,  pp.  95, 174. 


§  17-]  DEFECTIVE  VIRTUE-CONCEPTION.  101 

to  the  opposite  one  passes  necessarily  through  the  corresponding 
virtue.  Aristotle  himself  becomes  conscious  of  the  defectiveness 
of  his  definition  of  virtue ;  he  concedes  that  there  are  also  ac- 
tions and  tempers  in  regard  to  which  the  notion  of  the  too-much 
or  too-little  is  not  at  all  applicable,  as,  e.  g.,  delight  in  misfor- 
tune, envy,  murder,  theft,  adultery,  which  are  all  per  se  and  in 
their  essence  wrong,  and  do  not  simply  become  so  by  rising  to 
a  certain  height;  there  can  be,  for  example,  no  permissible  de- 
gree of  adultery,  and  so  of  the  other  cases  (Nic.,  ii,  7).  And  if 
notwithstanding  this  he  is  still  unwilling  to  discard  his  defini- 
tion of  virtue,  this  only  evinces  the  utter  perplexity  of  the  the- 
orist ;  for  by  making  this  concession,  his  definition  is  completely 
undermined,  inasmuch  as  it  is  thereby  implied  that  the  differ- 
ence between  good  and  evil  is  not  a  quantitative  but  a  qualita- 
tive one.  And  the  matter  is  made  much  worse  still  by  the 
express  admission,  that  virtue  is  often  not  in  the  actual  middle 
between  the  two  opposite-standing  faults,  but  stands  nearer  to 
the  one  extreme  than  to  the  other, — that  bravery,  e.  ff.,  stands 
nearer  to  fool-hardiness  than  to  cowardice,  liberality  nearer  to 
prodigality  than  to  niggardliness,  etc.,  and  that  of  two  errors 
the  one  is  usually  less  hurtful  than  the  other  (Nic.,  ii,  8), — for 
by  this  admission  not  only  is  the  ground-principle  entirely  over- 
thrown, but  also  all  possibility  of  a  certain  judgment  as  to 
morality  is  cut  off.  By  what  rule  is  one  to  find  in  the  diagonal 
the  correct  virtue-point,  if  this  point  is  an  eccentric  one?  Aris- 
totle himself  feels  the  great  difficulty  which  results  from  charg- 
ing the  moral  consciousness  of  the  individual  with  the  duty  of 
such  a  calculation ;  and  he  knows  no  better  counsel  to  give  than 
that  given  by  Circe  to  Ulysses  in  regard  to  his  sailing  between 
Scylla  and  Charybdis,  namely,  to  steer  nearer  the  less  dangerous 
Scylla, — to  go  nearer  the  extreme  that  is  less  remote  from  the 
mean  virtue,  than  to  the  other,  and  to  incur  the  risk  of  the  less 
fault  of  the  two ;  and  in  order  most  easily  to  find  the  middle- 
way,  one  must  sometimes  deviate  (airoK^iveiv)  on  the  side  of  ex- 
cess, and  sometimes  on  the  side  of  defectiveness  (Nic.,  ii,  9). 
More  patently  than  this,  Aristotle  could  hardly  possibly  have 
confessed  the  insufficiency  of  his  definition  of  virtue. 

Morality  presupposes  the  freedom  of  the  will ;  only  that  which 
takes  place  from  free  self-determination  is  morally  imputed  to  a 
man,  is  praised  or  blamed.  Virtue  belongs  exclusively  to  the 


102  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  17. 

sphere  of  freedom ;  that  is  unfree  which  is  either  forced  or  which 
is  done  from  ignorance ;  passionate  movements  of  feeling,  such 
as  anger  or  sensuous  desire,  do  not  destroy  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  for  man  can  and  should  control  them  by  reason ;  even  in 
case  of  moral  violence,  by  the  excitement  of  fear,  etc.,  the  free- 
dom of  volition  remains ;  involuntary  is  only  the  forced  action 
which  takes  place  with  inner  resistance  (Nic.,  iii,  1-3 ;  comp. 
Eud.,  ii,  6).     From  willingness  as  the  more  comprehensive  no- 
tion, the  resolution  is,  as  the  narrower,  to  be  distinguished, 
namely,  the  will  as  deliberately  directed  to  a  definite  and  possi- 
ble-regarded goal  (Nic.,  iii,  4,  5).     A  resolution  is  free  also  in 
regard  to  the  recognized  good  or  evil.     Every  resolution  is,  it 
is  true,  directed  to  a  good, — with  the  sage  always  to  the  truly 
good,  but  with  others  to  that  which  to  them  seems  to  be  good ; 
from  this  it  does  not  follow,  however,  that  men  always  sin  sim- 
ply from  error,  and  that  where  there  is  a  real  knowledge  of  the 
good,  the  resolution  must  necessarily  be  directed  to  this,  as  is 
taught  by  Socrates  and  Plato.     Such  a  view  is  contradicted 
even  by  the  genjeral  moral  judgment  both  of  individuals  and  of 
the  State,  which  makes  man,  as  soon  as  he  has  come  to  under- 
standing, responsible  for  all  the  evil  which  he  does,  and  imputes 
it  to  him  as  guilt.     It  is  true,  many  do  evil  simply  from  the 
error  of  their  moral  judgment  or  from  the  worthlessness  of  their 
character,  but  both  that  error  and  this  worthlessness  are  their 
own  fault,  and  do  not  excuse  them ;  in  fact  man  can  even  pur- 
posely do  what  he  has  recognized  as  evil,  namely,  by  inquiring 
not  after  the  good,  but  only  after  the  agreeable ;  and  the  opinion, 
that  no  one  does  evil  voluntarily  and  consciously,  conflicts  with 
undeniable  experience   and  with  the  essence  of  will-freedom 
(Nic.,  iii,  6,  7 ;  v,  12 ;  vii,  2,  3).     In  this  connection  Aristotle 
makes  the  significant  and  almost  surprising  observation,  that 
the  character  which  has  become  evil  by  guilt  can  just  as  little 
be  thrown  off  again  at  mere  volition,  as  the  person  who  has 
made  himself  sick  by  his  own  fault,  can  become  well  again  at 
mere  volition ;  once  become  evil  or  sick,  it  stands  no  longer 
within  his  discretion  to  cease  to  be  so;   a  stone  when  once 
cast  cannot  be  caught  back  from  its  flight;  and  so  is  it  also 
with  the  character  which  has  become  evil.    This  thought  might 
have  led  further ;  Aristotle,  however,  does  not  follow  it  out,  and 
he  leaves  unanswered  the  closely  related  question,  as  to  how, 


§  18.]  ARISTOTELIAN  VIRTUES.  103 

then,  a  reformation  in  character  is  possible.  Moreover,  he  does 
not  concede  to  evil  any  other  than  an  individual  effect, — knows 
nothing  of  any  natural  solidarity  of  evil  in  self-propagating, 
morally-degenerated  races.  Every  man,  at  least  the  free-born 
Greek,  is,  on  the  contrary,  perfectly  good  by  nature,  and  the 
sensuous  nature  with  which  every  one  is  born  has,  in  reason,  its 
perfectly  sufficient  counterpoise. 


SECTION  XVIII. 

In  carrying  out  his  system  into  details  Aristotle 
treats  first  the  ethical  virtues,  and  as  their  chief  rep- 
resentatives:  courage,  temperateness,  liberality,  mag- 
nanimity (from  which  the  love  of  honor  is,  as  of  a 
lower  quality,  to  be  distinguished),  the  proper  control 
of  temper,  and,  as  predominantly  social  virtues  :  ami- 
ability, truthfulness,  readiness  in  good-natured  wit, 
shame,  but  especially  justness  and,  as  closely-related 
therewith,  fairness  or  equity.  As  intellectual  or 
thought-virtues  are  examined,  more  largely,  prudence 
and  wisdom ;  and  their  significancy  is  more  closely 
defined  than  in  Socrates  and  Plato.  As  considered 
under  another  phase,  namely,  in  respect  to  the  degree 
of  the  moral  power  virtualizing  itself  in  the  doing 
of  the  good,  the  moral  character  is  distinguished  into 
virtuousness  in  the  narrower  sense,  into  temper  ateness, 
and  into  heroic  or  divine  virtue. 

The  carrying-out  of  the  ethical  matter  proper,  though  rich  in 
suggestive  thoughts  and  observations,  is  devoid  of  a  general 
scientific  development  from  one  central  principle;  nor  do  we 
find  as  yet  any  strict  organic  classification.  The  Platonic  divis- 
ion of  the  virtues  (§  14),  though  made  the  basis,  is  neither 
strictly  observed  nor  further  developed.  Differing  from  Plato, 
Aristotle  does  not  first  discuss  wisdom  as  the  root  of  all  the 
other  virtues,  but,  on  the  contrary,  manliness  or  courage  (av6pia) 
which  stands  mid-way  between  fool-hardy  daring  and  coward- 


104  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  18. 

ice.  It  relates  not  to  all  the  evils  that  are  to  be  assailed,  but 
essentially  to  death ;  and  also  not  to  every  mortal  danger,  but 
more  especially  to  the  most  honorable  of  these  dangers,  danger 
upon  the  battle-field,  and  besides  also  to  mortal  danger  by  sea 
and  in  sickness  (Nic.,  iii,  9-12).  This  limitation,  though  ex- 
plainable from  the  warlike  national  character,  is  not  based  in 
the  moral  idea ;  and  for  courage  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word  in 
the  face  of  all  evils,  Aristotle  finds  no  place  at  all  in  his  system 
of  virtue.  The  motive  to  courage  is  not  the  thought  of  an 
eternal  crown, — for  death  is  for  the  virtuous  man  the  most  fear- 
ful of  all  evils,  for  precisely  for  him  life  has  the  greatest  worth, 
— but  this  motive  is  only  a  delight  in  duty  and  in  the  beautiful 
(Nic.,  iii,  12). — The  second  virtue  is  temperateness  or  modera- 
tion (aufypoavvrj),  which  consists  in  the  observance  of  the  right 
mean  in  regard  to  sensuous  pleasure,  even  as,  on  the  other 
hand,  courage  relates  to  evil,  that  is,  pain.  The  extending 
of  this  virtue  to  other  than  the  sensuous,  and  that  too  the  low- 
est sensuous  feelings  of  taste  and  of  sensibility,  is  expressly 
disallowed ;  and  hence  there  remain  moral  phenomena,  both 
virtues  and  vices,  which  find  no  place  whatever  in  the  classes 
of  virtue  admitted  by  Aristotle.  As  to  the  question,  by  what 
rule  the  proper  measure  is  to  be  judged,  we  are  not  answered ; 
virtue  is  simply  placed  in  the  middle  between  the  immodera- 
tion which  surrenders  itself  passionately  to  sensuous  pleasure, 
and  which  sinks  man  to  the  brute,  and  an  entire  desireless- 
ness  or  insensibility  to  sensuous  pleasure,  which,  however, 
only  rarely  or  in  fact  strictly  speaking  never  exists, — for 
then  man  would  be  no  longer  human  (Nic.,  iii,  13-15);  in 
which  case  the  finding  of  the  virtuous  mean  between  the 
two  faults  would  be  a  rather  difficult  matter. — Liberality  or 
generosity,  as  the  third  virtue,  is  the  observance  of  the  mid- 
dle-way in  the  use  of  property.  It  gives  cheerfully,  out  of 
delight  in  the  beauty  of  the  action,  but  only  to  such  as  de- 
serve it ;  that  it  rests  on  love  is  not  stated.  As  especially  im- 
portant, is  extensively  discussed,  liberality  for  public  and 
generally  useful  ends,  for  theatrical  entertainments,  for  pop- 
ular diversions,  for  the  feasting  of  the  collective  citizenship, 
for  the  outfitting  of  war-ships,  and  for  the  keeping  up  of  a 
state  of  luxury  in  the  interest  of  the  dignity  of  the  person, — 
the  virtue  of  fie-ya^onp^fia  (Nic.,  iv,  1-6).  Of  the  moral  dan- 


§  18.]  MAGNANIMITY,  EQUANIMITY.  105 

gers  of  riches  for  the  moral  disposition  itself,  aside  from  the 
two  errors  of  prodigality  and  niggardliness,  nothing  is  said  ; 
on  the  contrary,  riches  is  regarded  as  a  high  and  much  to  be 
desired  good. — Magnanimity  (neyahotyvxin)  belongs  only  to 
men  of  high  gifts,  and  is,  as  opposed  to  empty  pretense,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  self-disparaging  pusillanimousness,  on 
the  other,  the  proper  respecting  of  self,  the  moral  pride  of 
the  great  man, — while  the  proper  self-respect  of  the  ordinary 
person  is  not  magnanimity,  but  only  modesty ;  the  former 
virtue  stands  higher  than  the  latter.  Only  he  can  be  mag- 
nanimous who  is  adorned  with  all  the  virtues,  that  is,  the 
truly  great  man ;  and  he  puts  this  virtue  into  practice,  in  that 
he  strives  after  true  honor,  that  is,  after  the  esteem  of  the 
great  and  noble,  as  the  highest  of  external  goods,  while  he 
disdains  the  honor  and  reproach  which  come  from  unimport- 
ant men.  But  proper  magnanimity  is  only  possible  when,  with 
the  inner  virtue-merit  there  is  associated  also  an  outwardly 
happy  and  eminent  condition,  such  as  rich  possessions,  a  high- 
born family,  power,  etc.,  for  this  brings  honor;  hence  the 
magnanimous  man  will  seek,  though  not  primarily  and  chief- 
ly, after  these  things,  not  so  much  for  their  own  sake,  as 
simply  for  the  honor  associated  with  them.  In  less  great 
souls  the  virtue  of  magnanimity  gives  place  to  the  lone  of 
honor  which  looks  only  to  inferior  degrees  of  honor,  and 
which  holds  the  mean  between  immoderate  ambition  and 
pusillanimity  (Nic.,  iv,  7-10). — The  virtue  of  equanimity  or 
gentleness,  (irpaorrif)  occupies  the  mean  between  irascibility 
and  phlegmatic  insensibility,  and  hence  consists  in  the  proper 
tempering  of  anger,  and  is  practically  of  difficult  observ- 
ance. Not  to  indulge  in  anger  at  all  is  stolidity,  and  not  to 
defend  one's  self  against  offenses  is  dishonorable  and  cow- 
ardly. It  is  advisable  not  to  repress  wrath,  but  to  let  it 
come  to  expression ;  the  indulging  of  vengeance  stills  wrath. 
Aristotle  regards  revenge  as  a  something  entirely  legitimate, 
and  simply  warns  against  over-indulgence.  More  specific 
limitations  of  this  dangerous  virtue  he  regards  as  impractica- 
ble, holding  that  feeling  decides  this  best  in  each  particular 
case,  and  that  minor  deviations  from  the  right  mean  are  here 
not  to  be  censured  (Nic.,  iv,  11). 

Without  any  strict  logical  connection,  Aristotle  now  passes 


106  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  18. 

to  treat  of  the  social  virtues.  Between  the  vices  of  a  fawning 
seeking  for  approbation  and  a  yielding  to  the  wishes  of  every 
one,  on  the  one  hand,  and  an  unsocial  abruptness,  on  the 
other,  stands  the  virtue  of  friendly  and  polite  amiability,  a 
virtue  which  (in  distinction  from  personal  love)  relates  not  to 
definite  loved  persons,  but  to  all  with  whom  we  come  into 
association,  and  does  not  rest  on  love  (Nic.,  iv,  12).  Be- 
tween vain-boastf ulness  and  ironical  self-disparagement,  lies 
the  virtue  of  truthfulness  of  discourse,  especially  in  relation 
to  the  speaker  himself,  in  other  words,  straightforwardness 
and  honesty.  But  inasmuch  as  too  strong  self-praise  is  more 
offensive  to  others  than  self-disparagement,  hence  it  is  ad- 
visable to  speak  rather  too  humbly  than  too  highly  of  one's 
self  (Nic.,  iv,  13).  A  third  social  virtue  relates  to  social  in- 
tercourse and  jesting,  and  is,  in  contrast  to  buffoonery  and 
excessive  irony,  on  the  one  hand,  and  sardonic  moroseness  on 
the  other,  cheerful  facetiousness  and  gracious  aptness  in  wit 
(evrpaneMa)  (Nic.,  iv,  14;  comp.  Eud.,  iii,  7).  Aristotle 
speaks  here  merely  incidentally  of  shame,  that  is,  the  fear  of 
disgrace,  which  is  indeed  not  per  se  a  virtue,  but  only  an  in- 
stinct ;  it  becomes  a  virtue  only  under  special  circumstances, 
namely,  when  a  mature  person  has  really  done  something  of 
which  he  must  feel  ashamed,  and  also  in  youth,  because  here 
the  passions  are  violent,  and  shame  is  a  check  against  them. 
The  morally  matured  man,  however,  is  never  to  have  occasion 
to  feel  ashamed,  for  he  is  not  by  any  means  to  think  of  him- 
self as  being  so  constituted  as  to  be  capable  of  doing  any- 
thing shameful  (Nic.,  iv,  15).  Of  the  true  moral  significancy 
of  shame,  which  is  so  suggestively  indicated  in  Gen.  iii,  7, 
Aristotle  has  no  conception. 

The  most  important  social  virtue,  the  one  which  in  fact  in- 
cludes all  the  others  in  so  far  as  they  relate  to  our  conduct 
toward  others,  is  justness,  which  consists  in  respecting  the 
laws  of  the  State  and  the  rights  of  others,  so  that  every  man 
is  treated  as  he  deserves  and  as  he  has  a  right  to  claim.  In 
a  narrower  sense  justness  relates  only  to  the  "mine"  and  the 
"thine,"  to  property  and  earnings.  The  principle  of  the  just 
mean  is  here  of  difficult  application,  as  there  is  manifestly  no 
immoral  form  of  conduct  which  can  contain  too  great  an  ob- 
servance of  the  rights  of  others  (Nic.  v,  1-14.) 


§  18.]  FAIRNESS,  PRUDENCE,  WISDOM.  107 

Related  to  justness,  and  belonging  thereto  in  the  wider 
sense  of  the  word,  is  the  subordinate  virtue  of  equitableness 
or  fairness.  It  accomplishes — in  contrast  to  the  rigid  observ- 
ance of  the  letter  of  the  civil  law — true  justness  outside  of 
the  requirements  of  the  law,  which  can  in  fact  only  express 
the  general,  and  cannot  apply  to  every  individual  case  ;  hence 
it  is  an  improving  and  perfecting  of  the  law,  in  that  in  the 
interest  of  justness  one  does  not  in  certain  cases  insist  on  a 
right  which  the  outward  law  concedes  (Nic.,  v,  15).  Against 
his  own  self  man  cannot,  properly  speaking,  do  injustice ; 
even  suicide,  as  being  voluntary,  is  not  an  injustice  to  one's 
self,  but  only  to  the  State. 

In  respect  to  the  intellectual  or  thought-virtues,  of  which 
only  prudence  and  wisdom  are  more  especially  treated  (Nic., 
vi,  1-13),  the  thought  of  the  middle-way  is  of  course  no  lon- 
ger applicable  ;  they,  do  not  themselves  observe  the  just 
mean,  rather  is  it  they  themselves  that  discover  it.  Prudence 
or  sensibleness  (^povj/trtf,  more  than  prudence  as  the  word  is 
usually  taken,  but  also  not  synonymous  with  reasonableness, 
as  Brandis  would  have  it)  is  the  spiritual  facility  of  making  in 
each  particular  case  suitable  practical  decisions  in  regard  to 
what  is  good  or  evil  for  the  actor.  Wisdom  (ao$ia)  is  of  a 
higher  character,  and  gives  to  prudence  its  right  basis.  It  is 
the  proper  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  grounds  of  true  knowl- 
edge, and  the  deriving  of  the  same  from  these  grounds,  and 
hence  refers  to  the  immutable,  whereas  prudence  has  to  do 
with  the  mutable  and  transitory ;  wisdom  relates  to  the  uni- 
versally valid ;  prudence,  to  that  which  is  befitting  for  the 
individual ;  and  hence  prudence  is  the  specific  practical  ap- 
plication of  wisdom,  which  latter  expresses  rather  the  moral 
idea  per  se.  Hence  prudence  or  sensibleness  is  the  applying 
of  moral  wisdom  in  the  ethical  virtues.  Wisdom  and  pru- 
dence do  not  constitute  the  whole  of  virtue  itself,  as  Socrates 
affirms,  but  they  are,  as  6p06f  ?.oy6f,  the  necessary  presupposi- 
tion of  all  the  other  virtues. 

Aristotle  passes  now  to  another  manner  of  considering  the 
moral  bearing,  namely,  not,  as  thus  far,  in  reference  to  its 
material  quality,  but  in  reference  to  the  degree  of  moral  en- 
ergy therein  virtualized.  Over  against  the  threefold  grada- 
tion qf  the  immoral  that  is  to  be  distinguished  in  this  respect, 


108  CHRISTIAN"  ETHICS.  [§  18. 

namely,  viciousness,  incontinence,  and  brutality, — wherein 
the  moral  consciousness  and  the  moral  will  are  either  badly 
constituted  or  feeble,  or  entirely  wanting, — stands  the  three- 
fold gradation  of  the  moral,  namely,  mrtuouaness  in  the  nar- 
rower sense,  continence,  and  heroic  or  divine  virtue ;  the  latter 
makes  man  entirely  like  the  gods,  but  is  attained  to  only  sel- 
dom; but  equally  seldom  is  also  the  opposite  extreme,  brutal- 
ity. Incontinence  is  a  weakness  of  the  moral  witt,  for  the 
person  knows  that  his  desires  are  evil,  nevertheless  he  follows 
them,  and  hence  sins  (what  Socrates  declares  as  impossible) 
consciously  and  from  passionateness.  On  the  contrary,  he 
who  is  continent  or  firm  in  character  acts  constantly  in  har- 
mony with  his  rational  insight.  The  feeble  and  hesitative 
manner  in  which  Aristotle  attempts  to  answer  the  perplexing 
questions  which  present  themselves  in  this  connection,  indi- 
cates very  clearly,  how  little  knowledge  he  has  of  the  per- 
versity of  a  corrupted  heart  (Me.,  vii,  1-7).  "While  Socrates 
covers  the  majority  of  sins  with  ignorance  and  error,  and 
thus  palliates  their  guilt,  Aristotle,  who  recognizes  the  mani- 
fold contradiction  between  knowledge  and  volition,  goes  so 
far  in  the  other  direction,  as  to  admit  inborn  faults  and  pas- 
sions, and  even  inborn  unnatural  vices,  and  to  find  therein 
a  degree  of  excuse  for  the  deviating  of  those  who  are  thus 
afflicted,  from  better  knowledge;  "the  fact  of  having  such 
proclivities,  lies  outside  of  the  sphere  of  the  morally  evil ;" 
and  when  man  is  dominated  by  such  evil  proclivities,  it  is  only 
in  an  improper  sense  that  his  conduct  is  to  be  called  immoral 
(Nic.,  vii,  6).  How  such  an  innateness  of  evil  proclivities  is 
to  be  explained,  we  are  not  informed.  The  proclivity  to  an- 
ger especially  is  to  be  judged  very  mildly, — there  lies  in  it 
even  something  rational,  as  in  contrast  to  the  sensuous  desires, 
and  at  all  events  no  presumption ;  and  its  justification  lies  in 
its  universal  prevalence.  In  general  it  is  excusable  to  follow 
one's  natural  proclivities,  and  this  all  the  more  so  the  more 
they  are  universal  (Me.,  vii,  7).  The  incontinent  are  not 
properly  speaking  vicious,  but  only  similar  to  the  vicious, 
and  for  the  reason  that  in  them  there  is  no  evil  purpose 
(Me.,  vii,  9.) 

After  an  extended  consideration  of  friendship  as  a  special 
field  of  the  moral  activity,  Aristotle  concludes  with  an  ex- 


§  18.]  IDEAL  SAGE-LIFE.  109 


tensive  discussion  of  pleasure  (r^Sovif)  and  well-being  (evdai/j.ovia) 
as  results  of  virtuous  conduct.  Pleasure  is  not  identical  with 
the  good,  —  is  not  the  highest  good,  but  many  kinds  of  pleas- 
ure are  goods,  and  hence  to  be  aimed  at,  while  others  are 
not  so.  Pleasure  is  the  result  of  a  power-exertion  in  coming 
to  its  goal,  and  hence  is  an  attendant  of  life-development 
per  se;  now,  according  as  this  power-exertion  is  good  or  evil, 
so  is  also  the  pleasure  attending  it,  and  only  the  pleasure 
which  is  connected  with  an  exercise  of  virtue  is  true  pleasure 
(Nic.,  x,  1-5).  Well-being  is  not  a  mere  condition,  but  is  es- 
sentially life-activity,  and  indeed  such  a  life-activity  as  is  not 
a  purposeless  play,  but  a  rational  practicing  of  virtue.  Now 
as  cognition  is  the  highest  spiritual  exertion  of  power,  hence 
the  acquiring  of  the  knowledge  of  wisdom  is  coincident  with 
the  highest  well-being  ;  all  other  activity  is  less  constant  and 
permanent,  less  free  and  independent,  —  rests  less  upon  itself 
and  has  its  end  less  within  itself.  Hence  the  practically-act- 
ing life  stands  only  in  secondary  importance,  as  in  fact  also 
the  life  and  the  happiness  of  the  gods,  or  of  God,  consists  not 
in  such  an  outward-working  activity,  but  only  in  reflection. 
In  third  importance  stand  the  outward  goods  of  fortune  : 
health,  riches,  etc.  Now,  though  such  goods  are  indeed  also 
necessary  to  well-being,  still  they  are  needed  only  in  a  mod- 
erate degree,  and  the  sage  can  be  happy  even  with  relatively 
small  goods  of  fortune  ;  for  he  who  develops  and  perfects  the 
thinking  spirit  with  great  zeal  is  the  most  beloved  of  the 
gods,  and  is  the  happiest,  for  he  is  most  like  the  gods  (Nic., 
x,  6-9).  Herein  this  ethical  system  returns  to  its  starting- 
point,  though  we  cannot  say  that  this  return  results  from  a 
natural  and  organic  development.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  well- 
being  is  indicated  as  the  highest  good,  at  the  outset  of  the 
ethical  development,  and  that  now  it  presents  itself  in  the 
end  as  the  result  of  the  moral  life-activity,  would  seem  to 
present  an  excellently  rounded  development-course  of  the 
system  ;  but  Aristotle  essentially  disturbs  this  organic  devel- 
opment of  his  thoughts  by  his  preference  (surprising,  in  view 
of  his  previous  discussions)  of  the  contemplative  life  to  the 
outwardly-active  life,  and  for  the  assumed  reason  that  the 
former,  as  being  the  truly  divine  life,  far  transcends  the  lat- 
ter ;  and  when  he  is  at  the  very  point  of  making  the  transi- 


110  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  19 

tion  from  merely  individual  morality  into  the  consideration 
of  the  moral  community-life, — which  rests  quite  predominant- 
ly on  the  practically-working  activity  of  all  the  individuals 
and  is  primarily  the  result  thereof, — he  throws  this  activity 
with  a  strange  disdain  into  the  background,  behind  the 
purely  intellectual  activity  of  the  unsocial  individual  spirit. 
In  this  connection  Plato  is  at  least  more  consequential,  in  that 
he  by  no  means  directs  the  philosopher  to  the  merely  contem- 
plative life,  but  concedes  to  him  political  domination  as  his 
peculiar  right  and  his  highest  calling.  It  is  evidently  no 
very  virtue-encouraging  thought,  that  the  highest  well-being 
should  be  one-sidedly  placed  in  an  activity,  for  which  only 
the  fewest  virtues  are  requisite. 


SECTION  XIX. 

The  idea,  already  so  strongly  emphasized  by  Plato, 
of  a  moral  community-life,  is  developed  by  Aristotle 
further  still,  and  more  judiciously,  without  his  being 
able,  however,  fully  to  divest  it  of  the  one-sidedness  of 
the  general  Graeco-heathen  world-view.  The  idea  of 
humanity  as  a  moral  whole  is  entirely  wanting  to  him 
also  ;  individual  morality  has  absolute  predominance. 
The  family  is  indeed  somewhat  more  highly  con- 
ceived of  than  in  Plato,  because  the  reality  of  life  is 
more  impartially  observed,  but  yet  it  is  not  recog- 
nized as  the  basis  of  the  moral  whole,  but  only  as  a 
subordinate  manifestation-form  of  morality  as  bearing 
upon  the  moral  community-life.  Wedlock-love  and 
family-love  in  general  is  only  a  special  form  of  friend- 
ship as  expressive  of  individual  morality.  Friend- 
ship, however,  is  not  so  much  a  duty  as  an  expression 
of  the  striving  after  individual  well-being, — bears  not 
an  objective  but  a  subjective  character. — But  also 
friendship  forms  neither  the  basis  nor  the  transition  to 
a  moral  community-life ;  the  community-life,  on  the 


§  19.]  FRIENDSHIP,  LOVE.  Ill 

contrary,  is  based  directly  upon  the  laws  as  express- 
ive of  the  moral  idea,  and  as  constituting  the  state, 
the  task  of  which  is,  under  the  guidance  of  the  moral- 
ly higher-gifted,  to  tutor  and  direct  the  great  multi- 
tude of  the  morally-immature,  and  to  habituate  them 
to  the  good. 

To  the  examination  of  friendship  Aristotle  devotes  two  en- 
tire books  of  his  Ethics,  in  great  detail.  Friendship  is  in- 
deed virtue,  but  not  a  special  virtue  along-side  of  the  others ; 
it  is  rather  a  special  manifestation-form  of  virtue  in  general. 
Its  definition  is  more  comprehensive  than  is  usual  in  modern 
times,  and  includes  in  itself  love  in  general,  but  it  is  by  no 
means  identical  with  the  Christian  idea  of  love ;  it  has  not 
an  objective  and  general,  but  only  a  subjective  and  individ- 
ual significancy ;  it  loves  not  for  the  sake  of  the  loved  one, 
but  for  the  happiness  of  the  lover, — seeks  primarily  not  the 
weal  of  the  other,  but  its  own,  loves  not  man  as  man,  but 
only  this  or  that  person  according  to  individual  election,  to 
the  exclusion  of  others.  The  idea  of  general  love  to  man,  as 
a  duty,  is  to  Aristotle  also  as  well  as  to  the  Greek  in  general, 
utterly  foreign.  The  highest  attainment  consists  in  true 
friendship  to  one  or  to  a  few  chosen  ones.  Toward  the  rest 
of  mankind  there  is  shown  only  a  very  feeble  and  luke-warm 
good-will,  a  justness  and  fairness  which  respect  essentially 
only  particular  rights, — humaneness  in  the  usual  sense  of  the 
word.  Aristotle  connects  the  examination  of  friendship  di- 
rectly and  expressly  with  that  of  pleasure,  and  places  it  be- 
fore the  more  particular  development  of  the  latter,  and  con- 
siders it  also  under  such  a  phase  as  that  it  appears  not  so 
much  as  duty  as  rather  as  a  virtualization  of  the  striving 
after  happiness.  Friendship  seeks  indeed  also  the  weal  of 
the  other,  but  first  of  all  it  seeks  reciprocal  love,  and  can  ex- 
ist only  where  it  finds  this ;  nevertheless,  that  friendship 
which  loves  only  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  and  the  benefit, 
is  not  the  true  and  lasting  love,  but  only  that  which  exists 
between  those  who  are  good  and  resemblant  in  virtue,  inas- 
much as  here  the  per  se  lasting  good  and  the  person  himself 
are  loved ;  in  the  friend  I  love,  at  the  same  time,  that  which 


112  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  19. 

is  for  myself  a  good ;  such  true  friendship,  however,  is  sel- 
doni,  and  can  never  exist  at  the  same  time  with  many  per- 
sons (Nic.,  viii,  1-7;  ix,  4,  5).  Friendship  in  the  narrower 
sense  presupposes  a  certain  moral  similarity  between  its  sub- 
jects ;  but  in  a  wider  sense  it  may  also  exist  between  the  dis- 
similar, especially  where  the  one  person  has  a  spiritual  pre- 
eminence over  the  other,  and  where  consequently  the  kind  of 
the  love  is  with  each  party  a  different  one.  Under  this  cate- 
gory belongs  the  love  between  husband  and  wife,  parents 
and  children,  and  between  the  higher  and  the  lower  in  rank. 
The  higher  of  two  persons  will,  and  ought  to,  be  more  loved 
in  this  relation,  than  he  himself  loves,  because  loving  is 
measured  by  the  worth  of  the  beloved  object  (Me.,  viii,  8,  9). 
This  feature  is  characteristic  of  the  predominantly  individual 
and  subjective  character  of  love,  in  Aristotle's  system.  Even 
parents  and  children  stand  to  each  other  only  in  this  individ- 
ual relation, — they  adapt  the  degree  of  their  love  according 
to  the  individual  worth  of  the  other ;  the  family  has  not  an 
objective  character  which  is  to  be  held  sacred  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, and  which  is  superior  to  all  individual  choice ; 
the  degree  of  love  diminishes  with  the  increase  of  the  worth 
of  the  subject  as  compared  with  the  worth  of  the  object;  and 
for  self-sacrificing  maternal  love,  Aristotle,  although  he  ob- 
serves it,  has  no  just  appreciation. 

Of  wedlock  and  of  sexual  love,  Aristotle  speaks  on  the  whole 
only  incidentally  and  very  inadequately.  Wedlock  is  the 
most  natural  of  all  friendships,  and  lias  for  its  end  not  merely 
the  generation  of  children,  but  also  the  aiding  and  comple- 
menting of  each  other  in  all  the  relations  of  life  (Nic.,  viii, 
14;  coinp.  Oecon.,  i,  3).  The  husband,  as  the  stronger,  has 
the  duty  of  protecting  the  wife  and  remaining  faithful  to 
her  (Oecon.,  i,  4),  and  the  right  to  rule  over  her, — not  abso- 
lutely, however,  but  only  in  the  sphere  belonging  to  him 
(Nic.,  viii,  12).  Children  stand  to  their  parents  in  a  perma- 
nent debt-relation, — cannot  divest  themselves  of  their  obli- 
gation to  them,  though  the  father  may  cast  off  his  son  (Nic., 
vii,  16).  The  obligation  of  children  to  fulfill  the  will  of  the 
parents  is  not,  however,  unlimited,  because  other  obligations 
may  modify  it ;  the  chief  duty  of  children  is  to  show  rever- 


§  19.]  THE   STATE   VERSUS  THE   MASSES.  113 

ence  to  their  parents,  and  when  they  need  it,  to  assure  them 
sustenance  (Nic.,  ix,  2). 

In  his  further  discussion  of  friendship  Aristotle  makes 
many  ingenious  observations.  Those  to  whom  one  has  shown 
benefits,  one  is  accustomed  to  love  more  than  those  from 
whom  one  has  received  benefits,  because  every  one  esteems 
especially  highly  that  which  himself  has  done,  whereas  he 
feels  the  debt-relation  as  in  some  sense  disagreeable  (Nic., 
ix,  7).  It  is  true,  Aristotle  does  not  exactly  praise  this  feel- 
ing, but  he  finds  it  very  natural,  and  has  for  it  no  blame. 
The  truly  good  man  loves  himself  perfectly,  but  this  legiti- 
mate self-love  is  not  an  enjoyment-seeking  selfishness,  for  he 
loves  in  himself  only  the  better  part,  and  he  promotes  his 
own  weal,  in  that  he  loves  and  works  the  good ;  and  even 
when  he  makes  sacrifices  for  others,  he  wins  for  himself  the 
higher  good  (Me.,  ix,  9). 

In  conceiving  of  the  essence  of  the  family  as  a  mere  friend- 
ship, it  is  natural  that  Aristotle  should  not  make  it  the  basis 
of  the  wider  community-life,  the  State,  but  that  he  should 
place  it  rather  in  the  sphere  of  individual  morality,  and  that 
he  should  make  the  transition  to  the  discussion  of  the  state, 
neither  from  friendship  nor  from  the  family,  but  rather  de- 
rive the  thought  of  the  state  immediately  from  the  general 
thought  of  morality,  and  transfer  all  the  moral  significancy 
of  the  family  to  the  thus  self-based  state.  This  transition 
Aristotle  makes  thus :  the  teaching  of  virtue  suffices  not  for 
the  great  multitude  to  induce  them  to  virtue,  seeing  that 
they  are  guided  almost  exclusively  by  fear  and  not  by  knowl- 
edge. The  multitude  must  be  trained  to  virtue  and  con- 
stantly guided,  and  hence  stand  in  need  of  laws ;  the  training 
of  a  father  suffices  not  for  this,  because  it  lacks  the  necessary 
authority  and  coercive  power;  only  the  rationally-governed 
state  has  both  of  these,  and  is  hence  the  ^necessary  condition 
of  a  more  general  realization  of  morality  (Nic.,  x,  10). 

Aristotle  is  too  judicious  an  observer  of  reality,  idealistic- 
ally  to  expect  all  salvation  from  mere  instruction,  and  not  to 
admit  the  moral  unimpressibility  of  the  great  multitude ;  he 
speaks  thereof  in  the  strongest  expressions;  "the  great  mul- 
titude obeys  force  rather  than  reason,  and  punishment  rather 
than  morality;"  "the  majority  abstain  from  evil  not  because 


114  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  19. 

it  is  disgraceful,  but  because  they  fear  punishment ;  guided 
only  by  their  passions  they  aim.  at  nothing  but  sensuous  pleas- 
ure, and  shun  nothing  but  the  pains  that  are  contrary  there- 
to ;  but  of  the  morally  beautiful,  and  of  the  true  joy  therein 
contained,  they  have  not  the  least  notion,  seeing  that  they 
have  never  tasted  it"  (Nic.,  x,  10);  and  this  moral  incapa- 
bility he  expressly  refers  to  the  nature  that  is  inborn  in  them, 
and  only  a  few  happy  ones  are  free  of  this  innate  imperfec- 
tion; "this  nature  itself  lies  evidently  not  within  our  own 
power,  but  is  by  some  kind  of  divine  causality  conferred 
on  the  truly  happy."  To  explain  this  broad  difference  of 
natural  endowment,  he  does  not  make  the  least  attempt,  and 
in  this  he  stands  far  below  Plato,  who  derives  the  imperfec- 
tion of  human  nature  (which  he  also  admitted,  but  conceived 
of  as  universal),  from  a  previous  guilt  in  a  life  antecedent  to 
the  earthly  life.  Aristotle  renounces  also  all  hope  of  radi- 
cally bettering  the  morally  unreceptive  multitude,  as  indeed 
he  knows  of  no  possibility  of  doing  it ;  he  contents  himself 
with  keeping  them  in  check,  and  with  placing  them  under 
the  discipline  of  an  objective  moral  reality,  the  state,  or  at 
least  with  accustoming  them,  by  force  and  by  potent  custom, 
to  order  and  to  obedience,  and  with  restraining  them  from 
the  outbreaks  of  inborn  passion ;  to  be  truly  free  in  moral  re- 
spects, however,  is  the  exclusive  privilege  of  the  few  who  are 
naturally-gifted. 

Aristotle  recognizes  thus  the  necessity  of  a  moral  commu- 
nity-life, which,  as  upheld  by  the  pre-eminent  moral  spirit  of 
the  few  specially-endowed  individuals,  furnishes,  itself,  the 
basis  of  the  morality  of  individuals  in  general,  and  develops, 
and  guides,  and  keeps  it  in  bounds.  This  is  a  weighty 
thought  far  transcending  the  shallowness  of  modern  rational- 
istic liberalism,  which  recognizes  no  other  objective  form  of 
the  moral  community-life,  than  that  which  has  grown  up  on 
the  broad  basis  of  the  morality  of  the  great  multitude, — a 
merely  abstract  product  without  any  power  and  effectiveness 
of  its  own.  Aristotle  regards  it  as  absurd  to  base  a  moral 
community-life  upon  the  disposition  and  the  spiritual  sover- 
eignty of  the  masses;  We  calls  for  the  sovereignty  of  the 
spiritual  and  moral  heroes, — the  exclusive  authority  of  the 
most  highly  gifted  personalities ;  but  he  is,  as  yet,  too  deeply 


§  20.]  REFUGE   IN  ABSOLUTISM.  115 

involved  in  the  peculiarities  of  the  heathen  world-view,  to 
penetrate  to  the  bottom  of  the  def ectiveness  of  human  nature, 
as  partially  recognized  by  him,  and  to  find  the  true  solution 
of  the  enigma,  and  to  divine  the  nature  of  the  true  remedy ; 
he  knows  only  man's  outward  phase,  but  not  the  depths  of 
the  human  heart.  He  ventures  not  to  entertain  any  doubt  as 
to  the  moral  nature  of  the  state-sages  and  philosophers,  and 
he  knows  no  other  redemption,  than  (as  in  contrast  to  the 
profound  spiritual  blindness  and  the  moral  stupidity  of  the 
masses)  in  an  immeasurable  exaltation  of  the  insight  and  the 
moral  strength  of  the  state-leaders  and  the  sages. — Aristotle 
sees,  in  the  state,  not  a  remedial  institution  actually  realizing 
true  morality,  but  only  a  police-organism  acting  outwardly, 
checking  the  evil,  and  restoring  outward  discipline.  The 
state  can  only  ameliorate,  but  not  radically  cure ;  true  wis- 
dom and  morality  are  not  imparted  by  it  to  those  who  are  by 
nature  incapable  thereof.  This  view  throws  light  upon  the 
decided  preference  of  Aristotle  for  a  contemplative  life,  un- 
involved  in  any  political  activity.  The  highest  goods  can 
fall  to  the  lot  only  of  the  few ;  the  fact  is  not,  that  many  are 
called  while  but  few  are  chosen,  but  that  only  a  few  are  called 
and  chosen;  there  prevails  here  an  absolute  predestination, 
not,  however,  from  a  monotheistic,  but  from  a  fatalistic 
ground. 


SECTION  XX. 

The  State  is  related  to  the  individual  citizens  of  the 
state  and  to  the  smaller  social  organisms — the  house- 
hold-life and  the  local  community — as  the  absolutely 
determining  and  enlivening  whole  to  the  members, — 
is  not  so  much  the  product  as  rather  the  ground  of 
all  morality.  The  threefold  gradation  of  dependence 
in  the  household-life,  and  above  all,  the  relation  of 
master  and  slave,  as  resting  upon  a  primitive  nature- 
destination,  is  the  presupposition  of  the  state.  Plac- 
ing a  higher  worth  upon  the  natural  social  relations 
than  Plato,  and  confining  himself  more  fully  to  his- 


116  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  20. 

torical  reality,  Aristotle  escapes  the  unpractical  ideal- 
ism of  Plato,  but  also  attains  to  less  definite  results, 
and  furnishes  rather  a  criticism  than  a  self-consistent 
theory  of  the  nature  of  the  state.  Emphasizing  the 
development  of  the  individual  citizen  to  free  self- 
determination  more  strongly  than  Plato,  he  modifies 
the  despotic  absolutism  of  the  latter,  and  presents  as 
the  moral  chief-task  of  the  state  the  moral  disciplin- 
ing of  the  free  citizens.  But  the  state-idea  attains  to 
a  universally-human  significancy  neither  in  its  out- 
ward nor  its  inward  relation  ;  humanity  both  in  the 
barbarian  and  in  the  slave,  is  of  an  imperfect  grade, 
and  capable  of  no  moral  emancipation. 

Of  the  Politics  of  Aristotle  we  have  to  do  only  with  the 
more  strictly  ethical  contents.  He  does  not  connect  this 
work  directly  with  his  Ethics,  but  treats  of  its  subject-matter 
from  a  more  practical  stand-point;  hence  he  gives,  on  the 
one  hand,  in  his  Ethics,  the  more  general  thoughts  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  state,  and,  on  the  other,  he  repeats  in  his 
Politics  some  of  the  thoughts  of  his  Ethics. 

The  state  is  the  highest  moral  communion,  and  hence  real- 
izes the  highest  of  all  goods.  Its  type  is  the  household-life ; 
its  task  is  not  merely  to  afford'  protection  and  help  for  the 
life  of  the  individuals,  but  essentially  to  found  and  promote 
the  true  life,  that  is,  the  spiritually  moral  life,  of  the  whole. 
The  state  is  not  itself  the  product  of  the  already  developed 
moral  life  of  the  individuals,  but  it  is  the  presupposition 
thereof;  outside  of  the  state  there  is- rio: moral  development; 
only  he  who  belongs  to  the  state  can  be  moral ;  the  whole  is 
antecedent  to  the  parts,  and  the  rational  man  is  a  part  of  the 
state ;  the  state  is  the  first,  the  citizen  of  the  state  the  second ; 
outside  of  the  state  lives  only  the  animal  or  God  (Pol.,  i,  1,  2). 
Hence  the  moral  relation  of  the  household-life  is  a  presuppo- 
sition of  the  state  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  constituent  element 
of  the  same,  but  not  in  such  a  sense  as  to  imply  that  it  al- 
ready existed  before  the  state  and  independently  of  the  same. 


§  20.]  ENSLAVEMENT   OF   LABOR.  117 

It  is  peculiarly  characteristic  that  of  the  threefold  foundation 
of  the  household-life,  as  stated  by  Aristotle,  namely,  the  re- 
lation of  man  t'o  wife,  of  father  to  children,  and  of  master  to 
slave,  he  treats  of  the  first  two  only  merely  incidentally  and 
briefly,  but  of  the  third  chiefly,  and  very  thoroughly.  Aris- 
totle furnishes  for  the  first  time,  and  in  its  entirety,  a  formal 
theory  of  slavery, — a  phenomenon  very  significant  for  the  his- 
tory of  ethics. 

The  opinion  that  slavery  is  not  a  something  entirely  natural, 
but  is  based  only  upon  violence  and  arbitrary  laws,  Aristotle 
emphatically  rejects.  A  household-life  without  possessions 
and  without  serving  instruments  is  not  conceivable,  and 
hence  also  not  without  slaves,  which  are  in  fact  living  in- 
struments and  possessions.  Even  as  the  artist  and  artisan 
stand  in  need  of  instruments,  so  the  housefather,  of  slaves, 
which  are  consequently  absolutely  his  property,  and  subject 
to  his  discretion;  this  is  a  natural,  and  not  a  merely  legal 
relation,  strictly  analogous  to  the  relation  of  soul  and  body, 
— the  former  as  the  absolutely  dominating,  the  latter  as  the 
absolutely  dominated  factor.  And  reality  corresponds  to  the 
want.  Men  differ  in  fact  from  each  other  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  ones,  as  being  really  rational,  possess  themselves, 
and  represent  the  soul  of  humanity,  whereas  the  others  rep- 
resent the  body  of  humanity, — are  corporeally  strong,  and 
adapted  for  bodily  toil,  but  are  spiritually  unfree  and  ignoble, 
and,  though  distinguished  by  reason  from  the  brute,  are  yet 
not  governed  by  reason  but  by  sensuous  desires.  These  are 
destined  by  nature  to  be  slaves,  and  it  is  well  for  them  tliat, 
as  the  property  of  others,  they  are  spiritually  dominated 
(Pol.,  i,  8-5).  And  Aristotle  expressly  says  that  those  who 
are  destined  by  nature  to  slavery  are  the  non-Greeks,  the 
barbarians.  Greek  prisoners-of-war  are  slaves  not  indeed  by 
nature,  but  by  law,  and  hence  legitimately. — What  the  sig- 
nificance of  slavery  is,  appears  clear  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
a  characteristic  of  a  slave  that  he  may  be  injured  with  im- 
punity (Nic.,  v,  8), — that  the  notion  of  justness  holds  good 
only  between  such  persons  as  have  rights,  and  hence  not  be- 
tween master  and  slave ;  that  the  legitimate  and  uncensurable 
manner  of  ruling  over  slaves  is  the  tyrannical,  the  end  of 
which  is  simply  the  profit  of  the  master  (Nic.,  viii,  12;  Pol., 


118  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  20. 

i,  8,  9),  and  that  to  a  slave  as  such  a  relation  of  love  or  friend- 
ship can  as  little  have  place  as  to  a  horse  or  ox, — in  which 
connection,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  in  so  far  as 
the  slave  is  also  a  human  being  a  certain  inferior  form  of  love 
is  admissible.  The  slave  has  indeed  also  a  degree  of  virtue, 
for  he  is  required  to  obey  and  to  be  modest  and  temperate, 
but  his  morality  differs  from  that  of  the  master,  not  merely 
in  degree  but  in  essence ;  while  the  master  is  capable  of  all 
virtue,  the  slave  is  utterly  incapable  of  the  power  of  delib- 
eration (ro  fiovlevTiKov)  and  hence  evidently  of  the  thought- 
virtues — prudence  and  wisdom  (Pol.,  i,  9).  The  more  humane 
directions  as  to  the  treatment  of  slaves  (Oecon.,  i,  5;  of 
questionable  authenticity)  are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  light 
of  these  principles. 

Aristotle  subjects  the  Platonic  state  to  a  very  keen  and 
sound  criticism;  the  community  of  goods  and  of  wives  he 
rejects,  as  both  unnatural  and  morally  corrupting,  and  even 
impossible  (Oecon.,  ii,  2  sqq.}.  Of  his  own  views  Aristotle 
is  more  reticent  than  Plato,  and  he  gives  rather  merely  gen- 
eral thoughts  than  specific  details.  Only  that  one  should 
take  active  part  in  political  life  who  possesses  all  civic  vir- 
tue, and  especially  far-seeing  insight;  but  such  virtue  can 
exist  only  where  there  is  leisure  for  its  development,  that  is, 
in  such  persons  as  are  free  from  the  necessity  of  laboring  for 
the  common  wants  of  life, — and  hence  not  in  day-laborers, 
artisans,  or  farmers  (Oecon.,  iii,  5;  vii,  9).  The  soil  must  be 
cultivated  by  slaves.  Leisure  stands  higher  than  labor,  and 
is  indeed  per  se  happiness.  A  proper  state-constitution  must 
have  for  its  end  the  weal  of  all  the  free  citizens  constituting 
the  state ;  it  may  be  equally  well  monarchic,  or  aristocratic, 
or  republican  (the  latter  being  that  wherein  all  the  truly  free 
citizens  take  part),  and  over  against  these  stand  as  their  per- 
versions: tyranny,  oligarchy,  and  democracy,  all  of  which 
look  to  the  good,  not  of  the  whole,  but  only  of  individual 
persons,  or  of  classes  in  society  (Oecon.,  iii,  6-8;  iv,  1  sqq.). 
It  is  best  for  the  State  when  the  best  citizens  bear  rule ;  and 
the  best  one  is  not  to  be  bound  by  trammeling  laws,  but 
stands  free  above  the  law,  although  in  general  Aristotle  places 
the  validity  of  the  law  higher  than  Plato,  and  is  not  hopeful 
of  finding  such  "best"  ones  very  frequently.  The  mass  of 


§20.]  MARRIAGE  AND  ABORTION.  119 

free  citizens  are  indeed  to  have  part  in  deliberating  upon  the 
laws  and  in  promoting  justice,  but  not  in  actually  governing 
(Oecon.,  iii,  9  »qq.).  Aristotle  inclines  most  strongly  to  a 
monarchy  limited  by  laws,  and,  in  this,  has  his  eye  mani- 
festly upon  Alexander  the  Great. 

The  state  provides  for  the  public  worship  and  for  the  moral 
culture  of  the  citizens ;  hence  it  prescribes,  in  order  to  the 
obtaining  of  a  vigorous  population,  the  institution  of  mar- 
riage. Maidens  are  to  marry  at  their  eighteenth  year,  and 
men  at  about  the  age  of  thirty-seven,  in  order  that  the  chil- 
dren may  stand  in  a  proper  relation  to  the  age  of  the  parents, 
and  in  order  that  the  differing  duration  of  the  productive 
period  of  the  two  sexes  may  stand  in  some  degree  of  har- 
mony, and  the  children  be  robust.  The  laws  are  to  prescribe 
the  manner  of  life  of  the  woman  while  pregnant,  and  the 
physical  and  spiritual  training  of  the  children.  In  relation 
to  the  exposing  of  children,  the  maxim  holds  good,  "that 
no  physically  imperfect  (ne-jrrjpufievov)  child  is  to  be  raised." 
Where,  however,  the  traditional  usages  forbid  the  exposing 
of  children,  there  the  excessive  increase  of  the  population  is 
to  be  prevented  by  forbidding  the  procreating  of  more  than 
a  legally  fixed  number,  and  the  fetus  is  to  be  destroyed  be- 
fore the  period  of  sensation  and  quickening  (Oecon.,  vii,  15, 
16).  The  education  of*  the  children  stands,  as  a  matter  of 
high  importance,  under  the  care  of  the  state ;  overseeing  this 
education  up  to  the  seventh  year,  the  state  then  actually 
undertakes  it  itself ;  for  the  citizens  belong  not  to  them- 
selves, but  to  the  state.  The  boys — and  the  question  is 
only  as  to  these — are  to  be  instructed  in  grammar  and  draw- 
ing, because  of  the  utility  of  these  sciences,  and  in  gymnas- 
tics in  order  to  the  development  of  courage,  and  in  music 
in  order  to  the  employment  of  the  leisure  which  becomes 
the  free  citizen  (labor  being  confined  to  the  slave),  and 
in  order  to  the  awakening  of  the  sense  for  harmony 
(Oecon.,  viii,  3-7). 

Though  Aristotle  presents  numerous  forms  of  state-consti- 
tution as  possible,  and  as  good  and  appropriate  according  to 
existing  circumstances,  yet  to  the  state  of  true  human  free- 
dom he  is  not  capable  of  rising.  Even  his  most  free  and 
most  democratic  constitution  rests  absolutely  on  the  basis  of 


120  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  20. 

slavery,  and  on  the  antithesis  of  the  Greeks,  as  true  men,  to 
the  slave-like  barbarians.  The  education  of  the  citizens  is, 
in  Aristotle,  quite  similar  to  the  education  of  a  cavalier  in 
the  age  of  Louis  XIV.  and  XV.  It  is  easy  enough  to  be 
liberal-minded  when  all  the  labor  falls  to  the  lot  of  those 
who,  as  unfree,  have  no  share  in  political  life.  The  fact  that 
a  so-called  anti-Christian  "humanistic"  culture  of  modern 
times  regards  the  Greeks  as  the  champions  of  true  humanity, 
of  humanitarianism  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  and 
their  age  and  their  world-theory  as  "the  paradise  of  the  hu- 
man mind,"  from  which  we  of  modern  times  have  to  learn 
and  receive  true  humanitarian  notions, — is  no  striking  evi- 
dence of  great  impartiality  of  view.  Though  Aristotle  con- 
cedes to  the  different  classes  of  citizens  in  the  state  a  some- 
what greater  freedom  and  independency  of  development  than 
Plato,  in  that  he  does  not  attribute  all  right  exclusively  to 
the  absolutism  of  the  state,  still  this  recognition  of  a  rela- 
tively free  self-development  does  not  by  any  means  reach 
down  to  the  laboring  classes ;  the  laborers  are  absolutely 
passive  and  for  the  most  part  personally  rightless  members 
of  the  state, — are  but  the  immovably  soil-bound  roots  of  the 
tree  whose  richly-developed  branches  and  leaves  wave  freely 
in  the  air  above.  The  distinction  and  the  classification  of 
the  ranks  in  society  are  not  a  moral  ordinance,  but  a  merely 
natural  and  hence  unfree  one, — rests  not  upon  a  moral  self- 
subordination  to  a  moral  idea,  but  upon  the  compulsory 
necessity  of  extra-moral  nature-differences, — springs  not  from 
a  like  moral  dignity  and  task,  but  from  the  naturally  differ- 
ent moral  nature  of  the  different  classes  of  mankind.  The 
slave  and  the  laborer  are  morally  entirely  different  and  inferior 
beings,  and  have  neither  the  task  nor  the  capability  of  even 
comprehending  the  full  moral  idea,  much  less  that  of  realiz- 
ing it ;  this  is  the  privilege  of  the  higher  classes  of  free  citi- 
zens. A  moral  redemption  of  the  great  multitude  from  this 
ban  of  moral  unfreedorn  and  incapacity  is  an  utterly  foreign 
thought  even  to  the  philosopher ;  nay,  he  would  feel  called 
upon,  should  he  conceive  of  even  the  possibility  of  such  a 
redemption,  to  assail  and  prevent  it  with  all  his  might,  for 
with  it  would  fall  to  the  ground,  for  the  Greek,  not  merely 
all  reality  of  the  state,  but  also  all  possibility  of  a  social  coin- 


§  20.]  ARISTOTLE  ON  CASTE.  121 

munity-life.  It  is  only  among  the  rudest  barbarians  that  he 
can  conceive  of  a  moral  equality  of  the  individuals ;  and  the 
Christian  idea  of  humanity,  as  moral,  must  have  appeared  to 
the  Greek  as  well  as  to  the  Roman  as  a  falling  back  into  rude 
barbarism ;  and  the  war  of  life  and  death  as  carried  on  against 
Christianity  by  the  otherwise  so  tolerant  Romans,  had,  at 
fbttom,  not  so  much  a  religious  as  rather  a  social  motive ; 
it  was  the  perfectly  correct  consciousness,  that  Christianity, 
although  essentially  a  purely  religiously-moral  power,  would 
inevitably  radically  undermine  the  foundation-principles  of 
the  heathen  state,  and  shatter  to  pieces  the  entire  absolutely 
slave-based  social  fabric.  The  thought  of  recognizing  the 
slave  and  the  barbarian  as  morally  equal  to  the  freeman,  and 
as  called  to  equal  moral  dignity  and  eternal  glory,  appeared 
to  the  Greek,  no  less  than  to  the  Roman,  as  a  treason  to  human 
society,  as  a  high  crime  against  the  solely  possible  founda- 
tions of  a  rational  state.  Beyond  this  world-theory  Plato  and 
Aristotle  did  not  rise. 

As  in  relation  to  those  within  the  Greek  state,  so  also  in 
relation  to  the  non-Greeks,  is  the  thought  of  humanity,  in 
Aristotle,  radically  defective.  The  non-Greeks  belong  only 
in  a  very  loose  sense  to  humanity  at  all, — are  really  but  half- 
men,  destined  by  nature  to  be  dominated  over  by  the  Greeks, 
as  born  for  ruling.  War  upon  them  is  treated  of  by  Aristotle, 
unhesitatingly,  under  the  head  of  the  legitimate  occupations 
of  life,  and  more  specifically  under  that  of  the  chase:  "War 
is,  in  its  very  nature,  a  branch  of  industry ;  for  the  chase  is 
a  form  of  the  industrial  activity,  which  comes  to  application 
as  well  in  relation  to  wild  beasts,  as  also  in  relation  to  those 
men  who  are  destined  by  nature  to  be  ruled  over  (n-f^vicoTSf 
apxeadai)  but  are  not  willing  thereto, — so  that  consequently 
such  a  war  is  a  just  one  "  (Oecon.,  i,  8).  War  is  regarded  by 
no  means  as  an  evil,  but  as  a  normal  life-manifestation  of  the 
nations,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  the  virtualizing  of  one  of 
the  most  essential  of  the  virtues.  The  relation  of  the  moral 
community-life  to  the  rest  of  mankind  is  consequently  in  no 
sense  one  which  looks  to  the  realizing  of  a  moral  communion, 
but  is  a  purely  negating  and  destructive  one.  Ethics  pro- 
claims not  peace  but  war, — aims  not  at  emancipating  and 
redeeming,  but  at  subjugating;  non-Greek  humanity  is  not 


122  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  21. 

an  object  of  moral  influencing,  but  of  violent  subjugating. 
The  Greek  knows  no  mission  of  the  word,  but  only  of  the 
sword. 

,    SECTION  XXI. 

The- form  of  Grecian  and  heathen  ethics  which  at- 
tained in  Aristotle  to  its  highest' perfection,  is  that  of  th* 
natural  man  as  contented  in  and  with  himself;  it  lacks 
the  consciousness  of  the  historical  reality  and  of  the 
historical  development  of  sin, — of  the  antagonism  of 
the  reality  of  natural  man,  as  sprung  from  an  historical 
act,  to  the  moral  idea,  and  of  the  earnestness  of  the 
moral  struggle  against  sin  ;  instead  thereof  we  find 
the  introduction  of  a  proud  distinction  between  a 
multitude  incapable  by  nature  of  true  morality,  and 
an  elect  minority  of  free-born  men  capable  of  all 
wisdom  and  virtue,  and  among  the  latter  a  lofty 
virtue-pride  of  man  as  having  attained  without  severe 
inner  struggle  to  an  easily-won  self-satisfaction.  Hu- 
mility is  not  a  virtue  of  a  free  sage,  but  only  of  the 
slave  and  plebeian,  as  born  unto  serving  obedience. — 
Morality  rests  only  upon  the  knowledge  (independent 
of  the  religious  consciousness)  of  the  per  se  good,  but 
not  upon  love, — neither  upon  love  to  God  nor  upon 
love  to  man ;  love  is  not  the  ground,  but  only  a 
co-ordinate  manifestation-form  of  virtue.  Hence 
also  the  solely  true  moral  community-life  is  only  a 
product  of  wise  and  rational  calculation,  but  not 
of  love;  and  the  primitive  community-life  of  moral 
love,  namely,  the  family,  is  not  the  basis,  but  only 
one  phase  of  the  state-life.  The  moral  view  of 
Aristotle,  and  indeed  of  the  Greeks  in  general,  is 
consequently  not  merely  manifoldly  different  from 
the  Christian  view,  but  indeed  radically  opposed 
thereto. 


§  2lT]  ARISTOTLE    VERSUS  C1IRIST.  123 

It  is  very  important  clearly  to  realize  this  inn^r  antithesis 
of  Aristotelian  and  Christian  ethics,  and  all  the  more  so  as 
Aristotle  has  had,  even  up  to  the  latest  times,  a  so  great  and 
so  largely  bewildering  influence  upon  the  shaping  of  Chris- 
tian ethics.  Though  not  wishing  to  undervalue  the  high 
scientific  significancy  of  the  Aristotelian  system,  we  are  yet 
not  at  liberty  to  find  in  it  thoughts  which  are  really  for- 
eign to  it. 

The  Christian  consciousness  rests  entirely  upon  the  recog- 
nition of  the  general  necessity  of  redemption,  and  indeed 
not  simply  in  reference  to  a  moral  defectiveness  inborn  in 
man,  but  to  one  that  has  fallen  to  all  men  through  historical 
guilt.  Of  this  Aristotle  knows  nothing.  When  Brandis 
says:  "The  doctrine  of  hereditary  sin  would  not  have 
seemed  foreign  to  him, "  inasmuch  as  he  saw  very  clearly  the 
corruption  of  human  nature,*  we  think  he  is  quite  incorrect. 
It  is  true  Aristotle  ascribes  to  the  great  multitude,  and  above 
all  to  those  who  are  born  for  service  and  labor,  an  inborn 
badness,  and  he  describes  it  in  the  strongest  colors  and  as  a 
real  insuperable  incapacity  for  true  virtue  ;  and  it  is  under 
this  head  that  falls  the  confirmatory  utterance  cited  by 
Brandis,  namely,  that  it  is  good,  in  the  state,  to  be  depend- 
ent, and  not  to  be  at  liberty  to  do  whatever  one  may  please, 
' '  for  the  liberty  to  do  what  one  pleases  cannot  hold  in  check 
the  evil  that  is  inborn  in  all  men" (TOfveKdaTuruvuvOpu-^uv^av'^ov) 
(Pol.,  vi,  4).  Were  this  to  be  taken  in  its  full  and  unlimited 
sense,  Aristotle  would  thereby  come  into  contradiction  with 
his  other  so  definite  and  repeated  declarations  as  to  the  per- 
fect will-freedom  of  those  who  are  capable  of  true  virtue, 
and  thus  overturn  his  entire  ethical  system, — which  rests  ab- 
solutely on  the  presupposition  of  this  freedom.  The  fact  is, 
he  is  speaking  here  as  a  statesman  and  not  as  a  moralist,  and 
alludes  therein  to  the  great  multitude  of  those  who,  though 
arriving  at  magisterial  offices,  are  yet  not  philosophers  nor 
truly  free.  Indeed,  he  expressly  says  that  the  truly  good 
should  not  by  any  means  be  limited  by  laws,  but  stand  abso- 
lutely above  all  law ;  t  and  though  he  admits  that  such  persons 
are  very  rare,  yet  he  presupposes  that  there  are  actually 

*Aritt.,  ii,  p.  1682. 

t  Polit.,  iii,  13 :  KO.TU  <Je  TOIOVTUV  oi>K  ?<m  vojiof,  avrol  yap  elai  vopof 


124  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  ^  21. 

some  such.,  Now  the  fact  that  Aristotle  unquestionably  ex- 
cepts  the  true  philosophers  as  the  elect  few,  from  the  other- 
wise all-prevalent  moral  corruption,  does  not  offer  any  tiling 
similar,  to  the  Christian  doctrine  of  natural  sinfulness,  but 
indeed  the  very  opposite, — is  not,  as  the  Christian  doctrine, 
an  expression  of  deep  humility,  but  on  the  contrary,  of  un- 
measured pride,  as  despisingly  conscious  of  a  superiority  to 
the  rest  of  mankind.  To  make  exceptions  to  the  general 
prevalence  of  sinfulness  limits  not  merely  the  thought  of  this 
sinfulness,  but  entirely  overthrows  it;  the  virtue-merit  of  the 
few  chosen  ones — and  these  are  of  course  always  the  philoso- 
phizing moralists  themselves — stands  forth  all  the  more  glar- 
ingly the  deeper  the  rest  of  mankind  are  degraded.  It 
affords  no  similarity  to  the  Christian  consciousness  when,  to 
the  few  philosophers,  that  character  is  attributed  which  Chris- 
tianity ascribes  exclusively  to  the  God-man. 

To  what  height  the  proud  self-consciousness  of  the  philoso- 
pher, as  pretendedly  perfect  in  his  virtue,  rises,  some  idea  may 
be  obtained  from  the  following  description  of  the  virtue  of 
magnanimity :  "  Magnanimous  is  he,  who,  being  worthy  of 
great  things,  esteems  himself  as  in  fact  worthy  of  them.  .  .  . 
The  greatest  of  outward  goods  is  honor;  hence  the  magnani- 
mous man  has  to  act  with  propriety  in  respect  to  honor  and 
dishonor.  ...  As  the  magnanimous  man  is  worthy  of  the 
greatest  things,  he  must  necessarily  be  a  perfectly  good  one ;  to 
him  belong  whatever  is  great  in  every  virtue ;  .  .  .  hence  it  is 
difficult  to  be  really  magnanimous.  ...  In  great  honors,  and 
honors  shown  him  by  eminent  men,  the  magnanimous  man  re- 
joices moderately,  as  at  that  which  he  deserves,  or  which  even 
falls  below  his  desert ;  for,  for  a  perfect  virtue  there  is  no  entirely 
sufficient  honor.  Nevertheless  he  accepts  it,  because  there  is  no 
greater  one  for  him.  But  the  honor  shown  him  by  ordinary 
men,  or  for  inferior  things,  he  disdains,  for  they  are  not  worthy 
of  him."  After  having  observed,  that  in  order  to  true  mag- 
nanimity also  outward  gifts  of  fortune  are  requisite,  and  that 
the  magnanimous  man  thinks  only  very  lightly  of  meri  and 
things,  and  regards  only  few  things  so  highly  as  to  expose  him- 
self to  danger  for  them,  Aristotle  says  of  him  further:  "He 
is  inclined  to  do  good,  but  disdains  to  receive  benefits,  for  the 
former  is  characteristic  of  the  eminent,  and  the  latter,  of  the 


rfl 


THE   GREEK  IDEAL   SAGE.  125 


inferior;  and  he  gives  more  liberally  in  return,  for  thereby  lie 
who  was  before  a  creditor  is  made  a  debtor.  Also  he  gladly 
recollects  those  to  whom  he  has  done  favors,  but  not  those  from 
whom  he  has  received  benefits !  for  the  receiver  of  a  benefit 
becomes  subordinate  to  him  who  renders  it,  whereas  Tie  is  fond 
of  being  superior  to  others ;  therefore  he  also  hears  mention, 
with  pleasure,  of  the  former  (his  own  good  deeds),  but  with 
displeasure  of  the  latter  (the  received  benefits);  ...  he  re- 
mains inactive  and  hesitating  when  no  great  honor  or  great 
work  is  involved ;  he  does  only  a  little,  but  that  little  is  great 
and  honor-bringing;  ...  he  acts  boldly  and  openly,  for  he 
cherishes  contempt  for  others;  he  speaks  the  truth,  save  when 
he  speaks  with  irony ;  and  he  does  this  when  lie  has  to  do  with 
the  great  multitude ;  ...  he  admires  nothing,  for  nothing  ap- 
pears to  him  as  great.  .  .  .  The  movements  of  a  magnanimous 
man  are  slow,  his  voice  restrained  and  his  pronunciation  meas- 
ured. For  he  who  is  interested  in  few  things,  is  not  in  haste ; 
and  he  who  regards  nothing  as  great,  is  not  zealous."  (Nic.,  iv, 
8,  9).  This  portraiture  of  one  who,  as  judged  from  a  Chris- 
tian stand-point,  is  but  a  courtly  fool,  is  the  virtue-ideal  of 
Aristotle. 

A  very  essential  defect  of  Aristotelian  ethics  is  the  falling 
into  the  back-ground  of  the  religious  character  of  the  moral ; 
and  in  this  respect  it  is  far  inferior  to  that  of  Plato.  The  moral 
stands  out  alone  in  entire  self-sufficiency,  not  needing  any  other 
ground  or  basis  than  itself;  the  good  is  good  without  reference 
to  .God, — is  good  in  and  of  itself,  and  is  at  the  same  time  the 
motive  of  its  own  realization.  -  That  the  moral  is  essentially 
God's  will,  that  it  brings  man  into  life-communion  with  God, 
that  man  has  an  immediate  moral  life-relation  to  God,  that 
piety  is  the  ground  and  life  of  all  virtue, — of  all  this  we  find 
in  Aristotle  but  a  few  very  faint  and  wavering  hints.  And  this 
is  especially  surprising  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  world-the- 
ory of  Aristotle  is,  in  other  respects,  by  no  means  inimical  to  a 
close  connecting  of  the  moral  with  the  religious,  seeing  that  his 
God-idea  is  a  very  highly  developed  one,  and  that  he  derives 
all  life  of  the  world  and  of  its  contents  absolutely  from  the 
proto-causality  of  the  highest  self-conscious  reason,  that  is,  the 
personal  God.  It  is  not  so  much  the  consequentiality  of  his 
philosophical  system,  as  the  feebleness  of  the  religious  con- 


126  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  21. 

sciousness  and  life  in  Aristotle  himself,  that  occasioned  him  to 
develop  the  religious  phase  of  the  moral  so  imperfectly ;  he 
does  not  reject  this  phase,  he  even  alludes  to  it,  but  he  does  not 
develop  it. 

Morality  in  Aristotle  lacks  therefore  its  essential  motive ;  for, 
in  that  he  himself  expressly  and  repeatedly  declares,  against 
Socrates,  that  from  the  knowledge  of  the  good  the  willing  of 
the  same  does  not  necessarily  follow,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a 
contradiction  may  occur  between  willing  and  knowing,  he 
thereby  indeed  evidently  shows  that  he  has  observed  real  life 
with  greater  impartiality  than  Socrates,  but  he  has  also  thereby 
rendered  impossible  any  clear  understanding  of  the  moral  life. 
For  if  knowledge  does  not  invariably  result  in  willing,  what 
then  is  the  impelling  power  which  calls  forth  willing,  or  the. 
lack  of  which  works  non-willing  ?  It  is  not  love,  for  love  ap- 
pears not  as  directed  toward  the  good  per  se,  or  toward  God 
as  the  highest  good,  but  only  toward  the  individual  manifesta- 
tion, as  individual  friendship, — not  as  a  motive  to  virtue,  but 
as  one  particular  virtue  along-side  of  many  others.  The  willing 
of  the  good  springs  not  from  love,  but  appears  as  something 
entirely  independent  and  unbased,  along-side  of  knowledge  and 
along-side  of  love ;  and  for  the  very  reason  that  Aristotle  knows 
not  the  moral  power  of  love,  he  can  discover  for  the  civic  vir- 
tue of  the  great  multitude  no  other  motive  than  fear. 


SECTION  XXII. 

After  the  time  of  Aristotle,  philosophy  declined 
with  accelerating  rapidity,  degenerating  more  and 
more  into  a  shallow  popular  moralizing,  loosely 
grouped  around  a  few  superficial  foundation-thoughts, 
and  consisting,  for  the  most  part,  simply  in  uncon- 
nected observations  on  isolated  topics.  The  decline 
of  thought  manifests  itself  in  a  constantly  growing  in- 
appreciation  of  the  objective  significancy  and  valid- 
ity of  the  moral  idea,  which  latter  assumes  more  and 
more  an  individually-subjective  character,  even  in 
cases  where  it  seemingly  subordinates  the  subject  to 


§  22.]  POST-SOCRATIC   DECLINE.  127 

itself,  as  in  Stoicism, — or  subordinates  the  same  to 
nature,  as  in  Epicureanism, — and  the  decline  reaches 
its  lowest  point  in  the  total  doing  away  with  all  gen- 
eral and  objective  significancy  of  the  moral  idea,  in 
Skepticism. 

The  moral  theories  that  rise  after  Aristotle  are  in  no  sense 
vigorous  and  truly  philosophical  products  of  thought  ;  they 
are  but  feeble  out-shoots  of  the  antecedent,  more  vigorous 
spirit-life,  without  bloom  and  without  fruit.  Moreover  they 
stand  less  closely  connected  with  Plato  and  Aristotle  than 
with  certain  other  tendencies  of  thought  that  sprang  from 
the  influence  of  Socrates.  On  the  basis  of  the  Cyrenaics 
sprang  up  Epicureanism ;  on  that  of  the  Cynics,  Stoicism ; 
while  the  last  form  of  Greek  philosophy,  also  in  the  sphere 
of  ethics,  namely,  Skepticism,  may  be  regarded  as  a  further 
development  of  the  tendency  of  the  Sophists. 

By  Socrates  this  much  was  gained,  that  the  moral,  rational 
subject  was  recognized  in  his  freedom  and  rights,  that  the 
moral  idea  in  general  had  come  to  consciousness.  With 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  however,  this  freedom  and  this  idea  are 
not  of  a  merely  individual,  subjective  character,  but  they  are 
brought  into  relation  to  the  living  whole  of  rational  reality. 
A  course  of  action  is  not  good  for  the  reason  that  I  regard  it 
as  such,  but  I  must  regard  it  as  good  because  it  is  good  per 
se;  the  moral  has  essentially  a  general  and  objective  validity. 
The  later  philosophy  holds  one-sidedly  fast  to  the  position 
gained  by  Socrates, — makes  of  the  subjective  consciousness 
the  highest  criterion  of  truth,  even  in  moral  things,  and  that 
too  in  its  individual,  absolutely  self-dependent  character, 
apart  from  any  organic  union  with  the  rational  whole.  The 
good  is  good  because  I  recognize  it  as  such.  In  this  subject- 
ivistic  tendency,  philosophy  turns  away  from  Aristotle  and 
falls  into  the  channel  rather  of  the  earlier  schools,  but  with  a 
still  stronger  emphasizing  of  the  subject.  Hence  also  the  in- 
terest for  general  and  for  natural  philosophy  grows  less,  and 
attention  is  concentrated  on  the  subjective,  on  morality,  and 
this  consists  now  essentially  in  subjective  opinions ;  lacking 
in  fundamental  ideas,  it  becomes  feeble,  lax,  shallow;  it 


128  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  23. 

comes  into  the  hands  of  the  masses,  and,  in  this  marsh-like 
out-spreading,  it  becomes  stagnant  and  spiritless  ;  in  the 
place  of  philosophical  schools  proper  we  find  hostile  parties, 
as  it  were,  confessional  sects  of  the  mass  of  the  cultured,  a 
party  spirit  which  supplies  for  these  sects  the  place  of  their 
already-vanished  religion;  every  cultured  person  sought  to 
belong  to  some  such  philosophical  sect,  and  he  selected  and 
molded  it  according  to  his  own  taste,  and  the  choice  itself 
of  the  school  became  really  simply  a  matter  of  taste. — The 
original  antithesis  of  Greek  philosophy,  as  Materialism  and 
Spiritualism,  as  Ionic  and  Eleatic  philosophy,  which  appeared 
later  as  the  antithesis  of  the  Cyrenaics  and  the  Cynics,  re- 
peats itself,  especially  in  the  sphere  of  ethics,  as  Epicurean- 
ism and  Stoicism ;  the  former  regards  the  spirit  as  determined 
by  nature  ;  the  latter,  nature  as  determined  by  the  spirit. 

SECTION  XXIIL 

The  doctrine  of  the  Epicureans, — which  was  wide- 
spread among  the  mass  of  the  cultured,  and  which 
subsequently  became  even  the  dominant  spirit  of  the 
age,  but  which  still  remained  without  any  scientific 
development,  as,  in  fact,  it  was  incapable  of  such, — is 
the  consequential  unfolding  of  the  individual  pleasure- 
principle,  the  theoretical  expression  of  irreligion  and 
immorality.  The  subjective  pleasure-feeling  is  the 
highest  criterion  of  truth  and  of  the  good  ;  the  yield- 
ing to  natural  proclivities,  even  the  sensuous,  and  the 
greatest  possible  enjoyment  of  the  present,  are  the 
highest  virtue, — prudent  calculating  for  prolonged 
pleasure,  the  highest  wisdom, — anxious  concern  as  to 
a  future  retribution  and  a  divine  world-government, 
the  greatest  folly ;  our  striving  and  thinking  should 
regard  only  this  life. 

Epicurus,  (06.271  B.  C.,  see  Diog.  L.,  x,  1  sqq.),  who  stood 
most  closely  related  with  the  school  of  the  Cyrenaics,  ob- 
tained very  soon  for  his  doctrine — which  has  so  much  to 


§  23.]  EPICUREANISM.  129 

recommend  itself  to  worldlings — a  wide  acceptance ;  and 
while  the  solid  thinking  of  Aristotle  became  almost  forgotten, 
this  thought-sparing,  self-styled  philosophy  continued  to 
spread  wider  and  wider, — formed,  in  fact,  by  far  the  most  nu- 
merous of  the  sects,  and  sustained  itself  until  long  after  the 
advent  of  Christ.  The  more  superficial  the  wisdom,  so  much 
the  greater  the  party  that  clings  to  it.  This  doctrine,  as  com- 
prehended in  a  very  few  thoughts  and  forms  of  expression, 
soon  became  fixed  and  stationary  and  received  no  further  de- 
velopment, but  nevertheless  an  all  the  wider  practical  appli- 
cation. From  the  so  wide-spread  sect  there  have  not  come 
down  to  posterity  even  the  names  of  self-styled  philoso- 
phers of  any  great  eminence,  to  say  nothing  of  systems  of 
thought. 

Happiness  is  the  highest  good,  and  hence  to  strive  after  it 
the  highest  wisdom  and  morality ;  all  cognition  looks  to  it  as 
its  end.  For  man  only  that  is  true  which  he  feel*,  which  he 
becomes  acquainted  with  through  the  senses,  namely,  con- 
crete sensuous  reality.  Whatever  transcends  this  is  at  least 
doubtful,  and  to  fear  the  doubtful  and  supersensuous  dis- 
turbs happiness.  Fear  of  the  gods  and  of  a  life  after  death 
must  vanish  away,  for  of  them  we  have  no  knowledge. 
Sensuous  feeling,  and  hence  the  individual  pleasure-feeling, 
is  the  highest  criterion  of  all  truth,  and  hence  also  of  the 
morally-true,  the  good.  But  we  feel  only  the  sensuous,  the 
corporeal,  hence  only  this  is  for  us  true  and  real.  Individ- 
ual being,  and  hence  multiplicity,  is  the  solely  true  exist- 
ence,— and  hence,  first  of  all,  the  individual  subject  ;  con- 
sequently to  carry  out  the  rights  of  the  subject  is  the  moral- 
task.  This  task  looks  in  no  sense  whatever  to  the  realizing 
of  a  something  transcendent  to  the  individual, — of  an  idea; 
man  is.  not  to  follow  an  all-prevalent  law,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, his  individual  nature, — is  not,  in  any  sense  whatever, 
to  deny  himself,  but  in  fact  to  cling  to  and  assert  this  his 
particular  existence,  such  as  it  is.  Man  is  not  an  upholder 
of  a  spiritual  world,  on  the  contrary, 'he  is  himself  absolutely 
supported  and  guided  by  nature, — should  merge  himself  har- 
moniously into  nature,  should  therein  feel  himself  well. 
This  feeling  of  one's  self-well  is  the  chief  end  of  life,  and 
therefore  the  solely  true  measure  of  the  good.  Enjoyment 


130  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  23. 

is  the  end ;  the  yielding  of  one's  self  over  to  one's  own  natu- 
ralness, is  the  means. 

Now,  for  this  manner  of  life  there  was  of  course  no  great 
degree  of  wisdom  requisite ;  nevertheless  direct  unconscious 
desire  may  lead  astray,  and  hence  it  must  be  guided  by  con- 
siderateness.  Man  must  consider  in  each  separate  case 
whether  an  immediately  inviting  pleasure  is  not  connected 
with  a  subsequent  greater  pain,  and  in  this  case  he  must 
avoid  it,  or  at  least  confine  it  within  the  necessary  limits,  and 
that  simply  in  order  to  render  the  pleasure-feeling  a  lasting 
one.  The  pleasure  of  the  soul  is  greater  than  that  of  the 
body,  because  it  is  more  lasting,  and  hence  it  is  more  to  be 
sought  after;  however,  the  difference  is  not  essential,  inas- 
much as  the  soul  itself  is  but  a  refined  body.  Higher  than 
the  pleasure  which  consists  in  the  present  gratifying  of  a  nat- 
ural impulse,  is  the  pleasure  of  being  satisfied,  that  is,  when 
desire  and  the  soul  are  in  a  state  of  comfortable  repose ;  for 
this  reason  a  certain  degree  of  temperateness  and  moderation 
are  among  the  conditions  of  happiness.  Hence  virtue  is  in- 
deed an  element  of  a  wise  life,  not  for  its  own  sake,  however, 
but  as  a  means  to  a  higher  pleasure-enjoyment, — even  as  one 
takes  medicine  as  a  means  to  health.  Right  and  wrong,  to 
which  the  virtue  of  justness  relates,  are  nothing  per  se  ;  right 
is  only  the  contents  of  mutual  compacts  that  are  entered  into 
for  reciprocal  benefit ;  their  violation  is  the  wrong.  Where 
there  are  no  compacts  there  is  neither  right  nor  wrong, 
and  hence  also  no  justness  or  righteousness.  Moreover,  only 
so  far  as  it  redounds  to  my  utility,  have  I  to  practice  just- 
ness ;  and  the  evil  of  unjustness  is  simply  the  damage  I  in- 
cur,— especially  through  judicial  infliction.  Friendship  is  of 
much  value,  wedlock-love  properly  of  none  at  all.  From 
offices  of  state  the  wise  man  keeps  himself  aloof ;  he  acquires 
for  himself  wealth  as  far  as  practicable,  and  thus  provides 
for  his  future. 

An  essential  condition  of  happiness  is  the  being  free  from 
all  fear  of  spiritual  powers — of  the  gods  and  their  displeasure, 
of  death  and  a  retribution  in  the  "yon-side."  Gods  there 
may  indeed  be,  but  as  they  are  to  be  conceived  of  as  in  a 
state  of  bliss,  hence  they  cannot  possibly  have  any  concern 
for  the  world  and  for  men.  Deatli  does  not  fall  within  the 


§  24.]  STOICISM.  131 

scope  of  feeling,  and  hence  does  not  exist  for  us  at  all, — does 
not  concern  us  in  the  least.  So  long  as  we  have  feeling, 
death  does  not  exist,  and  when  death  does  exist,  then  we 
have  no  feeling ;  hence  it  disturbs  our  happiness  only  when 
we  foolishly  harbor  a  fear  of  it.  But,  that  with  death,  all  is 
over  with  man,  is  a  matter  of  course,  as  in  fact  the  soul  also 
is  but  a  fortuitous  combination  of  manifold  atoms  which,  at 
death,  again  fall  apart.  In  order  to  get  rid  of  the  torment- 
ing superstition  of  a  life  after  death,  one  needs  but  to  study 
physics.  The  all-comprehending  and  dominating  chief-con- 
dition of  happiness  is,  therefore,  prudence, — which  in  each 
particular  case  chooses  and  determines  the  proper  measure 
and  the  proper  means  of  pleasure.  Man  is,  consequently, 
lord  of  his  own  fate,  and  herein  consists  his  freedom ;  for- 
tune, as  mere  chance,  has  but  a  minor  share  in  our  destiny. 
But  that  perfect  happiness  is  not  to  be  reached  in  the  way 
recommended  Epicurus  knew  very  well,  and  he  himself  de- 
picts the  miseries  of  humanity  in  very  dark  colors ;  he  does 
not,  however,  throw  the  blame  for  them  upon  man,  but  upon 
the  imperfectness  of  the  fortuitously-arisen  universe  itself; 
and,  by  this  course,  he  does  not  fall  out  with  his  system,  but 
in  fact  finds  for  it  a  fresh  justification-,  the  more  numerous 
the  miseries  to  which  man,  without  his  own  fault,  is  exposed, 
so  much  the  stronger  stimulus,  and  so  much  the  greater  right 
has  he,  to  strive' after  the  enjoyment  of  life. 


SECTION  XXIV. 

The  subjectively-idealistic  Stoicism  which  took  its 
start  from  Zeno,  teaches  a  morality  of  conflict, — of 
struggle  on  the  part  of  the  rational  spirit  (as  being 
alone,  of  worth,  and  as  being  absolutely  a  law  unto  it- 
self) against  sensuousness,  of  thought  against  pleasure, 
as  belonging  to  a  lower  sphere.  Virtue  is  the  solely 
true  good,  and  all  other  seeming  goods  are  either  in- 
different or  irrational.  But  this  struggle  rests  simply 
on  the  thought  of  an  unreconciled  and  irreconcilable 
antagonism  of  existence, — knows  not  the  higher 

10 


132  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  24. 

thought  of  the  inner  unity  of  all  veritable  existence, — 
rests  on  the  pride  of  the  subjective  understanding  and 
of  the  absolutely  self-legislating  individual  will,  over 
against  all  objective  reality,  even  over  against  a  moral 
commonalty  with  laws  binding  on  the  individual  sub- 
ject. Stoicism  leads,  therefore,  on  the  one.  hand,  to 
an  unbounded  virtue-pride,  and  on  the  other,  to  a 
querulous  despising  of  reality,  also  to  a  disregarding 
of  caprice-checking  custom,  nay.  even  to  a.  suicidal 
non-esteeming  of  one's  own  temporal  life, — pretend- 
ing to  an  inner  peace,  but  really  betraying  evidence 
of  un-peace.  Any  moral  significance,  and  any  even 
slight  presentiment  of  absolute  ethical  truth,  °re  to  be 
found  only  in  the  more  general  thoughts  of  the  Sto- 
ics; but  all  the  more  dubious,  arbitrary,  nay,  even  per- 
verted, is  the  particular  application  of  these  thoughts 
to  definite  life-relations. 

Stoicism  stands  on  the  one  hand  incomparably  higher  in 
spiritual  vigor  and  dignity  than  Epicureanism,  and  forms  a 
direct  antagonism  thereto,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  passes 
far  beyond  the  truth  in  the  direction  of  the  opposite  extreme, 
and  its  one-sided  uWnaturalness  manifests  even  more  clearly 
than  Epicureanism  the  insufficiency  of  heathen  principles  for 
arriving  at  true  moral  wisdom. — Zeno,  a  contemporary  of 
Epicurus,  illustrated  the  teachings  of  his  system  (see  Diog. 
Laert.  viii)  by  moral  strictness  of  life,  and  by  the  commis- 
sion of  suicide  at  an  advanced  age;  his  writings  are  lost. 
His  school,  which  collected  within  itself  the  nobler  class  of 
minds,  and  which,  while  less  numerous  than  that  of  the  Epi- 
cureans, yet  exhibited  far  more  spiritual  activity  than  the 
latter,  continued  to  exist  until  the  downfall  of  paganism, — 
especially  among  the  Romans,  where,  though  much  toned- 
down  and  transformed,  it  was  represented  not  only  by  the 
rather  eclectic  Cicero,  but  also  by  Seneca*  by  Epictetits 

*  From  him  are  extant  numerous  moral  writings  in  popular  rhetorical 
style. 


§24.]  STOIC   GROUND-PRINCIPLES.  133 

(toward  the  close  of  the  first  century  A.  D.)>*  and  by  Marcus 
Aurelius  Antoninus.^ 

On  the  dualistic  antithesis  of  matter  and  spirit  rests  the  cor- 
responding ethical  antithesis  between  merely  sensuously-natu- 
ral objective  existence  and  the  rational  spirit  in  the  individual 
free  subject.  Not  the  mere  nature-entity,  but  the  spirit,  is 
the  true  entity,  and  it  is  such  in  full,  freely  self-legislating 
self-sufficiency ;  its  destination  is  to  manifest  itself  as  inde- 
pendent in  relation  to  nature,  and  to  base  itself  entirely  upon 
itself.  Not  the  passive,  but  the  active  entity  is  the  solely 
true  one, — not  enjoyment  but  activity;  it  is  only  as  active 
that  the  spirit  is  in  its  true  reality,  whereas,  as  merely  enjoy- 
ing, it  sinks  below  spirituality.  Man,  as  related  to  objective 
existence,  is  a  self-poised  absolutely  freely  self-determining 
being, — is,  as  a  rational  spirit,  perfectly  self-sufficient,  needs 
nothing  outside  of  himself  in  order  to  be  a  spirit,  to  be  free, 
to  be  happy;  he  should  not  let  himself  be  determined •  by 
any  thing  whatever  external  to  himself.  Whatever  is  to  have 
worth  for  man,  and  hence  is  to  form  a  part  of,  and  to  con- 
tribute to,  his  perfection  and  happiness,  must  proceed  from 
and  depend  upon  himself  alone ;  every  thing  else,  whatever 
it  may  be,  concerns  him  not,  is  indifferent  to  him, — can,  and 
may,  neither  hinder  nor  promote  his  perfection  and  happi- 
ness. It  is  in  being  self-dependent  that  the  wise  man  is 
truly  free. — The  essence  of  man,  in  distinction  from  the  brute, 
is  not  enjoying  and  feeling,  but  thinking ;  it  is  not  in  enjoy- 
ing, but  in  thinking,  that  he  is  free,  that  he  is  a  rational 
spirit;  and  the  more  he  seeks  to  enjoy  external  objects  and 
finds  pleasure  therein,  so  much  the  more  is  he  dependent  and 
unfree,  so  much  the  more  is  he  irrational,  and  hence  so  much 
the  less  a  true  man.  Thinking  and  not  feeling  is,  therefore, 
the  decisive  criterion  of  the  truth  and  of  the  good ;  hence 
there  should  be  first  judging  and  then  acting.  All  rational, 
and  hence  moral,  activity  must  rest  on  knowledge ;  to  act 

*  His  lectures,  for  the  most  part  merely  popular  moral  exhortations, 
are  preserved  in  Arrian ;  besides  these  we  have  the  Enchiridion  Epic- 
teti,  Which  has  lieen  much  used  even  in  Christian  times. 

t  From  him  we  have  Tu  etf  eavrov ,  (moral  meditations) — disconnect- 
ed, and,  in  many  cases,  merely  suggested  thoughts  and  life  rules,  with 
much  repetition  and  without  regular  development. 


134  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§24: 

from  mere  feeling  is  irrational ;  there  is  no  virtue  without 
knowledge.  Philosophy  itself  is  a  practice  of  virtue,  and 
knowledge  is  the  first  and  highest  virtue.  Out  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  good  springs,  of  itself  and  from  inner  necessity, 
pleasure  in  the  good  and  a  striving  after  it,  just  as  from  a 
knowledge  of  the  evil  springs  an  abhorrence  of  the  same. 
But  these  movements  of  the  sensibilities  are  not  the  ground, 
but  only  the  attendants  of  the  moral  activity ;  the  ground 
thereof  is  knowledge  alone.  From  erroneous  knowledge, 
however,  spring  irrational  sensibility-movements  and  striv- 
ings of  the  soul,  that  is,  the  passions,  which  are  consequent- 
ly to  be  regarded  as  a  soul-disease.  Now,  though  all  evil 
springs  from  error,  yet  is  man  nevertheless  responsible  there- 
for, for  the  error  itself  is  guiltily  incurred.  It  is  by  the 
knowledge  of  the  good,  that  is,  by  perfect  consciousness, 
that  volition  is  distinguished  from  impulse  or  instinct.  The 
will  aims  at  the  truly-known  good,  impulse  at  the  merely 
seemingly  good.  Knowledge,  as  an  essential  manifestation 
of  rationality,  is,  like  the  latter  itself,  germinally  innate  in 
man,  and  hence  it  is  in  all  men  essentially  the  same ;  simply 
the  further  development  and  the  particular  application  of 
the  same  is  left  to  one's  own  judgment. 

The  essence  and  the  fundamental  thought  of  the  good  is 
conformity  to  nature  (6/zoAoym,  convenientia,  TO  Kara  Qvatv,  conven- 
ienter  natures  vivere).  Nature  is  taken  here,  not  as  outer 
sensuous  nature  in  contradistinction  to  the  self-conscious 
spirit,  but  as  the  general  order  of  the  world,  as  the  natura 
rerum,  the  inner  conformity-to-law  of  the  All,  and,  above  all, 
the  rational  nature  and  conformity-to-law  of  one's  oVn  spir- 
itual existence  and  life.  Hence  conformity  to  nature  is  agree- 
ment with  one's  self — the  inner  order  and  spiritual  health  of 
the  life.  Even  the  brute  puts  forth  effort  primarily  not  from 
pleasure  and  for  pleasure,  but  for  natural  self-preservation 
and  self-development.  The  true  nature  of  man,  however,  is 
not  the  sensuous  nature  but  the  reason.  To  live  right  signi- 
fies, therefore,  to  live  according  to  reason.  Hence  evil  is  a 
contradiction  to  the  rational  nature  of  man,  and  the  direct 
opposite  of  the  good, — differs  from  the  good  not  merely 
quantitatively,  but  also  qualitatively  and  essentially, — is  the 
anti-natural  and  anti-rational. 


(§24.  STOIC  VIRTUE.  135 

Virtue  is,  therefore,  in  its  very  essence,  a  "being  well  ;" 
hence  it  has  a  feeling  of  happiness  as  its  immediate  and 
necessary  consequence,  and  thus  it  is  itself  per  se  the  highest 
good.  He  who  is  truly  virtuous  is  happy  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  God ;  he  who  is  vicious  is  necessarily  wretched.  Not 
this  happiness-feeling,  however,  but  the  good  as  such,  is  the 
rational  end  of  the  moral  activity ;  virtue  is  to  be  sought  for 
its  own  sake  without  reference  to  the  happiness-feeling ;  the 
pleasure-sensation  is  indeed  the  consequence,  but  not  the  end 
of  moral  action.  There  are,  in  fact,  other  pleasure-sensations 
than  those  which  flow  from  virtue,  and  other  pain-sensations 
than  those  which  follow  from  vice ;  also  external  things, 
things  not  dependent  on  us  and  our  free  determination,  such 
as  health,  riches,  etc.,  may  excite  pleasure-sensations,  and 
hence  contribute  to  our  external  happiness.  Now,  if  the  end 
of  our  striving  were  not  the  good  per  se,  but  happiness,  then 
our  effort  would  be  directed  toward  a  something  that  is  not 
fully  within  our  power ;  but  nothing  can  be  truly  good,  and 
hence  truly  to  be  sought  after,  which  is  not  dependent  upon 
us  and  within  the  scope  of  our  will.  The  pleasure  which 
arises  independently  of  us  from  external  things  may  be 
agreeable,  and  hence  these  things  may  be  useful,  but  real 
goods  they  are  not.  Hence  the  antithesis  of  the  honestum 
(TO  KaOfjKov,  TO  naAov)  and  the  utile.  Thus  the  happiness  and  per- 
fection of  the  sage  rests  entirely  upon  himself ;  he  is  the  free 
creator  of  his  well-being;  all  that  is  really*  good  depends 
solely  upon  himself ;  all  that  is  not  dependent  upon  him  af- 
fects and  disturbs  him  not.  Every  wise  man  is  a  rich  man,  a 
king. — \s  the  good  differs  from  the  evil,  not  in  degree  but 
in  essence,  hence  all  the  virtues  are  essentially  equal  to  and 
homogeneous  with  each  other ;  for*  a  virtue  inferior  to  another 
could  be  possible  only  by  its  being  somewhat  participant  in 
evil ;  but  this  is  impossible  from  its  very  idea.  Hence  who- 
ever has  one  virtue  has  them  all ;  and  they  are  all  intimately 
involved  in  each  other.  Likewise,  all  vices  are  essentially 
equal  to  each  other,  and,  e.  g.,  to  kill  a  cock  needlessly  is 
just  as  bad  as  to  commit  parricide. 

From  the  Stoic  notion  of  the  self-based  freedom  of  the 
sage,  as  well  as  from  their  view  of  the  essence  of  virtue,  it 
follows  that  there  may  be  entirely  perfect  men,  men  who  are 


136  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§24. 

free  of  all  error  and  of  all  immorality,  fully  possessed  of  all 
knowledge  and  virtue  and  happiness.  That  there  really  are 
such  is  taken  for  granted ;  and  delineations  of  this  self- 
acquired  glory  are  given  in  the  most  glowing  colors,  and 
form  a  favorite  topic  of  Stoic  philosophy.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  find  not  the  least  trace  of  the  notion  of  a  natural 
corruption  of  mankind ;  there  is  admitted  (as  was  the  case  in 
Aristotle's  system)  simply  a  difference  between  the  rude  mul- 
titude little  inclined  to,  and  little  capable  of,  the  good,  and 
the  more  happily-gifted  ones, — the  latter  being  of  course  the 
Stoics  themselves ;  and  it  is  given  as  an  essential  character- 
istic of  a  sage,  never  to  repent  of  any  thing.* — In  consequence 
of  the  diametrical  antagonism  between  good  and  evil,  there 
is  no  mean  moral  sphere  between  the  two,  no  sphere  of  moral 
indifference.  There  are  indeed  things  that  are  per  se  indiffer- 
ent to  man,  and  which  can  hence  per  se  neither  increase  nor 
diminish  his  worth  and  happiness,  but  their 'actual  applica- 
tion is  in  each  particular  case  either  good  or  bad.  In  classi- 
fying the  virtues,  the  Stoics,  for  the  most  part,  follow  Plato. 
Zeno  himself  based  the  moral  on  religion;  also  some  of 
his  disciples  understand  by  the  "nature"  with  which  man  is 
to  be  in  harmony,  the  divine  contents  and  the 'divine  con- 
formity-to-law of  nature,  and  hence  that  which  harmo- 
nizes with  the  divine  will ;  and  they  conceive  of  reason  as  a 
manifestation  of  the  divine  activity  in  things.  But  the  later 
Stoics,  for  the  iHost  part,  lost  sight  of  this  religious  character 
of  the  moral,  and  presented  it  as  quite  independent  of  re- 
ligion,— as  a  spiritual  life-sphere  resting  strictly  and  inde- 
pendently upon  itself.  In  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Aurelius 
the  religious  element  comes  again  more  into  the  fore-ground ; 
they  recognize  reverence  fo"r  the  gods,  or  for  God,  as  a  virtue 
and  as  a  ground  of  the  moral, — conceive  of  virtuousness  as 
God-likeness,  and  viciousness  as  godlessness,  and  even  at- 
tribute high  worth  to  prayer,  though  here,  of  course,  there  is 
no  trace  of  penitential  prayer,  but  for  the  most  part,  only  the 
spirit  qf  the  Pharisee's  prayer  :  "God,  I  thank  thee  that -I 
am  not  as  other  men."t  It  is' in  fact  not  impossible  that  in 

*  Cic. :  Pro  Murcena,  29. 

1  Arrian :  Dissert.  Epict.,  iii,  24, 96  tqq. ;  iv,  10, 14 sqq.,  (ed.  Schweigh.) ; 
M.  Aurel.  Ant. :  «f  iavrov,  ix,  40. 


§24.]  STOIC  PRACTICE.  137 

the  more  religious  tendency  of  later  Stoicism  there  is  a  de- 
gree of  influence  from  Christianity. 

This  view  of  the  moral  produced  in  fact  among  the  Stoics 
an  earnest  moral  striving,  though  without  enthusiasm  or 
heart,  and  only  in  the  manner  of  a  cold  logical  calculating. 
Feeling  amounts  to  nothing  at  all ;  of  the  potency  of  love 
there  is  not  a  trace ;  thought  passes  directly  over  into  action, 
and  feeling  merely  accompanies  the  act  as  a  something  en- 
tirely indifferent.  The  love  of  neighbor  is  regarded  only  as 
a  mode  of  action,  but  not  as  an  aifair  of  the  heart.  The 
sage  ought  indeed  to  help  the  wretched  according  to  his 
means  and  according  to  their  worthiness,  but  to  feel  compas- 
sion, or  even  to  act  as  if  one  felt  it,  would  be  unworthy  of  a 
wise  man ;  for  the  truly  wise  man  is  above  all  suffering ;  and 
the  wretched  suffer  only  from  lack  of  knowledge,  because 
they  regard  external  things,  which  are  not  within  their  own 
control,  as  reai  goods.*  The  friendliness  to  man  which  is  so 
earnestly  recommended  by  the  Stoics  flows  not  from  love, 
and  their  patience  under  received  injustice  springs  only  from 
contemptuous  pride.  Hence,  while,  on  the  one  hand,  wrath, 
revenge,  envy,  slander,  etc.,  are  condemned  as  unworthy  of 
the  sage,  partly  because  every  passive  feeling-movement  is 
immoral,  and  in  part  because  the  sage  is  too  proud  to  allow 
himself  to  be  disturbed  by  the  acts  and  manners  of  others, — • 
yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  as  an  unworthy  weakness  to 
forgive  others  for  their  injustice,  for  that  jvould  be  equiva- 
lent to  declaring  the  injustice  as  indifferent,  and  to  lightly" 
esteeming  justice. f  The  Christian  principle,  "Forgive  and 
ye  shall  be  forgiven,"  has  no  force  for  a  Stoic,  because  he 
believes  himself  never  to  be  in  circumstances  to  need 
forgiveness. 

The  morality  of  the  Stoics  is  a  constant  contest  of  the  spirit 
against  sensuous  nature  and  against  the  unspiritual  and  irra- 
tional in  the  objective  world  in  general ;  but  as  this  contest 
is  directed  against  a  primordial  and  never  entirely-overcome- 
able  antagonism  in  existence  itself,  and  hence  can  never  lead 

*Epict. :  EncJiir.,  16;  M.  Anton.,  v,  36;  vii,  43  ;  Diog.  L.,  vii,  123; 
Cicero  :  Pro  MuranM,  c.  29  ;  Seneca  :  De  dementia,  ii,  5,  6. 

t  Stobsous  :  Echffce  etkicce,  ii,  7,  p.  190  (Heeren) ;  Diog.  L.,  vii,  123  ; 
Cic. :  Pro  Mur.,  23. 


138  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§24. 

to  an  objective  victory,  it  assumes  consequently  not  so  much 
an  actively  outward-working  character,  as  rather  that  of  a 
passive  resistance  against  irrational  reality.  The  sage  does 
not  undertake  to  produce  a  real  world  of  the  moral  spirit ;  on 
the  contrary,  he  retreats  within  himself  in  proud  contempt  of 
the  actual  world ;  only  himself,  but  not  the  outer  world,  can 
he  make  perfect ; — the  real  struggle  is  carried  on  not  by  a 
victory-confident  assaulting  of  immoral  reality,  but  by  a  con- 
temptuous turning  away  from  the  same, — by  an  indifference 
to  pleasure  and  pain,  the  depicting  of  which  is  given  again 
and  again  in  endless  reiteration.  This  blunt,  indifferent  en- 
during of  pain  is  not  the  fruit  of  a  pious  faith  in  a  divine 
world-government  or  of  love  toward  mankind,  but  it  is  the 
proud  defiance  of  the  absolutely  self-relying  subject  as  against 
a  world  imbued  with  a  primitive  and  essential  irrationality. 
This  indifference  toward  all  that  excites  the  sensibilities  re- 
strains indeed  the  Stoic  from  Epicurean  senguality,  but  is 
very  far  from  leading  to  a  true  resistance  of  one's  self ;  the 
sensuous  is  only  despised,  but  not  positively  assailed.  Stoic 
ethics  requires  no  severe  self-denial,  no  fasting,  no  jenuncia- 
tion  of  sensual  enjoyment ;  it  only  requires  that  one  be  mod- 
erate and  that  one  place  no  value  on  the  enjoyment ;  but  after 
all,  this  restraint  was,  for  the  most  part,  but  a  mere  flourish- 
ing of  rhetoric ; — Seneca  accepted,  with  the  greatest  suavity, 
riches  upon  riches,  which  his  pupil  Nero  conferred  upon  him. 
The  lightly  esteeming  of  the  non-spiritual  extends  also  to 
'the  physical  life.  The  Stoics  indeed  regard  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  as  a  fundamental  impulse  of  human  nature, 
and  as  a  strictly  normal  expression  of  the  law  which  requires 
harmony  with  one's  self  and  with  nature,  but  it  is  not  incon- 
sistent therewith  that  they  should  regard  life  itself  as  an 
object  of  indifference — seeing  that  it  is  not  within  man's  own 
control.  Death  must  not  be  feared,  but  must — as  a  power 
not  within  our  control — be  despised ;  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  a 
nature-law,  and  one  that  liberates  us  from  a  painful  bodily 
life,  it  is  to  be  regarded  even  with  pleasure.  The  thought 
of  immortality  is,  in  this  connection,  regarded  merely  as  a 
possibility ;  if  the  life  of  the  soul  continues  on,  then  the  wise 
man  is  happy ;  but  if  it  ceases,  then  ceases  for  him  also  all 
pain;  in  neither  case  is  there  the  least  ground  for  fear. — But 


§24.]  CHAMPIONSHIP  OF  SUICIDE.  139 

the  Stoic  goes  still  further.  The  wise  roan  is  a  free  lord  over 
himself ;  but  in  death  he  is  overcome  by  an  external  power. 
It  does  not  become  the  sage,  therefore,  to  let  the  close  of  his 
life  depend  merely  on  any  such  extraneous  power ;  it  is  but 
a  visualization  of  his  own  self-dependent  freedom,  that  he 
should  close  his  life  when  it  pleases  himself,  that  is,  when  he 
has  satisfactory  reasons  therefor.  To  the  Stoic,  suicide  is, 
under  certain  circumstances,  not  only  allowed,  but  even  a 
duty,  a  heroic  virtue.  Among  the  circumstances  that  justify 
suicide,  irrespective  of  self-sacrifice  for  country  or  friends, 
are  the  following:  great  distress,  poverty,  incurable  disease, 
physical  maiming,  and  other  oppressive  afflictions,  depriva- 
tion of  liberty,  and  in  general,  any  essential  hinderance  to 
living  freely  and  in  conformity  to  reason,  such  as  infirmity 
from  age ;  all  these  are  divine  hints  that  it  is  time  to  take 
one's  voluntary  departure;  "The  door  is  open," — is  a  saying 
which  the  Stoic  fondly  reiterates  as  an  expression  of  his  per- 
fect liberty,  even  in  regard  to  the  ending  of  his  life.*  Sui- 
cide is  defended  with  great  zeal,  and  almost  with  enthusiasm, 
by  Seneca,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  an  assertion  of  the  true 
self-dependence  and  freedom  of  man ;  for  this  reason  man 
may  and  should  proceed  to  suicide  even  when  the  above 
freedom-hindering  evils  are  merely  in  threatening  prospect, 
inasmuch  as,  if  he  does  not,  he  may  in  the  end  be  hindered 
from  the  accomplishment  of  this  self-liberation.  Only  a 
single  way  leads  into  life,  but  thousands  lead  out  of  it.  No 
one  is  wretched  save  through  his  own  fault ;  for  if  misfor- 
tune falls  upon  him,  he  is  at  liberty  to  depart;  life  keeps 
none  back.  The  wise  man  lives  only  so  long  as  life  pleases 
him ;  the  lancing  of  an  artery  opens  to  him  the  way  to  free- 
dom. Death  is,  after  all,  unavoidable,  why  then  adjourn  it 
till  the  evil  day  ?  The  foulest  death  is  better  than  the  clean- 
est slavery  ;  the  prudent  man  seeks  the  easiest  death ;  yet  if  it 
cannot  be  otherwise,  he  does  not  shun  even  a  painful  suicide. t 
—And  the  practice  corresponded  to  the  theory.  Zeno  himself 
is  said  to  have  hanged  himself  at  an  advanced  age,  because 
he  had  broken  one  of  his  fingers ;  his  disciple  Cleanthes 

*  Diog.  L. ,  vii,  130 ;  Arrian,  i,  9,  20 ;  i,  24,  20  ;  i,  25,  18  tqq. ;  ii,  1,  20 ; 
$A.  Anton.,v,  29  ;  Cic. :  De  Finibus,  iii,  18. 
t  Epiat.  ii,  5  (17) ;  vi,  6  (58) ;  viii,  1  (70) ;  De  ira,  iii,  15,  (ed.  Fickert). 


140  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§24 

starved  himself  to  death  because  his  gums  became  sore.  The 
frequent  suicides  among  the  Roman  Stoics  are  a  matter  of 
notoriety. — This  doctrine  and  this  practice  are  often  regarded 
as  in  conflict  with  the  general  view  of  the  Stoics,  which,  in 
fact,  denies  that  pain  is  a  real  evil.  The  inconsistency  is 
only  apparent,  and  contains,  at  all  events,  a  very  true  con- 
fession. If  man  has  no  higher  consolation  against  the  mis- 
eries of  existence  than  the  pride  of  the  self-centered,  self- 
satisfied  individual  spirit,  then  it  is  simply  mere  truthfulness 
when  he  confesses  that  he  is  not  equal  to  the  misery  of  real 
life, — that  he  has  not  the  moral  power  entirely  to  overcome 
it  by  morality,  and  to  say  with  joy,  "We  glory  also  in  tribu- 
lations." The  Stoic  knows  nothing  of  an  almighty  father- 
love  of  God,  and  less  still  of  any  personal  guilt ;  he  lacks 
the  entire  basis  upon  which  the  courage  of  a  Christian  heart 
can  even  grow  stronger  amid  all  the  buffetings  of  life ;  he 
rises  only  to  a  defiance  of  the  miseries  of  reality ;  but  this 
defiance,  seeing  that  it  is  not  exalted  to  moral  courage  by  the 
pious  confidence  of  a  God-thirsting  heart,  is  not  equal  to  the 
task  of  humbly  bowing  itself  under  suffering,  but  only  to 
that  of  destroying  itself  in  bitter  accusation  against  the 
moral  order  of  the  world,  and  in  the  consciousness  that  the 
real  world  is  not  worthy  longer  to  contain  such  a  sage. 

Stoic  morality  is  of  a  purely  individual  character,  aims  only 
at  virtualizing  the  free  self-dependence  and  self-sufficiency  of 
the  individual  subject.  For  an  objective  reality  of  the  moral 
thought,  and  for  a  moral  community-life,  the  Stoic  has  no  ap- 
preciation, and  hence  also  none  for  the  naturally-moral  basis  of 
society,  namely,  marriage, — which,  in  fact,  as  requiring  self- 
submission  to  an  objective  moral  reality,  appears  as  a  trammel- 
ing fetter  for  the  individual  subject;  and  it  is  doubtless  only 
from  the  striving  after  the  maintenance  of  the  complete  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  wise  subject  in  the  face  of  all  objective  moral 
reality,  that  are  to  be  explained  the  strangely  perverted  views 
of  the  sexual  relations  that  prevailed  among  the  Stoics.  By 
them  marriage  itself  was  lightly  esteemed,  and,  while  passion- 
ate love  and  lustfulness  were  condemned,  sexual  communion 
outside  of  marriage  was  expressly  defended  against  all  crit- 
icism ;  *  and  of  Zeno  and  Chrysippus,  it  is  made  out  with  a 
*  Epict. :  Enchir.  33. 


§24.]  DISESTEEM   OF    MARRIAGE.  141 

good  degree  of  certainty,  that  they  required  community  of 
wives  among  the  wise,  and  that  they  declared  allowable,  sexual 
communion  between  nearest  blood-relatives  (even  between  par- 
ents and  children),  and  also  whoredom,  self-pollution  and  ped- 
erasty.* It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  these  opinions — with 
the  exception  of  incest,  which  is  readily  explainable  from  their 
one-sided,  calculating  spirit, — the  Stoics  had  the  moral  con- 
sciousness of  the  Greeks  on  their  side,  and  that  for  their  com- 
munity of  wives  they  were  countenanced  by  the  teachings  of 
Plato. — Also  in  other  respects  their  moral  relations  to  other 
men  are  neither  frank  nor  pure.  The  lofty  contempt  which  the 
sage  indulges  in  toward  all  non-sages,  disengages  him  also  from 
many  moral  duties  toward  them;  thus  he  is  not  under  obliga- 
tion always  to  tell  them  the  truth, ;  falsehood  is  allowable  not 
only  in  war,  to  the  enemy,  but  also  in  many  other  cases, — 
especially  in  view  of  attaining  an  advantage.! 

The  morality  of  the  Stoic  is  the  pride  of  the  natural  man 
who  is  conscious  of  being  a  moral  creature,  but  who  has  no 
suspicion  of  a  morality  higher  than  and  transcending  the  indi- 
vidual subject,  nor  of  a  personal  moral  depravity.  His  oft- 
repeated  high-sounding  descriptions  of  self-complacency  make 
any  thing  but  an  agreeable  impression.  This  pride  restrains 
him,  it  is  true,  from  many  unworthy  acts;  in  consequence,  how- 
ever, of  his  total  lack  of  an  objective  standard,  it  did  not  guard 
him  from  grave  moral  errors,  nor  from  an  almost  fanatical  hate 
against  a  higher  world-theory,  which,  at  a  later  period,  offered 
itself  to  him  in  Christianity ;  and  Marcus  Aurelius  was  not  in 
the  least  deterred  by  his  so  high-sounding  discourses  on  kind- 
ness, tolerance,  and  charity,  from  letting  loose  a  fearful  perse- 
cution upon  the  Christians, — in  whose  martyr-courage  he 
could  discover  only  criminal  obstinacy. — Though  Stoic  ethics 
was  distinguished  from  the  essentially-related  ethics  of  the 
Cynics  by  the  fact  that  it  discarded  the  unspiritual  and  unre- 
fined form  of  the  latter,  and  that  it  respected  the  spiritual 
under  every  phase,  and  hence  also  in  art,  and  placed  a  high 
estimate  upon  the  worthy  appearance  of  the  body  and  upon 
cleanliness,  nevertheless  at  bottom  it  does  not  really  transcend 

*  Diog.  L.,  vii,  13,  33,  131,  188;  Sext.  Emp. :  'TCirorvTruofif,  iii,  24. 
fStob. :  Ed.  eth.,  ii,  7,  p.  230  (Heeren). 


142  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§ 25- 

the  same.  It  does  not  rise  beyond  the  mere  formal  notion  of 
the  moral  as  a  conformity  to  nature ;  the  material  constructions 
to  be  put  upon  the  contents  of  the  moral  idea  are  left  to  the 
subjective  discretion  of  the  individual;  and  though  it  really 
stands  higher  than  Epicurean  ethics,  still  it  did  not  spiritually 
vanquish  the  same.  Instead  of  an  absolutely  and  objectively 
valid  moral  idea,  and  of  the  expression  of  a  divine  will,  we 
find  only  man's  subjective  knowledge  of  his  own  nature ;  the 
contents  of  the  moral  law,  the  Stoic  discovers  only  by  the 
observation  of  his  own  personal  peculiarities ;  and  the  possi- 
bility that  this  self  of  his  might  be  a  morally  perverted  one 
he  does  not  even  remotely  suspect. 

SECTION  XXV. 

Epicureanism  and  Stoicism  are  two  diametrically 
opposed  but  also  mutually  requiring  and  complement- 
ing phases  of  the  Greek  spirit ;  both  are  equally  one- 
sided, both  are  equally  remote  from  the  Christian 
ethical  idea ; — both  refer  all  moral  truth  back  to  the 
individual  subject.  In  the  place  of  Christian  moral- 
ity, the  Epicureans  offer  joyous  voluptuousness;  the 
Stoics  offer  the  high-minded  pride  of  complete  self- 
righteousness  ;  neither  party  feels  the  least  need  of 
redemption,  of  divine  grace ;  "for  the  Epicureans 
regard  the  per  se  sinful  as  right,  while  the  Stoics  im- 
agine themselves  to  have  overcome  the  same  through 
their  per  se  pure  individual  will. 

Epicurean  ethics  emphasizes  the  nature-phase  in  man ;  Stoic 
the  spirit- phase ;  the  former  teaches  an  unresisting,  voluptuous 
giving-over  of  self  to  sensuous  nature,  the  latter  an  earnest  but 
only  partially  successful  resisting  of  the  same;  the  former  is 
absolutely  indiifeient  as  to  moral  knowledge, — natural  instinct 
supplies  the  place  of  knowledge ;  the  latter  manifests  a  busy 
seeking  after  knowledge,  and  esteems  it  as  a  virtue ;  the  former 
is  a  crude  realism, — in  all  essential  features  a  materialistic 
naturalism ;  the  latter  is  a  one-sided  idealism, — in  all  essential 


§  25.]  EPICUREANISM   VERSUS  STOICISM.  143 

features  a  ploddingly-calculating  spiritualism;  the  former  bears 
a  feminine  character, — is  passive,  yielding,  lax ;  the  latter  bears 
a  masculine  character, — is  active,  earnest,  rigorous;  the  former 
suited  better  the  effeminate  Ionic  tribe  and  the  Orient,  the  latter 
rather  the  stern  Doric  tribe  and  the  Romans. 

The  Epicurean  seemingly  gives  sway  to  the  universal,  namely, 
to  nature,  to  which  the  individual  subordinates  himself;  in 
reality,  however,  the  individual  subject  is  set  free  from  the  bonds 
of  the  universal,  of  the  spiritual,  of  rationality;  the  Stoic  also 
seemingly  subordinates  the  individual  subject  to  a  general 
thought,  namely,  the  moral  idea;  in  reality,  however,  also  here 
the  universal  is  made  to  yield  to  the  individual  subject;  in  the 
place  of  a  general  moral  idea  we  find,  strictly  speaking,  only 
the  calculating  opinion  of  the  individual ;  it  is  the  self-will  of 
the  subject  in  the  face  of  the  spiritual  objective  world,  namely, 
history,  that  asserts  itself  as  rational  freedom;  According  to 
both  systems,  therefore,  the  truth  is  found  only  within  the  sub- 
ject ;  nature  and  existence  in  general  have  value  for  the  Epicu- 
rean only  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  enjoyed,  that  is,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  for  the  individual  subject, — in  every  other  respect 
existence  is  indifferent ;  in  the  eyes  of  the  Stoic,  existence  is 
truth  only  in  so  far  as  it  appears  in  the  subject ;  the  sage  is  the 
embodiment  of  the  moral  order  of  the  universe,  which,  apart 
from  him,  exists  but  very  imperfectly.  In  both  systems  the 
higher  thought  of  Plato,  namely,  that,  by  the  moral,  the  real 
harmony  of  existence,  the  harmony  between  nature  and  spirit, 
is  realized,  is  one-sidedly  perverted ;  the  Epicurean  effects  this 
harmony  only  by  sacrificing  the  rationally-personal  spirit  to 
nature,  the  Stoic  by  sacrificing  nature  to  the  individual  per- 
sonal spirit ;  it  is  no  longer  a  harmonizing,  but  a  giving  up,  of 
one  of  the  two  phases  of  existence. 

Though  Stoic  ethics  is  in  many  respects  graver  and  more 
worthy  of  man  than  Epicurean,  nevertheless  both  systems  are 
equally  remote  from  the  Christian  view.  The  Epicurean  does 
not  recognize  the  spiritual  personality  as  the  highest  factor ;  the 
Stoic  does  not  recognize  the  rights  of  objective  reality;  but 
Christianity  recognizes  both  as  absolutely  belonging  to  each 
other.  In  both  systems,  the  natural  man,  the  individual  sub- 
ject, thrusts  himself  in  his  fortuitous  reality  into  the  fore- 
ground, as  having  the  highest  claims ;  in  both  the  subject  is  of 


144  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§26. 

himself  perfectly  competent  to  attain  to  all  perfection, — has  no 
need,  in  this  work,  either  of  God  or  of  history ;  neither  -has 
even  the  faintest  presentiment  of  the  moral  signifieancy  of  his- 
tory, of  humanity  as  a  unity.  In  both,  therefore,  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  humility  of  moral  self-denial,  but  either  a  mere 
lustful  devotion  to  world-enjoyment,  or  a  haughty  contempt  of 
the  external  world, — and  hence  in  neither  of  them  is  there  the 
least  felt  need  of  redemption ;  the  sole  redemption  from  the 
burden,  not  of  guilt  but  of  an  evil  world  of  reality,  is,  suicide 
with  the  Stoic,  and  sensuous  intoxication  with  the  Epicurean. 
In  neither  system  is  there  manifest  the  least  approximation 
to  the  Christian  principle, — no  progress  beyond  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  but  rather  simply  the  moral  consciousness  of  hea- 
thenism in  its  incipient  dissolution, — which  is  consummated  in 
Skepticism. 

• 

SECTION  XXVI. 

The  subjectivism  that  predominated  in  Epicurean 
and  Stoic  ethics  finds  its  consequential  and  scientific- 
ally-rigorous carrying-out, — and  at  the  same  time 
Greek  and  heathen  ethics  in  general,  its  dissolution 
and  honorable  self-destruction, — in  Skepticism,  which 
declares  all  judging  of  good  and  evil  as  futile,  and 
all  modes  of  action  as  indifferent. — Neo-Platonic 
philosophy,  which  seeks  to  rescue  heathenism  as 
against  Christianity,  and  which  perverts  Christian 
ideas  to  heathen  purposes,  presents  in  its  but  par- 
tially developed  ethics  little  more  than  a  dreamy 
mysticism — a  quietistic  self-merging  into  the  one  uni- 
versal divine  essence ;  and  it  is  only  for  non-philoso- 
phers that  there  is  need  of  a,  not  scientific  but, 
practical  code  of  morals. 

Roman  philosophy  made  no  original  contributions 
to  ethics.  Apart  from  a  but  slightly  independent 
adoption  of  the  doctrines  of  Stoicism,  it  presents 
nothing  more  than  a  feebly  eclectic  character,  and 


§  26.]  SKEPTICISM.  145 

does  not  rise  beyond  superficial  calculating  observa- 
tions and  opinions. 

Skepticism  lias  often  been  misunderstood  not  only  in  its 
scientific,  but  also  in  its  world-historical  significancy ;  it  arose 
gradually  and,  as  it  were,  spontaneously,  without  any  one  spe- 
cially prominent  founder,  as  a  protest  of  the  general  rational 
consciousness  against  the  self-sufficiency  and  presumption  of  the 
previously  existing  philosophies, — and,  in  the  sphere  of  ethics, 
as  the  scientific  conscience  of  heathenism.  Subjectivism,  when 
consequentially  carried  out,  leads  inevitably  to  skepticism. 
Socrates  had  contended  with  moral  earnestness  against  the 
subjectivism  of  the  Sophists,  and  had  attempted  to  find  a  solid 
basis  also  for  ethical  philosophy ;  in  this  commendable  effort, 
however,  he  succeeded  as  little  as  did,  after  him,  Plato  and 
Aristotle  and  the  Stoics.  In  these  efforts  they  did  not  rise  be- 
yond mere  formal  definitions  of  the  moral,  and  were  obliged 
to  derive  the  material  contents  of  the  same  from  the  primarily 
merely  fortuitously-determined  essence  of  the  individual  sub- 
ject. The  sole  thought  that  leads  to  a  true  basing  of  the  moral 
consciousness,  namely,  that  the  moral  is  the  will  of  God,  was 
only  dimly  caught  sight  of,  and  could  not  in  fact,  from  the 
heathen  stand-point,  be  carried  out  with  any  degree  of  cer- 
tainty. That,  now,  the  vail  was  torn  off  from  the  false  method 
of  taking  the  finite  subject  as  the  criterion  and  the  infallible 
source  of  universally-valid  and  objective  truth,  and  of  attrib- 
uting to  subjective  opinion  an  absolutely  valid  objective  sig- 
nificancy, and  that  subjectivism  was  exposed  in  all  its  naked- 
ness and  invalidity, — this  was  the  scientific  service  of  Skepti- 
cism,— which,  having  shown  traces  of  itself  as  early  as  in  the 
age  of  Aristotle  (Pyrrhd),  attained  to  greater  prevalence  in  the 
century  before  Christ  (^ffinesidemus  of  Alexandria),  and  fully 
developed  itself  in  the  second  century  after  Christ  (Sextus  Em- 
piricus),  and  thus  like  a  devouring  rust  gradually  undermined 
the  last  self-confidence  of  heathen  philosophy,  save  in  so  far 
as  it  did  not  seek  refuge  behind  the  mystical  nebula?  of  Neo- 
Platonicism. 

Skepticism  is  in  fact  simply  the  product  of  the  antithesis 
between  Epicureanism  and  Stoicism.  The  former  said:  the 
feeling  of  pleasure  and  displeasure  alone  decide  as  to  the 


146  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  26. 

morally-good  ;  the  latter  said :  not  feeling  but  thinking  decides ; 
Skepticism  lets  the  two  cancel  each  other,  and  says:  neither 
feeling  nor  thinking  is  capable  of  any  real  decision  as  to  what 
is  good.  Man  cannot  at  all  know  what  is  per  se  good ;  all  our 
feelings,  experiences  and  thoughts  have  merely  and  exclusively 
a  subjective  significancy, — furnish  no  truth  in  regard  to  things 
per  se.  This  is  not  a  mere  feeble  courting  of  doubt,  not  a  mere, 
*'  I  know  not  whether  this  or  that  is  good,"  but  a  decisive,  "  I 
know  positively  that  I  cannot  know  it,  and  I  know  also  that 
there  is  nothing  that  is  per  se  good ; "  and  this  knowledge  of 
the  lack  of  knowledge  is  the  true  wisdom  and  the  true  virtue. 
What  is  good  or  not  good  is  determined  solely  by  civil  law  and 
by  adopted  custom,  and  there  is  no  occasion  for  seeking  for  an- 
other or  higher  basis  therefor.  Nothing  is  per  se,  and  in  its 
essence  good  or  evil.  This  consideration  furnishes  the  basis 
for  true  soul-repose  and  happiness, — seeing  that  we  then  need 
no  longer  be  disturbed  by  feelings  of  desire  or  of  disgust,  but 
that  we  look  upon  every  thing  with  calm  indifference.  The 
true  and  highest  good  consists  therefore  in  this,  that  we  be  ab- 
solutely indifferent  toward  all  things  that  are  usually  regarded 
as  goods.  As,  on  one  occasion,  during  a  storm,  Pyrrho  saw  some 
swine  very  unconsciously  devouring  their  food,  he  is  said  to 
have  exclaimed:  "The  wise  man  must  also  be  equally  imper- 
turbable I"  If  there  were  any  thing  that  is  good  or  evil  per  se, 
all  men  would  be  found  to  see  it ;  whereas  in  fact  the  judgments 
of  men  differ  in  all  things,  and  the  opposing  philosophic  schools 
proclaim  the  most  opposite  things  as  good  or  evil.  The  truth 
is,  that  in  every  case,  the  judgment  as  to  good  or  evil  is  de- 
termined by  the  spiritual  or  bodily  peculiarity  of  the  person 
judging,  and  hence  gives  no  certainty  as  to  the  essence  of  the 
thing  per  se,  but  is  always  simply  indicative  as  to  what  chances 
to  seem  good  or  evil  to  him.  Hence  a  science  of  the  moral,  a  sys- 
tem of  ethics,  is  absolutely  impossible,  and  all  teaching  as  to 
the  moral  is  futile.  But,  as  now,  notwithstanding  this,  it  is 
necessary  to  live  and  act  in  some  manner,  so  it  is  most  advisable 
to  act  according  to  the  existing  laws  and  customs, — not,  how- 
ever, because  they  are  good,  but  because  this  course  is  most  ad- 
vantageous.— Though  Sextus  Empiricus, — who  has  said  most 
on  this  head, — does  not  show  his  best  powers  on  the  field  of 
ethics,  yet  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  liis  attacks  against  the  re- 


§  26.]  NEO-PLATONISM.  147 

suits  of  all  previous  ethics  contain  much  truth,  and  that  from 
the  heathen  stand-point  the  Skeptics  were,  on  the  whole,  justi- 
fied in  their  doubts.  Their  skepticism  gives  evidence  of  a  sig- 
nificant self-consciousness  in  heathen  science ;  and  even  though 
its  results  were  unsatisfactory,  still  there  was  need  of  just  such 
a  radical  sifting  and  exposure  in  order  to  bring  to  sober  reflec- 
tion the  falsely-secure  and  self-deluding  spirit  of  heathenism, 
and  to  render  it  more  receptive  for  a  better-founded  world- 
theory. 

Neo-Platonic  ethics  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  a  genuine  phase 
of  Greek  thought  proper.  Entering  the  lists  in  antagonism  to 
the  new  world-power  of  Christianity  for  the  purpose  of  rescuing 
heathenism,  mingling  together  into  a  nebulous  conglomerate  all 
the  fragmentary  notions  of  Oriental  and  Occidental  religions 
and  philosophies,  and  supplementing  them  with  Christian 
thoughts,  Neo-Platonic  philosophy  manifests  also  in  its  but 
crudely-formed  ethics  little  more  than  the  distressful  features 
of  a  spirit  slowly  and  painfully  dying  of  the  mere  senility  of 
age, — a  spirit  which,  without  considerate  choice  of  its  means,  is 
feverishly  possessed  with  the  one  desire  of  arousing  up  by  arti- 
ficial nerve-stimuli  its  already  half-dead  life-forces  to  one  last 
desperate  up-flickering  into  life, — a  tragically-grand  desperation- 
effort  of  a  mortally-wounded  combatant, — the  titanic  rebound- 
ing of  the  spirit  of  antiquity  when  pierced  through  the  heart 
by  the  arrow  of  a  higher  form  of  truth ;  (Plotinus,  the  greater 
disciple  of  Ammonius  Saccas,  the  founder  of  the  school,  living 
mostly  in  Rome,  ob.  A.  D.  270 ;  his  disciple  Porphyry,  ob,  A.  D. 
304 ;  Proclus,  who  lived  mostly  at  Athens,  ob.  A.  D.  485, — the 
last  philosopher  of  Occidental  heathenism.) 

Deviating  from  all  previous  Greek  philosophy,  the  Neo-Pla- 
tonists  place  the  idea  of  God  in  the  fore-ground,  and  deduce 
from  it,  and  bring  in  relation  to  it,  all  principles  of  morality. 
But  this  God-idea  itself  is  further  remote  from  the  Biblical  idea 
of  God  than  is  even  that  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  God  is  no 
longer  the  infinite  "personal  Reason,  but  the  absolutely  unde- 
termined abstract  Unity,  which  unfolds  itself,  in  Pantheistic  em- 
anation, into  the  world  of  multiplicity, — which  world  is  conse- 
quently not  a  separate  reality  different  from  God,  but  simply 
the  shadow  of  God  himself, — the  reverse-side  of  the  divine,  the 
fading-away  of  the  pure  divine  light,  and  hence  of  essentially 

11 


148  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§26. 

negative  essence. — Now  as  all  knowledge  must  aim  at  behold- 
ing all  things  in  God  and  God  in  all  things,  hence  also  all  moral 
activity  is  directed  exclusively  to  this  one  end,  namely,  to  unite 
one's  self  with  God,  to  press  one's  self  out  of  the  world  of  plu- 
rality, to  renounce  one's  self  as  an  individual  being,  to  wish  to 
be  and  actually  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  transient  phase  of 
the  alone  truly-existing  unitary  divine  essence.  The  moral 
activity  aims  not  at  the  producing  of  a  real  world  of  the  good 
different  from  God, — aims  not  at  realizing  any  thing  which  is 
not  already  real  and  perfect  from  eternity,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
aims  at  reducing  back  the  soul  from  its  immersion  in  the  world 
of  reality  into  the  solely  and  the  alone-existing  good,  that  is,  into 
God.  God  is  not  merely  the  highest  good,  but  in  fact  the  ab- 
solutely sole  good  ;  and  whatever  is  different  from  God  is,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  so,  not  truly  good.  Hence  the  sole  path  of  salvation 
is  the  return  from  plurality  to  unity,  and  the  first  and  most  es- 
sential condition  thereto  is  the  beholding  of  God,  an  indulging 
in  a  mystical  speculation,  which  is  possible  only  in  that  one  for- 
gets one's  self, — spiritually  dies  away, — so  as  to  permit  God 
alone  to  prevail.  The  more  I  am  a  particular  self-hood  claim- 
ing personality,  so  much  the  more  remote  am  I  from  God. 
Morality  consists,  therefore,  not  in  a  developing  of  this  person- 
ality, but  in  a  suppressing  of  it,  not  in  a  becoming  like  God, 
but  in  fact  in  becoming  God  himself.  The  self-conscious  per- 
sonality is  not  the  God-like,  but  the  God-foreign ;  for  God  him- 
self is  not  a  personality — is  not  this  or  that — has  no  manner  of 
determinateness,  but  is  that  which  is  sublime  above  all  cleter- 
minateness,  all  quality,  and  hence  also  above  spiritual  person- 
ality ;  whatever  is  in  any  manner  determined  is  not  God,  but 
has  gone  out  from  God,  and'  hence  is,  in  so  far,  extra-divine ; 
and  the  same  path  which  reality  has  traversed  in  passing  from 
undetermined  unity  to  manifoldly-determined  plurality,  moral- 
ity traverses  again  in  the  opposite  direction, — passes  back  from 
plurality  and  determinateness  to  the  unitary  and  undetermined. 
In  all  these  phases  of  thought,  an  Indian  influence  is  unmistak- 
able. 

As  true  cognizing  is  not  dialectical  but  contemplative,  name- 
ly, a  spiritual  beholding  of  God,  so  also  true  morality  is  not  an 
outward-going  activity,  but  rather  a  non-acting,  a  restraining 
of  active  volition,  a  dissolving  of  all  particular  personal  voli- 


§  26.]  ROMAN  ETHICS.  149 

tionating  into  the  one  divine  essence.  Whoever  has  the  high- 
est good  needs  and  wishes  for  no  other  good.  But  the  highest 
good  exists  in  no  sense  whatever  apart  from  God,  in  the  world, 
but  solely  in  the  reality-transcending  and  indeterminate  God. 
For  such  an  outward  working,  such  a  creating  of  a  real  king- 
dom of  the  good,  there  is  no  occasion  whatever;  for  all  that 
really  exists  is  good  already  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  divine  essence, 
and  hence  cannot  be  an  object  of  change  or  resistance ;  and  in 
so  far  as  it  is  the  divine  essence  as  self-estranged,  it  is  evil,  and 
hence  should  not  be  loved  and  confirmed ;  there  remains,  there- 
fore, for  the  moral  activity  no  other  work  than  simply  to  with- 
draw itself  from  the  world  and,  not  so  much  int  >  itself  as 
much  rather,  into  God.  Hence  there  is  no  need  of  striving,  of 
combatting,  and  of  laboring,  but  only  of  reposing ;  to  the  eter- 
nal keeping-silence,  the  eternal  repose,  of  God,  corresponds  the 
silent  repose  of  the  sage  and  moral  man.  Active  virtue  is  not 
the  highest  form  of  morality,  but  is  only  a  praiseworthy  moral 
quality  of  such  as  have  not  yet  risen  to  the  stage  of  true  wis- 
dom.— Such  are  the  chief  fundamental  thoughts  of  this  Keo- 
Platonic  philosophy,  the  influence  of  which  made  itself  felt  as 
late  as  in  the  Christian  mysticism  of  the  Middle  Ages.  On  the 
whole,  we  could  not  properly  expect  from  this  last  attempt  of 
heathen  philosophy  at  self-preservation,  any  rigorous  conse- 
quential carrying-out  of  fundamental  principles ;  and  hence  we 
in  fact  often  find  thoughts  in  it  which  hut  imperfec  ly  harmo- 
nize with  it  as  a  system.  Still,  the  most  of  these  seemingly  irrec- 
oncilable views  are  doubtless  to  be  accounted  for  in  the  light 
of  the  distinction  which  it  made  between  wisdom  proper  (which 
is  attainable  only  for  the  elect  few)  and  the  moral  instruction 
of  the  populace  at  large.  For  the  latter  there  is  in  fact  need  of 
other  moral  precepts,  seeing  that  men  at  large  are  not  yet  in 
such  a  condition  as  to  be  able,  through  beholding  and  yielding, 
to  merge  themselves  into  the  absolutely  One. 

Roman  philosophy,  though  enjoying  high  repute  in  the  Mid- 
dle Ages,  and  even  as  late  as  in  the  last  century,  has,  however, 
for  the  philosophical  development  of  the  science  of  ethics  scarce- 
ly any  significance.  The  Stoic  Romans  did  little  more  than  in- 
dulge in  general  popular  discussions  on  the  philosophy  they 
had  adopted  from  the  Greeks ;  the  Epicurean  Romans  simply 
applied  their  views  practically.  Cicero  is  simply  a  discreet 


150  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  26. 

Eclectic,  though  without  speculative  genius.  He  discusses 
moral  questions  in  clear  but  superficial  processes  of  reasoning, 
•without  finding  for  them  a  firm  philosophical  ground,  or  a  real- 
ly, scientific  solution.  The  rhetorical  form  of  his  ethico- philo- 
sophical writings  does  not  redeem  them  from  that  tediousness 
which  inheres  in  any  verbose  display  of  unprofound  observa- 
tions. Zealously  opposing  Epicureanism,  Cicero  holds  fast  in 
general  to  the  Stoic  system,  modifying  it  with  Platonic,  Aris- 
totelian and  other  elements,  and  this  too  not  without  many  in- 
stances of  misunderstanding.  His  most  important  ethical  work 
is  his  De  officiis,  which  is  based  mostly  on  the  Stoic  Panaetius. 
In  this  work  he  examines,  first,  the  notion  of  the  morally-good 
(honestum),  then  that  of  the  useful  (utile),  and  the  mutual  rela- 
tion of  these  so  often  conflicting  principles.  The  •'  useful "  he 
finds  to  be  only  seemingly  different  from  the  good ;  the  fact  is, 
whatever  is  good  is  also  useful,  and  whatever  is  truly  useful  is 
also  good,  not,  however,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  useful,  but  the 
converse ;  hence  to  strive  after  the  good  renders  necessarily  at 
the  same  time  also  happy.  Of  the  other  writings  of  Cicero,  be- 
long also  here  the  Quaestion.es  academ.,  the  Disputationes  Tus- 
culante, and  his  essays:  De  senectute,  De  amicitia,  De  legibus,  De 
finibus. — Cicero  blames,  in  the  Stoics,  that  they  conceive  of  the 
good  only  partially,  that  they  regard  not  the  entire  man,  but 
only  his  spiritual  phase,  and  lightly  esteem  the  corporeal,  so 
that  in  fact  while  professing  to  follow  nature  they  do  not  do 
her  justice, — that  they  place  on  an  equal  footing  all  the  virtues 
as  well  as  all  the  vices,  and  admit  no  intermediate  gradations, 
and  also  that  because  of  their  one-sidedness  they  involve  them- 
selves in  many  contradictions.  Though  finding  the  source  of 
the  moral  consciousness  in  reason, — which  is  an  efflux  from  the 
divine  reason,  and  by  which  therefore  we  become  like  God, — 
he  yet  derives  ethics  only  in  a  very  slight  degree  from  the  es- 
sence of  reason  itself,  but  rather  from  the  experience  of  life. 
From  this  lack  of  a  firm  philosophical  foundation,  we  can  un- 
derstand why  Cicero  placed  an  especially  high  value  on  his  dis- 
cussion upon  the  collision  of  duties.  On  the  condition  of  a  real 
deduction  of  the  various  forms  of  duty  from  one  fundamental 
principle,  there  would  be  no  possible  place  for  such  a  discus- 
sion ;  but  to  the  moralist  who  takes  his  starting-point  from  em- 
pirical observation,  this  field  appears  as  of  especial  difficulty  and 


§  27.]  OLD  TESTAMENT  ETHICS.  151 

importance.  The  question:  Which  of  several  morally  good 
actions  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  each  other  is  to  be 
chosen  as  the  better?  Cicero  answers  very  unsatisfactorily  and 
unphilosophically,  on  the  mere  ground  of  the  social  comfort- 
ableness resulting  therefrom  (De  off.,  i,  43 sqq.)  Nor  does  he 
succeed  in  all  his  sonorous  periods  on  universal  benevolence, 
etc.,  in  rising  beyond  the  narrow  views  characteristic  of 
heathen  ethics. — Plutarch,  a  Greek  with  Roman  education 
(about  A.  D.  100,)  furnishes  in  his  numerous  moral  writings 
many  good  observations  on  the  moral  life,  and  gives  evidence 
of  a  noble  disposition  of  soul,  though  he  does  not  rise  be- 
yond popular  essays  and  observations,  relating  for  the  most 
part  to  particular  moral  topics, — gives  neither  a  system,  nor 
rigorous,  clear  principles.  In  general  he  follows  Plato,  *and 
rejects  the  extremes  both  of  Epicureanism  and  Stoicism. 


B.— OLD-TESTAMENT  AND  JEWISH  ETHICS. 

SECTION  XXVII. 

The  ethics  of  the  Old  Testament  presents,  in  its 
entire  essence,  a  direct  contrast  to  all  heathen  ethics. 
Without  systematic  form  and  without  scientific  de- 
velopment, it  is  yet  perfectly  self-consistent  in  its 
ground,  its  essence,  and  its  end.  In  harmony  with 
the  idea  of  God  as  a  spirit  absolutely  independent  of 
nature,  and  himself  omnipotently  conditioning  the 
whole  sphere  of  nature,  the  ground  of  all  morality  is 
absolutely  and  exclusively  God's  holy  will  as  revealed 
to  the  free  personal  creature ;  the  essence  of  the  moral 
is  free,  loving  obedience  to  the  revealed  divine  will ; 
the  ultimate  end  of  morality  is  the  realizing  of  per- 
fect God-likeness,  and  hence  also  of  perfect  God-son- 
ship  and  bliss,  not  merely  for  the  individual,  not 
merely  for  the  people  Israel,  but  for  all  humanity, — 
and  hence  the  realization  of  a  humanity-embracing 
kingdom  of  God ;  the  most  immediate  historical  end, 


152  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  2T. 

however,  is  to  impart  a  knowledge  of  the  need  of 
redemption  from  depravity  as  incurred  by  the  sin  of 
man  himself.  Hence  the  law  appears  in  fact  pre- 
dominantly, not  as  an  inner  natural  one,  but  as  a 
purely  positive,  objective,  historically-revealed  one, 
in  order  that  man  may  become  conscious  of  his  natu- 
ral estrangement  from  the  truth.  In  this  form  it  does 
not  have  an  ultimately  definitive,  but  a  transitory 
and  essentially  disciplinary  end ;  and  the  realization 
of  the  kingdom  of  God  can  only  be  prepared  for,  but 
not  fully  accomplished,  by  the  Israelitic  people  ;  it  is 
a  morality  of  hope. 

As  in  the  presentation  of  Christian  ethics,  further  on,  we  shall 
have  to  glance  in  considerable  detail  also  at  its  historical  ante- 
cedent, namely,  Old  Testament  ethics,  hence  we  need  here  give 
only  the  general  characteristics  of  the  latter.* 

The  antagonism  of  the  moral  idea  of  the  Old  Testament  to 
the  views  of  collective  heathenism,  is  radical  and  fundamental ; 
there  is  here  no  shadow  of  a  transition  from  the  latter  to  the 
former.  Pre-Christian  revealed  ethics  did  not,  however,  have  a 
scientific,  systematic  form,  and  indeed  could  not  have  it,  inas- 
much as  the  key  to  its  correct  understanding  was  to  be  given 
only  in  the  days  of  the  Messiah,  and  as  the  Hebrews  were  not 
to  be  a  perfect,  independently-developed  nation,  but  to  find 
their  full  truth  only  in  Christianity. — The  Hebrews  do  not  un- 
dertake to  find  the  ground  of  the  moral  consciousness  in  the 
human  spirit  itself,  for  the  man  whom  they  know  as  real  is  no 
longer  the  pure  image  of  God, — has  no  longer  the  unobscured 
natural  consciousness  of  God  and  of  the  moral. — and  even  un- 
fallen  man  needed  to  be  awakened  to  this  consciousness  by  the 
revelation  of  God.  The  entire  ground  of  the  moral  conscious- 
ness is  therefore  sought  in  God's  positive  revelation  to  man,  as 

*In  addition  to  general  works  on  Old  Testament  theology,  which 
treat  mostly  of  the  ethical  phase  only  incidentally,  and  to  the  works 
mentioned  in  §  5,  may  be  cited,  G.  L.  Bauer:  Bibl.  Moral  des  A.  T., 
1803,  2  vols.,— extremely  Rationalistic;  (Imm.  Berger :  Prakt.  Einl.  ins 
A.  7*.,  continued  by  Augiitti,  1799-1808,  4  vols.) 


§  27.]  NORM  OF  RIGHT.  153 

indeed  the  ground  of  the  moral  on  the  whole  is  absolutely  the 
holy  will  of  God,— not  as  "an  abstract  law  immanent  in,  though 
partially  hidden  from,  human  reason,  but  as  an  express  com- 
mand of  the  personal  God  and  made  known  to  man  by  a  his- 
torical act  of  revelation.  God  speaks  and  man  hearkens ;  and 
the  moral  activity  is  in  its  entire  essence  a  child-like  obeying 
of  the  divine  command  made  upon  man.  Here  there  is  no 
longer  any  room  for  a  doubt,  unless  it  be. a  sinful  one, — no  need 
of  a  philosophical  analysis.  In  case  there  is  need  in  particular 
conjunctures  for  a  more  definite  decision,  then  God  gives  it  him- 
self, either  directly,  as  with  the  patriarchs  and  the  divinely- 
called  and  enlightened  prophets,  or,  mediately,  through  the 
same,  or  indeed  also  through  specific  signs,  such  as  the  lot 
[Num.  xxvi,  55,  56;  xxxiii,  54;  xxxiv,  13;  Josh,  vii,  14  sqq. ; 
xiii,  6;  xiv,  2;  xviii,  6  sqq.;  xix,  1  sqq.;  xxi,  4  sqq.;  1  Sam. 
x,  20  sqq.;  Prov.  xvi,  33;  xviii,  18],  the  high-priestly  Urim  and 
Thummim  [Ex.  xxviii,  30 ;  Num.  xxvii,  21 ;  1  Sam.  xxiii,  6  sqq.; 
xxviii,  6;  xxx,  7,  8;  comp.  2  Sam.  ii,  1;  v,  19,  23  sqq.],  and 
others  [1  Sam.  xiv,  8  sqq.,  cornp.  Gen.  xxiv,  12  sqq.].  The 
command  of  God  to  man  presents  itself  in  a  strictly  positive 
definite  form:  "thou  shalt,"  "thou  shalt  not,"  "thou  mayest." 
For  any  other  reason  than  God's  will,  man  has  no  right  to  ask ; 
he  is  simply  to  believe  the  word  of  God — this  alone  leads  him 
to  righteousness.  To  personal  free  self-determination  and  ma- 
turity, man  is  to  attain  simply  and  solely  through  child-like 
faith-obedience  to  the  word  of  the  Father.  He  who  questions 
and  hesitates  where  God  speaks,  cannot  possibly  be  moral, 
since  he  is  lacking  in  faith.  Unhesitating,  unreluctant,  joyous 
submission  to  God's  definite  command,  is  the  beginning,  the 
end  and  the  essence  of  all  morality.  Types  of  such  faith-obedi- 
ence are  Noah  [Gen.  vi,  22 ;  vii,  5],  Abraham  [xii,  4],  Jacob, 
Moses,  Samuel.  David,  and  others.  The  simple  fact  that  God 
wills  it,  is  the  absolutely  sufficient  reason  ;  the  fear  of  God  is 
the  beginning  of  wisdom.  The  antecedent  condition  of  the 
moral,  as  lying  in  the  bosom  of  man  himself,  is,  however,  the 
image  of  God — the  pure  knowledge  and  the  untrammeled 
will  of  moral  freedom.  Man  should,  but  he  is  not  compelled ; 
his  salvation  is  placed  within  his  own  hand ;  the  thought, 
"If  thou  hearkenest  to  my  word,  it  shall  go  well  with  thee," 
pervades  the  entire  Old  Testament  from  beginning  to  end., 


154  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  27. 

Between  God  and  man  there  subsists  an  absolutely  person- 
ally-moral relation.  Even  as  God, 'as  the  true  and  perfect 
personality,  is  the  holy  prototype  of  all  morality,  and  as  the 
simple  thought  of  this  God  is  directly  presented  as  the  per- 
fectly sufficient  ground  for  all  moral  life :  "Ye  shall  be  holy, 
for /the  Lord  your  God  am  holy"  [Lev.  xi,  45;  xix,  2],  "I 
am  the  almighty  God,  walk  before  me  and  be  thou  perfect " 
[Gen.  xvii,  1], — so  also  is  man's  complete  personality  recog- 
nized and  respected  by  God  even  in  the  already  sin-corrupted 
race.  God  does  not  himself  immediately  work  all  willing 
and  acting  in  man,  does  not  force  him  to  obedience,  but  He 
makes  a  cocenant  with  man,  with  his  people, — comes  as  a  holy 
personality  into  moral  relation  to  man  as  a  free  moral  person- 
ality. The  fulfillment  of  the  covenant-promise  is  conditioned 
on  the  covenant-fidelity  of  man. 

The  purpose,  the  goal  of  the  moral  is  not  the  merely  indi- 
vidual perfection  of  the  moral  subject,  but  it  is,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  salvation  and  perfection  of  the  whole  human  race, 
— a  thought  entirely  unknown  to  heathendom — and,  on  the 
other,  the  full  and  blissful  life-communion  of  the  person  with 
God;  "I  will  be  your  God,  and  ye  shall  be  my  people"  [Lev. 
xxvi,  12;  Jer.  vii,  23]; — not  merely  the  individual  subject 
but  the  moral  community,  the  people  of  God  (entire  humanity 
is  to  become  this  people),  is  to  be  received  into  this  com- 
munion with  God. 

Immediately  upon  the  creation  of  man  the  thought  of  the 
moral  presents  itself  clearly  and  definitely  [Gen.  i,  26-ii,  24]. 
(1.)  The  objective  presupposition  of  the  moral  is  presented, 
namely,  the  living  personal  God  as  the  prototype  of  man  and 
of  his  life,  and  nature  as  good  and  normal  and  as  existing 
independently  over  against  man, — and,  then,  the  subjective 
presupposition,  namely,  man  as  a  personal  spirit  like  unto 
his  Creator. — (2.)  The  goal  of  morality  as  a  task,  a  duty, 
namely,  the  realizing  and  completing  of  the  divine  image,  is 
expressed  under  one  of  its  phases,  as  the  dominion  of  man 
over  nature;  this  implies  the  realization  of  free  personal 
spirituality  in  likeness  to  God — the  legitimate  "being  as 
God."  In  the  strong  emphasizing  of  this  dominion  over 
nature,  (so  utterly  in  contrast  to  all  actual  experience,)  there 
is  plainly  indicated  the  ideal  essence  of  the  moral  task ;  its 


§  27.]  CONDITIONS   OF   MORALITY.  155 

full  realization  however  is  not  to  be  attained  to  at  once,  but  is 
the  final  goal,  and  lies  in  the  future.  In  striking  contrast  to 
all  heathen  views,  according  to  which  man  is  either  abso- 
lutely subject  to  nature,  or  at  least  has  nature  before  him  as 
a  cramping,  and  never-entirely-to-be-overcome  power,  we 
have  here  the  true  relation  of  the  rational  spirit  to  nature, 
namely,  his  complete  freedom,  his  destination  to  entire 
mastery  over  it,  that  is,  we  have  the  full  personality  of  man 
as  the  key-stone  of  the  collective  morally-religious  world- 
theory.  That  this  dominion  of  the  spirit  over  nature  is  not 
to  be  a  childish  magical  interfering  with  nature,  is  evident 
from  the  simple  fact  that  man  is  called  to  it  only  as  being  un 
image  of  the  nature-dominating  God,  and  that  immediately 
before  and  after  his  call  thereto  the  God-established  perma- 
nent regularity  of  nature  is  alluded  to  as  in  some  sense  a  right 
of  nature,  and  that  man  is  at  once  directed  to  the  orderly 
and  conserving  culture  of  nature  [ii,  15].  The  dominion 
o  /er  nature  is  not  the  entire  goal  of  the  moral  striving,  it  is, 
however,  a  very  expressive  suggestion  of  the  same,  and  is 
within  the  comprehension  of  the  child-like  and  as  yet  imma- 
ture spirit. — (3.)  The  legitimate  freedom  of  choice  and  its  en- 
joyment are  guaranteed  to  man. as  a  right,  in  the  sphere  of 
the  discretionary  [i,  28-30;  ii,  16]. — (4.)  The  unambiguous  dec- 
laration is  made  that  morality  is  not  a  something  belonging 
merely  to  the  individual  person,  but  that  on  the  contrary 
man  can  accomplish  his  task  only  as  a  member  of  a  moral 
community ;  it  is  not  good  that  man  should  be  alone ;  he  ought 
not  to  remain  in  isolation,  but  should  form  a  part  of  a  family, 
should  enter  into  association  with  moral  humanity,  and  it  is 
only  on  this  condition  that  the  good  is  truly  realizable  for  the 
subject. — (5.)  In  the  anticipatory  allusion  to  the  observance 
of  the  Sabbath  as  based  on  the  divine  example  [ii,  2,  3]  is 
presented  the  ideal  phase  of  human  activity, — the  re-collect- 
ing of  the  personal  spirit  from  the  distractions  of  the  outer 
life  into  the  calm  of  meditation ;  man  is  not  at  liberty  com- 
pletely to  merge  himself  into  earthly  temporal  cares, — should 
constantly  have  before  him,  in  all  his  temporal  activity,  also 
the  eternal  as  the  true  and  highest  good.  The  heathen  either 
buries  himself  up  in  temporal  activity  and  enjoyment,  or  con- 
temptuously turns  himself  entirely  away  from  the  same ;  .the 


156  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  2T. 

saint  of  the  Old  Testament  lives  and  acts  in  God's  good- 
created  world,  but  does  not  merge  himself  into  it,— with- 
draws himself  from  it  into  the  Sabbath  repose  of  a  heart 
in  communion  with  its  God.  In  the  simple  feature  of  Sab- 
bath observance  itself,  Old  Testament  morality  presents  itself 
in  sharp  and  definite  contrast  to  all  heathen  ethics,  and  places 
the  moral  task  of  man  higher  than  the  latter. 

Hebrew  ethics,  however,  does  not  linger,  as  was  almost 
exclusively  the  case  with  heathen  ethics,  in  the  purely  ideal 
sphere, — in  the  consideration  of  the  good  per  se, — does  not 
conceive  of  evil  as  a  mere  possibility  or  as  a  merely  excep- 
tional or  isolated  reality,  or  as  a  nature-necessity  back  of  all 
human  guilt  (which  are  all,  in  fact,  heathen  views) — but  looks 
evil  earnestly  and  squarely  in  the  face,  and  regards  it  as  a 
sad,  all-prevalent  reality,  the  guilt  of  which  lies  in  the  free 
act  of  man,  and  is  participated  in  by  all  without  exception. 
The  morality  of  the  chosen  people  of  God  looks,  therefore, 
not  merely  to  a  warding  off  and  an  avoiding  of  evil  as  a 
something  as  yet  external  to  our  heart,  and  merely  threaten- 
ing us,  but  to  a  zealous,  constant  combating  of  the  same, 
not  outside  of  us  in  an  originally  defective  world,  but  within 
in  the  inmost  guilt-laden  heart  of  the  subject  himself.  Sin 
is  of  historical  origin, — an  historical  reality  and  power;  and 
morality,  the  nature  of  which  presents  itself  now  quite  pre- 
dominantly as  a  vigorous  combating  against  sin,  appears 
,  also  itself  in  a  uniformly  historical  character, — is  promoted 
and  guided  by  a  divine  history-chain  of  ever  richer-unfolding 
gracious  guidances,  and  gives  rise  to  a  moral  history,  to  a 
redemption-history,  to  a  kingdom  of  God  here  upon  earth 
inside  of  humanity, — at  first,  in  faith  and  hope,  and  after- 
wards (after  it  has  reached  the  goal  promised  by  God  from  the 
very  start,  and  embraced  by  the  people  with  pious  confidence, 
and  kept  constantly  in  view)  in  full,  blissful  reality.  Hea- 
thenism knows  indeed  evil,  knows  vice,  but  it  does  not  know 
*t/i,  for  sin  is  of  a  morally-historical  character ;  hence  it  knows 
also  of  no  historical  overcoming  of  the  same,  no  expecting, 
no  preparing  for,  nor  realization  of,  a  kingdom  of  God  in 
humanity;  the  Persians  alone  have  an  obscure  presentiment 
thereof,  perhaps  not  without  a  ray  of  light  received  from  the 
people  of  God,  with  whom  they  were  in  contact,  and  whom, 


§  27.]  WORLD-HISTORICAL  GOAL.  157 

from  their  residence  among  them,  they  learned  highly   to 
esteem. 

On  the  entrance  of  sin  into  the  world  there  arises  at  once 
a  separation  among  men  between  those  who  permit  them- 
selves to  be  fettered  by  sin  and  those  who  retain  God  and  his 
salvation  in  view,  between  the  children  of  the  world  and  the 
children  of  God ;  God,  however,  looks  in  compassionate  love 
also  upon  the  former  and  plans  for  them  a  redemption,  the 
world-historical  preparation  of  which  is  confided  to  that  peo- 
ple which  He  separates  out  from  among  the  men  of  sin,  and 
paternally  guides ;  God  separates  to  himself  the  man  of 
faith, — him  who  trusts  in  God  with  rock-like  firmness  and 
cheerfully  and  unconditionally  obeys  his  word  even  where 
he  is  unable  to  comprehend  it  and  where  it  diametrically 
contradicts  his  own  natural  consciousness.  God  places  be- 
fore Abraham,  from  the  very  start,  not  a  merely  personal, 
but  a  world-historical  goal:  "In  thee  shall  all  the  families 
of  the  earth  be  blessed"  [Gen.  xii,  3],  and  he  repeats  this 
promise  again  and  again  in  progressively  more  definite  feat- 
ures ;  as  in  Adam  all  die,  so  in  Abraham  are  all  nations  to  be 
blessed  and  to  be  brought  to  the  Acconiplisher  of  Salvation. 
For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  humanity  we  find  here, 
and  in  contrast  to  all  heathendom,  a  definite  world-historical 
goal  of  the  moral  life ;  not  man,  but  God  has  established  it 
in  compassionating  grace,  and  has  sealed  it  in  successive  and 
progressively  richer  promises ;  and  an  individual  man  is 
elected  to  co-operate  in  the  fulfilling  of  this  promise,  which 
is  not  given  to  him  as  an  individual  but  to  humanity, — to  co- 
operate in  such  a  sense  as  that  this  man,  that  this  people 
itself,  may  become  capable  of  really  participating  in  the  fruit 
of  the  redemption  accomplished  by  the  act  of  grace, — by  be- 
coming the  maternal  womb  which  is  to  bear  and  give  birth 
to  the  Saviour.  But  the  individual  has  part  in  this  moral 
work  only  when  he  accepts  the  promise  in  faith,  and  it  is 
only  when  he  accepts  the  promise  in  faith,  and  only  on  the 
basis  of  this  faith,  that  he  is  able  to  attain  to  true  obedience 
of  life. 

This  people,  so  strictly  cut  off  from  all  the  rest  of  the  race, 
this  people  hated,  oppressed,  down-trodden  by  the  rest  of 
mankind,  becomes  thus,  from  the  very  beginning,  of  world- 


158  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  27. 

hixtorical  significance,  in  a  much  higher  sense  than  any  other 
pre-Christian  people.  The  heathen  nations  which  actively 
entered  into  and  shaped  history  sought  only  themselves  but 
not  humanity;  the  Israelitic  people,  shut  up  exclusively  to 
the  promise  and  to  faith,— a  people  already  spiritually  de- 
veloped and  molded  into  a  moral  organism  before  it  had  as 
yet  where  to  lay  its  head,  and  which  was  as  yet  seeking  its 
earthly  home,— a  spiritual  people  without  any  nature-basis, 
and  which  received  its  earthly  home  only  as  a  gracious  gift 
of  God,  conferred  on  moral  conditions  [Lev.  xxv,  23], — this 
people,  in  its  God-willed  and  commanded  separation  from  all 
heathen  nations,  in  its  so  often,  even  up  to  the  present  day, 
reproached  "particularism,"  was,  after  all,  absolutely  the 
only  people  which  had  in  view,  from  the  beginning,  the  true 
"  universalism, "  (namely,  the  salvation  of  collective  hu- 
manity), as  its  highest  goal,  and  which  sought  to  do  nothing 
else  than  to  prepare  the  way  for  this  salvation  of  humanity 
[Gen.  xii,  3;  ^viii,  18;  xxii,  18;  xxvi,  4;  Deut.  xxxii,  43; 
1  Chron.  xvi,  23,  28;  Isa.  ii,  2  sqq.;  xi,  10  sqq.;  xxv,  6  sqq.; 
xlii,  1,  6;  xlv,  20,  22,  23;  xlix,  6;  lii,  15;  liv,  3;  Iv,  5;  Ix; 
Ixi,  11;  Ixii,  2;  Ixv,  1;  Ixvi,  18  sqq.;  Jer.  iv,  2;  xvi,  19; 
Amos  ix,  11,  12 ;  Hag.  ii,  7  (8) ;  Zech.ii,  11 ;  vi,  15 ;  viii,  20  sqq.; 
xiv,  16 ;  Micah  iv,  1  sqq.;  Mai.  i,  11 ;  Psa.  ii,  8 ;  xviii,  49 ;  Ixvii, 
2;  Ixxii,  8 sqq.;  lxxxvi,9,10;  xcvi,7,10;  cii,  15;  cxvii,  1].  The 
Israelites  had  therefore,  from  the  very  beginning,  the  deepest 
interest  for  history,  and  for  the  goal  of  history  as  clearly 
presented  by  prophetic  promise ;  the  divine  prophetic  bene- 
dictions upon  the  patriarchs  relate  much  less  to  their  own 
person  than  to  the  history  of  humanity  as  proceeding  from 
them;  the  Hebrew  is  clearly  conscious  that  all  his  moral 
striving  contributes  to  conduct  the  God-guided  current  of 
history  to  the  God-promised  realization  of  salvation ;  instead 
of  the  gloomy,  despairing  tragic  consciousness  of  the  most 
highly  cultured  of  all  the  heathen  nations,  we  find  here  a 
full  confidence  in  the  ultimate  fulfillment  of  the  redemption 
longed-for  by  man  and  promised  by  God. 

The  Israelites  have  and  could  have  this  high  world-his- 
torical mission  only  because  they  were  made  to  conceive  of 
themselves  from  the  very  beginning  as,  not  a  nature-people, 
but  as  a  spiritual  people  which  obtained  for  itself  its  natural 


§  27.]  A   SPIRITUAL  PEOPLE.  159 

prosperity  only  through  moral  fidelity.  As  the  people  of 
God,  they  name  themselves  not  Hebrews,  from  their  natural 
descent,  nor  yet  from  Abraham,  nor  from  Isaac,  nor  indeed 
from  Jacob's  first  name,  but  from  his  later  God-given  name, 
Israel,  which  he  received  after  he  had  wrestled  with  the  angel 
[Gen.  xxx,  24  sqq].  From  Abraham  and  Isaac  descend  also 
other  tribes,  which  do  not  belong  to  the  people  of  God ;  only 
Jacob's  descendants  belong  all  thereto.  Nor  is  Jacob  the 
progenitor  of  the  people  of  God  in  his  earlier  self-willed  and 
self-confiding  life,  but  solely  in  his  spiritually-transformed 
life,  after  that,  praying  and  beseeching,  he  had  wrestled,  in 
bitter  repentance,  with  Jehovah  as  offended  at  his  many  sins 
and  deceits,  and  after  that,  in  self-denying  humility  having 
put  off  all  self-righteousness,  he  had  thrown  himself  child-like 
at  the  feet  of  God  and  confided  all  his  well-being  to  His 
blessing.  It  becomes  the  people  of  Israel,  as  a  spiritual  peo- 
ple, to  have  also  a  spiritual  and  not  a  merely  natural  man  as 
their  father,  and  the  true  bearing  of  this  father  to  God  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  words :  "I  will  not  let  thee  go  unless  thou  bless 
me."  Whoever  would  belong  to  this  spiritual  people  of  God 
must  divest  himself  of  all  his  mere  naturalness ;  this  is  sym- 
bolized by  the  covenant-token  of  the  people  with  God,  cir- 
cumcision. 

The  Israelite,  in  his  moral  strivings,  has  the  highest  good 
hopefully  and  confidently  in  view,  and  not  for  the  individual 
person  'alone,  but  for  humanity.  The  idea  of  the  highest 
good,  the  fundamental  thought  of  all  morality,  has,  in  the 
Old  Testament  history,  a  very  distinct  development.  It  ap- 
pears in  God's  promises,  on  the  one  hand,  as  a  grace,  and,  on 
the  other,  as  a  reward  for  trusting  fidelity, — neither  of  which 
is  by  any  means  to  be  separated  from,  or  regarded  as  contra- 
dictory to,  the  other.  In  the  first  blessing  after  the  creation, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  the  thought  of  the  highest  good  is 
already  indicated ;  by  sin,  however,  the  blessing  is  changed 
into  a  curse,  the  highest  good  is  thrown  into  the  far  distant, 
and  is  only  obscurely  alluded  to  in  the  promise  of  the  ulti- 
mate victory  of  the  seed  of  the  woman  over  the  seed  of  the 
serpent  [Gen.  iii,  15],  and  henceforth  the  thought  of  the 
highest  good  is  associated  with  the  victory  over  evil-,  with 
redemption.  And  though  mankind, — originally  destined  to 


160  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  2f . 

possess  the  whole  earth  [Gen.  i,  28;  Matt,  v,  5], — receive  now 
merely  in  small  numbers,  as  members  of  the  people  of  God, 
only  a  very  small  space  of  the  earth  for  their  possession,  yet 
is  also  this  typical  foretaste  of  the  possession  of  the  highest 
good  associated  at  the  same  time  with  promises  of  victory 
over  the  sin-symbolizing  heathen  inhabitants  thereof;  the 
highest  good  even  in  its  feeblest  foretastes  is  conditioned  on 
trustful  struggle  and  victory.  In  the  blessing  upon  Noah 
[Gen.  ix]  there  are  indicated  as  the  highest  good,  in  the  first 
place,  the  multiplication  of  the  human  race  through  Noah, 
and  the  dominion  over  nature  (now,  after  the  fall  into  sin, 
under  a  somewhat  changed  form),  and,  then,  in  the  express 
covenant  of  God  with  Noah,  the  full  personal  communion  of 
believing  man  with  God.  To  Abraham,  the  prophetic  bene- 
•  diction  is  essentially  enlarged,  including  the  multiplication 
of  his  family  under  God's  guidance,  the  guaranteeing  of  an 
earthly  father-land  as  a  gift  of  God,  and  the  blessing  of  en- 
tire humanity  through  the  people  of  God  as  springing  from 
him.  God  had  expressly  called  Abraham  away  from  his 
natural  father-land ;  he  is  to  receive  another  one  in  its  stead, 
one  that  is  morally  acquired  from  God's  hand  through  be- 
lieving submission  to  God ;  all  earthly  good  is  to  bear  also  a 
spiritual  character,  is  to  be  an  outgrowth  from  spiritual 
good ;  even  the  most  natural  earthly  good,  the  home,  is  to  be 
obtained  as  a  grace  in  reward  of  faith.  Homeless  upon  earth 
for  several  centuries,  the  people  Israel  are  to  find,  first, 
their  eternal  home,  so  as,  then,  after  having  been  trained 
by  God's  hand,  and  ripened  for  his  service  through  sufferings 
and  submission,  to  receive  an  earthly  one  as  a  gift  of  grace ; 
and  this  home  is  to  be  for  them  a  symbol  of  the  eternal  one, 
a  shadow  of  the  highest  good.  Even  in  the  first  promise  to 
Abraham,  there  beams  out  through  this  earthly  good  a  faint 
gleam  of  the  heavenly  one :  "  in  thee  shall  all  families  of  the 
earth  be  blessed  ;  "  Abraham  is  to  be,  not  merely  by  his  ex- 
ample of  faith,  but  also  really,  by  his  family,  the  beginning 
of  a  kingdom  of  God  for  entire  humanity ;  to  be  himself  in 
this  kingdom  of  blessing,  and  this  kingdom  in  him,  this  is, 
for  him,  the  highest  good.  Exactly  similar  promises  of  tem- 
poral and  likewise  spiritual  goods,  God  gives  to  Isaac  and  to 
Jacob  [Gen.  xxvi,  3-5;  xxviii,  13-15;  comp.  xxxv,  9-11; 


§  27.]  LIFE   AFTER  DEATH.  161 

xlviii,  4] ;  Isaac's  blessing  upon  his  son  Jacob  relates,  it  is 
true,  primarily  only  to  temporal  good  [xxvii,  28,29];  xxviii, 
3,  4],  but  nevertheless  with  allusion  to  the  higher  good.  It 
is  true,  temporal  well-being  [Gen.  xxxix,  2,  3,  5,  23;  Lev. 
xxvi,  3  sqq.;  Deut.  v,  29;  vi,  3,  18,  24;  vii,  13  sqq.;  viii, 
6  sqq.;  xi,  9  sqq.,  21  sqq.;  xii,  28;  xv,  4-6,  10;  xxviii,  I  sqq., 
comp.  Psa.  Ixxxi,  13,  14],  and  a  continuance  in  the  land,  and 
long  life  [Exod.  xx,  12 ;  xxiii,  26 ;  Deut.  iv,  40 ;  v,  33 ;  vi,  2 ; 
xxx,  2  sqq.;  xxxii,  47],  are  very  often  presented, — not  indeed 
with  reference  merely  to  the  individual,  but  also  to  the  na- 
tion, as  a  divine  blessing  for  pious  fidelity, — as  a  high  good 
and  end ;  but  as  early  as  at  the  time  of  the  actual  conclusion 
of  the  covenant  of  God  with  the  people  on  Sinai,  the  highest 
good  appears  as  of  a  spiritual  character:  "If  ye  will  obey 
my  voice  indeed  and  keep  my  covenant,  then  ye  shall  be  a 
peculiar  treasure  unto  me  above  all  people ;  for  all  the  earth 
is  mine ;  and  ye  shall  be  unto  me  a  kingdom  of  priests  and  a 
holy  nation  "  [Exod.  xix,  5,  6] ;  the  highest  blessing  is  the  peace 
of  God  [Num.  vi,  26 ;  Psa.  xxix,  11],  the  love  of  God,  the  com- 
passion of  God,  and  his  covenant  with  men  [Deut.  vii,  9, 
12,  13;  xiii,  17,  18],  so  that  they  "may  live  long"  [Deut. 
v,  33]  and  that  God  might  be  their  "righteousness"  [vi,  25] ; 
and  in  the  first  commandment :  "  I  am  the  Lord  thy  God,  thou 
shalt  have  no  other  gods  before  me  "  [Exod.  xx,  2,  3],  the  ob- 
jective phase  of  the  highest  good  is  definitely  expressed ; 
any  thing  else,  save  God,  that  man  might  regard  as  the 
highest  good,  is  in  fact  but  a  worthless  idol ;  and  hence  the 
rejection  of  the  covenant  of  grace  works  an  everlasting  rejection 
of  him  who  rejects  it  [1  Chron.  xxviii,  9]. 

In  view  of  this  high  spiritual  conception  of  the  highest  good, 
it  appears  as  in  the  highest  degrge  a  surprising  fact  that  the 
thought  of  a  life  after  death  is  not  directly  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  moral  life, — is  not  presented  as  a  motive  of  action,  or 
as  a  phase  of  the  highest  good, — a  peculiarity  that  is  all  the 
more  striking  when  we  consider  that  the  children  of  Israel  had 
lived  for  four  centuries  in  Egypt,  and  that  Moses  had  been  edu- 
cated in  the  wisdom  of  this  country,  where  precisely  this 
thought  of  immortality  very  powerfully  shaped  the  entire  moral 
and  religious  life,  and  when  we  further  consider  that  this 
thought  itself  was  most  unquestionably  recognized  among  the 


162  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  27. 

children  of  Israel  [Gen.  v,  24 ;  xv,  15 ;  xxv,  8 ;  xxxvii,  35 ;  xlix, 
26,  29,33;  Deut.  xxxi,  16;  xxxii,  50;  1  Sam.  xxviii;  Job 
xxvi,  5;  2  Kings  ii;  Psa.  xvi,  10;  xlix,  15;  Prov.  xv,  24],  as 
it  would  also  be  naturally  presumable  that  a  people  which 
places  so  high  a  value  upon  the  personality,  could  not  be  igno- 
rant of  this  thought,  which  so  largely  prevailed  throughout 
heathendom.  This  manifestly  intentional  placing  in  the 
back-ground  of  the  thought  of  immortality  as  bearing  upon 
the  moral  life,  is  to  be  explained  from  the  peculiarity  of  the 
purpose  which  God  had  with  this  nation,  in  view  of  the  salva- 
tion of  mankind. — (1.)  The  people  of  Israel  is  a  world-historical 
one  as  no  other  ante-Christian  people  was;  the  entire  hopes  and 
striving  of  the  nation  are  directed  toward  the  ultimate  salva- 
tion of  the  human  race  as  the  highest  goal ;  the  primarily 
feeble,  but  constantly  more  definite-growing  Messianic  thought 
throws  temporarily  into  the  back-ground  the  interest  in  future 
life  of  the  individual  person.  The  entire  hope  of  Israel  looks 
forward  to  the  highest  good,  the  true  salvation,  but  this  high- 
est good  consists,  even  for  the  pious  Israelite,  only  in  the  future 
redemption  that  is  to  be  accomplished  by  a  world-historical 
divine  act ;  the  Redeemer  had  first  to  spring  from  the  line  of 
David  before  the  life  after  death  could  have  real  worth  for  the 
saint,  or  be  his  highest  good ;  before  this  event,  the  transmun- 
dane  life  was  a  beclouded  one,  not  only  for  the  consciousness, 
Ttmt  also  per  se, — was  not  as  yet  a  truly  blissful  life  in  the  pres- 
ence of  God  [Psa.  vi,  5;  xlix,  15  sqq .  ;  Ixxxviii,  10-13;  cxv, 
17;  Isa.  xxxviii,  18].  As  Abraham  rejoiced  that  he  should  see 
the  day  of  the  Lord  [John  viii,  56],  so  also  longed  Abraham's 
seed  for  this  day,  from  which  time  forth,  only,  the  life  after 
death  could  be  a  truly  blessed  one.  The  saints  of  the  Old 
Covenant  did  not  pass  their  lives  as  having  no  hope,  but  their 
hope  was  primarily  an  historical  one, — was  fixed  upon  the  his- 
torical fulfillment  of  the  promises,  and  aspired  toward  a  heav- 
enly home  only  from,  and  on  the  basis  of,  this  fulfillment. — 
(2.)  Though  for  the  redeemed  Christian  the  thought  of  a 
future  life  is  a  very  important  element  of  his  moral  conscious- 
ness, nevertheless  for  the  as  yet  not  truly  regenerated  man  there 
lies  in  the  same  no  inconsiderable  danger,  namely,  the  danger 
of  selfish  reward-seeking,  of  a  narrow-hearted  directing  of 
his  moral  striving  exclusively  toward  his  personal  well-being 


§27.]  ANTI-HERO -WORSHIP.  163 

instead  of  toward  the  salvation  of  humanity.  Though  the 
saints  of  the  Old  Covenant  participated  in  many  gracious 
gifts,  so  that  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  merely  natural  men, 
still,  they  were  not  as  yet  in  the  highest  sense  spiritually 
regenerated ;  and,  in  fact,  in  the  necessary  redemption-prepar- 
ing requirement  of  strict  obedience  to  the  objectively-given 
law,  they  stood  all  the  more  exposed  Jo  this  danger  of  regard- 
ing their  future  salvation  as  a  reward  for  good  works,  as  is 
actually  evinced  by  the  rise  of  Pharisaism.  From  this  danger 
God  preserved  the  Hebrews,  in  that  while  He  indeed  promised 
them  a  gracious  reward  for  their  fidelity,  He  yet  presented  as 
such  reward,  on  the  one  hand,  only  such  goods  as  most  evi- 
dently could  not  be,  for  the  pious,  the  highest  good,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  fulfillment  of  the  divine  promises  within 
the  sphere  of  history,  namely,  redemption,  so  that  they  were 
necessarily  brought  to  the  consciousness  that  the  highest  good 
was  not  the  reward  of  their  own  works,  but  the  fruit  of  a  future 
divine  act  of  grace. 

Although  the  law  had  essentially  also  the  purpose  of  awak- 
ening the  consciousness  of  the  antagonism  of  the  sinful  nature 
of  man  against  the  holy  will  of  God,  thus  implying  that  the 
full  consciousness  of  the  sinful  perversion  of  human  nature  was 
a  state  that  had  as  yet  to  be  attained  to,  nevertheless  this  con- 
sciousness exists  from  the  very  beginning,  and  that  too  very 
vividly,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see ;  and  it  is  especially  note- 
worthy that  notwithstanding  the  high  reverence  which  the 
Israelites  had  for  their  patriarchs  and  for  the  prophets  of  God, 
still  they  were  very  far  from  regarding  them  as  moral  ideals.  It 
is  true,  there  are  mentioned  pious  and  just  men,  such  as  Enoch 
and  Noah;  and  the  faithfulness  of  Abraham  shines  forth 
typically  even  into  the  New  Covenant ;  but  they  are  never  pre- 
sented as  real  holy  types  of  morality,  (not  even  in  Gen.  xxvi, 
4,  5 ;  2  Chron.  vii,  17 ;  Mai.  ii,  15) ;  on  the  contrary,  the  his- 
torical records  relate,  even  of  the  most  revered  characters, 
manifold  sins,  and  sins  which  the  Israelites  unquestionably 
regarded  as  such;  thus,  for  example,  of  Abraham  [Gen. xii,  11 
sqq. ;  xx,  2  sqg.],  and  of  Jacob  [xxvii,  14  sqq. ;  xxxi,  20],  and 
of  Reuben,  of  Simeon  and  Levi  [xxxiv,  14  sqq. ;  xxxv,  22; 
xlix,  14  sqq.] ;  and  of  the  other  sons  of  Jacob  [xxxvii] ;  and 
of  Judah,  the  ancestor  of  the  kings,  there  is  recorded  scarcely 

12 


164  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  27. 

any  thing  but  evil ;  he  even  begets  Pharez — from  whom  David, 
and  hence  also  the  Messiah,  were  to  descend — in  unconscious 
incest  and  conscious  whoredom  [xxxviii] ;  Moses  slays  the 
Egyptian  and  buries  him  secretly,  and  this  was  also  certainly 
regarded  as  a  crime  [Exod.  ii,  11  sqq.] ;  he  resists  faint-heartedly 
the  divine  call,  [Exod.  iii  and  iv]  and  subsequently  wavers  in  his 
faith,  and  is,  for  that  reason,  shut  out  from  the  Land  of  Prom- 
ise [Num.  xx,  7  sqq. ;  Deut.  xxxii,  49  sqq.] ;  and  that  which  is 
said  to  him  holds  good  in  another  sense  of  all  the  saints  of 
the  Old  Covenant,  namely :  "  thou  shalt  see  the  land  before 
thee,  but  thou  shalt  not  enter  into  it ; "  and  however  pre-eminent 
David  and  Solomon  are  in  courageous  faith  and  in  wisdom, 
still  they  were  not  pure  examples  even  for  the  Israelites ;  the 
Israelites  knew  of  only  one  Servant  of  God  who  was  perfect 
and  pure  and  holy,  namely,  the  longed-for  Anointed  of  the  Lord. 
And  accordingly  the  saints  of  the  Old  Covenant  kept  them- 
selves far  from  all  self-glorification,  and  aspired  to  a  higher 
goal.  The  undevout  self-righteousness  and  work -holiness  of  the 
later  Pharisaism  is  totally  repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  the  Old 
Covenant ;  for  the  law  requires  most  certainly  not  merely  the 
outward  work,  but  above  all  and  essentially  also  a  morally-pious 
disposition, — bears,  in  contradistinction  to  the  later  Jewish  out- 
ward legality,  a  very  positive  character  of  inwardliness.  The 
basis  and  essence  of  all  morality  are  the  requirement,  that  man 
"  should  love  God  with  all  his  heart,  with  all  his  soul,  and  with 
all  his  might "  [Deut.  vi,  5 ;  x,  12 ;  xiii,  3] ;  he  is  to  take  the 
divine  law  to  his  heart,  and  to  observe  it  with  his  whole  heart 
and  his  whole  soul  [Deut.  v,  29;  vi,  6;  xi,  13;  18  sqq. ;  xxvi, 
16 ;  xxx,  2 ;  Josh,  xxii,  5] ;  God  desires  not  merely  the  external 
works,  he  requires  our  heart  [1  Chron.  xxii,  19 ;  Prov.  xxiii,  26] ; 
the  saint  not  only  fulfills  the  law,  but  "  his  delight  is  in  the  law  of 
the  Lord  "  [Psa.  i,  2 ;  cxii,  1 ;  cxix,  24,  35,  70 ;  Job  xxii,  22,  26 ; 
Deut.  xxviii,  47] ;  and  all  obedience  is  simply  joyous  thankful- 
ness for  God's  gracious  guidance  [Exod.  xx,  2  sqq. ;  Deut.  iv 
and  v;  vi,  20  s^.;  viii,  3  sqq. ;  x,  19  sqq.  ;  xi,  1;  xv,  15;  xvi, 
12 ;  1  Chron.  xxix,  9  and  others] ;  and  therefore  not  merely  the 
sinful  act,  but  equally  also  the  lust  to  evil,  is  sinful  and  damna- 
ble [Exod.  xx,  17 ;  Prov.  vi,  25]. 

Old  Testament  morality  has  essentially  a  preparatory  charac- 
ter,— refers  forward  to  a  higher   and  as  yet  to  be  acquired 


§27.]  "CLEAN"   AND   "UNCLEAN."  165 

morality ;  hence  it  bears  in  part  a  symbolical  form, — expressing 
by  external  signs,  that,  the  full  realization  of  which,  was  pos- 
sible only  after  the  time  of  the  accomplishment  of  redemption, 
and  thereby  constantly  keeping  before  the  eyes  of  the  people 
what  the  ultimate  moral  purpose  of  the  divine  economy  with 
Israel  was, — although  this  purpose  could  not  as  yet  be  fully 
realized.  In  order  to  keep  constantly  awake  and  to  intensify 
the  moral  consciousness  of  the  antagonism  of  the  divine  will  to 
the  sinful  nature  which  had  now  become  natural  to  actual  man, 
the  antagonism  of  the  "  clean  "  and  the  "  unclean  "  is  rigor- 
ously insisted  upon  and  carried  out,  and  that  too  not  merely  in 
the  sphere  of  the  purely  spiritual  and  moral,  but  also  in  that 
of  nature,  where  the  moral  is  only  symbolically  prefigured. 
Man  is  required  to  learn,  in  free  obedience,  to  distinguish  and 
choose  between  the  godly  and  the  ungodly,  and  that  too  not 
according  to  his  natural  impulses  and  feelings,  nor  by  the  merely 
reflective  observation  and  examination  of  things,  but  solely  by 
the  minutely-particularizing  positive  divine  law.  To  man,  as 
not  yet  actually  redeemed  and  sanctifiecl,  but  as  yet  involved 
and  entangled  in  the  bonds  of  sinfulness,  the  law  presents 
itself,  and  properly  so,  as  of  an  objectively-revealed  character, 
as  foreign  to  his  natural  state,  and  to  which  there  is  nothing 
correspondent  in  his  inner  nature  unless  it  be  a  loving  willing- 
ness to  unconditional  obedience.  Educative  disciplining  to 
obedience  is  the  essential  end  of  many  of  the  positive  laws, 
which  must  consequently  appear  to  the  truly  emancipated 
and  redeemed  as  a  yoke,  whereas,  for  him  who  is  only  as  yet 
struggling  toward  freedom,  they  are  a  wholesome  discipline. 

Old  Testament  morality  presents  a  moral  task  not  only  to  the 
individual  person,  but  it  also  keeps  in  view,  from  the  very 
start,  the  necessity  of  moral  communion.  It  conceives  of  the 
moral  significance  of  the  family  more  highly  than  any  of  the 
heathen  systems ;  in  giving  to  reverence  for  parents  a  religious 
ground,  it  guarantees  at  the  same  time  the  moral  rights  of 
children  as  against  sinful  parents ;  and  if  it  is  not  as  yet  able  to 
raise  marriage  to  the  height  of  the  Christian  view,  inasmuch  as 
only  the  truly  spiritually-regenerated  are  in  a  condition  to  appre- 
ciate and  fulfill  its  full  significance  [Matt,  v,  31 ;  xix,  8],  nev- 
ertheless it  does  give  to  it  the  truly  religious  and  moral  basis. 
It  changes  the  slavery  of  Israelites  into  a  very  mild  service-rela- 


166  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  27. 

tion,  and  protects,  by  extremely  humane  regulations,  that  o» 
non-Israelites  from  arbitrary  and  severe  oppressiveness.  The 
differences  among  mankind  are  no  longer  natural,  but  spirit- 
ually -moral ;  even  foreign  slaves  have  part  in  the  worship  and 
in  the  blessings  of  the  people  of  God.  The  moral  organization 
of  society  into  the  state  is  presented  in  the  Old  Testament,  from 
the  very  start,  in  its  highest  moral  significancy,  as  a  unity  of 
church  and  state — as  a  theocracy — in  which  the  entire  moral 
community-life  of  the  people  rests  on  a  religious  basis, — in 
which  Jehovah  alone  is  Jdng,  and  the  God-called  and  enlight- 
ened prophets  the  organs  of  his  will, — organs  to  whom  the  peo- 
ple submit  themselves  in  believingly  joyous  obedience.  But  here 
also,  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  marriage,  God  gives  simply  the 
unambiguous  idea,  and,  because  of  the  hardness  of  the  hearts, 
concedes  another  state-organization  more  correspondent  to  the 
sinful  circumstances  of  the  people,  namely,  the  purely  human 
institution  of  an  earthly  monarchy, — reserving  the  full  realiza- 
tion of  the  higher  idea,  for  the  future.  But  even  this  earthly 
kingdom  is  to  be  an  image  of  the  divine  kingdom,  and  the 
kings,  the  faithful  instruments  of  the  holy  will  of  God — kings 
"after  God's  own  heart;"  the  Old  Testament  recognizes  neither 
despotic  nor  democratic  caprice-domination  as  morally  admissi- 
ble. Of  all  this  we  must  speak  again  further  on. 

As  Old  Testament  redemption-history  presents  essentially  an 
educative  preparation  for  the  historical  accomplishing  of  the 
redemption-act,  hence  it  is  clearly  manifest  that  this  prepara- 
tion must  be  a  historically-progressive  one,  and  that  conse- 
quently Old  Testament  ethics  itself  must  have  an  historical  devel- 
opment. This,  as  yet,  very  unsatisfactorily-treated  portion  of 
Biblical  theology  cannot,  however,  be  fully  presented  in  the 
brief  space  to  which  the  plan  of  our  historical  Introduction 
confines  us ;  we  therefore  remark  here  only  two  points,  (1),  that 
the  essential  character  of  the  moral  view  (and  the  question  is 
here  simply  as  to  essential  features)  is  contradictory  to  the 
heathen  view,  and  different  from  the  Christian,  and,  throughout 
all  the  writings  of  the  Old  Testament,  self-consistent  and  the 
same :  and,  (2),  that  the  prophetic  redemption-history  is  closely 
connected  with  the  legislative,  seeing  that  Moses  himself  was 
the  greatest  among  the  prophets.  The  prophets,  in  the  nar- 
rower sense  of  the  word,  do  not  give  an  essentially  new  moral 


§  27.]        ETHICS  OF  THE  PROPHETS.         167 

revelation,  but,  on  the  contrary,  uniformly  proceed  on  the  basis 
of  that  of  Moses, — referring,  on  the  one  hand,  exhortingly  to  its 
requirements,  and  rebuking  the  unfaithfulness  of  the  people  to 
its  spirit,  but,  on  the  other,  directing  attention  with  constantly 
greater  distinctness  to  the  goal  of  this  moral  development- 
process  of  the  people  of  Israel,  that  is,  to  their  world  historical 
destination, — and,  above  all,  they  seek  to  ward  against  the 
danger  of  legal  holiness  and  self-sufficiency,  the  danger  of  the 
selfish  contentment  of  the  single  moral  subject  with  his  own 
individual  development, —  which  lies  in  every  strictly-developed 
system  of  laws, — that  is,  against  the  danger  of  a  merely  external 
performing  of  the  works  of  the  law,  as  was  at  a  later  period 
actually  presented  in  Pharisaism ;  they  earnestly  urged  to  the 
inner  purity  of  the  heart,  and  bring  to  an  increasingly  clearer 
consciousness,  the  morality  that  transcends  that  of  the  mere  in- 
dividual, namely,  the  general  moral  task  of  the  totality,  of  the 
people  of  God.  While  the  earlier  ethics  has  more  the  character 
of  a  doctrine  of  laws  and  duties,  the  ethics  of  the  prophets 
bears  rather  that  of  a  doctrine  of  goods. — The  Proverbs  of  Sol- 
omon, in  contrast  to  the  Mosaic  Laws  which  present  themselves 
as  direct  revelations  from  God,  consist  predominantly  in  rules 
of  practical  life-wisdom  and  life-prudence,  drawn  from  the  rich 
life-experience  of  a  heart  pious,  though  indeed  often  erring,  and 
strengthened  and  ripened  in  the  true  fear  of  God ;  they  appeal 
therefore  less  to  a  believing  submission  to  an  express  divine 
command  than  rather  to  the  free  spontaneous  assent,  natural  to 
a  pious  God-consciousness ;  they  aim  not  at  the  disciplining  of 
a,  as  yet,  morally  immature  spirit  by  a  legal  yoke,  but  at  the 
purifying,  ripening  and  moral  strengthening  of  the  spirit  as  al- 
ready consciously  dwelling  in  God;  they  are  not  the  sternly 
demanding  voice  of  a  prophet,  but  the  witness  of  a  preacher; 
it  is  not  directly  Jehovah,  but  it  is  the  pious  servant  of  God, 
who  speaks  to  the  pious.  In  Moses  the  question  is  every-where 
as  to  obedience  ;  with  Solomon  the  constant  theme  is  wisdom,  a 
quality  which  is  scarcely  mentioned  by  Moses,  and  for  the  sim- 
ple reason  that  the  discipline  of  the  law  needed  to  precede  and 
prepare  the  way,  before  the  free  subjectivity  of  wisdom  could 
come  to  realization.  This  coming  into  the  fore-ground  of  the 
thought  of  wisdom  evinces  the  progress  of  the  moral  conscious- 
ness out  of  the  child-like  condition  of  subjection  to  an  objective 


168  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  27. 

law,  to  the  riper  manhood  of  a  freer  self-determination  on  the 
basis  of  personal  moral  knowledge.  Wisdom  is  here  by  no 
means  mere  worldly  prudence,  but  its  beginning  and  essence  is 
the  "fear  of  the  Lord"  [Prov.  i,  7],  and  complete,  hearty,  God- 
confiding  is  its  life-spring  [iii,  5;  xvi],  and  soul-repose  and 
God's  approbation  its  fruit  [iii,  12, 18,  22  sqq.;  viii,  17,  35 ;  xv, 
24;  xxviii] ;  and  hence  for  individual  man  it  is  the  highest 
good  [iii,  13  sqq].  This  wisdom  is  very  far  removed  from  the 
"magnanimous"  wisdom  of  the  Greeks;  it  takes  cognizance 
above  all  things  of  the  sinfulness  of  the  natural  heart,  and  re- 
quires watchfulness  over  the  same  [iv,  23]  and  humility  before 
God  and  man  [iii,  34 ;  xi,  2 ;  xvi,  18 ;  xviii,  12 ;  xxvii,  2 ;  xxix, 
23].  While  in  the  Solomonic  Proverbs  there  is  a  manifest  ele- 
vating of  Mosaic  legality  toward  the  personal  freedom  of  the 
pious  sage,  still  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  there  lies  in  the 
stand-point  they  assume,  as  in  contrast  to  the  Mosaic,  also  the 
danger  that  the  subjective  presumption  of  the  individual  per- 
son may  rise  to  an  unwarranted  height,  and  work  detriment  to 
the  true  heart-humility  that  springs  from  a  consciousness  of 
one's  own  want  of  conformity  to  the  law.  And  it  is  not 
unworthy  of  note  that  the  Christian  consciousness  of  the  Apos- 
tles found  much  less  occasion  to  appeal  to  the  wisdom  of  man ; 
they  discourse  far  preferably  of  self-denying,  humbly  loving 
faith. — The  Ecclesiastes  of  Solomon,  after  referring  to  the  com- 
fortless experience  of  a  heart  temporarily  immersed  in  world- 
enjoyment,  totally  overthrows  all  world-pleasure  and  the  vain 
hope  of  finding  in  the  finite  any  real  good ;  the  mere  negative 
knowledge  that  "  all  is  vanity  "  prepares  the  way  for  a  seeking 
after  the  true,  the  highest  good,  which,  however,  is  but  remotely 
suggested  [Eccles.  xii,  7, 13]  but  not  fully  presented ;  the  skepti- 
cism, at  first  sight  so  seemingly  wide-reaching  and  so  entirely 
despairing  of  satisfaction,  has  a  back-ground  of  very  profound 
educative  wisdom. 

In  the  fact  that  the  moral  is  not  derived  from  the  natural 
conscience  of  man,  seeing  that  the  conscience  is  no  longer 
the  pure  expression  of  the  original  God-consciousness,  but 
that,  on  the  contrary,  the  historically-revealed  will  of  God  is 
the  exclusive  source  of  the  moral  command,  there  lies  an  es- 
sential reason  why  Hebrew  ethics  did  not  develop  itself  into 
a  philosophy ;  the  very  thought  of  such  a  philosophy  conflicts 


§28.]  ETHICS  OF  THE   APOCRYPHA.  169 

with  the  fundamental  presuppositions  of  the  Old  Testament 
consciousness.  The  time  had  not  yet  come  when  the  con- 
science, and  human  knowledge  in  general,  had  so  far  become 
free  as  to  derive  truth  also  from  within  themselves.  As  yet 
man  was  called  simply  believingly  to  obey,  but  not  freely 
and  philosophically  to  create. 

SECTION  XXVIII. 

The  Old  Testament  Apocryphal  Books*  abandon- 
ed by  the  fire  of  the  prophetic  spirit,  and  in  part  affect- 
ed by  foreign  philosophical  influences,  treat  predomi- 
nantly of  morality.  The  moral  law, — in  the  Old 
Testament  canon  an  essential  element  of  the  educa- 
tive divine  revelation  as  a  whole, — is  here  considered 
rather  in  itself  and  as  unconnected  with  the  world- 
historical  goal  of  the  Theocracy,  and  is  thereby  de- 
graded into  a  merely  individual,  empirically-grounded 
moral  system. — In  the  Talmud  the  law  appears  aa 
entirely  unspiritualized, — as  fallen  into  complete  life- 
less externality,  dissolved  into  its  ultimate  atoms. 

The  moral  thoughts  of  the  Apocrypha  give  clear  evidence 
of  some  degree  of  obscuration  of  the  consciousness  of  re- 
demption-history, both  in  respect  to  its  presupposition, 
namely,  the  fall  and  its  consequences,  and  in  regard  to  its 
true  nature  in  the  Ancient  Covenant,  and  also  in  regard  to  its 
historical  goal — the  expected  redemption-act  by  Christ. 
With  the  obscuration  of  this  thought  go  naturally  enough 
hand  in  hand  a  manifest  coming  into  the  fore-ground  of  a 
certain  holiness  by  works,  in  the  manner  of  the  heathen  mor- 
alists [comp.  Sirach  iii,  16,  17  (14,  15),  33  (30) ;  xxix,  15-17 
(12,  13);  xvii,  18  (22)  sqq.],  a  one-sided  laudation  of  wisdom 
and  righteousness  in  obliviousness  of  the  question  whether 

*  Comp.  Staudlin :  Gesch.  der  Sittenl.  Jesu,  i,  358  ;  Cramer :  Moral 
der  Apokr.,  1814;  (also  in  Keil  and  Tzschirner's  Analekten,  1814,  5i,  1, 
2,);  Babiger:  Ethica  libe  apocr.,  1838  ;  Kcerl :  Die  Apokr.  d.  A.  T., 
1852,  somewhat  unfair ;  comp.  Heugstenberg :  Fur  BeHtehaltung  der 
Apokr. 


170  CHKISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§28. 

indeed  there  are  any  such  wise  and  righteous  persons  to  be 
found,  and  also  in  many  respects  a  proud  self-satisfaction 
with  one's  own  wisdom  and  virtue,  together  with  a  censori- 
ous and  contemptuous  looking-down  upon  the  unwise  and 
unrighteous  many, — a  certain  coldly-rational  self-complacent 
tone,  especially  in  Sirach, — a  suspicious  complaining  and  an 
almost  bigoted  abstaining  from  true  love -communion  with 
others  [comp.  Sirach  xi,  30  (29)  sqq.;  xii;  xiii;  xxv,  10  (7); 
xxx,  6;  xxxiii,  25;  sqq.], — a  zealous  cautioning  against  the 
wickedness  and  falseness  of  others  instead  of  a  warning 
against  the  wickedness  and  deceptiveness  of  one's  own  heart ; 
and  there  is  frequently  a  manifest  lack  of  the  proper  humil- 
ity of  the  truly  self-understanding  conscience ;  and  the  ob- 
taining of  personal  happiness  is  often  presented  too  one- 
sidedly  as  a  direct  motive  to  virtue,  so  that  the  ethical  view 
is  sometimes  tinged  with  a  shallow  utilitarianism  [comp. 
Sirach  xiv,  14  tqq.]. — The  book  of  Wisdom,  showing  traces  of 
Alexandrine-Platonic  influences,  and  accordingly  containing 
the  four  Greek  virtues  [viii,  7],  does  not  keep  far  clear  of 
work-holy  boasting  [e.  g.  vii  and  viii] ;  and  though  it  admits 
the  sinful  corruption  and  weakness  of  all  men  [ix;  xii,  10 
sqq.;  xiii,  1  sqq.;  ii,  24],  it  yet  brings  them  into  a  false  con- 
nection with  theories  from  other  sources  [viii,  19,  20 ;  ix,  15 ; 
e.  g.,  pre-existence  of  the  soul,  and  dualistic  relation  of  the 
body  as  an  essential  trammeling  of  the  soul].  The  book  of 
Sirach  gives  expression  both  to  a  deep  piety  and  to  a  rich 
practical  life-experience,  and  though  in  the  eyes  of  Rational- 
ism it  is  the  most  valuable  book  of  j;he  Old  Testament,  it  is  still 
very  far  superior  to  modern  Rationalistic  shallowness  [comp. 
xxv,  32  (24) ;  xl,  15,16 ;  xii,  8  (5),  sqq. ;  viii,  6  (5)] ;  it  manifests, 
however,  on  the  other  hand,  also  a  want  of  depth  in  its  view  of 
sinfulness  and  of  the  need  of  redemption  [comp.  xv,  15-17; 
xxxii,  27  (Septuagint,  xxxv,  23) ;  xxx  vii,  17  (13) ;  li,  18  (13) 
sqq.],  and  often  places  the  outward  ungenerous  prudence- 
rules  of  a  distrustful  understanding  in  the  stead  of  higher 
moral  ideas  [e.  g.  viii,  1  sqq.;  xiii,  6,  7],  and,  as  differing 
from  the  book  of  Wisdom,  alludes  to  no  supernatural  goal  of 
morality  in  a  transmundane  life;  it  may  indeed  teach  the 
spiritually  regenerated  much  moral  life-wisdom  and  prudent 
rational  foresight,  but  it  cannot  bring  the  natural  man  to 


§28.]  TALMUDISM,  ISLAMISM.  171 

self-acquaintance  and  humility.  From  the  stand-point  of 
Christian  ethics,  this  book  is  very  far  remote ;  the  essence  of 
love  is  unknown  to  it.  The  book  of  Judith  presents  in  narra- 
tive form  a  highly  questionable  morality  [ix,  2  sqq.;  comp. 
Gen.  xxxiv;  xlix,  5-7]. 

As  in  Sirach  the  vigorously-growing  tree  of  Old  Testament 
ethics  begins  to  show  signs  of  failing  vitality,  so  in  the  Talmud 
(A.  D.  200-600)  We  find  the  dead  and  decayed  or  petrified 
trunk.*  Abandoned  by  the  spirit  of  faith  and  hope,  the  Jews, 
in  their  faithlessness  to  their  Redeemer,  lost  also  the  spirit  of 
love;  and  human  ingenuity  changed  the  law  which  was  readily 
enough  borne  by  hoping  faith,  into  an  unspiritual  yoke  utterly 
subversive  of  moral  freedom.  The  strictly  objective  character 
of  the  Old  Testament  law,  so  necessary  for  disciplinary  purposes, 
had  its  vital  complement  in  an  expectant  faith.  This  latter  ele- 
ment becomes  in  the  Talmud  deceptive  and  wavering,  and 
gives  place  almost  entirely  to  the  doctrine  of  the  law ;  and  the 
lifeless,  idealess  law,  multiplied  thousaudfoldly  by  the  ingenuity 
of  human  exegesis  and  inference,  takes  even  the  most  insignifi- 
cant and  external  actions  into  a  dictatorially-regulative  tutelage. 
Man  acts  no  longer  as  prompted  by  his  inner  consciousness,  for 
his  inner  life-source  is  dried  up,  but  according  to  the  outward 
law  as  multiplying  its  branches  through  all  the  channels  of 
human  life. — The  Talmud  contains,  besides  its  more  spiritual 
elements,  which  are  mostly  taken  from  the  Old  Testament,  a 
system  of  casuistry  unparalleled  for  its  trivial  and  childish  en- 
tering into  minutiae,  such  as  was  possible  in  fact  only  on  just 
such  a  soil,  namely,  matured  Pharisaism.  For  the  Jew,  the 
authority  of  the  Scribes  takes  the  place  of  the  moral  conscience ; 
to  him  who  honestly  holds  fast  to  the  law,  the  multiplicity  of 
precepts  becomes  a  yoke  subversive  of  true  morality,  while  to 
those  who  are  less  sincere  the  manifold  contradictions  in  the 
same  give  pretext  for  a  disingenuous  relaxation  of  duty. 

Observation.  Islami&m, — which  finds  its  place  in  the  history 
of  the  religious  and  moral  spirit  not  as  a  vital  organic  member, 
but  as  violently  interrupting  the  course  of  this  history,  and 

*  Mishna  translated  by  Rabe,  "1760,  6  vote.—  Talmud  Eabli,  the  Baby- 
lonian Talmud,  by  Pinner,  1842. — Schulchan  Arueh  by  Lowe,  1836, 
4  vols. — Fassel:  Die  mosaisch-rabbin.  Tugend-u.  Iflichtenl.,  2  ed., 
1842. 


172  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  28. 

which  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  attempt  of  heathenism  to  main- 
tain itself  erect,  under  an  outward  monotheistic  form,  against 
Christianity,  and  to  arm  the  entire  unbroken  essence  of  the  nat- 
ural man  against  the  spirit  of  an  inner  new-birth, — has  indeed 
given  rise  to  a  peculiar  ethical  system,  though  one  which  has 
so  little  of  deptli  peculiar  to  itself,  that  we  need  here  only  allude 
to  it  in  passing.*  The  ethics  of  Islam  bears  the  character  of  an 
outwardly  and  crudely  conceived  doctrine  of  righteousness ; 
conscientiousness  in  the  sphere  of  the  social  relations,  faithful- 
ness to  conviction  and  to  one's  word,  and  the  bringing  of  all 
action  into  relation  to  God,  are  its  bright  points  ;  but  there  is  a 
lack  of  heart-depth,  of  a  basing  of  the  moral  in  love.  The  highest 
good  is  the  very  outwardly  and  very  sensuously  conceived 
happiness  of  the  individual.  The  potency  of  sin  is  not  recog- 
nized ;  evil  is  only  an  individual,  not  an  historical  power ; 
hence  there  is  no  need  of  redemption,  but  only  of  personal 
works  on  the  basis  of  prophetic  instruction ;  Mohammed  is 
only  a  teacher,  not  an  atoner.  God  and  man  remain  strictly 
external  to,  and  separate  from,  each  other ;  God — no  less  in- 
dividually conceived  of  than  man — comes  into  no  real  com- 
munion with  man ;  and  man,  as  moral,  acts  not  as  influenced 
by  such  a  communion,  but  only  as  an  isolated  individual.  The 
ideal  basis  of  the  moral  is  faith  in  God  and  in  his  Prophet ;  the 
moral  life,  conceived  as  mainly  consisting  in  external  works,  is 
not  a  fruit  of  received  salvation,  but  a  means  for  the  attainment 
of  the  same;  pious  works,  and  particularly  prayer,  fasting  and 
almsgiving,  and  pilgrimaging  to  Mecca,  work  salvation  directly 
of  themselves.  Man  has  nothing  to  receive  from  God  but  the 
Word,  and  nothing  to  do  for  God  but  good  works ;  of  inner 
sanctification  there  is  no  thought ;  the  essential  point  is  simply 
to  let  the  per  se  good  nature  of  man  manifest  itself  in  works ; 
there  is  no  inner  struggle  in  order  to  attain  to  the  true  life,  no 
penitence-struggle  against  inner  sinfulness ;  and  instead  of  true 
humility  we  find  only  proud  work-righteousness.  To  the  nat- 
ural propensions  of  man  there  is  consequently  but  little  refused, 
— nothing  but  the  enjoyment  of  wine,  of  swine-flesh,  of  blood, 
of  strangled  animals,  and  of  games  of  chance,  and  this,  too,  for 

*  Imm.  Berger  :  Ueber  die  Moral  des  Koran  in  Staudlin's  Beitrage  zur 
PMl.,  v,  250,  (1799),  superficial.— Weil:  Mohammed,  1843.— Sprenger : 
Ltben  u.  Lehre  des  Moh.,  1862. 


§  29.]  MARRIAGE   AND   POLYGAMY.  173 

insufficient  (assigned)  reasons.  The  merely  individual  character 
of  the  morality  manifests  itself  especially  in  the  low  conception 
that  is  formed  of  marriage,  in  which  polygamy  is  expressly 
conceded,  woman  degraded  to  a  very  low  position,  and  the  dis- 
solution of  the  marriage  bond  placed  in  the  unlimited  discretion 
of  the  man ;  there  hence  results  a  very  superficial  view  of  the 
family  in  general;  the  moral  community-life  is  conceived  of 
throughout  in  a  very  crude  manner.  Unquestionably  this  form 
of  ethics  is  not  an  advancing  on  the  part  of  humanity,  but  a 
guilty  retrograding  from  that  which  had  already  been  attained. 


C.— CHRISTIAN  ETHICS. 
SECTION  XXIX. 

In  Christianity  alone  morality  and  ethics  are  en- 
abled to  reach  their  perfection, — the  former  being 
perfected  in  the  person  of  Christ  himself,  the  latter 
being  in  process  of  self-perfection  in  the  progressive 
intellectual  activity  of  the  church. — The  subjective 
and  the  objective  grounds  of  morality  are  given,  in 
Christianity,  in  full  sufficiency.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
moral  subject  has  attained  to  a  full  consciousness  of 
sin,  of  its  general  sway,  of  its  historical  significancy, 
and  of  its  guilt ;  on  the  other,  he  has,  by  redemption, 
become  free  from  his  bondage  under  sin.  and  risen 
again  to  moral  freedom, — has  again  attained  to  the 
possibility  of  accomplishing  his  moral  task.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  objective  ground  of  the  moral — God — 
is  now  for  the  first,  perfectly,  personally  and  historic- 
ally revealed  to  man.  and  God's  will  not  merely  man- 
ifested in  unclouded  clearness  in  his  Word  and 
through  the  historical  appearance  of  the  Redeemer 
himself,  but  also,  by  the  holy,  divine  Spirit  as  im- 
parted to  the  redeemed,  written  into  their  hearts ;  on 
the  other,  this  God  stands  no  longer  in  violent  antith- 


174  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§29. 

esis  to  the  sin-estranged  creature,  but  is  in  Christ  rec- 
onciled with  him,  and,  as  a  graciously  loving  Father, 
is  present  to  him  and  in  constant  sanctifying  and 
strengthening  lite-communion  with  him. 

The  goal  of  morality  has  become  an  other, — has 
risen  from  the  state  of  hope  to  a  constantly-growing 
reality.  God-sonship  is  not  placed  simply  at  the 
remote  termination  of  the  moral  career,  but  is  from 
the  very  beginning  already  present ;  the  Christian 
strives  not  merely  in  moral  aspiration  toward  it,  but 
lives  and  acts  in  it  and  as  inspired  by  it ;  he  cannot 
possibly  live  or  act  morally  if  he  is  not  already  God's 
child ;  he  has  his  goal  already  from  the  very  begin- 
ning as  a  blessed  reality,  and  his  further  goal  is  in 
fact  simply  fidelity  in  this  God-sonship, — a  sinking 
deeper  into  it,  a  strengthening  and  purifying  of  it  by 
a  constantly  greater  triumphing  over  the  sinful  nature 
which  yet  clings  to  the  Christian,  namely,  the  "flesh" 
which  lusts  against  the  spirit ;  and  for  collective 
humanity  the  moral  goal  is  and  has  been  realizing 
itself  from  the  beginning  in  ever  increasing  fullness, 
namely,  in  the  fact  that  all  nation-separating  barriers 
progressively  fall  away,  arid  that  the  Word  of  life  in- 
creasingly assumes  form  in  the  God-fearing  of  all 
nationalities, — constituting  the  kingdom  of  God  in  its 
gradual  rising  to  full  historical  reality  in  a  universal 
Christian  church. 

The  essence  of  morality  has  risen  from  the  stage  of 
the  obedience  of  a  faithful  servant  to  that  of  the  lov- 
ing, confiding  freedom  of  the  children  of  God.  Man 
has  the  command  no  longer  as  a  merely  outward, 
purely  objective  one,  uncongenial  to  his  subjective 
nature,  but  as  an  inward  one  dwelling  within  him, 
and  as  become  his  personal  possession,  and  hence  as 


§  29.]  CHRISTIANITY  A  PROGRESS.  175 

no  longer  a  yoke,  a  burden,  but  as  an  inner  power  at 
one  with  his  personality  itself.  Man  lives  and  acts 
no  longer  as  a  mere  individual  subject,  but  he  lives 
and  acts  in  full  life-communion  with  the  Redeemer, 
and  through  him  with  God, — by  virtue,  on  the  one 
hand,  of  the  love  of  faith,  and,  on  the  other,  of  the  gift 
of  the  Spirit :  I  live,  and  yet  not  I,  but  Christ  lives  iu 
me.  The  moral  idea  is  not  a  mere  revealed  Word,  it 
is  the  Son  of  God  as  become  man,  the  personal  Re- 
deemer himself,  not  merely  in  his  truth-unvailing 
doctrine,  not  merely  in  his  truth-revealing  Spirit,  but 
pre-eminently  in  his  person  itself,  both  as  the  histor- 
ical, pure  example  of  all  holiness,  as  also  as  the  One 
who  is  with  us  always  even  to  the  end  of  the  world. — 
Love  to  that  God  who  is  manifested  in  redemption  as 
himself  the  highest  love,  is  the  motive  of  the  moral 
life — its  essence  and  its  power ;  it  is  a  life  of  holy  com- 
munion in  every  respect, — a  life  in  and  with  God,  a 
life  with  the  children  of  God  and  in  the  communion 
of  the  redeemed. — The  morality  of  hope  has  passed 
over  into  a  morality  of  the  joyous  victory-conscious- 
ness,— is  rather  an  actual  manifestation  of  the  already- 
attained,  grace-awarded  highest  good,  than  a  mere 
longing,  aspiring  after  it.  The  ideal  goal  of  morality 
is  not  in  the  least  of  a  doubtful  character,  but  is  ab- 
solutely assured.  While  the  fundamental  feeling  of 
the  heathen  virtue-sage  is  that  of  a  proud  self-con- 
sciousness of  personal  merit,  the  fundamental  feeling 
of  the  Christian  is  the  feeling  of  grace-accepting, 
thankful,  loving  humility /  while  the  fundamental 
virtue  of  the  Greeks  is  self  -  acquired  wisdom, 
that  of  Christian  morality  is  child-like  faith  in 
God's  loving  revelation  both  in  Word  and  in  histor- 
ical act. 


176  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§29. 

There  is  no  need  here  of  detailed  developments  or  proofs ; 
we  desire  simply  to  present  the  ground-character  of  Christian 
ethics  as  in  contrast  to  heathen  ethics.  This  much  is  clear 
from  what  we  have  already  said,  that  morality  must  assume 
here  an  entirely  other  form  than  in  heathendom,  and  even  in 
many  respects  a  different  one  from  that  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment. No  heathen  ethical  system  looks  to  the  formation  of 
a  kingdom  of  God  embracing  all  mankind ;  the  freedom  of 
the  will  is  either  denied  or  restricted  to  a  very  few  favored 
ones,  and  with  these  it  is  regarded  as  unaffected  by  the  his- 
torical power  of  sin ;  heathenism  knows  nothing  of  personal 
love  to  God  as  a  moral  motive,  and  of  the  personal  love  of 
God  to  all  men  as  its  antecedent  condition.  Christianity 
takes  it  just  as  earnestly  with  the  reality,  the  power  and  the 
guilt  of  sin,  as  with  the  real,  historical,  overcoming  of  the 
same  through  Christ.  Man,  as  not  from  nature  free,  but  as 
become  free  by  historical  redemption-act  and  by  the  personal 
appropriation  of  the  same,  is  the  true  subject,  capable  of  all 
true  morality ;  and  hence  the  realization  of  this  morality  de- 
pends no  longer  on  a  mere  nature-conditionment,  but  solely 
on  man's  free  self-determination  for  or  against  his  redemp- 
tion. That  which  is  presumptuously  presupposed  by  the 
Greek  philosophers  as  already  possessed  by  the  elect  few  who 
are  capable  of  true  morality,  namely,  true  will-freedom  and 
a  personal  moral  consciousness  springing  from  the  inner  es- 
sence of  the  soul,  all  this  has  attained  to  its  full  truth  only 
in  Christianity,  namely,  in  that  the  false  security  of  a  merely 
natural  freedom  and  power  is  overcome  and  remedied.  Both 
freedom  and  power  are  procured  for  all  who  wish  them,  and 
that  not  by  self-deception,  but  by  a  real  moral  redemption- 
act  of  the  alone  holy  One. 

That  the  highest  good  is  not  a  something  to  be  attained  to 
exclusively  by  moral  action,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  its  es- 
sence a  power  graciously  conferred  on  the  willing  heart,  a 
power  which  has  true  morality  simply  as  its  fruit  and  sub- 
jective perfection,  and  which  manifests  this  morality  essen- 
tially as  faithfulness,  as  a  preserving  and  virtualizing  of  the 
received  grace, — this  is  a  thought  utterly  foreign  to  all 
heathendom,  and  which  is  placed,  even  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, only  in  the  promised  future ;  and  upon  this  thought, 


§  29.]  LOVE  AND  PRAYER.  177 

as  upon  the  consciousness  of  personal  guilt  and  divine  grace, 
rests  the  so  distinctively  Christian  virtue  of  humility,  as  that 
of  a  pardoned  sinner.  There  is  scarcely  anywhere  to  be 
found  so  violent  an  ethical  antithesis  as  that  between  the 
high-esteemed  virtue  of  magnanimity  in  Aristotle  (which 
corresponds  to  the  pride  of  the  Pharisee  in  the  parable  of 
Christ,)  and  the  Christian  humility  of  that  Publican  who  ven- 
tures no  other  prayer  than  this :  "God  be  merciful  to  me  a 
sinner."  Such  magnanimity  appears  to  the  Christian  as 
mere  self-blinding  pride,  while  this  humility  appears  to  the 
Greek  as  servile-mindedness. 

Heathen  ethics  is  always  simply  of  a  purely  individual 
character,  or,  if  it  relates  to  a  moral  community-life,  then 
only  of  a  merely  civil  character,  as  consisting  in  obedience  to 
laws  purely  human,  and  valid  only  for  a  particular  people ; 
or  where,  as  in  China,  the  state  is  regarded  as  of  divine  ori- 
gin and  essence,  there  individual  morality  becomes  essential- 
ly a  mere  mechanical  self-conforming  to  an  eternally  on-re- 
volving unspiritual  world-order ;  Christian  morality  is,  on  the 
contrary,  never  of  a  merely  individual  character,  but  abso- 
lutely and  always  an  expression  of  moral  communion — on  the 
one  hand,  with  the  personal  Saviour  and  God,  and,  on  the 
other,  with  the  Christian  society ;  its  essential  nature  is  there- 
fore love  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  and  it  is  never  of  a 
merely  civil  character  but  belongs  to  a  purely  moral  commun- 
ity-life,— a  life  that  rests  in  no  respect  on  nature -limits  or  on 
unfreedom, — namely,  that  of  the  Church  as  the  historical  king- 
dom of  God. — In  contradistinction  to  worldward-turned 
heathenism,  Christians  make  the  foundation  and  essence  of 
all  moral  life  to  consist  in  the  constant  direction  of  the  heart 
to  God ;  and  especially  in  prayer — (which,  as  exalted  by  the 
communion  of  devotion,  becomes  the  principal  phase  of  the 
entire  religious  life,  and  conditions  and  preserves  a  direct 
personal  life-communion  with  God) — the  entire  moral  life 
shapes  itself  into  an  expression  of  the  religious  consciousness 
as  certain  of  its  reconciliation  with  God.  The  Christian 
stands  not  alone  in  his  moral  life,  nor  is  he  merely  a  member 
of  a  moral  society,  but  he  stands  in  constant  vital  personal 
life-communion  with  God,  and  derives  therefrom  constantly 
new  moral  power.  And  precisely  because  Christian  morality 


178  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [g  29. 

is  not  of  a  merely  individual  character,  but  is  rooted  in  and 
grows  out  of  the  holiest  of  communions,  is  it  truly  free ;  the 
law  stands  no  longer  simply  over  against  man,  so  that  his  re- 
lation to  it  becomes  one  of  mere  service,  but,  as  in  contrast 
to  the  self-sufficiency  of  the  heathen  mind  (which  finds  in  the 
natural  man  the  pure  fountain  of  the  moral  consciousness),  it 
has  become  a  perfectly  inward  personal  law,  one  that  con- 
stantly generates  itself  anew  out  of  the  sanctified  heart  of  the 
spiritually  regenerated. 

But  prayer,  wherein  man  enters  into  communion  with  God,  is, 
as  also  the  example  of  the  ancient  church  shows,  essentially  in- 
tercession,— implies  moral  communion.  The  development  of 
morality  into  a  collective  life  of  the  moral  society, — into  a  col- 
lective morality, — is  an  essentially  new  phenomenon.  Heathen- 
dom knew  indeed  the  indefinite  and  merely  impersonal,  abstract 
power  of  national  custom,  as  well  as  the  very  definite  but  un- 
free-working  power  of  the  civil  law  and  of  political  rulers,  but 
it  knew  nothing  of  a  free  moral  power  of  the  truly  moral  com- 
munity. The  Christian  community  itself  is  the  clearly  duty- 
conscious  ^upholder,  promoter  and  conservator  of  the  morality 
of  the  individuals ;  it  has  the  duty  of  the  moral  overseeing, 
furthering  and  guiding  of  all  its  members,  and  hence  also  of 
moral  discipline,  and,  as  involved  hi  this,  also  the  power  of  in- 
flicting moral  discipline  upon  the  unfaithful, — consisting  essen- 
tially in  the  withdrawing  of  communion  with  them,  in  the 
excluding  of  them  from  the  moral  whole  as  being  non-tolerant 
of  any  immoral  element.  The  community-life  is  of  so  purely 
moral,  so  intensely  unitary,  a  character,  that  the  unfaithfulness 
of  a  single  member  thrills  through  the  moral  whole,  and,  because 
of  the  intimate  love  of  the  whole  for  all  the  individuals,  is  pain- 
fully felt  and  reproved  and  rejected  by  the  society.  The  total- 
ity stands  surety  for  the  morality  of  the  individual,  and  the  in- 
dividual for  that  of  totality ;  the  moral  life  of  the  spiritual 
organism  has  attained  to  its  truth.  The  thought  of  church- 
discipline, — which  raises  morality  above  the  sphere  of  mere 
individuality,  without,  however,  giving  to  the  community- 
life  the  power  of  outward  coercion,  such  as  that  of  the 
state,  but  on  the  contrary  preserves  and  gives  effect  to  this 
life  as  a  purely  spiritual  power, — is  an  essentially  Christian 
thought,  and  is  only  there  practical  where  the  moral  idea 


§29.]  TASK  OF  THE  CHURCH.  179 

and  its  realization  in  the  community-life  are  taken  really  in 
earnest. 

In  the  emancipation  of  the  human  spirit  by  redemption,  in 
the'taking  up  of  the  moral  idea  into  the  inner  heart  of  the  con- 
sciousness, there  lie,  now,  the  possibility  of,  and  the  incentive 
to,  a  scientific  development  of  the  moral  consciousness.  Hea- 
thendom developed  an  ethical  science  only  on  the  basis  of  a 
presumed  freedom  and  autonomy  of  the  spirit  of  the  natural 
man ;  the  Old  Testament  religion  developed  none  at  all,  because 
in  it  the  divine  law  was  as  yet  an  absolutely  objective  and 
merely  passively-given  one,  tov  which  man  could  stand  only  in 
an  obeying  relation.  But  Christianity  regains  for  the  human 
spirit  its  true  freedom, — makes  the  merely  objective  law  into 
an  also  perfectly  subjective  one,  into  one  that  lives  in  the  heart 
of  the  regenerated  as  his  real  property,  one  that  enlightens  the 
reason  and  becomes  thereby  truly  rational ;  and  hence  there  is 
here  given  the  possibility  of  shaping  this  pure  moral  subject- 
matter  as  embraced  in  the  divinely  enlightened  conscience,  into 
free  scientific  self-development.  But  Cliristian  ethics,  naturally 
enough,  developed  itself  as  a  science  only  after  its  presupposi- 
tions, namely,  the  dogmatical  questions  in  regard  to  God,  to 
Christ  and  to  man  had  attained  to  some  degree  of  ripeness  in 
the  dogmatic  consciousness  of  the  church,  and  hence  it  appears 
for  a  long  while  predominantly  only  in  closest  involution  with 
dogmatics,  and  in  popular  ecclesiastical  instruction  in  the  form 
of  rules  and  exhortations,  and  hi  part  also  hi  ecclesiastically- 
defined  life-regulations  enforced  by  ecclesiastical  discipline. 
The  notion  that  the  ancient  church  could  and  should  have 
passed  over  the  great  dogmatic  questions  and  devoted  itself  pri- 
marily and  predominantly,  or  hi  fact  exclusively,  to  the  devel- 
opment of  a  system  of  morals  as  the  essence  proper  of  Chris- 
tianity, is  very  erroneous.  If  we  once  perceive  and  admit  that 
the  Christian  world-theory  in  general,  in  respect  to  God,  to  the 
creature,  and  especially  to  the  nature  of  man,  is  of  a  character 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  heathen  view,  and  if  we  admit 
that  morality  cannot  be  of  an  unconscious  and  merely  instinct- 
ive character,  but  must  rest  on  a  rational  consciousness,  then  it 
is  perfectly  clear  that  the  consciousness  must  first  be  scientific- 
ally informed  in  regard  to  the  reality  of  existence,  before  that 
the  consciousness  of  that  which,  in  virtue  of  the  character  of 

13 


180  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  30. 

this  reality,  becomes  moral  duty,  can  be  further  developed 
The  religious  consciousness  of"  the  moral  was  indeed  given  in 
high  perfection  in  the  first  form  of  Christianity,  but  the  scien- 
tific development  of  the  moral  could  realize  itself  only  very 
gradually  and  subsequently  to  the  development  of  dogmatics. 

The  three  natural  chief  epochs  of  church  history  constitute  also 
those  of  the  history  of  Christian  ethics. 


I.  THE  ANCIENT  CHURCH  UP  TO  THE  SEVENTH 
CENTURY. 

SECTION  XXX. 

Morality,  as  never  separated  from  piety,  and  as 
uniformly  based  on  loving  faith  in  the  Redeemer,  and 
as  upheld,  fostered  and  watched  over  by  the  church- 
communion,  appears  in  its  inner  phase  as  essentially 
love  to  God,  and  to  Christ  and  to  his  disciples  as 
brethren,  and  in  its  outer  phase  as  a  strict  rejection 
of  heathen  customs,  which  latter  feature,  both  in  con- 
sequence of  the  persecutions  suffered  and  because  of 
the  deep  corruption  of  the  extra-Christian  world,  as- 
sumes the  form  not  unfrequently  of  a  painfully-anx- 
ious self-seclusion  from  the  same ;  and  when,  with  the 
victory  of  Christianity  over  heathenism,  from  the  time 
of  Constantine  on,  worldliness  pressed  into  the  church 
itself,  then,  as  a  natural  counterpoise  against  this 
worldliness,  world-renunciation  was  made  to  apply, 
among  the  more  pious-minded  Christians,  even  to  the 
sensuously-worldly  phase  of  the  Christian  life,  and 
was  intensified,  in  the  hermit-life,  even  to  morbidness  ; 
and  in  consequence  of  the  distinction  which  gradually 
sprang  up  in  the  church  itself  out  of  this  antithesis 
in  the  Christian  life,  namely,  between  the  moral  com- 


§  30.]  INCIPIENT   MONASTICISM.  181 

mands,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  evangelical  counsels 
on  the  other  (which  latter  were  thought  to  condition 
a  superior  degree  of  holiness),  the  moral  consciousness 
was  essentially  beclouded. 

The  moral  views  of  the  early  Church  are  at  once  distin- 
guishable from  those  of  later  Judaism  by  their  profound 
grasping  into  the  pious  heart  as  the  living  fountain  of  a  true 
and  free  morality,  and  from  those  of  heathenism  by  the  pu- 
rity and  rigor  of  the  fundamental  principles  involved ;  and 
the  unavoidable  militant  resistance  against  the  demoralized 
heathen  world  naturally  enough  heightened  this  rigor  to  a  de- 
gree which,  but  for  this,  seems  no  longer  required.  The  es- 
sential difference  of  the  Christian  moral  law  from  that  of  the 
Old  Testament  is  fully  recognized  as  early  as  from  the  time 
of  Barnabas  (Ep.  c.  19).  The  rigorous  element  shows  itself 
especially  in  respect  to  all  sensuous  pleasure  and  all  worldly 
diversion,  to  marriage,  to  temporal  possessions,  and  to  polit- 
ical power,  and  to  whatever  is  in  any  manner  implicated  with 
heathenism.  In  contrast  to  heathen  laxity,  the  ancient  Chris- 
tians were  all  the  more  anxiously  watchful  against  all  domin- 
ion of  sensuous  desire,  esteeming  fasting  very  highly,  though 
not  as  a  commanded  duty,  and  eschewing  the  demoralizing 
and  religion-periling  influence  of  the  heathen  stage  and  of 
other  amusements ;  and  the  severity  of  their  sufferings  under 
the  hatred  of  the  world  naturally  enough  made  all  worldly 
pleasure  appear  as  in  diametrical  antagonism  to  Christian- 
mindedness.  In  a  well-grounded  persuasion  of  the  dangers 
involved,  the  Christians  declined  to  accept  official  positions 
in  the  heathen  State.  Chasteness  even  in  thought  was  rigor- 
ously insisted  upon ;  marriage  was  held  more  sacred  than  had 
ever  been  done  before,  and  the  sensuous  element  of  the  same 
was  guarded  within  strict  limits ;  and  in  view  of  the  troubles 
of  the  times,  and  of  the  expectation  of  a  near  second-coming 
of  Christ  (which  pretty  generally  prevailed  in  the  first  two 
centuries),  very  many  inclined  to  a  preference  of  celibacy, 
without,  however,  regarding  it  as  a  specially-meritorious 
course  of  conduct;  second  marriages,  however,  were  general- 
ly viewed  as  an  infidelity  to  the  first  consort.  Riches  were 


182  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§30. 

mostly  looked  on  as  of  questionable  desirableness ;  the  tak- 
ing of  interest  was  regarded  (in  harmony  with  the  Old  Testa- 
ment view)  as  not  permissible ;  beneficence  and  generosity 
to  the  brethren  on  a  wide-reaching  scale,  was  held  as  one.  of 
the  most  essential  virtues ;  fidelity  to  truth,  especially  in  con- 
fessing the  faith,  even  in  the  face  of  threatening  death,  was 
a  sacred  duty,  and  its  faithful  fulfillment  was  the  Christian's 
brightest  testimony  before  his  heathen  persecutors.  The 
oath  was  generally  regarded  as  not  allowable.  Tender  love 
toward  each  other,  and  a  noble  love  of  enemies,  were  the 
Christian's  honor.  The  moral  and  warmly-fraternal  com- 
munity-life of  the  believers  was  a  matter  of  astonishment 
even  to  the  passionate  enemies  of  Christianity.  Slavery  was 
at  once  essentially  done  away  with  by  being  transformed  into 
a  fraternally-affectionate  service-relation ;  and  when  the  State 
and  laws  became  Christian,  it  was  also  greatly  mitigated 
legally. 

Notwithstanding  the  rigor  of  the  moral  view  of  the  Chris- 
tians, it  nevertheless  differs  essentially  from  that  of  the  Stoics, 
because  of  its  fundamental  character  of  joyous  faith  and  love ; 
it  is  in  no  respect  a  harsh,  stiff  or  dismal,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  thoroughly  vigorous,  youthful  and  joyous  self-sacri- 
ficing life,  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  inner  peace  and  of  a  con- 
scious blessedness.  These  features  were  measurably  lost  only 
when  the  Christian  Church  itself  ceased  to  be  the  pure  moral 
antithesis  of  the  un-Christian  world,  and  when,  having  be- 
come a  State-Church,  it  admitted  into  itself  even  worldly, 
and  in  so  far,  also,  heathen  elements.  And  it  was  now  an  es- 
sentially correct  consciousness  which  inspired  the  more  pious 
of  the  believers  with  a  disinclination  to  the  life  and  pursuits 
of  the  great  mass  of  Christians,  and  drove  them  into  separat- 
ing themselves  from  them.  The  error,  however,  was  this,  that 
instead  of  separating  the  unpiousfrom  the  Church  itself,  they 
chose  the  separation,  within  the  Church,  of  the  pious  from 
communion  with  the  mass  of  the  Church,  and  thereby  ren- 
dered the  exclusion  of  the  immoral  from  the  Church  more 
impracticable  than  ever, — in  other  words,  that,  instead  of 
morally  purifying  the  natural  elements  that  inhered  both  in' 
themselves  and  in  the  society,  they  despisingly  withdrew  the 
spiritual  from  all  contact  with  the  natural. 


§  30.]  ASCETICISM.  183 

The  first  theoretical  as  well  as  practical  separation  of  the 
ascetes  (as  imitated  from  the  distinction,  prevalent  in  the 
heathen  world,  between  philosophers  and  the  unphilosophical 
multitude,  and  as  extending  even  to  their  costume),  who 
thought  by  extreme  world-renunciation  to  attain  to  an  es- 
pecially high  moral  perfection,  and,  as  consequent  thereon, 
also  the  distinguishing  of  a  general  Christian  morality  from 
a  higher  (and  in  some  sense  voluntary)  ascetic  morality,  man- 
ifests itself  in  the  third  century  in  the  currents  of  Alexan- 
drian thought  which  had  been  so  largely  influenced  by 
heathen  philosophy, — as  yet  but  feebly  in  Clemens  Alexan- 
drinus,*  but  already  very  damagingly  in  Origen.f  The  vic- 
tory of  Christianity  over  the  heathen  state  in  the  fourth  cen- 
tury, and  the  in-rushing  both  of  the  great  and  also  of  the 
populace  into  the  Church,  occasioned,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
progressively  growing  relaxation  of  ecclesiastical  discipline 
and  a  darkening  of  the  moral  consciousness  in  the  great 
masses,  and,  on  the  other,  in  natural  antithesis  thereto,  an 
increasingly  radical  exalting  of  the  monastic  life,  in  which 
the  Christian  conscience  of  the  multitude  found,  as  it  were, 
an  atoning  complementing  of  their  own  imperfect  secularized 
life.  The  ordinary  requirements  made  upon  the  life  of  the  or- 
dinary Christian  became  less  deep-reaching ;  but  all  the  more 
rigorous  were  those  made  upon  the  ascetic  life — wherein 
Christian  morality  was  now  thought  to  exist  in  its  highest 
perfection.  The  distinguishing  of  mere  ordinary  moral  duty, 
as  the  inferior,  from  moral  perfection,  became  increasingly 
more  familiar  to  the  general  Christian  consciousness.  The 
two  true  elements  of  Christian  morality,  namely,  the  turning 
away  from  the  sinful  world,  and  the  aggressive  living  and 
working  in  and  for  the  same,  fell  apart  into  two  different 
channels,  which  respectively  served,  for  the  sum  total  of 
moral  merit,  as  complements  to  each  other;  the  superabun- 
dant merit  of  the  sanctity  of  the  ascetes  fell  to  the  good  of 
the  little-meriting  world-Christians.  In  the  sphere  of  moral- 
ity a  division  of  labor,  so  to  speak,  took  place,  and,  in  conse- 
quence thereof,t.there  was  subsequently  developed  in  the 
sphere  of  moral  merits  a  system  of  labor  and  traffic  so  artfully 

*  Strom.,  p.  775,  825  (Potter). 

t  Comm.  in  Ep.  ad  Bom.,  507  (De  la  Rue). 


184  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§31. 

organized  that  it  required  all  the  boldly  initiatory  vigor  of 
the  Eeformation  to  bring  again  to  the  light  of  day  the  plain 
fundamental  principles  of  evangelical  morality.  To  the  pres- 
ent period  of  the  history  of  Christian  ethics  belong,  however, 
only  the  feebler  beginnings  of  this  corruption. 

The  development  of  monasticism  introduced  a  dualism  into 
Christian  morality,  in  that  it  proposed  for  the  ascetes  a  mo- 
rality essentially  different  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Chris- 
tian world,  the  latter  being  based  upon  the  divine  command, 
and  the  former  \npf>n  pretended  divine  counsels  ;  with  this  error 
were  more  or  less  affected  Lactantius,  Ambrose,  Chrysostom, 
Jerome,  and  Augustine.  In  consequence  of  this,  general 
Christian  morality  was  degraded  to  a  mere  minimum ;  the 
truly  good  was  made  to  be  different  from  the  divine  com- 
mand, and  this  good  was  considered  no  longer  as  the  imper- 
ative will  of  God,  but  only,  as  it  were,  a  divine  wish,  the  ful- 
filling of  which  procures  for  man  a  special  extraordinary 
merit,  but  the  non-fulfilling  of  which  awakens  no  divine  dis- 
pleasure. The  more  general  prevalence  of  this  view  involved 
the  overthrow  of  purely  evangelical  ethics,  and  the  begin- 
ning of  the  perversion  of  the  moral  life  of  the  Chnrch  in 
practical  respects.  By  far  the  greatest  portion  even  of  the 
dogmatic  and  ecclesiastical  errors  of  the  Romish  and  Greek 
Churches  has  sprung  from  this  very  notion  of  a  special  sanc- 
tity in  monasticism. 

SECTION  XXXI. 

Ethics  itself  appears  not  as  yet  in  scientific  form 
and  apart  from  the  presentation  of  the  subject-matter 
of  dogmatics ;  it  appears  more  in  the  popular  edifi- 
catory  than  in  the  scientific  writings,  and  approaches 
more  nearly  a  scientific  form  in  the  works  written  in 
self-defense  against  the  heathen.  The  first  connected 
and  somewhat  comprehensive  presentation  of  ethics — 
by  Ambrose — in  the  manner  of  Cicero,  is  scientifically 
of  little  value;  while  the  brilliant,  penetrative,  and 
ingenious  moral  thoughts  of  Augustine,  (which,  along 
with  Aristotle,  formed  the  foundation  of  Mediaeval 


§  31.]  THE   EARLIER  FATHERS.  185 

ethics),  deviate  sometimes  in  daring  originality  from 
the  earlier  ecclesiastical  view,  and  also  bring  some 
confusion  into  purely  evangelical  ethics  by  an  over- 
valuing of  monkish  asceticism.  After  the  time  of 
Augustine,  ethics  is  for  the  most  part  limited  to  the 
mere  collecting  of  the  views  of  earlier  writers,  and  to 
popular  instruction.  The  mystical  thoughts  of  the 
pseudo-Dionyaius  the  Areopagite  became  influential 
onty  in  the  Middle  Ages.* 

The  strict  moral  life  of  the  early  Christians  furnished  in- 
deed in  its  inner  experiences  weighty  matter  for  ethics; 
ethics  proper,  however,  confined  itself  at  first  to  the  framing 
of  life-rules,  which,  resting  on  the  fundamental  thought  of 
faith  and  love,  were  enforced  and  supported  by  Scripture 
texts  and  by  apostolical  tradition,  by  the  example  of  Christ 
and  of  the  saints  of  sacred  history,  and  by  spiritual  experi- 
ence, and,  at  a  later  period,  also  by  the  example  and  authority 
of  the  martyrs,  and  by  the  definitions  [canones]  qf  the  synods, 
but  they  were  not  as  yet  digested  into  a  scientific  whole. 
From  the  moral  philosophy  of  the  heathen  the  Church 
Fathers  kept  themselves  substantially  clear,  though  they 
adopted  from  the  Platonic  and  Stoic,  and  from  the  later  pop- 
ular philosophy  of  the  Eclectics,  many  forms  and  thoughts. 
The  earlier  Fathers,  also  Irenaeus,  involved  themselves  in 
perplexities  by  the  fact  that,  basing  themselves  primarily  on 
the  Old  Testament  writings,  they  often  presented  the  moral 
life  of  the  Patriarchs  too  fully  as  a  pattern  for  Christians,  al- 
though they  recognized,  throughout,  the  merely  preparatory 
purpose  of  the  Old  Testament  law. 

In  their  genuine  writings  the  apostolical  Fathers  confine 
themselves  to  simple  evangelically-earnest  exhortations,  t — 

*  The  ethical  views  of  the  Ebionites  and  Gnostics  offer  many  interest- 
ing phases,  but  they  have  too  little  influence  in  the  shaping  of  the 
ethics  of  the  church,  and  are,  without  a  fuller  examination,  too  obscure 
to  justify  us  in  entering  upon  the  subject  here  at  all :  comp.  Neander : 
Geseh.  d.  christl.  Sittenl.,  pp.  Ill,  137. 

t  Heyns:  Depatrum  op.  doctrina  morali,  1833;  Van  Gilse,  the  same 
subject,  1833. 


186  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  31. 

At  a  very  early  date  there  was  manifested  an  antithesis  of 
such  on  the  one  hand,  as  with  full  fidelity  to  the  Christian 
faith  yet  used  in  the  service  of  Christianity  the  best  results 
of  heathen  culture,  and,  of  such  on  the  other,  as  regarded  it 
as  the  primary  duty  of  the  Church  to  emphasize  and  insist 
on  the  total  contrariety  of  Christianity  to  heathenism,  and, 
above  all  things,  also  in  the  morally-practical  life,  to  break 
off  all  yet-existing  relations  with  the  heathen  world,  and  to 
present  the  holy  society  as,  in  itself,  a  totally  new  worid. 
Both  tendencies — the  former  prevailing  more  among  Greek, 
the  latter  more  among  Latin  Christians — were  equally  legiti- 
mate, but  both  in  equal  danger  of  one-sidedness ;  the  former 
with  the  aid  of  Greek  philosophy  laid  rather  the  foundation 
for  a  scientific  construction  of  the  moral  consciousness,  the 
latter  developed  rather  a  rigorous,  and  even  harsh,  legality  of 
the  moral  life ;  Origen  and  Tertullian  respectively,  are  prom- 
inent representatives  of  this  antithesis. 

The  philosophically  educated  Justin  the  Martyr  gives  spe- 
cial emphasis,  in  defense  of  Christianity,  to  its  high  moral 
(and  by  him  very  earnestly  conceived)  views  and  practical 
workings,  and  to  its  difference  from  the  merely  preparatory 
Old  Testament  law ;  he  insists  very  strongly  on  the  freedom 
of  the  will  as  a  condition  of  the  moral ;  but  he  manifests  al- 
ready a  preference  for  celibacy  as  a  higher  perfection,  doubt- 
less not  without  being  somewhat  influenced  thereto  by  the 
Platonic  notion  of  the  nature  of  matter. — Clemens  Alex- 
andrinus  enters  more  direct  upon  the  nature  of  the  moral. 
In  his  Exhortation  to  the  Heathen  (Logos  protreptikos,  cohorta- 
tio),  he  exposes  the  defectiveness  of  heathen  ethics,  and  in 
single  characterizing  strokes  contrasts  with  it  Christian  ethics 
as  the  higher;  in  his  Paedagogos,  designed  for  beginners  in 
Christianity,  he  gives  a  more  specific  but  at  the  same  time 
more  popular  presentation  of  the  subject ;  but  in  his  Stromctta 
he  raises  the  Christian  faith-consciousness  and  morality-con- 
sciousness to  a  much  higher  scientific  form,  evidencing  truly 
philosophic  ability.  The  divine  Logos, — who  manifests  him- 
self in  fact  in  all  true  philosophy  of  the  heathen,  but  in  a 
still  higher  degree  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  most  fully  and 
purely  in  the  New  Testament, — is  also  the  pure  fountain  of 
the  moral  consciousness ;  with  the  Hebrews  the  divine  law 


§  31.]  CLEMENS— ORIGEN.  187 

was  essentially  objective ;  but  in  Christianity  it  is,  by  virtue 
of  the  activity  of  the  divine  Logos,  written  into  the  hearts 
of  all  believers.  The  highest  law  is  love  to  God,  and,  as 
based  thereon,  love  to  our  neighbor ;  the  highest  goal  is  like- 
ness to,  and  life-communion  with,  God ;  the  condition  of  the 
moral  is  will-freedom,  which,  although  hampered,  yet  not 
destroyed,  by  the  fall,  is  now  restored  in  Christianity ;  the 
Logos,  that  is,  Christ,  is  the  pattern  of  salvation  and  the 
leader  thereto.  In  his  very  detailed  inquiries  in  the  sphere 
of  the  moral  life,  Clemens  shows  himself  both  earnest  and 
judicious ;  he  esteems  marriage  very  highly,  and  manifests  no 
preference  for  celibacy.  A  visible  fondness  for  the  rational 
contemplation  of  the  divine,  as  in  contrast  to  the  lower 
sphere  of  mere  faith  (corresponding  to  the  prevalent  Greek 
distinguishing  between  philosophers  and  ordinary  men),  in- 
terferes somewhat,  however,  with  his  interest  in  active  out- 
ward life. — On  the  use  of  earthly  goods,  he  treats  in  detail 
in  his  work :  Quiz  dives  salvetur. 

Origen  has  rich  thoughts  on  the  moral,  scattered  through 
his  many  writings,  but  especially  in  his  Homilies  and  Com- 
mentaries and  in  his  work  against  Celsus.  His  Scripture- 
exegesis  is  always  pregnant  with  thought,  though  often 
venturesomely  interpreting  and  allegorizing,  especially  in  the 
Old  Testament.  Freedom  of  will  he  insists  on  fully  as 
strongly  as  does  Clemens,  with  whom  in  other  respects  he 
essentially  harmonizes.  His  moral  views  are  rigid,  but  not 
harsh ;  the  moral  disposition  alone  constitutes,  in  his  view, 
the  worth  of  the  deed ;  but  his  over-estimation  of  the  monk- 
ish life  and  of  martyrdom,  and  his  doctrine  that  man  can  do 
more  of  the  good  and  meritorious  than  is  commanded  of  him, 
becloud  somewhat  the  otherwise  evangelical  character  of  his 
ethics.  His  well-known  dogmatical  tendency  to  un-churchly 
opinion  shows  itself  less  prominently  in  the  sphere  of  ethics, 
and  even  his  notion  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls  does  not 
essentially  interfere  with  his  moral  ideas. 

In  striking  contrast  to  the  freer  idealistic  tendency  of  the 
Alexandrians,  and  in  harshest  Occidental  realism,  stands  the 
African  theologian  Tertullian.  Greatly  delighting  in  spiritual 
eccentricities,  and  inclined  to  daring  exaggerations  of  per  se 
true  ^oughts,  this  writer  presents  Christian  ethics  in  his 


188  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  31. 

numerous  moral  writings  on  special  topics  (especially  in  his 
De  idololatria,  De  pudicitia,  Ad  uxorem,  De  monogamia,  De  ex- 
hortatione  castitatis,  De  spectaculis,  De  oratwne,  etc.),  in  a  very 
rigorously  legal  spirit,  especially  insisting  upon  its  self-deny- 
ing, world-renouncing,  ascetic  phase, — already  far  leaning 
toward  the  monkish  view,  and  exerting  a  wide-spread  influ- 
ence on  the  Occident.  And  this  juristic-minded  man,  with 
his  strong  inclination  to  rigorous  formulae,  is  true  to  himself 
also  in  the  sphere  of  morality.  His  passing  over  to  Montan- 
ist  views  does  not  essentially  modify  his  previous  moral 
views,  as  they  were  in  fact  from  the  first  not  inconsistent 
therewith. — While,  on  the  one  hand,  he  emphasizes  more 
strongly  than  the  Greek  Fathers  the  natural  corruption  of  all 
men  as  resulting  from  the  fall,  without,  however,  doing  away 
with  moral  freedom,  on  the  other  hand,  he  raises  (though 
not  without  having  the  precedent  of  the  church  in  his  favor) 
the  requirement  of  holiness  in  Christians  so  high  that  he  re- 
gards as  admissible,  at  farthest,  only  a  single  repentance  after 
baptism,  and,  for  reiterated  severe  sins,  such  as  defection 
from  the  faith,  adultery,  whoredom,  murder,  knows  of  no 
forgiveness  whatever ;  *  the  distinction — here  appearing  more 
strongly  than  ever  before — between  venial  and  mortal  sins, 
received  subsequently  a  somewhat  different  significancy. 
The  greatest  sin  is  defection  from  the  true  faith — idolatry ;  t 
hence  the  Christian  must  avoid  in  word  and  deed  every  thing 
which  is  connected  with  heathenism, — e.  g.,  he  may  not 
crown  himself,  may  not  visit  theatrical  spectacles,  etc.  Ter- 
tullian  insists  also,  and  with  almost  painful  anxiety,  on  at- 
tention to  all  outward  actions  and  manners, — e.  g.,  he  gives 
long  and  detailed  disquisitions  on  the  clothing  and  decoration 
of  women,  whom  he  would  like  to  see  attired  in  a  natural 
and  modest  simplicity, — not  without  many  theoretical  whims 
(De  halitu,  muliebri,  De  cultu  foeminarum,  De  velandis  vi/rgini- 
bu8).  Marriage  he  regards  indeed  as  a  divine  institution,  al- 
though, in  view  of  the  expectation  of  a  speedy  second  coming 
of  Christ,  he  prefers  celibacy  as  the  more  perfect  and  pure 
state ;  and  second  marriages  he  unconditionally  forbids  as  a 
heavy  sin, — in  the  face  of  the  utterances  of  Paul.  Fasting 

*  Depoenit.,  c.  2,  6 ;  Depudicitia,  c.  2,  19  ;  comp.  Adv.  Marc,,  4,  9. 
•f-  De  idolol. ,  c.  1  sqq. 


§31.]  TERTULLIAN— CYPRIAN.  189 

he  requires  -not  merely  as  a  penance,  but  as  a  protective  means 
of  virtue,  conducive  to  a  higher  perfection,  namely,  in  that 
it  turns  the  soul  away  from  the  earthly  and  toward  the  heav- 
enly ;  and  he  attempts  to  reduce  it  to  definite  rigorous  rules 
(De  jejunio).  To  accept  political  offices  and  to  wear  the  in- 
signa  thereof,  conflicts  per  se  with  Christian  humility,  seeing 
that  because  of  their  connection  with  heathen  religion  they 
are  inconsistent  with  Christian  sincerity,  as  also,  because  of 
the  function  of  officers  to  execute  and  to  torture,  inconsistent 
with  Christian  gentleness ;  *  military  service,  the  Christian 
must  unconditionally  refuse.!  The  notion  of  a  Christian 
state  is  utterly  foreign  to  Tertullian;  he  knows  only  of  the 
heathen  state.  The  enduring  of  martyrdom  may,  as  the 
highest  victory  of  Christian  virtue,  by  no  means  be  evaded 
by  flight  or  otherwise ;  all  shrinking  is  here  unworthy  coward- 
ice (Defuga  in  persecutione  ;  Scorpiacum).  Unshaken  patience 
in  all  manner  of  suffering  in  general,  he  describes  and  dis- 
cusses with  great  ability  (De  patientia). 

Cyprian,  a  great  admirer  of  Tertullian,  but  more  churchly 
than  he,  and  in  his  moral  judgments  more  mild,  developed, 
one-sidedly,  still  further,  the  ascetic  phase  of  Christian 
morality;  abstinence  from  enjoyment,  steadfastness  in  suffer- 
ing, martyrdom,  and  beneficence  to  the  poor,  appear,  to  him, 
as  the  highest  virtues ;  strict  churchliness,  obedient  submis- 
sion to  the  visible  church  and  its  episcopal  guides,  as  the 
foundation  of  all  Christian  morality ;  heretical  opinions  and 
schismatic  separation,  as  the  ground  of  all  moral  corruption. 
While  in  Tertullian  morality  appears  more  as  an  individual 
manifestation  of  the  religious  personality,  in  Cyprian  it  is 
rather  an  expression  of  the  community-life  of  the  church. 
As  to  marriage  and  celibacy,  he  judges  as  Tertullian.  (De 
unitate  eeclesm;  Exhort,  ad  martyrium  ;  De  tono  patientice  •  De 
opere  et  eleemosynis  ;  De  zelo  et  liwre;  De  oratione  dominica; 
and  many  letters). 

The  severe  dogmatic  conflicts  of  the  fourth  century  which  so 
deeply  rent  the  Oriental  church,  turned  the  current  of  thought 
somewhat  away  from  ethics,  so  that  we  here  find  scarcely  any 
thing  but  merely  popular  and  not  scientific  presentations  of  the 

*  De  idol.,  c.  17, 18,  21.     t  De  corona  miUtis,  c.  11 ;  De  idol.,  e.  19. 


190  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  31. 

ethical,  and  that  too  for  the  most  part  simply  in  homilies  and 
practical  elucidations  of  Scripture. — Basil  the  Great — :is  yet 
largely  devoted  to  ethical  questions — gives  (besides  his  homi- 
lies and  several  other  writings  of  kindred  nature)  in  his  Ethica 
a  short,  popular,  little-digested,  but  plain  and  Gospel-inspired 
synopsis  of  New  Testament  ethics, — comprised  in  eighty  rules 
expressed  in  strictly  Biblical  forms.  In  other  respects  he  man- 
ifests indeed  an  over-estimation  of  monasticism  and  of  outward 
works  in  general,  as  well  as  an  under-estimation  of  the  natural 
corruption  of  man.  His  brother,  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  likewise 
emphasized  moral  freedom  quite  strongly,  even  in  man  while  as 
yet  unregenerate,  and  applied  many  of  the  ideas  of  Greek  phi- 
losophy to  Christian  ethics,  and  moreover  found  also  the  moral 
ideal  in  the  monkish  life. — This  life  was  still  more  exalted  by 
Gregory  of  Nasiamus,  who  also  presents  already  quite  definitely 
the  doctrine  of  the  evangelical  counsels  as  distinguished  from 
the  universally-binding  moral  laws,*  although  in  other  respects 
he  gives  expression  to  many  excellent  thoughts  on  Christian 
ethics.  — The  liberally-cultured,  John  Chrysostom, — who  was  no 
less  profound  in  feeling  than  rich  in  thoughts  and  in  acquaint- 
ance with  man,  and  who  was  inspired  with  high  moral  earnest- 
ness and  moral  love, — presents  in  his  masterly  Homilies  an  es- 
sentially pure,  evangelical  and  deep-reaching  moral  view,  in  a 
striking,  warm  and  clear  style, — to  such  an  extent  as  no  other 
Church  Father  has  done ;  and  even  where,  in  the  delineation 
of  the  natural  conscience  and  of  its  freedom,  he  presents,  by  the 
help  of  philosophical  examples,  the  favorable  phases  rather  too 
prominently,  and  where  he  treats  over-fondly  of  monasticism 
and  the  monkish  life,  and  ascribes,  in  repentance,  too  high  a 
value  to  outward  works,  especially  to  fasting  and  alms-giving, 
still  the  evangelical  ground-thought  is  by  no  means  pushed 
into  the  back-ground.  Love  to  God  is,  with  him,  the  ground, 
the  beginning,  the  essence  of  all  morality.  His  somewhat  ideal- 
istic turn  of  mind  betrays  him  sometimes  into  unpractical 
views,  e.  g.,  into  the  wish  (born  of  his  love  to  monasticism)  for 
the  introduction  of  a  community  of  goods. t — Imitating  Chrys- 
ostom  also  in  his  weaker  points,  the  likewise  philosophically 

*  Orat.  Ill,  invect.  in  JuL,  p.  94  sqq.  (ed.  Col.);   Orat.  iv,  c.  97  sqq. 
(ed.  Bened.) 
t  HomiL  in  Act.,  opp.  (ed.  Montf.)  ix,  93. 


§31.]  LACTANTIUS — AMBROSE.  191 

educated  abbot,  Isidore  of  Pelmium,  treated,  in  numerous  epis- 
tles, largely  of  special  topics  in  ethics,  and  sometimes  bordered 
on  Pelagian  views. 

In  the  more  practically-inclined  and  less  dogmatically-rent 
Occident,  we  find,  already  in  the  fourth  century,  more  compre- 
hensive treatises  on  the  moral  subject-matter  of  Christianity, 
but — as  differing  from  the  more  idealistic  and  philosophic 
Greek  doctors — in  a  rather  realistic,  legal,  juridical  manner; 
and  it  is  characteristic  that  precisely  the  most  excellent  of  the 
ethical  writers  among  the  Latin  Fathers  were  originally  jurists 
and  rhetoricians. — Lactantius,  in  his  Institutiones  divirue  (III- 
VI),  treats  of  the  ethical  quite  largely,  critically  assailing  hea- 
then ethics,  and  defending  spiritedly  the  ethics  of  Christianity. 
The  highest  good,  as  the  ground-question  of  ethics,  he  finds  in 
the  blissful  communion  of  the  immortal  spirit  with  God,  a  com- 
munion which  is  to  be  attained  to  only  in  the  Christian  religion, 
and  of  which,  in  heathendom,  not  even  the  conception  is  to  be 
found.  Christianity  alone,  but  not  heathen  philosophy,  affords 
a  knowledge  of  the  moral  goal,  and  of  the  moral  way,  and  fur- 
nishes also  in  Christ  the  moral  example,  and  moral  strength, 
and  lastly,  in  pure  unselfish  love,  the  true  moral  motive.  The 
unchurchly  and  dualistically-iuclining  notion  entertained  by 
Lactantius,  of  a  certain  primitively-ordained  necessity  of  evil 
(ii,  8,  9,  12;  vi,  15;  De  ira  Dei,  55)  has  not  much  interfered 
with  his  other  moral  thoughts. — Ethics  attains,  in  a  feeble  and 
ill-adapted  outward  imitation  of  Cicero,  to  a  scientific  form, 
though  without  really  scientific  development,  through  the  labors 
of  Ambrose,  whose  work  De  affici.s  ministrorum,  though  for  a 
long  time  highly  prized,  is  yet  rhetorical  in  style,  and  feeble  in 
scientific  contents ;  and  yet,  notwithstanding  that  it  introduces, 
undigested,  many  foreign  thoughts  and  forms  into  the  field  of 
Christian  thought  in  order  to  conceal  a  manifest  lack  of  theo- 
logical culture,  it  still  commends  itself  by  the  warmth  of  a 
sincere  heart,  by  its  enthusiasm  for  active  piety  and  by  ingen- 
ious trains  of  thought.  Though  treating  in  this  work  primarily 
of  the  duties  of  clergymen,  Ambrose  yet  considers  also  pretty 
extensively  those  of  Christians  in  general ;  as  a  whole,  however, 
it  has  little  order  and  consecutiveness,  and,  notwithstanding  its 
frequent  prolixity  and  repetitions,  leaves  many  points  but 
slightly  touched.  He  cites  many  Biblical  examples,  especially 


192  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  31. 

from  the  Old  Testament ;  in  his  exegetical  method  he  is  quite 
faulty ;  that  which  is  not  expressly  taught  in  Scripture  either 
by  word  or  example,  he  regards  as  unallowed,  e.  g.,  jesting. 
The  four  virtutes pr'mcipales  (the  expression  virtutes  cardinalea 
occurs  only  in  the  manifestly  unauthentic  work,  De  sacramentis), 
he  adopts  from  Plato ;  he  gives  them,  however,  a  much  higher 
significancy ;  and,  by  finding  for  them  a  greater  unity  in  piety 
and  love,  as  also  by  penetrating  deeper  into  the  subjectivity  of 
the  love-inspired  and  morally-acting  heart,  he  demonstrates, 
despite  all  his  defectiveness  in  scientific  construction,  the  great 
superiority  of  Christian  ethics  over  heathen.  He  places  the 
highest  good  in  the  bliss  resulting  from  a  knowledge  of  God, 
and  in  moral  perfection,  the  two  being  inseparably  connected 
with  each  other.  A  preference  for  celibacy  he  shares  with  his 
contemporaries,  but  in  enthusiastic  laudations  thereof  he  even 
outdoes  most  of  them.  The"  duty  of  beneficence  he  pushes  so 
far  that,  like  Chrysostom,  he  passes  over  into  advocacy  of  a  vol- 
untary community  of  goods  (i,  28) ;  and  he  regards  self-defense, 
even  in  case  of  murderous  assault,  as  unallowable.  The  scien- 
tifically-insignificant exegetical  writings  of  Ambrose  deal  also 
very  largely  with  ethical  questions. — St.  Jerome,  in  such  of  his 
writings  as  treat  of  the  moral,  is,  for  the  most  part,  intent  on 
exalting  the,  by  him,  fanatically  espoused  monastic  life,  but 
rather  rhetorically  than  scientifically,  and  with  frequent  incon- 
sistencies ;  treating  marriage  disdainfully,  and  in  fact  hostilely, 
he  finds  any  good  in  it  at  all  only  because  it  produces  children 
who  may  devote  themselves  to  the  unmarried  life  (Ep.  22,  20, 
ad  Eustoch.,  ed  Veron.,  t.  i) ;  his  passionately  violent  assailing 
of  Jovinian  (in  Rome)  who  contested  the  meritoriousness  of  the 
monastic  life  and  of  ascetic  works,  found  in  the  spirit  of  the  age 
great  applause. 

Much  higher  in  spirit  and  penetration  than  the  views  of  the 
other  Latin  Fathers,  stand  St.  Augustine's  ethical  disquisi- 
tions,— De  doctrina  Christiana,  De  civitate  dei,  De  moribus  ec- 
clexice  catholicce,  De  libero  arbitrio,  and  other  works — without, 
however,  presenting  a  connected  ethical  system.  In  Augus- 
tine the  Occidental  church  not  only  manifests  her  radical 
antithesis  to  the  fundamental  and  dangerous  errors  of  the 
Pelagian  school,  but  she  further  develops  at  the  same  time 
the  ethically-significant  and  healthful  antithesis  to  the  more 


§  31.]  ST.   AUGUSTINE.  193 

dogmatically  and  theosophico-speculatively  inclined  Greek 
church,  namely,  in  that  this  Father  emphasized  much  more 
strongly  than  did  the  Greek  church  the  antagonism  of  the 
natural  man  to  God  as  well  as  man's  moral  impotency,  and 
hence  his  need  of  redemption,  and  also  in  that  he  conceived 
the  Christianly-moral  life  as  the  expression  of  a  complete 
spiritual  transformation,  whereas  the  Greek  Fathers  tended 
to  regard  it  rather  as  a  bettering  of  the,  in  his  moral  essence, 
but  slightly-disordered  natural  man.  Occidental  ethics  makes 
more  reference  to  the  Saviour ;  Oriental,  more  to  the  Creator ; 
the  former  has  therefore  conceived  more  deeply,  than  the 
latter,  the  moral  consciousness  of  Christianity,  and  has  de- 
veloped it  more  fully.  And  from  this  time  on,  the  history 
of  Christian  ethics  finds  but  little  that  is  worthy  of  attention 
outside  of  the  current  of  Occidental  thought.  As  it  was  the 
special  task  of  the  Greek  church  to  ward  off  from  the  Chris- 
tian doctrine  of  God  and  of  Christ,  all  heathen  and  Judaistic 
notions,  and  definitively  to  refute  them,  so  was  it  the  task 
of  the  Latin  church  to  confute  and  overcome  these  same  ele- 
ments in  the  field  of  ethics;  and  this  task  was  in  the  main 
accomplished  by  St.  Augustine.  The  freedom  of  the  will  as 
it  appears  in  the  Greek  church,  and  especially  also  in  Chrys- 
ostooi,  is  by  no  means  identical  with  the  freedom  of  the 
regenerated  Christian  as  insisted  upon  by  the  evangelical 
church,  and  the  confidence  which  many  of  the  Greek  Fathers 
place  in  the  moral  inclination  of  the  piously-stirred  heart,  is 
not  yet  free  from  every  trace  of  that  over-estimation  of  the 
purity  of  human  nature  so  characteristic  of  heathenism ;  also 
moral  action  is  as  yet  obscured  by  the  thought  of  the  meri- 
toriousness  of  the  same.  These  remaining  traces  of  heathen 
and  Jewish  views  were,  in  their  ground-thought  at  least, 
eradicated  by  Augustine ;  the  thought  of  unmerited  grace 
whereby  man  attained  to  the  capability  of  a  moral  life,  and 
to  the  highest  good,  was  placed  by  him  in  the  foreground, 
and  thus  the  foundation  was  laid  for  a  true  evangelical  ethical 
system.  His  doctrine  (far  exceeding  Scripture  warrant)  of 
the  total  unfreedom,  for  good,  of  the  natural  will  and  of  an 
unconditional  election  of  grace,  has  a  less  misleading  influ- 
ence on  his  moral  views  than  might  have  been  expected, — it 
simply  gives  to  them  the  character  of  deep  earnestness,  but 


194  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  31. 

does  not  dampen  the  power  of  moral  admonition. — Man  in 
his  enslavement  under  sin  to  moral  unfreedom  is  raised  to 
real  moral  freedom  only  on  the  basis  of  a  divine  election  of 
grace,  by  means  of  a  spiritual  regeneration  through  faith  in 
Christ.  Natural  man  is  not  able  to  will  and  to  accomplish 
the  truly  good ;  the  virtues  of  heathen  and  of  unbelievers, 
though  indeed  often  very  admirable,  have  yet  no  real  merit, 
no  truly  moral  worth.  Between  virtue  and  vice  there  lies  no 
medium  ground ;  whatever  is  not  virtue,  and  hence  whatever 
springs  not  from  faith,  from  the  right  intentio,  is  necessarily 
sinful ;  natural  man  is  free  only  to  evil ;  even  the  desire  for 
redemption  is  lacking  to  him,  and  is  purely  a  work  of  gra- 
cious influence.  Still  there  are  among  sin-dominated  hu- 
manity great  differences  of  personal  guilt,  and  even  the 
heathen  have  yet  a  free  choice  between  the  more,  and  the 
less,  evil ;  to  true  righteousness,  however,  they  cannot  attain. 
—  The  destination  of  man,  and  hence  his  moral  goal  and  the 
highest  good,  is  to  return  to  God  from  whom  he  has  fallen 
away,  to  become  reunited  with  Him  by  God-likeness.  This 
is  possible  only  through  love  to  God,  which  is  consequently 
the  ground  and  essence  of  all  good.  The  world  and  what- 
ever belongs  to  it,  is  not  the  goal  of  moral  effort, — is  not  the 
highest  good  itself,  but  only  a  means  to  this  end.  L«ve  to 
the  world  in  itself  is  therefore  not  true  moral  love,  but  is  only 
lust ;  spirit  never  has  true  love  save  to  spirit.  But  man  is 
not  to  himself  the  highest  end,  because  he  is  not  per  se  capa- 
ble of  blessedness ;  the  highest  end,  and  hence  the  highest 
object  of  love,  is  God,  upon  whom  all -blessedness  rests.  All 
true  love  rests  on  love  to  God,  and  to  love  men  otherwise 
than  in  God,  is  sinful ;  also  self-love  is  only  then  moral  when 
it  flows  from  love  to  God.  Hence  love  to  God  is  the  first  and 
highest  command,  and  the  one  from  which  all  others  spring ; 
this  love  works  obedience  to  God's  command,  wherein  alone 
rests  all  the  moral  worth  of  an  action ;  love  is  the  sole  true 
motive  to  the  good, — fear  is  only  a  feeble  incipiency  of 
wisdom.  Hence  virtue  is  in  its  essence  simply  love  to  God, — 
is  nothing  other  than  ordo  amoris*  and  therefore  obedience  to 
the  divine  will,  which  will  is  the  eternal  law  of  all  morality. 

*  De  civ.  dei,  xv,  22. 


§  31.J  SEVEN   VIRTUES.  195 

Love  to  God  as  the  ground-virtue  unfolds  itself  into  the 
four  cardinal  virtues  :  TEMPERANTIA,  amor  integrum  se  prac- 
lens  ei,  quod  amatur ;  FORTITUDO,  amor  facile  tolerans  omnia 
propter  quod  amatur;  JUSTITIA,  amor  soli  amato  serciens  et 
proptcrea  recte  dominant;  PRUDENTIA,  amor  ea,  quibus  adju- 
vatur,  db  eis,  quibus  impeditur,  sagaciter  seligens*  It  is  with 
great  ingenuity  that  the  Greek  classification  of  virtue  is  thus 
embraced  and  presented  in  higher  unity,  as  an  unfolding  of  love 
under  four  forms,  but  the  violence  of  the  process  is  too  mani- 
fest not  to  make  felt  at  once  the  unadaptedness  of  the  Greek 
classification  for  the  Christian  idea ;  it  is  new  wine  in  old  ves- 
sels. To  these  virtues,  borrowed  from  Greek  philosophy, 
Augustine  adds,  as  superordinate  thereto,  the  three  virtues 
subsequently  known  as  the  theological  virtues :  faith,  love  and 
hope,  without  succeeding  in  placing  them  into  a  clear  relation 
to  the  other  four;  t  and  this  unclear  and  clumsy  twofold 
classification  prevails  from  now  henceforth  and  until  the 
close  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Faith  springs  from  the  merely 
germinal  love  to  God ;  but  only  from  faith  springs  the  true 
all-dominating  love  to  God,  and  from  faith  and  love  springs 
hope,  namely,  a  longing  for  the  highest  good,  for  the  blissful 
enjoyment  of  God  in  union  with  Him,  in  the  vision  of  Him, — 
in  perfected  love ;  objectively  therefore  the  highest  good  is 
God  himself  as  the  perfect  truth,  the  infinite  eternal  life 
itself. 

Evil  or  sin  is  in  essence  and  origin  a  lack  of  true  love,  that 
is,  a  love  not  to  God  but  to  the  world  and  its  lusts,  and 
primarily  a  love  to  self  that  does  not  rest  on  love  to  God, 
that  is  self-seeking.  From  self-seeking  springs  evil  desire 
(concupiscentia)  which  becomes  a  power  over  the  spirit.  Evil 
become  real  in  no  sense  whatever  from  God,  but  through  the 
free  choice,  through  the  guilt,  of  free  creatures, — is  a  guilty 
ruining  of  the  originally  good.  The  distinction  (referring 
primarily  to  the  administration  and  practice  of  penance)  be- 
tween venial  and  mortal  sins  (peccata  venalia  et  mortifera  8. 
mortulia),  Augustine  defines  in  the  thenceforth  prevailing 
sense,  thus, — that  the  latter  include  all  sins  consciously  and 

*  De  moribus  eccl.,  c.  15  (25)  sqq.,  25  (46) ;  De  lib.  arl.,  1,  13 ;  2,  10. 
t  Enchiridion,  s.  deflde,  spe  et  cMritate /  de  doctr.  christ.,  1,  37  ;  3, 10, 
ft  al. 

14 


196  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  31. 

voluntarily  committed  against  the  Decalogue,  and  particu- 
larly idolatry,  adultery,  and  murder,  which,  unless  atoned  for 
by  ecclesiastical  penance,  involve  damnation,  whereas  the 
former  may  be  atoned  for,  or  gotten  rid  of,  by  the  repentant 
person  himself,  without  special  church-penance,  through 
prayer,  alms-giving  and  fasting.* 

As  to  the  requirements  of  morality  in  detail,  Augustine  is 
no  less  earnest  than  judicious,  forming  quite  a  contrast  to 
the  manifold  laxities  of  the  age,  and  to  many  errors  and  ex- 
treme views  of  earlier  Church  Fathers,  and,  on  the  whole,  he 
conceived  of  Christian  morality  much  more  profoundly  than 
had  yet  been  done  by  church  writers ;  but  his  more  especial 
merit  consists  in  this,  that  he  brought  clearly  and  definitely 
into  prominence  the  foundation  of  all  morality,  namely,  faith 
and  the  essence  of  faith,  to  wit,  love  to  God,  and  that  he 
referred  the  validity  of  outward  works  more  definitely  than 
had  been  done  before  to  the  inner  disposition  of  the  actor. 
A  truly  evangelical  spirit  breathes  through  the  greater  part 
of  his  moral  views ;  and  even  where,  in  harmony  with"  the 
spirit  of  the  times,  he  laudingly  emphasizes  outward  good 
works,  and  particularly  fasting,  alms-giving  and  monastic 
asceticism,  he  still  always  lays  greater  stress  on  the  state  of 
the  heart  than  on  the  work  itself.  His  greatest  departure 
from  a  purely  evangelical  consciousness  is  the  recognition  of 
the,  then,  already  long-prevalent  distinction  between  the  di- 
vine commands  and  the  divine  counsels;  the  latter  refer  es- 
sentially to  the  giving  up  of  allowed  enjoyments,  and  espe- 
cially to  the  abstaining  from  marriage.  The  man  who  leaves 
the  counsels  unobserved,  sins  not ;  he  who  fulfills  them,  ac- 
quires for  himself  higher  virtue ;  wedlock-virtue  is  merely 
human  virtue,  but  virginal  chastity  is  angelic  virtue.  Mar- 
riage is  indeed  per  se  holy  and  pure,  and  prevailed  also  in  the 
state  of  sinlessness,t  but  for  the  state  of  sinfulness,  from 
which  in  fact  the  redeemed  are  not  as  yet  totally  free,  celib- 
acy is  higher  than  marriage ;  and  if  all  men  would  but  live 
unmarried,  there  would  thereby  be  straightway  brought 
about  the  end  of  the  world  and  the  perfection  of  the  king- 

*  Sermo,  351 ;  EncTiir.^  70,  11 ;  comp.  Defideet  op.,  c.  19  (34) ;  He  civ. 
dei,  21,  27. 
t  D«  Geneti  ad  litt.,  9,  3  iqg.t  1. 


§  31.]  ST.   AUGUSTINE — BOETHIUS.  197 

dom  of  God.*  But  Augustine  wisely  avoids  the  self-contra- 
dictory extremes  of  Jerome,  and  tolerates  even  second  mar- 
riages.— In  contrast  to  heathen  ethics,  which  looks,  for  all 
salvation,  to  the  State  and  to  its  unlimited  sway,  Christians, 
even  in  the  days  of  Augustine,  placed  (not  without  very  good 
reasons)  very  little  confidence  in  the  worldly  State.  The 
Christian  state — to  the  realization  of  which  the  Germanic  na- 
tions were  more  especially  called — had  not  yet  become  real ; 
and  the  nominally-Christian  Roman  State  lingered  as  yet  es- 
sentially in  heathen  forms.  In  his  ingenious  work  De  civitate 
dei,  Augustine  contrasts  with  the  earthly  State  the  purely 
spiritual  divine  State,  deriving  the  former  from  the  self-seek- 
ing of  God-forsaking  man,  as  prevailing  since  the  brother- 
murder  of  Cain, — since  which  time  the  earthly  and  heavenly 
State  have  been  in  a  condition  of  divorce  (xv,  5).  "The  two 
kinds  of  love  produced  two  kinds  of  state :  the  earthly  state 
springs  from  self-love  which  ripens  into  contempt  of  God ; 
the  heavenly,  from  love  to  God  which  ripens  into  contempt 
of  self."  (xiv,  28).  The  divine  State  develops  itself  inde- 
pendently of  the  sinful  earthly  one,  until  it  attains  to  its  true 
manifestation  in  Christ ;  this  state  is  not  an  outwardly  force- 
exercising  one,  but  a  spiritual  kingdom,  and  is  indeed  des- 
tined to  sanctify  and  transfigure  the  earthly  State, — to  change 
it  from  a  merely  world-state  into  an  organ  of  the  divine  state, 
but  not  to  merge  itself  into  it. 

The  great  decline  of  the  scientific  life  in  the  Occident  from 
and  after  the  close  of  the  fifth  century,  manifested  its  effects 
also  in  the  field  of  ethics.  Little  more  was  done  than  to 
make  collections  of  the  opinions  (sententice)  of  the  Fathers, 
and  to  apply  them  to  purposes  of  Church-discipline  and  of 
popular  instruction.  But  there  was  no  further  creative  pro- 
duction. In  reducing  to  greater  system  the  discipline  of 
penance,  the  interest  was  turned  rather  to  the  discriminating, 
defining  and  classifying  of  sins  than  to  the  scientific  exami- 
nation of  the  moral  in  general.  The  knowledge  of  Greek 
ethics  disappeared  almost  entirely,  and  the  work  of  Boethius, 
De  consolatione  philosophies  (about  A.D.  542)  t, — which  is  but 
feebly  touched  with  Christian  influence,  and  which  for  the 

*  De  Sancta  mrginitate  ;  De  bono  conjugali  ;  De  nuptiis  et  con&ipis. 

t  Fr.  Mtzsch  :  System  des  Soeth.,  1860,  p.  42  sqq. 


198  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  31. 

most  part  expresses,  eclectively,  mere  Graeco-Roman  philos- 
ophy,— passed  in  the  earlier  Middle  Ages  for  an  excellent 
work  of  Christian  philosophy. — Gregory  the  Great,  basing 
himself  on  Augustine,  wrote  moral  expositions  (Mornlid)  of 
the  Book  of  Job,  of  Solomon's  Song,  etc.,  and  other  rather 
edificatory  than  scientific  works  of  the  same  class ;  most  in- 
fluential was  his  Regula  pastoralis,  which  treated  of  the  cler- 
ical calling  more  especially  under  its  moral  phase.  Isidore 
of  Hispalis  (Seville)  (ob.  636)  treats,  especially  in  his  Sententice, 
on  many  moral  points,  mostly,  however,  by  way  of  judicious 
digesting  from  preceding  Fathers,  especially  from  Augus- 
tine and  Gregory  the  Great, — furnishing  for  the  early  Mid- 
dle Ages  a  principal  help  in  ethical  study. — In  the  Greek 
Church  Maximus  the  Confessor  (ob.  622)  gives  in  his  "  Chapters 
on  Love  "  *  a  tolerably  complete  presentation  of  ethics ;  John 
Damascenus  (ob.  754)  furnishes,  in  his  chief  work,  the  ground 
thoughts  for  an  ethical  treatise,  and  in  his  "Holy  Parallels  " 
a  rich  collection  of  patristic  sentences. 

Standing  entirely  apart,  and  of  influence  only  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  is  the  pseudo-Dionysius  the  Areopagite  (fifth  century) 
.who  introduced  Neo-Platonic  mysticism  into  Christianity,  and 
whose  Pantheistically-inclined  world-theory  invades  here  and 
there  also  the  moral  sphere,  f  God  is  all  in  all, — is  the  being 
in  all  being,  the  life  in  all  that  lives,  is  the  good  absolutely. 
Hence  evil  cannot  exist  by  itself,  but  must  always  be  a  negating 
something  on  the  good, — is  not  an  existing  something,  but  es- 
sentially only  a  lack  and  more  an  appearance  than  a  reality, 
and  it  turns  again  into  the  good.  The  goal  of  all  life,  and  hence 
also  of  the  moral,  is  the  returning  into  God,  the  changing  into 
God,  of  whatever  is  as  yet  distinct  from  God ;  the  highest  wis- 
dom is  therefore  the  turning-away  of  the  spirit  from  whatever 
is  not  God, — the  unclouded  beholding  of  the  one,  the  nameless, 
the  pure  divine  light,  in  which  God  directly  imparts  himself  to 
man.  An  outwardly  active  morality  is,  according  to  this  view, 
the  opposite  of  true  wisdom. 

*  Kftydhaia  irepi  aydirrjf. 

t  Especially  in   De  divinis  nominibus ;  De  ccelesti  hierarchia ;  D« 
mygt.  theol. 


§  32.]  CASUISTIC  ETHICS.  199 


II.  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

SECTION  XXXH. 

The  ecclesiastical  consciousness,  as  having  arrived 
now  at  greater  repose,  but  as  also  in  a  state  of  spirit- 
ual paralysis,  limits  itself  primarily  to  the  preserving 
and  digesting  of  the  views  already-attained  to,  and  to 
the  constructing  of  systems  of  life-rules  on  the  basis 
of  the  decisions  of  the  Fathers  and  of  church  councils, 
— at  best  elucidated  anew  by  examples  from  the 
Scriptures  or  from  the  legends  of  the  saints.  The 
practical  decisions  on  the  subject  of  church  penance 
gave  rise  gradually,  in  connection  with  these  collec- 
tions of  rules,  to  a  very  minutely-specifying  system  of 
casuistry,  which,  however,  related  primarily  chiefly 
to  transgressions.  The  moral  views  themselves  were 
already  largely  estranged  from  evangelical  purity,  and 
an  ascetic  monk-morality,  not  binding  upon  all,  passed 
as  the  ideal  of  Christian  virtue,  while  the  general 
morality,  binding  upon  all,  .was  to  a  large  degree 
neglected. 

The  libri  pcenitentiales,  for  the  use  of  confessors,  are  based  for 
the  most  part  on  the  decisions  of  synods  and  on  ancient  practice, 
but  are  also  in  some  degree  complemented  by  their  respective 
authors;  they  give  for  the  most  part  little  more  than  imper- 
fectly classified  and  illogically  connected  registers  of  single  sins 
and  of  the  church-penances  and  penalties  imposed  therefor, 
the  latter  of  course  without  established  and  certain  norms 
(Theodore  of  Canterbury,  Bede,  Halitgarius  and  others).  These 
books  form  the  beginning  of  a  casuistical  treatment  of  ethics, 
which  was  subsequently  extended  to  other  questions  than  sins, 
especially  to  cases  of  conscience. — Attempts  at  a  more  inde- 
pendent and  more  connected,  but  yet,  on  the  whole,  purely 


200  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§32. 

practical  treatment  of  ethics — mostly  simply  on  single  points, — 
were  made  by  Alcuin  (De  mrtutibus  et  vitiis  ;  De  ratione  ani- 
mce),  largely  borrowing  from  Augustine;  also  by  Rhdbanua 
Maurus,  by  Jonas,  Bishop  of  Orleans  (about  828),  by  the  earnest- 
ly sin-rebuking  Ratherius  of  Verona  (ol.  974),  by  Damiani  (ob. 
1072),  the  excessive  eulogist  of  self-castigation,  and  by  the 
learned  FuTbert  of  Chartres  (ob.  1029). 

In  proportion  as  the  zeal  of  love  abated,  and  worldly- 
mindedness  increased  in  the  church  at  large,  in  the  same 
proportion  arose,  as  in  antithesis  to  this  secularism  of  the 
church,  a  zeal  for  a  special  holiness  transcending  the  general 
morality  required  of  all.  Directions  for  the  monkish  life 
form  a  favorite  topic  for  ecclesiastical  moralists ;  the  merits 
of  the  ascetic  life  are  more  warmly  lauded  than  the  practical 
Christian  life  in  the  civil  or  domestic  spheres,  and  wedlock 
is  progressively  more  deeply  disparaged  as  in  contrast  to  en- 
tire renunciation ;  consorts  are  loaded  with  praise,  who  divorce 
themselves  in  order  to  practice  such  renunciation ;  and  accord- 
ing to  Damiani's  assertion,  even  St.  Peter  had  to  undergo 
the  martyr-death  in  order  to  wash  away  the  stains  of  hia 
wedlock-life  (De  perfect ione  monach,  c.  6). 


SECTION  XXXIII. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  especially 
Scholasticism,  was  occupied  for  a  long  while  almost 
exclusively  with  speculations  on  dogmatical  and 
metaphysical  questions,  leaving  ethics  almost  un- 
touched ;  wherever,  however,  it  brought  ethics  within 
the  sphere  of  its  intellectual  activity,  there  it  treated 
the  same  merely  in  connection  with  dogmatics,  and 
for  the  most  part  in  the  light  of  the  opinions  of 
Augustine,  and,  later,  of  those  of  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
— often  buuglingly  combining  the  latter  with  the 
former.— The  brilliant  but  idealistico-Pantheistieally 
inclined  mystical  philosophy  of  John  Scotus  Erigena, 
which  threw  its  lights,  as  well  as  its  shades,  into  the 


§33.]  ERIGENA'S  PANTHEISM.  201 

field  of  morality,  seems — as  not  understood — to  have 
had  little  influence  on  subsequent  ethics,  save  in  the 
mystical  school. 

The  spiritualistico-idealistic  tendency  of  the  Schoolmen 
could  primarily  treat  of  the  moral  only  collaterally,  at  least 
until  the  dogmatical  and  metaphysical  fields  had  attained  to 
some  degree  of  philosophical  maturity  and  self-consciousness. 
The  potent  influence  of  Augustine  made  itself  felt  also  in  the 
ethical  field,  and  his  ground-thoughts  re-appear  in  almost  all 
the  Schoolmen.  The  freedom  of  the  will  is,  however,  dis- 
tinctly recognized,  although,  in  man  after  the  fall,  as  in  a 
trammeled  condition ;  but  also  Greek  philosophy  was  power- 
fully influential  on  ethics,  not  merely  as  to  the  form,  but  also 
as  to  the  subject-matter.  The  Platonic  classification  of  the 
virtues  was  already  early  combined  with  the  three  theological 
virtues,  notwithstanding  the  inconsistency  and  impractica- 
bility of  such  a  uniting  of  two  entirely  different  stand-points. 
In  how  far  John  Scotus'  attempted  translation  of  Aristotle's 
Ethics  into  Latin  was  of  influence,  is  doubtful ;  the  applica- 
tion of  Aristotle  to  Christian  ethics  appears  in  a  more  direct ' 
form,  first,  in  the  thirteenth  century. 

The  deep-thinking  John  Scotus  Erigena  (at  the  court  of 
Charles  the  Bald,  then  at  Oxford,  ob.  886),  who  was  not  un- 
derstood by  his  own  age,  and  who  had  but  little  connection 
with  it  even  in  his  errors,  touches  in  his  chief  work,  De  di- 
visione  natures,  also  upon  the  more  general  ethical  topics, 
and  molds  them  to  his  idealistico-Pantheistical  system, — a 
system  based  on  the  Neo-Platonic  views  of  Dionysius  the 
Areopagite,  and  which — very  different  from  recent  natural- 
istic Pantheism — denies  not  the  absolute  personal  God,  but 
on  the  contrary  the  independent  reality  of  the  world.  The 
world  is  only  another  existence-form  of  the  eternal  God  him- 
self ;  God  alone  is  real ;  the  creature,  in  so  far  as  it  is  con- 
ceived as  distinct  from  God,  is  nothing ;  it  exists  only  in  so 
far  as  it  is  wholly  identical  with  God.  God  is  whatever 
truly  exists,  because  He  himself  does  all  and  is  in  all;  G.  d 
in  not  merely  the  most  excellent  part  of  the  creature,  but  He 
is  its  beginning,  its  middle  and  its  end — the  essence  and  true 
being  in  all  things.  The  coming  into  being  of  the  world  is 


202  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  33. 

a  self-outpouring  of  God,  a  theophany.  God  is  manifest  not 
only  in  Christ,  but  also  in  the  entire  universe, — in  the  highest 
degree  in  the  rational  creature,  and  here  indeed  most  purely 
in  the  saints.  The  believing  and  cognizing  of  the  saints 
take  place  solely  through  God ;  God  cognizes  himself  in  man 
as  cognizing  Him.  Man  is  therefore  God's  image,  because 
God  himself  conies  to  manifestation  in  him.  As  now  every 
thing  ideal,  and  hence  the  ideal  world,  precedes,  in  the 
mind  of  God,  its  outward  realization,  so  is  also  the  spirit  of 
man  earlier  than  his  body, — which  latter  is  but  the  shadow 
of  the  spirit,  and  is  in  fact  by  it  created,  and  that  too  as  a 
perfect  and  immortal  one  (ii,  24). — Man,  however,  is  now  no 
longer  in  the  condition  in  which  he  originally  was ;  the  body 
is  frail  and  subject  to  death;  this  condition  can  have  been 
brought  about  only  by  sin.  But  how  is  sin  possible  if  God 
is  in  fact  all  in  all  ?  Answer:  every  thing  is  real  only  in  so 
far  as  it  is  good ;  but  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  good,  it  exists 
not.  Hence  evil  is  a  mere  non-being,  a  merely  negative 
something,  but  in  no  sense  a  real  entity.  God  can  cognize 
only  that  which  is,  not  that  which  is  not,  hence  He  cognizes 
and  knows  not  evil ;  for  if  He  knew  it,  then  it  would  be  real, 
and  hence  would  not  be  evil  (ii,  28).  This  normal  Dei  igno- 
rantia  banishes  evil  from  the  sphere  of  being  into  that  of 
mere  appearance.  All  evil  is  merely  the  shadow  of  the  good, 
and  is  accordingly  only  upon  the  good, — is  essentially  only  a 
lack, — a  non-being,  not  a  positive  entity.  Sin  consists  in 
this,  that  man,  as  on  the  one  hand  identical  with,  and,  on 
the  other,  distinct  from  God,  fixes  his  attention  solely  upon 
this  distinctness  from  God, — directs  himself  toward  himself 
and  toward  nature,  and  not  toward  God  (i,  68;  ii,  12,  25). 
Only  by  this  confessedly  per  se  inexplicable  (v.  36)  fall  into 
sin,  is  it  that  the  body  of  man  became  material  and  mortal 
and  a  clog  to  the  spiritual  life  (ii,  25,  26;  comp.  iv,  12,  14, 
15,  20);  man  thereby  ceased  to  be  truly  a  spirit, — became 
subject  to  natural  desires ;  previously  the  lord  of  nature,  he 
now  became  a  slave  to  it. — The  ultimate  goal  of  all  life,  and 
hence  also  of  the  moral,  is  the  return  into  God  (ii,  2,  11), 
namely,  so  that  this  differentness  from  God,  all  corporeality 
and  individuality,  ceases  and  passes  over  into  God  himself, — 
is  transformed  into  Him  (i,  10 ;  v,  20,  27,  37,  38).  Hence  all 


§34.]  SCHOLASTICISM.  203 

moral  effort  is  directed  toward  this  uniting  of  one's  self  with 
God,  toward  the  breaking  down  of  the  hampering  limits  of 
individual  naturality,  and  realizes  itself  in  a  gradually  pro- 
gressive development  (v,  8,  39).  Morality  must  accordingly 
bear  a  predominantly  spiritualistic  and  ascetic,  negating 
character, — must  disdainfully  turn  itself  away  from  finite 
reality  (iv,  5).  Into  details  Erigena  enters  but  little.  It  is 
perfectly  consequential  in  him  that  he  regards  marriage, 
which  rests  on  the  difference  of  the  sexes,  as  having  origi- 
nated solely  in  consequence  of  sin,  whereas  sinless  man  was 
sexless  (ii,  6;  iv,  12,  28).  And  yet  marriage  is  now  allow- 
able, only,  however,  in  view  of  the  propagation  of  the  race, 
irrespective  of  sensuous  pleasure.  Though  the  mystico- 
speculative  bases  of  these  ethical  thoughts  were  of  a  very 
unchurchly  character,  still  the  thoughts  themselves  answered 
very  well  to  the  ascetic  spirit  of  the  then  prevalent  morality. 


SECTION  XXXIV. 

It  is  only  in  the  twelfth  century  that  ethics  is 
seriously  treated  of  by  scholastic  science; — first  by 
ffildebert  of  Tours  (ob.  1134),  for  the  most  part  in 
the  light  of  the  Roman  Eclectic  and  Stoic  philoso- 
phies ; — then  by  Abelard,  who,  however,  treats,  mostly 
in  a  mere  preliminary  manner,  of  the  more  general 
questions,  giving  proof  of  great  acumen,  but  also 
sometimes  enfeebling  the  significancy  of  sin ; — very 
fruitfully  by  Peter  Lombard,  who  presents,  in  the 
light  of  Augustinian  thoughts,  and  with  the  help  of 
ancient  philosophy,  a  very  clear  and  well-arranged 
total  of  Christian  doctrine,  of  which  ethics,  though 
but  briefly  presented,  constitutes  an  essential  part ; — 
but  with  greatest  thoroughness  and  fullness  by 
Thomas  Aquinas,  who  made  large  use  of  the  Aristo- 
telian philosophy  in  perfecting  a  system  of  Christian 
speculation,  and  that,  too,  without  thereby  working 
serious  detriment  to  the  Christian  idea. — In  Duns 


204  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  34. 

Sootus  a  sophistico-skeptical  treatment  of  ethics  began 
already  to  effect,  in  many  respects,  an  enfeebling  of 
the  moral  idea,  and  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  double- 
dealing  morality  of  the  Jesuits. — Through  almost  all 
the  scholastic  presentations  of  ethics  there  prevails  a 
pretty  great  uniformity  of  spirit  and  manner  of  treat- 
ment, springing  mostly  from  Augustine  and  Aristotle, 
and  subsequently  from  Peter  Lombard  and  Thomas 
Aquinas ;  evangelico-theological  and  ethnico-philo- 
sophical  elements  are  often  brought  together,  without 
that  the  latter  element  is  always  successfully  mastered 
and  molded  into  a  Christian  character.  Ingenious 
arid  often  truly  speculative  processes  of  thought,  but 
frequently  also  trivial  and  fruitless  hair-splittings, 
also  a  pedantic  carrying  out  of  particular  schemata, 
and  a  preference  for  certain  typical  numbers  in  the 
distribution  of  the  subject-matter, — such  are  the  gen- 
eral characteristics  of  scholastic  ethics. 

Contemporaneously  with  scholasticism  prevailed  also 
the  science  of  casuistry,  which  had  also  to  do  with 
practical  life ;  this  science  was  in  fact  influenced  by 
scholasticism  to  a  higher  development,  and  it  attained 
to  its  highest  perfection  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries. 

Hildeb&rt  of  Tours  (about  1100)  treated  ethics  for  the  first 
time  in  a  special  work :  Philosophia  inoralis  de  honesto  et  utili 
(Opp.  Par.  1708,  p.  961  sqq).  In  philosophical  contents  it  is  as 
yet  feeble  and  dependent,  and  belongs  rather  to  the  sphere  of 
Roman  popular  philosophy,  especially  that  of  Cicero  and  Sen- 
eca, than  to  speculative  science  proper;  and  the  Christian  ele- 
ment is  thrown  largely  into  the  shade  by  that  which  is  borrowed 
from  heathen  moralists ;  the  four  Greek  virtues  are  servilely  car- 
ried out ;  the  relation  of  the  honestum  and  utile  is  extensively 
discussed ;  and  as  a  whole  the  work  is  immature  and  superficial. 
— Nearly  cotemporaneously  appears  Abelard^  Ethica,  s.  Scito  te 


§  34.]  ABELARD.  205 

ipsum, — not  a  comprehensive  system,  but  properly  only  a  phil- 
osopliico-theological  introduction  to  ethics ;  it  treats  somewhat 
un-uniformly  of  general  questions,  and  particularly  of  the  essence 
of  sin  and  of  its  imputation.  The  toning-down  of  Christian 
thoughts, — elsewhere  observable  in  Abelard,  in  his  over-estimat- 
ing the  natural  capability  of  man, — shows  itself  also  here.  He 
distinguishes  between  a  natural  tendency  to  evil  (called  by  him 
a  "  will ")  and  the  freely-resolved  approving  of  the  same ;  the 
former  is  not  per  se  sinful  and  forbidden  of  God,  for  it  has  its 
seat  in  the  sensuous  and  fragile  nature  of  man,  and  it  is  not 
even  yet  a  sin  when  it  overcomes  the  reason ;  it  becomes  sin 
only  by  a  real  approving  of  sin ;  and  it  is  for  the  simple  reason 
that  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  evil  in  us,  that  the  virtuous 
opposing  of  it  becomes  a  moral  desert.  From  this  it  follows, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  man,  in  virtue  of  his  very  nature,  cannot 
avoid  all  evil,  though  indeed  this  unavoidable  evil  is  not  im- 
puted to  him  as  guilt,  and,  on  the  other,  that  the  essence  of  sin 
consists  wholly  and  alone  in  the  conscious  choosing  of  it,  and 
neither  in  the  evil  tendency  preceding  it,  nor  in  the  act  pro- 
ceeding therefrom.  By  the  carrying-out  of  an  evil  intention 
the  guilt  of  that  intention  becomes  not  greater,  and  by  the 
omitting  of  its  carrying-out,  not  less.  Moral  merit  and  guilt 
lie  consequently  entirely  and  alone  in  the  disposition  ;  actions 
themselves,  per  se  considered,  are  morally  indifferent.  Hence 
he  who  does  a  bad  act  without  a  bad  intention,  does  not  sin. 
True,  there  is  necessary  also  in  order  to  the  truly  good  not 
merely  a  well-meaning,  but  also  a  correctly-cognizing  intention. 
Therefore  it  is  that,  while,  because  of  the  heathens'  lack  of  a 
correct  knowledge  of  the  law  and  the  truth,  their  unbelief  and 
even  their  persecuting  of  the  Christian  martyrs  cannot  be  im- 
puted to  them  as  real  sins,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  they  cannot 
without  faith  become  really  saved ;  and  the  prayer  of  Christ  on 
the  cross  for  his  persecutors  shows  that  they  did  wrong  in 
ignorance,  and  were  in  need  of  forgiveness. — There  are  thoughts 
here  in  Abelard  which,  while  per  se  true,  are  yet  one-sidedly 
pushed  into  the  extreme,  and  thereby  become  erroneous.  Thus, 
he  explains  the  distinction,  prevalent  in  the  ethics  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  between  mortal  and  venial  sins,  to  mean  this,  that  under 
the  latter  we  are  to  understand  those  the  immorality  of  which 
is  indeed  known  to  us  in  general,  but  is  not  clearly  conscious 


206  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  34. 

and  present  to  our  mind  at  the  moment  of  our  consenting  to 
them,  and  which  are  consequently  committed  rather  in  a  state 
of  forgetfulness.  The  ethics  of  Abelard  was,  not  without  rea- 
son, severely  assailed  by  Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  and  is  in  many 
respects  a  fore-runner  of  the  system  of  the  Jesuits ;  but  in  his 
own  day  the  conscience  of  the  church'  was  as  yet  somewhat 
quick  and  tender,  and  the  synod  of  Sens  (1140)  expressly  con- 
demned the  more  questionable  features  of  the  same. 

The  subject  of  ethics  was  treated  with  great  skill,  but  rather 
ingeniously  than  profoundly,  by  Peter  Lombard  (ob.  1160),  more 
especially  in  the  third  book  of  his  Libri  sententiarum, — a  work 
which  was  for  later  schoolmen  a  very  influential  model  and  a 
high  authority,  though  the  relatively  brief  manner  of  treatment 
touches  only  upon  the  principal  points.  With  a  fully-developed 
system  we  are  not  as  yet  furnished ;  it  is  rather  a  dialectical 
analysis  and  examination  of  ideas  than  a  profound  speculative 
development  from  a  fundamental  principle.  The  ethical  notions 
are  presented  first  in  definitions,  then  proved  and  illustrated  by 
texts  from  Scripture  and  from  the  Fathers,  and  thereupon  fol- 
low dialectical  inquiries,  comparisons  of  opposed  views,  and  a 
definitive  judgment. 

The  notion  "good"  has  both  an  objective  and  a  subjective 
significancy.  The  good  as  object  is  the  goal  of  the  subjective 
good,  the  good  will ;  this  good  object  is  blessedness,  eternal 
life  in  God,  and  hence  God  himself  in  so  far  as  he  comes  into 
communion  with  man  (II,  Dftt.  38,  40).  The  presupposition 
of  all  morally  good  is  will-freedom.  This  freedom  is  primarily 
a  threefold  one :  freedom  from  necessity,  freedom  from  sin  as  a 
dominating  power,  and  freedom  from  misery.  The  first  is  un- 
forfeitable, — exists  also  in  sinful  man ;  the  second  is  enjoyed  by 
the  redeemed,  the  third  by  the  saved.  Before  the  fall  man  had 
perfect  freedom, — could,  by  his  own  strength,  keep  free  from 
sin,  though  not  attain  to  perfection  save  as  aided  by  divine 
grace,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  he  could  in  his  own  strength  also 
turn  to  sin.  Hence  will-freedom  is  that  capacity  of  the  rational 
will  whereby  it,  by  the  assistance  of  divine  grace  (gracia  assist- 
ente),  chooses  the  good,  or,  by  not  sharing  in  the  same  (eadcm  de- 
sistente),  the  evil.  In  the  rational  will  there  is  a  natural  striving, 
though  but  feeble  (licet  tenuiter  el  exiliter),  to  choose  the  good ; 
but,  by  the  assistance  of  grace,  it  becomes  powerful  and  effica- 


§  34.]  PETER  LOMBARD.  207 

cious  (efficaciter),  whereas  man  per  se  can  effectually  turn  to 
evil.  By  the  possibility  of  choice  in  the  two  directions,  human 
liberty  differs  from  divine  liberty,  which  latter  can  eternally 
choose  only  the  good.  After  the  fall  into  sin,  the  truth  :  poterat 
peecare  et  not  peccare,  was  changed  into,  potest  peccare  et  non 
potest  non  peccare;  that  is,  into  a  freedom  very  much  tram- 
meled indeed,  though  not  yet  sunk  to  necessity ;  the  inwardly 
enfeebled  and  corrupted  nature  of  man  impels  him  constantly 
to  sin,  and  allows  him  not  to  will  and  to  accomplish  the  truly 
good.  The  redeemed,  however,  is  free  from  this  predominancy 
of  evil  desire, — has  indeed  as  yet  moral  weakness,  but  also  the 
assistance  of  divine  grace ;  hence  he  can  also  yet  sin, — in  fact 
it  is  still  true  of  him :  non  posse  non  peccare,  but  only  as  to  venial 
sins,  not  as  to  mortal  sins.  In  his  ultimate  perfection,  however, 
the  redeemed  attains  to  a  condition  transcending  the  condition 
of  unfallen  man,  namely :  non  posse  peccare, — where  all  weakness 
is  overcome,  and  man  has  risen  to  a  moral  impossibility  of 
choosing  evil;  thus  the  threefold  freedom  becomes  a  fourfold 
one  (II,  Dist.  24,  25). 

Virtue  is  the  right  quality  of  the  human  will  as  turned  toward 
the  good.  The  ground-virtue  is,  therefore,  love  to  Gorl,  as  the 
substance  of  all  good ;  and  all  virtues  are  closely  involved  in 
each  other,  so  that  he  who  truly  possesses  one,  possesses  them 
all,  and  he  to  whom  one  is  lacking,  lacks  them  all ;  no  one  can 
have  simply  one  virtue,  for  love  is  the  mother  of  all  the  virtues, 
and  he  who  has  the  mother  has*  also  the  children  (III,  Dist.  36). 
In  agreement  with  Augustine,  Peter  Lombard  presents  three 
chief-virtues,  which,  however,  are  only  different  phases  of  the 
one  love  to  God,  namely  :  faith,  hope,  love  (fides,  spes,  charitas). 
(1)  FIDES  est  virtus,  qua  creduntur,  qua  non  videntur,  namely,  in 
the  sphere  of  the  religious ;  this  faith  is  threefold : — (a)  credere 
DEO,  to  believe  the  word  of  God ;  (&)  credere  DEUM,  to  believe  in 
the  existence  of  God ;  both  these  forms  of  faith  are  possible  to 
the  evil ;  (<•)  credere  IN  DETTM,  to  love  God  in  faith,  and  to  unite 
one's  self  with  him ;  this  is  true  faith,  which  leads  also  to  truly 
good  works  (III,  Dist.  23).  (2)  SPES  est  virtus,  qua,  spiritualia 
et  ceterna  *bona  sperantur,  i.  e.,  cum  fiducia  exspectantur.  This 
virtue  is  only  briefly  and  insufficiently  developed,  and  is  not 
clearly  enough  distinguished  from  the  first;  for  the  statement 
that  hope  refers  only  to  future  good,  while  faith  refers  also  to 


208  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  34. 

evil  and  to  the  past  and  to  the  present  (III,  Dist.,  26),  gives, 
after  all,  only  the  difference  of  a  part  from  the  whole.  (3)  CHAR- 
IT  AS  eat  dilectio,  qua  diligitur  deus  propter  se,  et  proximus  prop- 
ter  deum  Tel  in  deo;  God  must  be  loved  for  his  own  sake,  but 
our  neighbor  (and  every  human  being  is  such)  only  for  God's 
sake  (III,  Dist.  27  sqq.). — From  another  point  of  view, — and 
which  is  not  properly  brought  into  harmony  with  the  first,  but 
only  joined  to  it — four  other  virtues  (virtutes  principals  vel 
cardinales)  are  adopted,  after  the  example  of  Plato  and  Augus- 
tine, and  presented,  namely:  just itia,  fortitudo  (which  manifests 
itself  in  suffering),  prudentia,  and  temperantia  (III,  33) ;  after 
which,  without  any  further  development  of  these  four  virtues, 
are  given  the  seven  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  (taken  from  Isa.  xi, 
2,  3,  in  the  Vulgate  version,  namely :  wisdom,  understanding, 
counsel,  strength,  knowledge,  piety,  God-fearing),  as  the  condi- 
tions of  the  practice  of  virtue,  and  as  spiritual  virtues.  Some 
further  discussion  of  special  points  is  given  in  connection  with 
a  presentation  of  the  ten  commandments  and  of  the  sacraments. 

In  the  steps  of  Peter  Lombard  follows,  in  all  essential  points, 
Alexander  Hales  (ob.  1245),  though  he  develops  some  points 
more  fully,  and  contributes  thereto  original  matter, — especially 
is  this  the  case  in  his  discussion  of  the  moral  law,  which  he 
distinguishes  into  the  natural,  the  Mosaic,  and  the  evangelical 
(Summa  univ.  theol.,  pars  III).  He  separates  the  moral  part  of 
theology  more  distinctly  than  had  yet  been  done  from  the  dog- 
matical, as  the  "doctrine  of  manners,"  and  distributes  it  into 
the  doctrine,  first,  of  the  divine  law,  second,  of  grace  and  the 
virtues,  and,  third,  of  the  fruit  of  virtue. — (William  of  Paris 
[ob.  1249]  discussed  the  more  important  points  of  morality  in 
separate  treatises  grounded  on  Augustine  and  Aristotle).  More 
learned,  and  especially  distinguished  by  extensive  use  of  Aris- 
totle, are  the  ethical  portions  of  the  writings  of  Albertus 
Magnus  (ob.  1280),  though  in  other  respects  they  do  not  con- 
tain very  much  original  speculation,  and  in  some  respects 
they  show  already  a  strong  casuistical  tendency. 

It  is  through  Thomas  Aquinas  that  scholastic  ethics  was 
most  highly  perfected  both  in  form  and  in  substance,  and 
raised  to  a  system  of  profound  speculation.  His  great  work, 
Summa  theologies,  prima  et  secunda  secunda,  combines,  in  com- 
prehensive thoroughness,  a  clear  intellectual  insight  with 


§  34.]  THOMAS  AQUINAS.  209 

deep  religious  knowledge  and  moral  life  experience.  The 
style  of  presentation  is  indeed  somewhat  discursive,  especially 
in  the  citing  and  refuting  of  opposite  opinions,  and  runs  often 
into  unprofitable  distinctions  and  splittings  of  ideas,  but  the 
substantial  contents  are  in  the  main  so  sound  and  excellent, 
that  the  almost  autocratical  authority  enjoyed  by  Thomas 
Aquinas,  especially  in  the  field  of  ethics — (an  authority  which 
has  maintained  itself  unabated  in  the  Romish  Church  up  to 
the  present  day) — is  essentially  a  well-merited  one ;  the  later 
ethics  of  the  Romish  Church  could  indeed  fall  below  this 
model,  but  it  has  not  surpassed  it ;  and  also  for  Protestant 
ethics  have  the  works  of  this  author  been  of  great  influence, 
and  they  are  even  yet  of  weighty  import. 

The  ethics  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  which  is  directly  connected 
with  his  dogmatics,  is  distributed  into  a  general  and  a  special 
part,  of  which  the  former  treats  of  the  virtues  and  vices  in 
general,  and  the  latter  of  the  same  in  detail,  so  that  the 
whole  is  made  to  appear  predominantly,  though  not  exclu- 
sively, as  the  doctrine  of  virtue. — Man  is  the  image  of  God 
principally  in  virtue  of  his  reason ;  but  an  essential  element 
of  reason  is  the  freedom  of  the  will,  namely,  the  free  deter- 
mining of  our  own  activity.  All  activity,  and  hence  also 
that  of  irrational  creatures,  has  an  end ;  hence  human  activ- 
ity must  have  a  rational  end,  and  one  which  man  knows  as 
such,  and  which  is  aimed  at  by  free  will-determination, 
whereas  irrational  creatures  seek  their  end  unconsciously  and 
from  natural  instinct.  But  rational  ends  are  such  only  in  so 
far  as  they  do  not  constitute  a  mere  interminable  plurality, 
but  converge  and  terminate  in  one  last  and  highest  good, 
upon  which  consequently  all  rational  activity  is  directed. 
This  one  highest  end,  and  hence  the  highest  good,  which  the 
rational  creature  seeks  to  attain  to,  cannot  consist  in  outward, 
perishable,  and  hence  unessential  things,  but  only  in  the  one 
absolutely  imperishable,  the  divine,  namely,  in  communion 
with  God,  and  hence  in  the  absolutely  perfect  life  of  the 
rational  creature, — in  blessedness.  God  is  the  objective,  bless- 
edness the  subjective,  phase  of  the  highest  good.  The  human 
soul  per  se,  and  without  being  united  with  God,  cannot  be 
happy ;  hence  the  highest  good  is  not  a  something  belonging 
to  the  soul  per  se, — has  its  ground  not  in  the  soul  but  in  God; 


210  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  34. 

the  highest  good  in  its  objective  phase,  considered  as  an  ob- 
ject, is  not  a  created,  but  an  uncreated  and  divine  entity, 
which,  however,  is  appropriated  to  himself  by  man.  But 
this  uncreated  entity  cannot  be  appropriated  by  sensuous 
perception,  but  solely  through  a  spiritual  grasping,  through 
cognizing,  through  spiritual  beholding  or  intuiting.  Hence 
blessedness  rests  on  an.  intuiting  of  God,  and  toward  this, 
therefore,  the  rational  activity  of  the  soul  is  directed.  This 
blessedness,  as  resting  on  the  highest  activity  of  the  reason, 
cannot  be  wholly  reached  in  this  earthly,  manifoldly-limited 
and  dependent  life,  and,  moreover,  as  being  of  an  unending 
nature,  it  cannot  be  merited  by  finite  actions, — it  can  only  be 
appropriated  by  religious  intuition,  by  contemplation,  namely, 
in  jthat  God  lovingly  imparts  himself,  and  therewith  at  the 
same  time  blessedness,  to  man.  This  appropriating  is,  how- 
ever, not  a  merely  passive  bearing,  not  a  will-less  beholding, 
but  a  willing,  loving,  and  love-enjoying  embracing  of  the 
divine.  In  that  the  rational  striving  attains  to  perfect  satis- 
faction and  rest  in  God  as  the  highest  good,  blessedness  is 
enjoyment,  the  feeling  of  delight;  this  is,  however,  but  one 
of  the  phases  of  blessedness, — the  other  is  the  visional  cog- 
nizing.— The  will  of  man, — ever  directed  toward  a  good, — 
is  indeed  free, — can  be  forced  neither  through  an  outward 
nor  through  an  inward  power  to  a  given  choice,  nor  is  it  so 
forced  by  God,  for  God  leaves  every  created  being  to  act 
according  to  its  inborn  nature ;  and  hence  the  will  can  direct 
itself  as  well  to  a  false  and  merely  seeming  good,  as  to  the 
true  good, — but  this  true  good  itself  stands  not  within  the 
free  determination  of  man,  but  is  absolutely  determined  by 
God  and  by  the  inner  necessity  of  the  case  itself ;  man  can, 
freely-willing,  strive  for  it  or  fail  of  it,  but  he  cannot  posit 
any  other  good  than  the  true  one.  There  is  no  other  highest 
good  than  God.  The  will  is  good  when  it  hearkens  to  the 
reason ;  but  the  reason  is  truthful  only  when  it  hearkens  to 
God  and  accepts  illumination  from  him.  Hence  every  action 
is  evil  which  deviates  from  reason,  and  is  evil  also  when  this 
reason  is  in  error  (II,  1,  19) ;  whatever  does  not  spring  from 
the  conscience  is  sin ;  but  the  will  that  follows  an  erring  rea- 
son is  also  not  good,  but  evil,  in  so  far  as  the  error  was  avoid- 
able. Hence  only  that  action  is  truly  good  which  follows, 


§  34.]  THOMAS  AQUINAS.  211 

not  merely  reason  in  general  as  fortuitously  determined  in 
this  or  that  particular  person,  but  true  reason, — which  is  con- 
scious of  the  divine  will,  and  determines  itself  thereafter. 

The  readiness  of  the  soul  for  well-acting  is  virtue, — which  is 
consequently  to  be  conceived  of  not  as  mere  action,  but  as  a 
permanent  power  and  tendency  for  acting,  as  a  habitus,  as  a 
power  of  the  rational  will.  The  virtues  are  primarily  of  a  nat- 
ural character;  that  is,  such  as  belong  to  man  as  such,  to  his 
natural  rational  being,  and  are  developed  by  exercise  and  ha- 
bituation,  although  they  cannot  in  themselves  attain  to  perfec- 
tion (ii,  1,  qu.  55-59,  63).  They  are  distinguished  as  knowledge- 
virtues  and  moral  virtues  (comp.  §§  17,  18) ;  the  former  are  wis- 
dom, science,  understanding  and,  connected  therewith,  prudence, 
and,  in  a  somewhat  peculiar  sense,  also  art-skill.  The  moral 
virtues  relate  to  desire;  they  fall  into  four  cardinal  virtues 
(ii,  1,  qu.  60.  61 ;  ii,  2,  47  sqq).  (1)  Virtue  considered  as  a  good 
of  the  reason,  and  as  expressing  the  essence  of  the  same,  is 
prudence ;  this  virtue  is,  as  distinguished  from  wisdom,  not  the 
lord,  but  the  servant  of  morality, — gives  not  the  end  proper, 
but  only  the  means  to  the  end  of  the  practical  reason. 
(2)  The  virtue  which  expresses  the  practical  will-direction  of  the 
reason  toward  moral  actions,  is  justness  or  righteousness ;  it  re- 
lates to  the  realizing  of  the  right, — is  the  constant  and  fixed 
will  to  give  to  each  his  right,  and  hence  has  to  do  with  what 
we  owe  to  others.  It  is  true,  man  can  in  a  certain  sense  be  just 
also  toward  himself,  namely,  when  reason  holds  in  proper  con- 
trol the  passions.  Justness  is  the  highest  of  the  moral  virtues, 
and  includes  in  itself  also  piety,  thankfulness,  etc.  (3)  The  vir- 
tue which  expresses  the  practical  will-direction  of  the  reason 
toward  the  checking  of  all  reason-resisting  desires  and  passions, 
is  temperateness.  It  holds  within  rational  bounds  all  desires 
and  pleasure-feelings  which  relate  to  sensuous  goods,  and  all  dis- 
pleasure-feelings which  spring  from  the  lack  of  such  goods. 
Modifications  of  this  virtue  are  shame,  reverentiality,  abstinence, 
gentleness,  modesty,  humility,  etc.  (4)  The  virtue  which  ex- 
presses the  practical  will-direction  of  the  reason  toward  the  car- 
rying-out of  rational  purposes  as  against  opposing  natural 
inclinations  and  affections,  especially  against  fear  in  the  face  of 
dangers,  is  courage.  It  wards  off  whatever  would  hinder  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  reason,  and  thus  preserves  man,  as  against  all 
15 


212  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  C§  34- 

sensuous  and  irrational  impulses,  within  the  limits  of  rational- 
ity ;  it  is,  on  the  one  hand,  defensive,  a  firm  calm  enduring  of 
hostile  influences,  and,  on  the  other,  offensive,  in  that  it  actually 
assaults  the  dangers ;  the  first  phase,  however,  is,  for  Christian 
morality,  the  predominant.  The  highest  stage  of  Christian 
courage  is  martyrdom,  wherein  the  main  element  is  love.  The 
several  chief  virtues  are  subdivided  by  Thomas  Aquinas  in  a 
very  far-reaching  and  excessively  detailed  manner,  into  very  nu- 
merous special  manifestation-forms. 

Above  all  the  moral  virtues,  stand  (not  as  co-ordinate  there- 
with, but  as  in  fact  exalting  them  into  a  Christian  character) 
the  theological  virtues,  that  is,  the  supernatural  ones — those 
which  have  for  their  object  the  divine,  the  supernatural,  and 
are  not  grounded  in  us  by  nature,  but  given  (infusce)  to  us  by 
God  (ii,  1,  62  sqq.;  ii,  2,  1-46);  through  these  alone  is  per- 
fection possible  to  man,  even  in  the  other  or  moral  virtues. — 
(1)  Faith;  this  virtae  relates  not  to  the  finite,  but  to  God, 
and  has  as  its  presupposition,  divine  revelation.  It  is'a  think- 
ing with  an  inner  assent  of  the  will,  and  must  manifest  itself 
also  outwardly  in  confession.  The  object  of  faith  is,  in  part, 
purely  supernatural,  transcending  our  knowledge  and  reason, 
and  in  part  it  can  be  discovered  even  through  natural  reason ; 
but  also  that  which  is  discoverable  through  reason  has  in 
fact  been  revealed  by  God  out  of  love,  and  for  purposes  of 
culture.  Faith  is  raised  to  a  vital  form  only  by  the  incre- 
ment of  love  (fides formata) ;  without  love  it  is  crude  (in- 
formis).  As  faith  is  the  foundation  of  all  morality,  so  is  un- 
belief the  greatest  sin ;  but  as  faith  is  a  virtue,  hence  it  is 
not  allowable  to  bring  a  non-Christian  to  faith  by  force. 
The  matter  is,  however,  very  different  with  heretics  and  apos- 
tates, for  these  have  broken  their  vow,  and  hence  fall  under 
punishment ;  heresy  deserves  capital  punishment  (ii,  2,  10, 
art.  8,  9) ;  and  when  a  prince  falls  from  faith  and  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  incurs  the  ban  of  the  Church,  then  are  his 
subjects  ipso  facto  free  and  absolved  from  his  dominions  and 
from  their  oath  of  fealty  (ii,  2,  12,  art.  2). — (2)  Hope  has  for 
its  object  eternal  blessedness,  that  is,  the  subjective  phase 
of  the  highest  good ;  it  pre-supposes  faith  inasmuch  as  it  is 
only  by  faith  that  eternal  blessedness  becomes  known  to  us. 
With  hope  must  be  associated  God-fearing,  inasmuch  as  God 


§  34.]  THOMAS  AQUINAS.  m      213 

is  the  executor  of  just  punishments. — (3)  Love  is  the  most 
perfect  of  the  virtues,  and  its  presupposition  is  faith  and 
hope.  It  is  an  intimate  union  of  man  with  God,  a  possessing 
of  God,  and  the  shaping-form  of  all  the  other  virtues,  inas- 
much as  man  is  to  do  all  good  out  of  love  to  God ;  it  endures 
forever,  whereas  faith  ultimately  passes  over  into  sight,  and 
hope  into  the  possession  of  blessedness.  This  love,  which  is 
primarily  love  to  God,  and  as  such  is  not  in  us  by  nature,  but  ia 
a  divine  grace-gift,  enlarges  itself  spontaneously  into  love  to 
men  and  to  all  creatures,  as  also  into  a  love  of  man  for  him- 
self and  for  his  own  body  as  created  by  God.  But  all  love 
to  the  created  must  spring  exclusively  from  our  love  to  God, 
and  it  cannot  relate  approvingly  to  the  evil  that  is  in  crea- 
tures, but  rathej  seeks  to  eradicate  it.  Our  enemies  and  bad 
men  in  general  we  are  to  love,  not  as  bad,  but  as  men,  and 
for  the  sake  of  their  rational  nature.  The  degree  of  our  love 
to  creatures  is  to  be  in  proportion  to  the  union  of  the  same 
with  God.  God  himself  is  to  be  loved  above  all  things, 
above  even  ourselves. 

This  double  classification  of  the  virtues  is  doubtless  the 
weakest  side  of  the  ethics  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  of  the 
schoolmen  in  general.  The  theological  and  the  natural  vir- 
tues do  not  possibly  admit  of  being  brought  into  any  clear 
relation  to  each  other ;  they  are  based  upon  two  utterly  foreign 
and  heterogeneous  stand-points,  and  can  be  reduced  neither  to 
a  condition  of  co-ordinatiun  nor  of  subordination,  but  on  the 
contrary,  they  constantly  cross  and  cramp  each  other,  and  lead, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  many  repetitions,  and,  on  the  other,  to 
an  arbitrary  distribution  of  the  special  virtue-manifestations. 
That  love,  even  love  to  the  creature,  should  appear  solely 
as  a  theological  virtue,  is  entirely  unnatural.  The  separating 
of  faith  from  wisdom  is  no  less  erroneous,  inasmuch  as  Chris- 
tian wisdom  rests  essentially  on  faith  in  God.  The  distinc- 
tion made  between  knowledge-virtues  and  moral  virtues  suf- 
fers not  only  under  all  the  defects  of  its  prototype  in  Aris- 
totle, but  becomes  more  perplexed  still  by  the  distinguishing 
of  both  these  classes  from  the  theological  virtues,  inasmuch 
as  a  very  essential  part  of  that  which  Aristotle  ascribes  to 
wisdom  must  here  be  transferred  to  faith.  And  the  matter 
is  made  still  worse  by  the  fact  that  the  moral  virtues  are  not 


214  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  34. 

presented  strictly  according  to  Aristotle,  but  according  to 
the  four  chief  virtues  of  Plato,  who  does  not  find  any  place 
for  special  knowledge-virtues,  so  that  while,  now,  wisdom 
does  not,  yet  prudence  does,  appear  as  a  moral  cardinal  viV- 
tue,  whereas  in  fact  prudence  belongs  unquestionably  along 
with  wisdom  to  the  knowledge-virtues,  as  is  the  case  in  Aris- 
totle (§  17).  The  fact  is,  the  entire  Greek  schema  is  totally 
inadequate  for  the  expression  of  the  Christian  virtues,  and 
the  violence  of  the  process  is  felt  at  every  step  of  the  attempt. 
Even  the  utterly  untenable  position  of  Aristotle,  that  virtue 
always  lies  in  the  middle  between  two  opposite  aberrations 
(§  17),  is  adopted  by  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  applied  even  to 
the  knowledge-virtues ;  to  the  theological  virtues  he  applies 
it  only  in  this  respect,  that,  in  them,  we  are*  to  reach  a  defi- 
nite measure  corresponding  to  our  nature  (ii,  1,  64), — to  say 
the  least,  a  strange  application  of  the  middle-way  of  Aris- 
totle. 

On  the  virtues  in  general,  Thomas  Aquinas  makes  also  the 
following  observations,  mostly  in  the  spirit  of  Aristotle : 
every  virtue  is  heightened  in  its  power  by  exercise ;  all  of 
them  stand  in  connection  with  each  other,  and  when  they  ap- 
pear in  their  perfection,  no  one  of  them  is  without  all  the 
others.  The  virtues,  according  as  they  are  viewed  under  dif- 
ferent aspects,  are,  as  to  worth,  in  part  equal  and  in  part  un- 
equal ;  the  knowledge-virtues  are  per  se  nobler  than  the  moral 
virtues,  inasmuch  as  reason  is  nobler  than  desire ;  but  in  re- 
spect to  their  activity,  the  moral  virtues  stand  higher,  as  they 
are  more  fruitful  in  results.  The  perfect  practice  of  virtue 
depends  on  the  directly  God-conferred  seven  gifts  of  the  Spirit 
(ii,  1,  68),  which  make  the  person  willing  to  follow  the 
promptings  of  the  Holy  Spirit, — a  thought  which  occurs  al- 
ready in  Ambrose  and  in  Gregory  I. ,  but  in  respect  to  which, 
even  the  intellectual  acumen  of  a  Thomas  Aquinas  does  not 
succeed  in  making  clear  the  relation  of  these  gifts  to  the  cor- 
responding virtdes,  especially  the  theological. 

The  moral  activity  determines  itself  according  to  a  law ; 
this  law  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  reason.  The  eternal  law  is 
the  universe-ruling  divine  reason,  not  the  fortuitous  reason 
of  the  individual.  The  laws  of  nature,  and  also  those  of  the 
practical  reason  (ratio  practica)  are  an  efflux  from  the  eternal 


§34.]  THOMAS  AQUINAS.  215 

law,  and  the  human  laws  of  the  state  and  of  society  are  in 
turn  an  efflux  from  both.  The  laws  which  lie  merely  in  the 
natural  reason  do  not  suffice  for  morality ;  but  there  is  needed, 
in  order  to  the  supernatural  end  of  blessedness,  also  a  positive 
divine  law,  which  is  made  known  and  evidenced  to  all  bv 
revelation,  and  which  at  the  same  time  also  preserves  the 
natural  consciousness  from  all  doubt  (ii,  1,  90  sgq). — In  the 
field  of  Christian  morality  the  law  proper,  which  is  absolutely 
binding  on  all  Christians,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
counsels,  which  are  left  to  free  choice,  though  the  following 
of  them  works  a  higher  perfection  and  leads  more  speedily  to 
the  goal  of  salvation.  The  Old  Testament  law,  as  a  law  of 
servitude,  had  no  such  counsels ;  but  the  Gospel  as  a  law  of 
freedom  has  them,  in  order  to  bring  men  rightly  to  a  con- 
sciousness of  their  freedom.  The  clinging  to  the  earthly 
hinders  our  arriving  at  the  heavenly;  hence  the  counsels 
hasten  this  arriving,  in  that  they  free  man  as  far  as  possible 
from  earthly  enjoyments  which  are  otherwise  not  forbidden 
to  him;  they  therefore  require  poverty,  perpetual  chastity 
(that  is,  non-marriage),  and  the  yoke  of  obedience  (obedientice 
servitus),  the  latter  very  erroneously  based  on  Matt,  xix,  21 
("follow  me,")  and  on  John  x,  27  (ii,  1,  108,  art.  4;  comp. 
ii,  2,  186). — The  Christian  law  as  distinguished  from  the  nat- 
ural law  cannot  be  fulfilled  by  our  own  natural  power,  but 
only  in  virtue  of  the  grace-gifts  infused  into  the  hearts  of  be- 
lievers ;  and  in  so  far  man  acquires  for  himself,  by  his  virtue, 
no  merit  before  God.  Without  grace  no  one  can  acquire  the 
life  of  blessedness ;  on  the  presupposition  of  grace,  however, 
man  can  in  fact  acquire  a  merit  before  God,  and  thereby  an 
increase  of  grace  and  of  the  love  of  God,  and  hence  also  a 
heightening  of  his  blessedness  (meritum  condigni)  (ii,  1,  114). 
Opposed  to  the  morally-good  stands  evil;  to  the  virtuous 
act,  sin;  and  to  virtue  as  a  habit,  vice  (ii,  1,  71  sqq.);  sin  and 
vice  are  in  contradiction  to  true  reason,  and  hence  in  general 
to  the  essence  or  nature  of  man.  In  reference  to  the  kind  of 
pleasure  felt  or  sought  in  sin,  sins  are  divided  into  spiritual 
and  fleshly  sins.  In  reference  to  their  guilt  and  punishable- 
ness,  they  are  classed  into  venial  and  mortal  (peccata  venalia  et 
mortalid) ;  the  former  consist  in  the  turning  to  the  finite 
without  a  conscious  and  designed  turning-away  from  God, 


216  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  34 

and  they  involve  finite  punishments,  either  here  upon  earth 
or  in  purgatory;  mortal  sins  consist  in  a  conscious  and  de- 
signed turning-away  from,  and  hence  in  a  conscious  rebell- 
ing against,  God  and  his  will, — are  contrary  to  the  order  of 
love,  and  hence  involve  eternal  punishment.  The  gravity  of 
the  guilt  is  measured  by  the  importance  of  the  object,  by  the 
motives,  by  the  degree  of  consciousness  and  of  freedom,  and 
by  the  spiritual  character  and  position  of  the  subject  in  so- 
ciety. In  reference  to  the  positive  or  negative  contents  of 
the  action,  sins  fall  into  sins  of  commission  and  of  omission 
(peccata  commissionis  et  omissi&nis).  In  reference  to  their  man- 
ner of  commission,  sins  are  sins  of  the  heart,  of  the  mouth, 
and  of  act  {peccata  cardis,  oris,  operis).  In  sin  there  is  to  be 
distinguished  a  twofold  consent  of  the  rational  will,  namely, 
to  the  pleasure  in  the  sin,  and  to  the  sinful  deed  itself,  the  latter 
being  the  more  criminal. — The  causes  of  sin,  as  act,  are  in 
part  direct,  namely,  erring  cognition  and  volition — the  re- 
garding a  seeming  good  as  a  real  one,  and  the  willing  it, — 
and,  in  part,  indirect,  namely,  first,  inner  ones,  such  as  im- 
agination, sensuousness,  ignorance,,  passion,  and  other  al- 
ready committed  sins;  and,  second,  outward  or  tempting 
ones,  such  as  evil  spirits  and  bad  men ;  temptation,  however, 
presupposes,  in  order  to  its  effectualness,  a  sinful  welcoming 
of  it.  God  is  not  the  cause  of  sin,  though  indeed,  in  virtue 
of  his  righteousness,  He  is  the  mediate  cause  of  the  conse- 
quences of  sin,  e.  <?.,  of  the  hardening  of  the  heart.  The 
sinful  corruption  which  transmits  itself  from  the  first  man  to 
all  following  generations,  that  is,  original  sin,  is,  formally, 
the  being  destitute  of  original  righteousness,  and,  materially, 
the  tending  of  the  soul-powers  to  false  goods, — concupiscentia 
(75  sqq).  The  particular  sins  are  severally  treated  of  in  con- 
nection with  the  virtues  of  which  they  are  the  violation. 

In  his,  not  seldom  very  casuistical  carrying  out  of  details, 
Thomas  Aquinas,  notwithstanding  his  moral  earnestness,  does 
not,  on  the  whole,  incline  to  theoretical  rigor,  but  leaves 
pretty  free  scope  for  personal  determination  in  particular 
cases,  and  even  in  the  face  of  outward  human  law.  The 
right  of  property,  for  example,  is,  in  his  opinion,  not  uncon- 
ditional ;  and  in  extreme  cases  of  necessity,  where  the  saving 
of  life  is  involved,  the  right  of  self-preservation  takes  pre- 


§34.]  DUNS  SCOTUS.  217 

cedence  of  the  right  of  property,  and  a  person  sins  not  when, 
in  such  a  case,  he  openly  or  secretly  takes  from  the  refused 
superfluity  of  another  that  which  he  needs  (ii,  2,  sq.  66,  7). — 
To  take  interest  for  money  loaned,  he  regards,  in  agreement 
with  general  ancient-Christian  and  Mediteval  opinion,  as 
unallowable ;  otherwise  the  same  thing  would  be  paid  for 
twice ;  he  who  sells  a  loaf  of  bread,  may  not  demand  another 
special  payment  for  the  eating  of  the  same;  he  who  lends 
receives,  in  fact, -the  purchase  price  with  the  return  of  the 
simple  sum  lent ;  however,  it  is  not  unallowable,  in  case  of 
need,  to  pay  interest  to  others  for  money. — The  duty  of 
truthfulness  admits,  indeed,  of  saying  less  than  one  knows  to 
be  the  truth',  but  not  more ;  for  the  little  is  a  part  of  the 
whole.  All  -lies  are  sins,  though  in  different  degrees ;  a  con- 
scious lie  for  the  injury  of  another  is  a  mortal  sin,  but  a  lie 
said  in  sport  or  a  lie  of  courtesy  (mendacium  qfficiosum)  in 
indifferent  things,  and  where  it  injures  no  one,  is  a  venial  one 
(ii,  2,  sq.  110,  4). 

Duns  Scotus  (ob.  1308),  whose  really  speculative  acumen 
went  but  too  often  astray  into  sophistical  and  skeptical  rea- 
sonings, involved  the  moral  idea,  and  above  all  its  special 
application,  in  more  than  one  respect,  in  uncertainty,  namely, 
by  his -sophist-delight  in  the  discovering  and  in  the  ingen- 
ious solving  of  contradictions  and  difficulties.  A  minutely 
spun-out  quatenus  makes  room  for  the  most  opposite  assump- 
tions, and  opens  the  way,  to  subjective  discretion,  for  a  lax 
construing  of  the  law.  Many  elements  in  Scotus  remind  us 
strikingly  of  the  later  aberrations  of  the  Jesuitical  view. 
The  notion  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  he  conceives,  in  oppo- 
sition to  Thomas  Aquinas,  as  essentially  a  mere  norm-less 
discretion,  both  in  man  and  in  God ;  while  Aquinas  held  that 
man,  as  really  rational,  has,  in  his  rational  knowledge  of  the 
good,  a  motive — not  a  compelling  one,  it  is  true,  but  a  mo- 
tive— to  the  good,  so  that  he  cannot  determine  himself 
equally  easily  for  the  rational  and  the  irrational,  but  has  in 
fact  a  primitive,  a  constitutional  inclination  to  the  good, 
and  that  consequently  the  will  does  not  by  any  means  stand 
entirely  neutral  (ii,  1,  9,  13,  17,  58),  Duns  Scotus  maintains, 
on  the  contrary,  that  according  to  this  view  the  will  is  not  at 
all  free,  but  is  determined  by  knowledge ;  according  to  his 


218  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  34. 

view,  the  will,  as  free,  is  not  in  the  least  bound  by  rational 
knowledge,  but  stands  perfectly  neutral,  and  can  with  like 
facility  decide  for,  or  against,  the  known  good.*  Likewise, 
also,  is  the  freedom  of  the  divine  will  in  nowise  to  be  con- 
ceived of  as  characterized  by  any  inner  necessity,  so  that,  for 
example,  God  could  not  equally  well  will  the  opposite  of 
that  which  he  actually  does  will.  A  course  of  order  is  not 
willed  by  God  and  established  as  a  law  because  it  is  good 
per  se,  but  it  is  good  simply  and  solely  because  God  has  willed 
it  precisely  so;  but  He  might  just  as  readily  have  willed  the 
opposite  thereof.  Hence  also  God  is  not  bound  by  his 
commands,  and  He  can  in  fact  annul  them, — not  merely  the 
positive  laws  of  Revelation,  but  also  the  natural  laws  of 
morals ;  only  from  the  two  first  laws  of  the  Decalogue,  as  re- 
sulting directly  from  the  essence  of  God,  can  God  not  dis- 
pense, t  It  is  evidently  in  the  interest  of  this  lax  notion  of 
liberty  that  Duns  Scotus  admits  also  of  morally  indifferent 
actions — not  merely  such  manners  of  action,  as,  being  neither 
commended  nor  forbidden,  constitute  the  sphere  of 'the  al- 
lowed,— but  also  real,  positive  actions  which  are  neither  good 
nor  evil,  that  is,  which  are  not  done  out  of  love  to  God,  but 
also  not  in  opposition  to  Him.  J  Hence  in  regard  to  particular 
moral  cases,  Duns  Scotus  shows  himself  often  very  lax. 
Falsehood  and  misrepresentation  he  declares  as,  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  allowable.  §  An  oath  of  promise  obligates 
to  its  fulfillment  only  when  the  person  had  at  the  time  of 
swearing  it  the  intention  of  fulfilling  it, — though  of  course 
an  oath  in  which  one  did  not  have  this  intention,  is  a  moral 
sin.  1 

Scholastic  ethics  as  a  whole  bears  a  pretty  unvarying  out- 
ward form.  The  method  is,  as  the  several  points  present 
themselves,  first,  to  state  the  various  opposing  views  with 
the  reasons  in  their  favor,  and  then  to  pass  a  decision  upon 
the  point  itself ;  mere  dicta  of  the  Fathers,  especially  of  Au- 
gustine and  of  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  and  often  also  of  the 
Philasophus,  that  is,  Aristotle,  suffice  in  and  t>f  themselves  as 
conclusive  proofs ;  texts  from  the  Scriptures  fall  rather  into 

*  Quastt.  in  Ubr.  Sentent.  ii,  dist.  25,  ed.  Lugd.,  1639,  t.  6,  p.  873  sqq. 

t  Ibid.  Hi,  dist.  37,  t.  7,  p.  857.  \  Ibid,  ii,  dist.  41. 

§  Ibid,  iii,  dist.  38,  p.  917.  |  Ibid,  iii,  dist.  39,  p.  980. 


§  34.]  SPIRIT   OF  SCHOLASTICISM.  219 

the  back-ground. — Despite  the  undeniable  acumen  shown  by 
the  schoolmen  in  the  development  of  processes  of  reason- 
ing, there  is  yet  manifest  also  a  lack  of  the  courage  to  derive 
their  philosophical  systems  purely  and  simply  from  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness.  Graeco-Roman  ethics  was  in  fact,  to  the 
schoolmen,  not  a  merely  preliminary  and  preparatory  study, 
but  it  was  with  them  of  quite  too  determining  an  influence, 
also  in  respect  to  the  subject-matter"  of  their  science.  They 
endeavor,  indeed,  with  great  earnestness  to  exalt  extra-Chris- 
tian philosophy  into  the  sphere  of  Christian  thought;  it 
proves,  however,  an  element  too  mighty  for  them,  and  they  do 
not  wholly  escape  entangling  the  Christian  consciousness  in 
the  heathen,  and  thus  robbing  it  of  its  peculiarity.  They 
felt  indeed  the  antagonism,  but  did  not  overcome  it,  and  the 
prevalent  lifeless  juxtaposing  of  the  two  elements  shows  only 
their  embarrassment,  but  not  their  ability  to  dominate  the 
foreign  material. — The  almost  universal  resorting  to  certain 
favorite  numbers  in  the  division  and  classification  of  the 
subject-thatter,  particularly  to  three  and  seven,  and  also  to 
four  and  twelve,  is  indeed  based  on  an  obscure  consciousness 
of  an  inner  order  of  the  spiritual  life ;  but  this  order  does  not 
come  to  a  scientific  consciousness,  and  the  real  reason  for  its 
observance  is,  after  all,  the  typical  significance  of  these  num- 
bers as  sacred.  That  there  should  be  presented  precisely 
seven  beatitudes,  seven  (diversely-stated)  mortal  sins,  etc., 
seems  without  inner  ground ;  and  frequently  this  using  of 
numbers  sinks  to  jejune  play,  as,  e.  g.,  when  a  certain  writer 
introduces  every-where  the  number  twelve, — in  the  dividing 
of  his  subject,  in  assigning  reasons,  in  citing  objections,  etc. 
The  ethical  subject-matter  treated  of  by  the  schoolmen  was 
subsequently  wrought  over  in  large,  though  but  little  system- 
etized  summaries  in  connection  with  appropriate  citations 
from  the  Fathers,  and  placed  within  reach  of  the  wider  cir- 
cles of  the  ecclesiastical  world.  To  the  period  of  Thomas 
Aquinas  himself  belongs  the  Summa  of  William  Peraldus,*  an 
essentially  casuistical  and  pretty  well  digested  appreciation 
of  scholastic  science ;  after  which  we  may  mention  the  Spee- 

*  Summa  s.  tractatus  de  mrtictibus  et  vitiis,  from  the  fifteenth  century, 
(without  date  or  place  of  printing,  then  at  Col.  Agr.,  1479  fol. ;  Basle, 
1497,  8vo.)  often  reprinted. 


220  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  34. 

ulum  morale,  attributed  to  Vincent  of  Beauvais  (ob.  1264),  but 
originating  in  the  fourteenth  century  ;*  and  also  the  much 
used  and  very  complete  and  erudite  Summa  of  Antony  of 
Florence  (ob.  1459). t 

John  of  Salisbury  (ob.  1180,  as  Bishop  of  Chartres),  who  op- 
posed scholasticism  proper  with  brilliant  ability,  but  was 
rather  empirical  in  regard  to  the  source  of  knowledge,  though 
in  other  respects  of  rich  philosophical  culture,  undertook  to 
give  to  the  moral  views  of  the  Church  a  scientific  expression ; 
in  his  efforts  he  based  himself  most  largely  on  Gregory  the 
Great.  To  be  perfect  is  God's  essence,  to  become  perfect  is  the 
task  of  man  as  God's  image ;  man  becomes  perfect,  and  hence 
happy  only  by  moral  activity, — which  activity  rests,  on  the 
one  hand,  on  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and,  on  the  other, 
on  love  to  God.  Since  the  fall  into  sin  man  can  know  the 
truth  only  in  virtue  of  divine  revelation  and  illumination, 
and  he  can  realize  the  good  only  by  the  assistance  of  divine 
grace.  Because  of  the  evil  desire  inborn  in  all  men,  there  is 
no  virtue  without  a  constant  struggle  of  our  love  tf>  right- 
eousness, as  strengthened  by  redemption,  against  our  innate 
evil  desires.  Even  as  the  essence  and  source  of  all  sins  is 
the  natural  desire  as  developed  into  pride  and  presumption 
(so  that  consequently  all  virtuous  effort  directs  itself  prima- 
rily against  the  pride  of  the  heart),  so  the  essence  of  all  Chris- 
tian virtue  is  that  humility  which  springs  from  love  to  God, 
and  which  seeks  to  lay  aside  all  self-will  and  to  give  God 
the  glory  in  all  things.  Hence  the  moral  worth  of  actions 
lies  not  in  the  work,  but  in  the  disposition ;  but  from  the 
right  disposition  there  follows  with  moral  necessity  also  the 
right  work. — Morality  is  not,  however,  a  merely  individual 
task,  it  finds  its  full  truth  only  in  the  moral  community-life, 
which  comes  to  expression  in  the  church  and  in  the  closely 
therewith-connected  Christian  state.  The  State  has,  as  a 
real  moral  organism,  also  a  moral  task,  namely,  to  execute 
righteousness  according  to  the  divine  will,  and  not  only  to 
protect  the  morality  of  the  people,  but  also  to  foster  and 
guide  it.  Hence  the  law  which  governs  the  state  is  to  be 

*  Not  in  his  Opp.,  1431,  but  separately  printed  as  a  part  of  the  great 
Speculum  naturale,  etc.,  1473,  and  subsequently. 
t  Summa,  theol.,  1477,  1476,  1480,  1496;  1740,  4  vols. 


§  34.]  JOHN  OF  SALISBURY.  221 

an  expression,  not  of  human  discretion,  but  only  of  the  di- 
vine will,  to  which  even  the  prince  must  absolutely  subordin- 
ate himself ;  hence  it  must  rest  on  God's  revealed  Word,  and 
the  vicegerents  of  God,  that  is,  the  representatives  of  the 
religious  community-life — the  Church, — must  be  also  the  ani- 
mating soul  of  the  Christian  state ;  for,  in  fact,  in  its  moral 
task,  the  Christian  state  is  identical  with  the  church.  God- 
fearing is  the  life-power  of  the  Christian  state,  and  this  state 
must  therefore  above  all  things  recognize  and  honor  both  the 
moral  right  of  the  church  and  also  the  priests  as  the  higher 
and,  so  to  speak,  divine  element  in  worldly  society.  The 
priests  indeed  should  not  and  may  not  themselves  guide  and 
administer  the  state ;  they  are  rather  simply  by  their  moral 
example,  by  doctrine,  by  exhortation,  and  by  reproof,  to  in- 
fluence the  same,  but  the  princes  to  whom  by  divine  ordi- 
nance the  guidance  of  the  state  belongs,  have  received  the 
sword  only  from  the  higher  moral  community,  the  church,  in 
order  to  execute  justice  in  the  name  of  the  Christian  idea ; 
and  so  likewise  stands  the  military  order,  knighthood,  not 
merely  in  the  service  of  the  prince,  but  quite  as  fully,  and  in 
fact  primarily,  in  the  service  of  God,  and  hence  of  the  church. 
A  prince  who  breaks  away  from  divine  law,  who  rebels  against 
the  divine  ordinances,  and  hence  also  against  the  church,  has, 
as  a  tyrant,  forfeited  his  moral  right  to  the  crown,  and  it  is 
not  merely  legitimate  to  offer  resistance  to  him,  but  also  in 
any  manner  whatever,  even  by  treachery  or  assassination,  to 
get  rid  of  him  [Policraticus  iv,  2].  The  political  doctrine  of 
John  of  Salisbury  is  a  Mediaeval  Christian  counterpart  to 
Plato's  doctrine  of  the  state,  with  which  he  was  not  acquaint- 
ed, and  is  in  fact  an  attempt  to  introduce  Augustine's  Civitas 
Dei  into  the  worldly  state.* 

The  fondness  of  Schoolmen  for  proposing  difficult  contro- 
versial questions  led  them  inevitably  into  the  province  of 
casuistry;  and  this  science — which  had  sustained  itself  along- 
side of  scholasticism — subsequently  borrowed  from  scholastic 
science  much  congenial  material,  and  in  part  also  a  scientific 
form.  Hence  at  the  decline  of  scholasticism  in  the  fourteenth 
century,  casuistry  entered  in  fact  upon  its  brightest  days. 

*  Especially  in  his  Policraticus. — (Reuter :  Joh.  v.  S.,  1842).  Schaar- 
Bchmidt:  Joh.  Saresb.,  1862. 


222  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  34. 

The  works  entitled  Summce  casuum  conscientice,  were  very 
much  used  in  connection  with  confession  and  penance,  and, 
as  they  generally  contained  also  much  matter  relative  to 
church  law,  also  in  ecclesiastical  administration.  In  them 
we  find  a  very  imperfectly  digested,  and  often  merely  alpha- 
betical, summary  of  specific  single  moral  questions,  which 
relate  in  the  main  to  what  is  allowed  or  disallowed,  and  the 
decision  of  which  is  given  less  from  general  principles  than 
on  the  basis  of  the  utterances  of  the  more  highly  esteemed 
Fathers.  The  questions  are  often  not  taken  from -life  at  all, 
but  are  simply  invented  in  order  to  exercise  ingenuity,  as  in 
riddle-solving ;  and  in  some  of  these  works  there  is  manifest- 
ed a  peculiarly  fond  lingering  over  extremely  impure  sub- 
jects. In  the  presence  of  the  too  exclusively  considered 
individual  case,  the  general  principles  involved  in  it  are 
often  wholly  lost  sight  of,  and  ethics  is  in  danger  of  degen- 
erating into  a  sophistry  of  special-pleading, — into  a  treating 
of  the  moral  merely  empirically  and  skeptically ;  thus  we 
find  questions  often  extensively  discussed,  as  doubtful,  which 
cannot  be  in  the  least  practically  doubtful  for  the  unsophis- 
ticated moral  consciousness.  The  best  known  of  these  works 
are  the  Summce  of  Raymund  of  Pennaforti  in  the  thirteenth 
century,*  and  of  Astesanus  in  the  fourteenth!  (the  Astesana, 
is  cautious  and  judicious,  contains  also  many  general  consid- 
erations, and  is  pretty  systematic  and  comprehensive) ;  Angelus 
of  Clavasio  in  the  fifteenth  century  J  (the  Angelica,  perhaps 
the  most  extensively  used ;  alphabetical,  with  much  worth- 
less matter,  and  often  treating  of  indelicate  questions) ;  Syl- 
vester Prierias,  General  of  the  Dominicans,  the  well-known 
opponent  of  Luther,  gave  in  his  Summa  moralis,§  generally 
called  Summa  summarum,  an  alphabetical  compilation  from 
others.  (The  Pisanella  [1470  and  often],  revised  by  Nicolas 
of  Ausmo,  1471,  '73,  '74,  '75,  '78;  Galensis,  1475;  Rosella, 
1516;  Pacifica,  1574.  The  BiUia  aurea,  1475,  '81, — also  in 

*  Summa  de  casibue  panitentice,  Verona,  1744;  upon  this  is  based  the 
work  of  John  of  Freiburg,  Augsb.,  1472,  and  frequently. 

t  <ST.  d.  cos.  consc.  (at  first  without  date  or  place) 'about  1468-72  fol. ; 
then  at  Col.,  1479 ;  Norimb.,  1482,  and  often  later. 

%  S.  cos.  consc.,  1486  without  place,  fol. ;  Venet.,  1487  4to. ;  Norimb., 
1488,  and  often. 

§  Printed  in  1515  4to. ;  Argent,  1518  fol. 


§  35.]  THE    MYSTICS.  223 

German,  alphabetical.) — Also  the  Decretum  of  Qratian  con- 
tains, in  its  first  part,  much  that  appertains  to  casuistical 
ethics. 


SECTION  XXXV. 

The  writings  of  the  Mystics  contain  in  the  field  of 
ethics  many  profound  thoughts,  though  without  rig- 
idly scientific  form.  This  is  the  case  with  Richard 
of  St.  Victor  and  Sonaventura.  Less  mystical  than 
simply  practical,  and  strongly  emphasizing  the  sub- 
jective phase  of  morality,  was  the  influence  of  Ber- 
nard of  Clairvaux,  and  later,  of  Thomas  d  Kempis  ; 
while  Eckart,  and  in  part  even  Tauler,  conceive  the 
moral  in  the  main  negatively  and  quietistically  (in 
the  spirit  of  a  Pantheistically-infected  mysticism)  as 
spiritual  poverty,  as  the  turning-avvay  of  the  spirit 
from  all  that  is  created.  Occupying  a  mediating 
position  between  mysticism  and  scholasticism,  also 
John  Gerson  seeks  to  give  form  to  ethics,  but  he  al- 
ready begins  to  show  signs  of  that  paralysis  of  the 
moral  spirit  which  had  spread  into  the  widest  circles 
previously  to  the  Reformation  ;  Raymund  de  Sabunde 
deals  in  more  popularly-practical  modes  of  thought. 
In  the  spirit  of  the  Reformation,  and  as  its  precursors, 
worked,  in  the  field  of  ethics,  also  Wickliffe,  Huss, 
John  of  Goch,  and  Savonarola. 

In  contrast  to  the  growingly- Aristotelian,  dialectical  treat- 
ment of  ethics,  the  mystical  anti-scholastic  current  of  theol- 
ogy clings,  more  or  less  closely,  to  the  writings  of  the  sup- 
posed Areopagite  (§  31),  but  keeps  for  the  most  part  clear 
from  the  daring  speculations  of  John  Scotus  Erigena,  and 
gives,  in  general,  thoughtful  meditations  and  profound  glances 
of  insight  rather  than  rigorous  and  clear  processes  of  reason- 
ing. The  freedom  of  the  will  is,  by  most  of  the  Mediaeval 
mystics,  pretty  strongly  emphasized ;  but  the  active  working 


224  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  35. 

in  the  outer  world  is  made  largely  to  give  place  to  the  purely 
contemplative  life. 

Richard  of  St.  Victor  (about  1150)  treats,  in  several  special 
works,  of  the  inner  life  of  the  pious  heart  in  its  union  with 
God, — a  life  which  through  contemplatio  as  distinguished 
from  cogitatio  and  meditatio,  passes  over  into  self-forgetting 
love.  The  divine  is  not  attained  to  by  laborious  thinking 
and  doing,  but  by  an  immediate  and  spiritual,  freely  self- 
devoting  vision  or  beholding,  to  which  receptive  state  of  the 
soul  God  lovingly  manifests  himself  as  in-streaming  light. 
And  the  soul  becomes  receptive  by  the  progressive  cleansing 
of  it  from  the  dross  of  the  earthly  life,  from  the  striving  after 
the  creature, — by  self -immersion  into  itself,  not  in  order  to 
hold  fast  to  itself  in  antithesis  to  God,  but  in  order  to  aspire 
toward  him  in  ardent  love-desire ;  the  goal  is  perfect,  bliss- 
ful rest  in  God ;  the  condition  is  the  operation  of  grace  and 
the  willing,  joyous  laying-hold  upon  the  same  on  the  part  of 
the  subject. — Bonaventura  (ob.  1274)  attempts  to  fuse  dialec- 
tics with  mysticism,  but,  notwithstanding  his  frequently  al- 
most overflowing  subjectivity  of  feeling,  his  mysticism  is  less 
sustained  and  less  deep  than  that  of  Richard  St.  Victor,  and 
lingers  more  in  the  sphere  of  practical  piety. — Bernard  of 
Clairvaux  (ob.  1153), — opposing  scholasticism  in  many  respects 
not  without  good  grounds,  and  confining  himself  mainly  to 
the  practical  sphere, — has  also  carefully  examined  the  sub- 
ject of  ethics  in  some  of  its  parts;  (De  diligendo  deo ;  De 
gradibus  Jiumilitatis  et  superb.;  De  gratia  et  liber o  arbitrio  ; 
De  consider atione.)  To  true  virtue  belong  two  things :  divine 
grace  and  a  free,  active  embracing  of  the  same ;  without  free- 
dom there  is  no  responsibility.  But  freedom  is  threefold: 
first,  freedom  of  nature  as  opposed  to  necessity ;  second,  free- 
dom of  grace, — attained  to  through  Christ, — that  is,  emanci- 
pation from  the  bondage  of  sin ;  and,  third,  freedom  of  glory 
which  is  realized  in  eternal  blessedness,  but  enjoyed  here 
only  in  moments  of  spiritual  vision.  Freedom  of  choice  is 
from  nature,  but  by  grace  it  is  regulated  and  attracted  toward 
the  good,  though  not  forced.  By  simple  free-will  we  belong 
to  ourselves ;  by  the  willing  of  the  good  we  belong  to  God ; 
by  the  willing  of  evil,  to  Satan.  The  decision  lies  in  our 
own  hand ;  no  one  is  forced  to  salvation.  Love,  as  constitut- 


§  35.]  BERNARD,  ECKART. 

ing  the  essence  of  the  moral,  has  four  degrees:  first,  man 
loves  himself  for  his  own  sake ;  second,  he  loves  God,  not, 
however,  for  God's  but  for  his  own  sake,  because  without 
God  he  can  do  nothing;  third,  he  loves  God  for  God's  sake, 
out  of  thankfulness  for  experienced  love ;  fourth,  he  loves 
also  himself  solely  for  God's  sake ;  this  highest  stage,  that  of 
true  morality,  is,  however,  but  seldom  enjoyed  in  this  life. 
The  essence  of  wisdom,  on  the  whole,  is,  to  behold  and  to 
love  the  invisible  essence  of  God  in  all  things,  to  give  up  all 
that  we  have  to  God,  and  to  live  only  in  God  and  for  God. 
All  true  virtue  is  an  expression  of  humility,  whereby,  in  true 
self-knowledge  man  becomes  nothing  in  his  own  eyes;  humil- 
ity leads  in  twelve  stages  to  the  truth,  which  truth  in  turn 
develops  itself  in  three  stages,  the  highest  of  which  is  the 
direct  spiritual  beholding  of  God.  Humility,  love,  and  the 
beholding  of  the  truth,  are  the  three  aliments  of  the  soul,  cor- 
responding to  the  Son,  the  Spirit,  and  the  Father.  The  mys- 
tical element  in  Bernard  shows  itself  mainly  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  doctrine  of  contemplation.  Many  of  his  principles 
he  borrows  from  the  ethics  prevalent  in  his  day,  as,  e.  g.,  the 
four  cardinal  virtues,  and  also  the  notion  of  the  middle-way 
as  the  essence  of  virtue. 

Master  Eckart  (a  Dominican  at  Cologne,  db.  1329),*  distin- 
guished for  profound  insight,  but  not  unfrequently  overpass- 
ing, in  his  fervid  soarings,  the  limits  of  the  Christian  world- 
theory,  was  of  very  great  influence  on  subsequent  mystics; 
taking  his  departure  from  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  he  pushes 
the  thought  of  the  union  of  the  soul  with  God,  as  the  highest 
good  to  such  a  height  as  almost  to  lose  sight  of  the  individ- 
ual existence  of  the  creature,  and  of  its  distinctness  from 
God, — not,  however,  in  the  sense  qf  modern  Pantheism,  but 
in  that  of  John  Scotus  Erigena.  The  world  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, nothing  at  all, — is  rather  mere  appearance  than  reality; 
God  alone  is  real  in  whatever  exists ;  God  alone  is  the  object 
of  true  love,  and  in  this  love  all  morality  is  comprehended. 
Hence  the  entire  striving  of  man  must  be  directed  to  this  end, 
namely,  to  becoming  at  one  with  God,  to  laying  aside  his 

*  Schriften,  edited  by  Pfeiffer,  1847,— (mostly  sermons ;  larger  scien- 
tific works  of  his  appear  to  be  lost.  C.  Schmidt  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1839 ; 
Martensen,  1842 ;  J.  Back,  1864. 


226  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  35. 

separate  existence,  to  turning  away  from  all  that  is  created, 
to  wishing  nothing,  loving  nothing,  knowing  nothing  but 
God  alone — to  merging  himself  into  God,  to  transforming 
himself  into  God.  If  God  is  to  come  into  the  soul,  then  the 
creature  must  be  driven  out ;  if  man  is  to  become  rich  in  God, 
then  he  must  become  poor  in  the  creature.  When  man  turns 
himself  away  from  all  that  is  finite,  when  he  forgets  himself 
and  the  world,  and  directs  his  soul  exclusively  toward  God, 
then  God  pours  himself  into  his  soul, — God  is  born  in  the 
soul,  and  the  soul  has  eternal  rest  in  God.  Virtuous  working 
in  the  world  is  not  the  highest  working,  for  in  it  man  dis- 
perses himself  into  the  multiplicity  of  the  finite ;  he  who  has 
found  God,  who  has  God  dwelling  in  himself,  divests  himself 
also  of  works, — seeks  only  the  inner  work,  reposes  in  God 
alone ;  nay,  he  aims  not  at  his  own  blessedness,  for  in  fact  this 
is  also  a  clinging  to  self,  to  the  created, — he  aims  only  at  giv- 
ing himself  wholly  np  to  God,  at  sacrificing  himself  to  God,  at 
reducing  himself  to  nothing,  at  cutting  off  and  throwing  away 
from  himself  whatever  is  finite  or  creature-like,  or  different 
from  God ;  he  breaks  himself  loose  not  only  from  sin,  but  also 
from  the  world  and  from  his  own  self.  Not  man  is  to  work, 
but  he  is  to  let  God  exclusively  and  alone  work  in  him ;  such 
purity  of  heart,  such  freedom  from  all  self,  also  from  all  per- 
sonal volition,  is  the  highest  good,  is  the  spiritual  birth  of 
God  in  the  soul ;  we  possess  all  good  when  we  are  united  with 
God's  nature,  and  a  single  glance  at  God  "  in  his  nakedness  " 
is  of  more  avail,  and  unites  the  soul  more  with  God,  than  all 
the  works  of  Christendom  could  accomplish. 

In  a  similar  spirit,  although  less  bold  in  emphasizing  the 
mystical  element,  wrote  and  lived  Tauler,  Eckart's  disciple 
(a  Dominican  at  Cologne  and  Strasburg,  6b.  1361).  He  pre- 
sented, in  his  "Imitation  of  the  humble  Life  of  Christ,"*  a 
system  of  pure  mysticism,  and  which,  for  that  very  reason, 
was  one-sided  and  dangerous  to  the  Christian  consciousness. 
The  essence  of  morality  is  spiritual  poverty ;  the  way  to  life, 
to  "equality  with  God,"  is  to  become  spiritually  poor,  to  be 
separated  from  all  that  belongs  to  the  creature,  to  cling  to 

*  Edited  by  Schlosser,  1833  (in  modern  German) ;  his  sermons  are 
mostly  practico-ediflcntory.  The  work,  Medulla  amnux,  is  not  by  Tauler 
C.  Schmidt:  J.  Tender,  1841. 


§  35.]  TATTLER.  227 

nothing  among  finite  things ;  as,  however,  all  that  is  finite 
must  cling  to  something,  hence  man  is  to  cling  only  to  that 
which  is  above  himself,  to  God.%  The  poorer  man  is  in  the 
creature,  so  much  the  richer  is  he  in  God ;  God  is  intuited 
only  immediately,  without  any  intervention  of  the  creature ; 
in  so  far  as  man  looks  to  the  creature  he  is  distant  from  God. 
Man  must  put  off  from  himself  all  that  is  multiple,  manifold, 
in  order  to  become  rich  in  the  One, — must  be  poor  in  knowl- 
edge in  so  far  as  knowledge  relates  to  the  finite  and  is  in- 
volved in  finite  forms, — poor  in  virtue  in  so  far  as  it  is  an 
acting  in  the  finite  (only  the  disposition  is  divine), — poor 
even  in  grace  in  so  far  as  the  soul  in  its  union  with  God  stands 
no  longer  in  a  mere  relation  of  grace  to  God,  but  is  actively 
led  by  God  in  harmony  with  himself  in  a  divine  manner. 
The  sole  true  knowledge  is  the  direct  spiritual  beholding 
of  God.  The  sole  virtue  is  simple  love  to  God.  God  is  free 
from  every  thing  that  is  creatural ;  in  spiritual  poverty  man 
becomes  also  free  from  and  divested  of  all  things, — presses, 
as  a  free  soul,  into  the  uncreated  good,  into  God,  and  is  no 
longer  affected  by  earthly  pleasure  or  by  pain.  Hence  true 
divine  freedom  springs  from  poverty  and  humility;  false 
freedom,  from  pride.  God  is  a  pure  activity — a  mere  work- 
ing ;  therefore  also  poverty  is  a  pure  working  with  God ;  now 
there  are  three  kinds  of  work :  (1)  natural  work,  in  part  bodily 
and  sensuous ;  this  work  must  take  place  with  moderation 
and  in  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  the  senses  must  be  indulged  in 
their  necessary  wants ;  and  in  part,  spiritual,  as  knowledge 
and  love ;  also  this  work  must  take  place  only  in  so  far  as 
necessary,  must  be  turned  aside  from  all  not  absolutely  essen- 
tial things ;  otherwise  it  leads  to  pride.  (2)  Grace-work ;  in 
man,  this  work  is  primarily  learning,  namely,  acquiring  a 
knowledge  of  the  Scriptures  and  of  all  the  efficacy  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  hence  also  a  knowledge  of  good  and  evil. 
When  man  permits  himself  to  be  guided  by  the  divine  Spirit 
that  dwells  within  him,  then  he  becomes  a  friend  of  God ;  as 
such,  he  must  divest  himself  of  all  temporal  things,  and  re- 
nounce them,  for  they  are  all  null  and  void ;  he  must  simply 
follow  Christ,  and  in  so  doing  he  attains  (3)  to  the  divine 
work  in  man;  man  is  now  one  spirit  with  God,  and  seeks 
nothing  but  God ;  his  work  is  God's  work,  and  God's  work 

16 


228  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  35. 

is  his  own  work ;  and  God's  spirit  speaks  to  him  no  more  in 
symbol  and  form,  but  in  full  life,  light,  and  truth.  All  the 
powers  of  the  soul  keep  holiday,  and  are  at  rest,  and  let  God 
alone  work,  and  this  is  the  highest  work  of  which  they  are 
capable.  The  human  spirit  loses  finally  its  own  self,  loses 
itself  in  God  and  knows  no  longer  any  thing  but  God ;  God 
puts  himself  in  the  place  of  reason  in  man,  and  works  man's 
works ;  the  soul  merges  itself  into  God  and  remains  eternally 
hovering  in  God, — drowns  itself  in  the  unfathomable  sea  of 
divinity.  Hence  by  the  renouncing  of  all  that  is  temporal, 
by  true  poverty,  man  becomes  divested  also  of  outward 
works.  He  who  has  no  longer  any  thing  wherewith  to  help 
his  fellow-man,  is  in  fact  no  longer  required  to  do  so ;  also 
external  works  belong  to  the  sphere  of  the  temporal,  and 
hence  man  must  pass  through  them  and  beyond  them  up  to 
true  poverty  and  vision ;  in  this  one  work  he  works  all  works, 
and  in  this  one  virtue  he  has  all  virtues. — In  Tauler  the  one 
phase  of  the,  moral,  namely,  union  with  God,  is  pushed  one- 
sidedly  into  untruth,  so  that  the  right  of  the  creatural  indi- 
viduality is  relatively  lost  sight  of,  and  hence  we  find  in 
many  respects  Pantheistical  forms  of  thought. — John  Ruis- 
broch  of  Brussels  (6b.  1381)  wrote  in  a  similar  spirit,  but 
strayed  into  a  still  more  transcendental  heart-mysticism, 
though  his  works  abound  rather  in  allegorizing  portrayals 
and  confident  assertions  than  in  scientific  demonstration. 

The  comprehensiveness  of  a  &erson  (ob.  1429)  could  not 
bring  to  a  check  the  decline  of  the  inner  spirit  of  the  church, 
which  was  now  seriously  affecting  also  the  general  moral 
consciousness.  Scholasticism  and  casuistry  had,  by  their 
interminable  subtleties,  largely  obscured  the  more  simple 
moral  modes  of  thought;  and  while  puzzling  themselves  in 
fruitless  speculation  over  the  imaginary  difficulties  of  cun- 
ningly-invented cases  of  conscience,  they  lost  all  sense  for 
moral  straightforwardness,  and  found  abundant  pretexts  for 
making  exceptions  from  the  moral  rule.  The  Franciscan, 
Jean  Petit  of  Paris,  was  able,  on  occasion  of  the  murder  of 
the  regent,  the  Duke  of  Orleans,  in  1407,  to  find  reasons  for 
openly  justifying  the  murder  of  tyrants,  and  the  Council  of 
Constance  did  not  venture  to  pronounce  a  decided  disapproval 
of  this  doctrine ;  and  not  only  that,  but  it  gave,  for  the  first 


§  35.]  GERSOISr,    KEMPIS.  229 

time,  serious  countenance  to  the  notion  of  moral  probabilism, 
that  is,  the  doctrine  that  a  morally  doubtful  action  is  per- 
missible on  condition  that  several  esteemed  Fathers  can  be 
cited  in  its  favor.*  Gerson,  who  opposed  the  doctrine  of 
Petit  with  but  half-heart,  was  also  himself  involved  in  the 
general  laxity  of  the  moral  consciousness ;  he  also  counte- 
nanced probabilism.  He  held  that  the  vow  of  celibacy  was 
violated  only  by  actual  marriage  but  not  by  fornication,  and 
for  this  sin  he  shows  an  excessive  leniency. t  The  notorious 
morality  of  the  Jesuits  is  not  peculiar  to  them,  but  is  only 
the  further  development  of  a  spirit  that  was  already  powerful 
in  the  Romish  church  before  the  time  of  the  Reformation. 
In  other  respects  Gerson  seeks,  in  his  numerous  writings  on 
specific  moral  topics,  to  mitigate  the  erroneousjiess  of  the 
prevailing  moral  views ;  the  monastic  life  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  divine  counsels,  he  does  not  esteem  so  highly  as  did  the 
spirit  of  his  age ;  he  finds  the  difference  between  venial  and 
mortal  sins  rather  in  the  subjective  intention  than  in  the  ob- 
jective nature  of  the  sin.  The  mystical  element  appears  in 
Gerson  under  a  very  moderated  form. 

Thomas  a  Kempis  (ob.  1471),  the  author  of  the  most  widely 
known  of  all  books  of  devotion :  De  imitatione  Christi  (trans- 
lated into  all  European  languages,  and  published  nearly  two 
thousand  times),  shows  himself  in  this  book  as  a  thoroughly 
practical,  moderated  mystic,  of  deep  moral  life-experience, 
and  of  genuine,  heart-felt,  morally- vigorous  piety ;  and  hence 
his  work  is  not  less  prized  in  the  Protestant  than  in  the 
Romish  church.  The  thoughts  are  presented  in  a  clear, 
genuinely-popular  style,  and  the  rich  heart-depth  is  thereby 
thrown  all  the  more  brightly  into  relief. — The  book  known 
as  German  Theology,  published  fijst  by  Luther  in  1516,  but 
springing  from  an  unknown  author  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
is  based  on  Tauler,  and  is  characterized  by  a  somewhat  more 
strongly  speculative  mysticism  than  that  of  Kempis, — em- 
phasizing in  an  almost  one-sided  manner  the  turning-away 
from  self  and  from  the  world,  and  the  becoming  united  with 

*  Marheinecke :  Gesch.  d.  chrwil.  Moral,  etc.,  1806,  p.  161  sqq. ; 
Standlin:  Gesch.  d.  ch.  Mor.  seit.  d.  Wiederaufl,,  etc.,  p.  63  sqq. ;  Wes- 
senberg:  Kirschenversamnil.,  2,  247. 

t  Opp.,  Antv.,  1706,  t.  iii,  917  sqg. 


230  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  35. 

God  as  the  one  eternal  good,  so  that  the  moral  right  of  the 
personality  is  thrown  quite  too  far  into  the  back-ground,  and 
too  little  distinction  is  made  between  the  personality  itself 
and  the  "selfhood  "  that  is  to  be  done  away  with. 

Less  peculiar  in  contents  than  in>form,  and  differing  equal- 
ly from  scholasticism  and  from  mysticism,  are  the  moral 
views  of  Raymund  de  Sabunde  (of  Toulouse,  about  1430).* 
Appropriating  to  himself  the  results  of  preceding  theological 
and  philosophical  thought,  he  undertook,  rather  from  the 
stand-point  of  experience,  of  the  observation  of  nature,  and 
of  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  to  place  these  results  with- 
in reach  of  the  understanding  of  the  masses.  The  freedom 
of  the  will  as  directed  toward  the  good  is  the  highest  posses- 
sion of  reason ;  called  to  the  highest  place  in  the  scale  of 
created  beings,  man  should,  by  free  conduct,  show  himself 
worthy  of  this  calling, — should  establish  and  preserve  the 
harmony  of  the  created.  As  man  has  received  nothing  from 
himself,  but  every  thing  from  God  alone,  hence  his  first  duty 
is  thankful  love  to  God  who  first  loved  him  (tit.  96  sqq.,  109 
sqq.};  love  to  self  becomes  moral  only  through  love  to  God. 
Other  creatures  give  us  good  only  in  so  far  as  God  works 
through  them,  and  hence  our  love  to  them  must  be  subordi- 
nated to  our  love  to  God ;  but  out  of  this  love  to  God  follows 
also  a  love  to  that  which  He  has  created,  and  hence,  first  of 
all,  to  man  as  God's  image ;  hence  the  requirement  to  love 
one's  neighbor  as  one's  self  (120  sqq).  Through  love  to  God, 
man  constantly  grows  in  God -likeness,  for  amor  convertit 
amdntem  in  rem  amatam  (129  sqq.),  though  this  is  not  to  be 
taken  in  the  sweeping  sense  of  the  Mystics.  Evil  consists  in 
this,  that  we  honor  and  love  the  creature  not  in  God  but  for 
itself,  and  is  consequently  idolatry ;  the  root  of  all  evil  is 
this  impious  love  to  self,  that  is,  it  is  self-seeking  and  self- 
will;  the  devil  seeks  nothing  but  himself. — As  in  consequence 
of  sin  a  general  corruption  of  man's  nature  has  been  brought 
about,  and  as  the  power  of  sin  over  man  is  paralyzed  only  by 
redemption,  hence  Christian  morality  rests  entirely  on  loving 
thankfulness  to  Christ,  and  involves  a  constant  struggle 
against  the  remains  of  sin  that  still  infect  us.  • 

The  evangelical  tendency  which  during  the  time  of  the 
*  Theologia  naturalis,  Solisb.,  1852.— Matzke  :  B.  t>.  S.,  1846. 


§35.]  PRE-REFORMERS.  231 

universal  domination  of  the  Romish  church  had  never  entire- 
ly disappeared,  and  which,  especially  since  the  appearance 
of  the  Waldenses,  had  been  growing  more  positive  in  its 
opposition  to  the  corrupted  church,  directed  its  efforts  from 
the  very  first  against  the  anti-scriptural  and  arbitrary  ordi- 
nances of  said  church,  especially  against  the  work -holiness 
of  monastic  morality,  in  order  to  vindicate  the  moral  free- 
dom of  the  Christian  personality,  and  also  against  the  sophis- 
tical laxity  of  the  more  recent  period ;  this  tendency  insists 
above  all  upon  faith-born  love  as  the  source  and  essence  of 
all  true  morality,  and  rejects  the  notion  of  supererogatory 
merit  as  arising  from  the  observance  of  the  so-called  evan- 
gelical counsels.— So  taught  Wickliffe  in  his  Trialogus,  but 
rather  as  assailing  than  as  positively  building  up ;  all  sin,  he 
refers  to  a  lack  in  true  faith ;  a  correct  knowledge  of  faith 
precludes  sin ;  true  virtue  is  not  possible  without  true  faith ; 
a  correct  knowledge  of  faith  precludes  sin ;  true  virtue  is  not 
possible  without  true  faith ;  hence  by  a  man's  virtue  one  can 
judge  of  his  faith.  Wickliffe's  over-rigid  and  almost  de- 
terministic predestinarianism  simply  stands,  unmediated, 
along-side  of  his  moral  views,  and  merely  impedes  their  freer 
scope. — Also  Huss  combats,  in  the  ethical  field,  chiefly  only 
against  the  errors  of  Romish  dogmas  and  morals,  without 
himself  establishing  any  thing  essentially  new. — Violent  and 
keen,  and  generally,  though  not  always,  purely  evangelical 
are  also  the  assaults  of  Nicolas  de  Clamengis  [Clemangis]  in 
France — ob.  about  1440 — against  the  corruption  of  the  moral 
consciousness  of  the  church).* — John  of  Goch,  of  Malines  (pb. 
1475)  assailed,  from  an  Augustinian  stand-point,  the  com- 
mingling of  the  evangelical  with  the  Mosaic  law,  also  the  sys- 
tem of  vows,  and  outward  work-holiness  in  general ;  faith  as 
working  by  love  is  the  essence  of  Christian  freedom  and  moral- 
ity.f  The  influence  of  Savonarola  in  Florence  lay  more  in  his 
fiery  zeal  for  pure  evangelical  morality  than  in  fruits  of  scientific 
thought ;  in  his  mode  of  thinking,  the  phase  of  the  God-pos- 
sessed affections  stands  forth  with  most  prominence ;  a  mysti- 
cal subjectiveness  is  combined  with  a  fervent  work-activity.  J 

*  De  corrupto  eccl.  statu,  and  in  briefer  essays  and  letters,  Opp.t  1613. 
t  Ullmann  :  Bef&rmatoren  vor  d.  Ref.,  1841,  i. 
JRudelbach:  Sav.,  1835;  F.  C.  Meier,  1836. 


232  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§35. 

If  we  leave  out  of  view  these  teachers  of  the  church  who 
were  forerunners  of  the  Reformation,  we  find  in  general  in  the 
ecclesiastical  ethics  prevailing  before  the  opening  of  this  Refor- 
mation a  threefold  character :  a  casuistical,  a  scholastic,  and  a 
mystical  one,  corresponding  to  the  three  phases  of  the  soul-life, 
namely,  to  the  empirical  understanding,  to  the  speculative  rea- 
son and  to  the  loving  heart.  The  mystical  form  of  ethics  is 
the  pure  antithesis  to  the  casuistical ;  the  former  rests  on  heart- 
union  with  God,  the  latter  on  the  analyzing  understanding ;  the 
former,  upon  an  inward  ineffable  vision,  the  latter,  upon  out- 
ward calculating  observation ;  the  former  strays  at  times  into 
the  borders  of  Pantheism,  and  hence  has  some  points  of  con- 
tact with  the  cosmic  theory  of  India ;  the  latter  is  rather  in 
danger  of  repeating,  in  the  Christian  sphere,  the  Jewish  ex- 
ternality and  chicanery  of  Pharisaism  and  Talmudisin ; — the 
former  reduces  all  plurality,  all  heterogeneousness,  to  a  homo- 
geneous unity, — endangers  the  practically  moral  working-life 
in  the  world ;  the  latter  dissolves  the  moral  idea  into  an  atom- 
istic plurality  of  single  cases  devoid  of  uniting  bond ; — mysti- 
cism turns  itself  away  disdainfully  from  all  objective  reality 
even  of  the  moral  life ;  casuistry  threatens  to  bind  up  and  to 
smother  the  moral  in  narrow  legal  forms ;  mysticism  turns  away 
from  the  circumference  toward  the  center,  but  does  not  return 
again  from  the  center  to  the  circumference ;  casuistry  proceeds 
and  stumbles  by  a  reverse  course ; — the  former  tends  to  a  lightly- 
esteeming  of  the  active  life,  the  latter  to  a  hypocritical  and  ex- 
ternal work-holiness.  Speculative  ethics,  especially  in  Thomas 
Aquinas,  stands  higher  than  in  either  of  the  other  two  forms,  but 
lacks  too  much  in  evangelical  directness  and  simplicity;  and 
because  of  its  double  dependence  on  Greek  ethics,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  evangelical  church-creed,  on  the  other,  it  has 
not  only  compromised  its  legitimate  and  essential  freedom,  but, 
at  the  same  time,  also  its  truth.  Notwithstanding  this,  how- 
ever, it  stands  (especially  in  its  highest  perfection  in  Thomas 
Aquinas)  far  more  closely  to  the  evangelical  consciousness  than 
the  later  form  of  Roman  Catholic  ethics  as  presented  by  the 
zealous  champion  of  the  Romish  church,  the  Jesuits. 


§  36.]  PROTESTANT  ETHICS.  233 

IIL  THE  EPOCH  OP  REFORM. 
SECTION  XXXVI. 

The  antagonism  of  the  evangelical  ground-thought 
to  that  of  Romanism  manifested  itself  also  in  ethics. 
In  the  evangelical  or  Protestant  church  the  sinful 
corruption  of  the  natural  man  was  conceived  much 
more  deeply,  and  consequently  the  moral  task  of  the 
Christian  much  more  earnestly  ;  and,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  impossibility  of  meriting  salvation  by  our 
works,  Christian  virtue  was  conceived,  in  much 
greater  freedom  from  self-seeking,  as  the  simple  fruit 
of  faith ;  and  the  notion  of  supererogatory  works  be- 
came impossible  in  view  of  the  decided  recognition, 
that  the  life  even  of  the  most  holy  always  falls  short 
of  moral  perfection.  The  Scriptural  view  excludes 
a  very  essential  portion  of  Romish  ethics  from  that 
of  the  evangelical  church.* 

The  semi-Pelagian  enfeebling  of  the  effects  of  sin  that  pre- 
vailed in  the  Romish  church,  deprived  ethics  of  its  proper 
deep-reaching  foundation.  The  more  deeply  the  moral  corrup- 
tion of  man  is  conceived  of,  so  much  the  greater  becomes  also 
the  significancy  of  redemption,  and  likewise  also  of  the  moral 
struggle  of  the  regenerated  Christian  against  sin.  Hence  the, 
at  first  thought,  surprising  phenomenon  that  the  rigid  predes- 
tinarianism  of  Calvin  did  not  lead  to  a  decline  in  moral  effort, 
but  on  the  contrary  to  a  very  vigorous  moral  life.  In  the  deep 
earnestness- of  their  conception  of  the  moral  task,  both  evan- 
gelical churches,  the  Lutheran  and  the  Reformed,  stand  alike. 

The  Holy  Scriptures  are  the  sole  fountain  of  Christian  ethics, 
just  as,  living  faith  in  Christ  as  the  sole  cause  of  salvation,  is 

*  Comp.  H.  Merz :  System  der  christl.  Sittenlehre  in  seiner  Gestaltung 
nach  den  Orundsetzen  des  Protestantismus  im  Gegensatze  zum  KatJioUcis- 
mtw,  Tub.,  1841,— ingenious,  but  prepossessed  by  speculative  theories, 
arid  doing  inj  ustice  to  both  sides. 


234  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  36. 

also  the  subjective  ground  and  the  living  fountain  of  morality. 
All  blessedness  is  imparted  to  us  without  our  meriting  it,  and 
solely  of  grace ;  but  good  works,  as  the  necessary  effects  of  true 
faith,  are  the  certain  verification  of  the  same.  The  moral  law 
is  not.  as  in  the  Romish  church,  predominantly  objective,  but 
is  of  a  strictly  inward  character.  No  one  can  do  more  than 
what  God  requires  of  him,  for  man  is  called  to  perfection ;  all 
that  is  truly  good  is  a  requirement  of  the  divine  law  and  not 
of  any  mere  counsels,  which,  without  the  forfeiture  of  a  God- 
pleasing  life,  might  in  so  far  be  left  undone, — all  the  good  that 
we  can  do,  we  are  also  under  obligation  to  do.  The  so-called 
counsels  of  the  Romish  church  are  rather  a  hindering  than  a 
furthering  of  the  good,  for  they  stand  in  the  way  of  active  love, 
and  nourish  the  delusion  of  personal  merit.  Monastic  vows  are 
not  consistent  with  vital  faith.  As  man  is  saved  only  in  virtue 
of  redemption  through  Christ,  hence  his  salvation  rests  solely 
on  the  worthiness  of  Christ,  and  not  on  personal  merit ;  all  true 
virtue  must  be  simply  a  fruit  of  faith,  and  hence  of  an  already- 
acquired  divine  sonship,  and  consequently,  though  it  may  verify 
this  sonship,  it  cannot  first  acquire  or  heighten  it. 

Evangelical  ethics  is  therefore  apparently  much  less  compre- 
hensive in  its  subject-matter  than  that  of  the  Romish  church, — 
treats  a  not  inconsiderable  portion  of  the  latter  merely  con- 
demnatorily,  as,  e.  g.,  the  entire  subject  of  asceticism,  and  of 
opera  supererogatoria  as  fulfilling  the  counsels;  on  the  other 
hand,  however,  it  has  a  deeper  ground  and  a  higher  earnest- 
ness. Romish  asceticism  simply  hides  from  view  the  inner 
lack  of  a  truly  evangelically  moral  depth.  He  who  has  under- 
stood the  entire  and  profound  earnestness  of  the  moral  life-task, 
and  is  conscious,  how  far  the  reality  still  falls  below  the  moral 
prototype,  can  never  come  upon  the  thought  of  attempting, 
in  addition  to  the  moral  task  proposed  to  us  by  God,  to  per- 
form still  other  additional  works,  in  order  to  attain  to  a  still 
higher  degree  of  sanctity.  All  these  self-imposed  works  are 
really  an  implication  that  God  placed  the  moral  goal  of  man 
too  low,  and  that  He  is  thankfully  pleased  to  accept  the 
voluntary  and  non-owed  over-payment  of  those  who  feel  them- 
selves superior  to  the  ordinary  assessment. 


§  37.]  LUTHER.  235 

SECTION  XXXVII. 

The  Reformers  themselves  treat  the  moral  con- 
tents of  the  Christian  consciousness  for  the  most  part 
only  practically ;  Melanchthon  develops  in  his  Loci 
merely  the  ground-thoughts,  though  he  also  attempts, 
on  the  basis  of  Aristotle,  a  philosophical  establishing 
of  the  foundations  of  ethics ;  Calvin  gives  only 
brief  outlines,  independently  of  the  earlier  scholastic 
method.  The  antithesis  of  the  two  evangelical 
churches  manifested  itself  also  in  wide-reaching  dif- 
ferences of  ethical  views.  As  an  independent  theo- 
logical science,  ethics  was  somewhat  earlier  treated 
in  the  Reformed  than  in  the  Lutheran  church.  In 
the  latter,  it  was  at  first  either  combined,  in  its  mere 
ground-principles,  with  dogmatics,  or  treated  merely 
practically  and  popularly  ;  G.  Calixtus,  however, 
treated  it  as  a  science  distinctly  separate  from  dog- 
matics, though  only  in  its  scanty  beginnings.  From 
this  time  forward  it  was  frequently  treated  independ- 
ently, though  for  the  most  part,  even  as  late  as  into 
the  eighteenth  century,  only  as  casuistry;  and  Pietism, 
which  embraced  so  earnestly  the  ethical  contents  of 
Christianity,  although  with  some  formal  narrowness, 
prepared  the  way  for  a  profounder  scientific  treat- 
ment of  ethics. 

Luther  himself,  who  embraced  the  evangelical  ground-truths 
so  clearly  and  distinctly,  was  not  called  by  the  general  scope  of 
his  activity  to  the  preparing  of  a  system  of  scientific  ethics 
proper.  His  warfare  against  Romish  work-holiness,  and  against 
the  formal,  subtle  and  freedom-hampering  casuistry  of  the  Ro- 
manists, must  have  awakened  in  him  a  certain  disinclination  to 
a  rigidly-scientific  development  of  ethics,  and  an  anxiety  lest 
such  a  work  might  sink  the  free  moral  activity  of  the  Christian 


236  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§37. 

from  the  sphere  of  faith-communion  with  Christ  into  unfree 
and  juridical  forms.  He  expressed  it  repeatedly,  that  the  true 
believer  needs  no  law  at  all,  because  faith  itself  is  both  law  and 
power,  and  spontaneously  works  the  God-pleasing  out  of  free 
love  without  being  hampered  by  an  objective  law.  As  the 
apple-tree  bears  its  fruit  not  in  virtue  of  a  law  given  to  it,  but 
out  of  its  own  proper  nature,  so  are  all  Christians  so  tempered 
by  faith  that  they  spontaneously  do  well  and  righteously  better 
than  all  laws  could  teach  them  to  do.  Even  as  the  tree  must 
exist  antecedently  to  its  fruit,  and  as  the  fruit  does  not  make  a 
tree  good  or  bad,  but  the  tree  makes  the  fruit,  so  must  man  be 
good  or  bad  before  he  does  good  or  bad  works.  The  Christian's 
love  is  to  be  an  outward-gushing  love,  flowing  from  within  out 
of  the  heart,  out  of  his  own  little  fountain ;  the  spring  and  the 
stream  are  themselves  to  be  good, — are  not  to  derive  their  waters 
from  without.  Christ  was  a  Redeemer,  not  a  Lawgiver,  and 
the  Gospel  is  not  to  be  turned  into  a  book  of  laws.  With  such 
views,  so  directly  antagonistic  to  the  common  Romish  teach- 
ing, if  we  except  the  Mystics,  it  was  natural  that  a  rigidly- 
drawn-up  system  of  ethics  might  seem  a  hampering  to  faith- 
born  freedom, — might  seem  like  an  adulterating  of  the  teachings 
of  the  Gospel  with  the  doctrine  of  the  law.  This  period  of 
agitated  contest  was  therefore  little  adapted  to  the  scientific 
development  of  a  system  of  ethics ;  this  science  was  in  fact  the 
fruit  of  the  evangelical  life  as  having  come  to  inner  peace 
and  stability,  and  as  grown  ripe  through  long  experience  in 
faith. 

Of  the  chief  Reformers,  only  Melanchthon, — who  was  of  solid 
classic  culture,  and  who  gave  proof,  at  the  time  of  his  scientific 
maturity,  both  of  decided  fondness  for,  and  of  a  thorough  un- 
derstanding of,  Aristotle, — indicated,  in  his  theological  writings 
not  only  the  ground- thoughts  of 'evangelical  ethics,  but  gave 
even  the  outlines  of  a  system  of  philosophical  ethics.  Besides 
his  valuable  comments  on  the  Ethics  and  Politics  of  Aristotle,* 
he  wrote,  on  -the  basis  of  Aristotelian  principles,  Philosophies 

*  InEthica  Arist.  comment.,  1529,  treating  only  the  1st  and  2d  books  ; 
in  1532  were  added  the  3d  and  5th ;  re-written  in  1545  as  Enarratio 
aliquot  tibrorum  Efh.  Ar.,  etc., — in  the  Corpus  Reformatorum  of  Bret- 
schneider  and  Bindseil,  t.  xvi,  p.  277-41 H. —  Comment,  in  aliquot  polU- 
icos  Ubros  Aristot.,  1530,  in  Corp.  Ref.,  ib.,  p.  417  sqq. 


§37.J  MELANCHTHON.  237 

moralis  epitome,  1538.*  In  this  work  Melanchthon  keeps  phil- 
osophical ethics  and  the  Christian  knowledge  of  the  moral 
strictly  separate.  The  former  is  capable  of  comprehending  and 
presenting  only  a  part  of  the  divine  law ;  it  gives  only  the  nat- 
ural law ;  but  this  is  also  a  true  divine  law,  which  is  implanted 
in  human  reason ;  and  the  philosophical  knowledge  of  the  same 
is  a  legitimate  requirement  and  is  an  education  toward  the 
higher  truth,  as  also  the  true  foundation  of  all  civil  legislation, 
and  is  consequently  by  no  means  to  be  despised  ;  moral  reason 
is  the  mirror  from  which  the  wisdom  of  God  is  reflected  forth 
[Corp.  Be/.,  pp.  21-27 ;  comp.  277].  The  method  of  the  work 
follows  the  plan  of  the  ethics  of  Aristotle,  but  presents  far  more 
solid  principles.  Man  is  the  image  of  God,  and  his  goal  is  the 
true  development  and  manifestation  of  this  image.  Hence  the 
end  of  man  is  to  know  and  to  recognize  God,  his  prototype, 
and  to  manifest,  in  and  through  himself,  the  glory  of  God,  by 
willing  and  complete  obedience  [28  sqq~\.  Of  the  virtues  that 
fall  within  the  scope  of  philosophical  ethics,  righteousness  or 
justness  takes  first  rank,  and  this  virtue  is  pretty  fully  discussed 
[63  sqq.~],  especially  in  its  civic  significancy ;  more  briefly  are 
treated  the  virtues  of  truthfulness,  beneficence,  thankfulness,  and 
friendship. — His  philosophical  ethics  appeared,  in  1550,  entirely 
re-written  and  more  independent  of  Aristotle,  as  Ethicm  doctrines 
elementa  et  enarratio  libri  quinti  Ethicorum,  and  afterward  in 
1554,  '57,  '60,  and  frequently  after  Melanchthon's  death. f  This 
excellent  work,  though  not  comprehensive, — shorter  even  than 
the  previous  work,  and  presenting  only  the  general  bases  of  the 
moral,  and  examining  more  fully  only  certain  special  and,  in 
part,  civic  questions, — is  written  in  a  clear,  concise,  and  beauti- 
ful style,  and  is  a  worthy  commencement  toward  a  system  of 
evangelical  and,  in  fact,  essentially  philosophical  ethics, — since 
the  seventeenth  century  undeservedly  laid  aside,  and  also  in 
more  recent  times  almost  forgotten. — A  knowledge  of  the  vir- 
tues is  necessary,  because  it  shows  that  God  is ;  for  the  eternal 
and  immutable  distinction  of  the  moral  and  the  immoral  in  our 
reason  cannot  be  fortuitous,  but  must  proceed  from  the  eternal, 
prescribing  reason  itself;  it  shows  also  how  God  is,  namely, 

*  Corp.  Ref.,  xvi,  pp.  21-164.    The  following  editions,  1539,  '40,  are 
largely  changed ;  three  later  ones,  1542-'46,  are  like  that  of  1540. 
t  Corp.  Ref.,  xvi,  pp.  165-276  ;  not  printed  in  the  earlier  Opp. 


238  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  37. 

wise,  free,  truthful,  just,  beneficent,  merciful,  etc.  ;  it  is  a  witness 
of  God's  justly  retributing  judgments,  and  is  a  life-norm  for 
men  in  outward  (not  spiritual)  actions  and  in  discipline.  Nat- 
ural reason,  however,  can  discover  neither  the  ground  of  the 
enfeehleinent  which  has  resulted  from  sin,  nor  the  means  of  sal- 
vation therefrom  ;  hence  philosophy,  without  the  Gospel,  does 
not  suffice  [Corp.  Ref.,  165-167].  Moral  philosophy  is  the  sci- 
entific presentation  of  the  moral  law  of  nature  in  the  sphere  of 
external  morals  and  discipline,  and  is,  in  this  field,  in  harmony 
with  the  Decalogue,  and  in  so  far  also  with  the  Gospel ;  for  the 
moral  law  is  the  eternal  and  immutable  wisdom  and  measure 
of  the  justice  of  God,  obligating  all  rational  creatures,  and  con- 
demning those  who  come  into  conflict  with  it ;  but  the  Gospel 
preaches  repentance,  and  promises  forgiveness  of  sins  on  the 
ground  of  redemption  by  grace.  Now,  though  moral  philoso- 
phy knows  nothing  of  this  promise,  yet,  as  being  a  part  of  the 
law,  it  also,  on  its  part,  leads  toward  the  Gospel,  and  is  there- 
fore not  to  be  despised  [C.  JR.,  167-170]. — Ethics  inquires  first 
of  all  after  the  goal  of  the  moral  course.  This  goal  or  end  is 
God  himself,  who  lovingly  communicates  himself  to  us,  and 
hence  the  true  knowledge  and  reverencing  of  God.  God  created 
man  unto  his  image,  hence  He  wills  that  He  should  himself  be 
manifested  in  and  through  man,  namely,  in  that  man  becomes 
morally  like  unto  Him ;  only  in  a  derived  sense  can  it  be  said 
that  virtue  is  the  end  of  man,  as  the  highest  good.  The  good 
is  that  which  harmonizes  with  the  God-set  goal ;  hence  evil  is 
a  disturbing  of  the  divine  plan ;  and  evil  is  primarily  a  malum 
culpee,  in  pure  antagonism  to  the  divine  will,  and  then,  second- 
arily, a  malum  poence,  which  by  the  divine,  righteous  will  is 
madeT  to  follow  upon  the  guilty  malum  culpce;  God  is  in  no 
sense  whatever  the  author  or  accomplice  of  sin, — to  affirm  this 
would  be  blasphemy, — though  He  is  indeed  the  author  of  the 
punishment  [C.  R.,  170-183].' — Virtue,  as  an  acquired  tendency 
to  obey  right  reason,  is  conditioned  on  the  fact  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  reason  guides  the  will  by  a  right  judgment,  and  that  on 
the  other  the  will  freely,  persistently  and  firmly  lays  hold  upon 
this  judgment,  and  has  pleasure  in  so  doing.  A  knowledge  of 
the  law  and  a  free-will  are  the  characteristics  of  the  divine 
image  as  created  in  man  by  divine  love;  virtue  is  the  moral 
realization  of  this  image, — is  thankful,  answering  love  for  re- 


§  37.]  MELA1STCHTHON.  239 

ceivecl  love.  In  reason,  as  darkened  by  sin,  this  knowledge  and 
freedom  are  indeed  enfeebled,  but  not  annihilated,  and  there 
remained  in  man  a  moral  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  and 
some  degree  of  freedom  to  act  conformably  to  this  conscious- 
ness. Hence,  the  will  is  then  truly  good  when  it  corresponds 
to  the  moral  consciousness  in  so  far  as  this  consciousness  har- 
monizes with  the  divine  will.  Hence  virtue — more  definitely 
stated — is  the  tendency  of  the  will  constantly  to  hearken  to  the 
moral  consciousness  for  God's  sake  and  out  of  thankfulness 
toward  him  [183  sqq\.  The  thought  of  the  moral  freedom  of 
the  will  is,  now,  thoroughly,  carefully,  and  very  emphatically 
developed  by  Melanchthon,  and  an  attempt  made  to  establish 
it  by  Scripture  (in  harmony  with  Loci,  iv,  edition  of  1559). 
Man  as  man,  and  hence  even  unredeemed  man,  has  in  the  moral 
sphere  a  free  discretion  to  prefer  morality  to  crime,  to  perform 
outward  moral  works  and  to  preserve  discipline,  and  it  is  God's 
will  that  such  discipline  and  order  be  freely  preserved — not 
merely  from  fear,  but  also  for  conscience'  sake.  Indeed,  genuine 
God-fearing,  right  trust  and  right  love  to  God,  steadfastness  in 
confession,  and  hence,  in  fact,  all  the  truly  God-pleasing  spiritual 
virtues,  are  impossible  without  the  assistance  of  the  Holy  Spirit ; 
in  this  assistance,  however,  man  is  not  purely  inactive  like  a 
statue,  but  reason  must  attentively  lay  hold  on  the  Word  of 
God,  and  the  will  must  not  resist,  but  must  yield  to  the  gracious 
workings  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  aspire  after  divine  support. 
Absolute  predestination  and  Stoic  fatality  are  equally  to  be 
rejected.  The  passions — by  which  Melanchthon  understands 
both  the  impulses  of  feeling  and  the  desires — are  not  to  be  sup- 
pressed as  irrational,  as  the  Stoics  teach,  but  are  to  be  taken 
into  the  service  of  the  moral  reason,  and  those  that  have  become 
evil  by  sin  are  to  be  resisted  [201-207]. — The  distribution  of 
the  virtues  is  best  made  according  to  the  Decalogue.  But  the 
commands  of  the  first  table  cannot  be  adequately  known  in  a 
purely  philosophical  manner;  nevertheless,  some  points  may  be 
made.  Every  effect  is  dependent  on  its  cause,  and  must  remain 
in  harmony  therewith ;  man  is  an  effect  of  God,  consequently 
he  ought  to  remain  in  harmony  with  God,  and  not  break  off 
the  bond  that  unites  him  with  God.  Moreover,  as  the  image 
of  God,  man  has  the  duty  of  remaining  in  likeness  and  harmony 
with  God  [214,  215].  In  the  commandments  of  the  second 


240  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  37. 

table  appears,  first,  the  virtue  of  justness,  and  in  fact  primarily 
in  a  general  character,  in  the  relation  of  those  who  guide  and 
those  who  are  guided,  in  which  relation  obedience  to  parents 
and  to  the  magistracy,  and  piety  in  general,  appear  as  a  moral 
law  of  nature.  Justness  in  its  special  form — that  which  gives 
to  every  one  his  dues — appears  in  the  three  following  command- 
ments, which  require  the  preserving  of  every  one  in  his  rights, 
in  respect  to  life,  to  wedlock-fidelity  and  to  property.  The 
second  chief  virtue,  as  expressed  in  the  eighth  commandment, 
is  truthfulness,  which  is  a  necessary  requirement  of  the  rational 
nature  of  man ;  for  in  fact  reason  consists  essentially  in  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth,  and  consequently  it  also  requires  the  truth. 
The  two  last  commandments  enjoin  temperateness,  but  they  are 
not  developed  in  detail.  To  these  three  chief  virtues  the  others 
are  joined  as  branches,  namely,  steadfastness  to  truthfulness, 
and  thankfulness,  beneficence,  diligence,  etc.,  to  justness,  espe- 
cially justness  toward  God  [215-222]. — In  his  second  book, 
Melanchthon  gives  a  development  of  the  virtue  of  justness  in 
detail,  with  the  omission  of  the  other  virtues.  Justness,  of 
righteousness  in  the  evangelical  sense — the  virtue  which  acquires 
for  man  eternal  salvation — cannot  be  attained  to  by  mere  human 
effort  because  of  the  prevalence  of  sin,  but  is  imparted  to  man 
by  grace  in  virtue  of  redemption;  in  moral  philosophy  the 
question  is  therefore  only  as  to  the  justness  which  consists  in 
the  outward  fulfilling  of  positive  laws.  This  justness  is,  in 
part,  of  a  general  character,  consisting  in  obedience  to  law 
both  human  and  divine  [as  in  Rom.  ii,  13;  Psa.  cxix,  121],  and 
in  part  of  a  special  character;  the  latter  is,  in  its  turn,  of  a  dis- 
tributive and  of  an  exchanging  character ;  as  distributive  it 
relates  to  social  order,  as  well  to  social  superordination  and 
subordination  as  to  the  calling  of  the  proper  persons  to  par- 
ticular offices,  and  to  rewarding  and  punishing,  and  hence, 
in  general,  to  the  upholding  of  proper  discipline, — as  exchang- 
ing it  relates  to  the  moral  intercourse  and  commerce  of  men 
among  each  other  as  equals.  The  practice  of  justness,  and 
hence  also  obedience  toward  those  holding  oflice  and  author- 
ity, takes  place  not  merely  in  virtue  of  human  laws,  but  also 
in  the  fulfilling  of  the  divine  will ;  the  proper  human  ordi- 
nances of  society  are  God's  ordinances.  A  violation  of  the 
law  of  nature,  and  hence  also  disobedience  toward  the  legit- 


§37.]  MELANCHTHON'S  LOCI.  241 

imate  ordinances  of  civil  authority,  is  consequently  not  merely 
a  civil  misdemeanor,  but  also  a  sin  against  God,  a  mortal  sin. 
The  ordinances  of  the  natural  law  are  in  part  unconditional, 
and  hence  divine  and  perpetually-valid  commands,  such  as 
obedience  toward  God,  parental  duties,  the  virtue  of  truth- 
fulness ;  and,  in  part,  only  conditionally-valid,  such  as  the 
keeping  of  peace  and  the  communistic  use  of  property ;  the 
latter  feature,  in  fact,  would  be  obligatory  only  on  condition 
that  mankind  were  not  corrupted  by  sin ;  in  consequence  of 
sin,  however,  the  forcible  protection  and  distinct  separation 
of  property  become  necessary  [223-234] .  The  guilt  of  trans- 
gressions of  the  law  is  different  according  as  the  person  does 
or  does  not  act  with  a  clear  consciousness  of  the  law  and  of 
the  deed ;  guiltily-incurred  error  excuses  not  the  deed,  but 
rather  heightens  the  guilt,  inasmuch  as  it  is  our  duty  to  seek 
after  the  truth.  Also  violent  passions  do  not  make  the  un- 
lawful action  an  involuntary  one,  for  man  may  and  ought  to 
control  his  passions  [237-240]. — Hereupon,  and  apropos  to 
the  assumption  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  Pope  over  sec- 
ular governments,  Melanchthon  treats  of  the  nature  of,  and 
the  difference  between,  the  spiritual  and  the  temporal  pow- 
ers, in  essential  agreement  with  what  he  had  said  in  his 
Loci  [20,  21] ;  this  is  followed  by  disquisitions  on  questions 
of  civil  right,  on  taxes  and  contracts. 

In  his  Loci  Melanchthon  gives  the  general  bases  of  the  moral 
consciousness  in  strictly  Biblical  form  [Loci  3-6;  8-11].  The 
Old  Testament  law  is  not  identical  with  the  eternal  moral  law, 
but  contains  besides  this  law  (which  is  indeed  not  fully  included 
in  the  Decalogue,  but  only  indicated  in  its  chief  features)  also 
the  ceremonial  and  the  civil  law,  both  of  which  had  validity 
only  until  the  advent  of  Christianity.  The  moral  law  is  the 
immediate  and  pure  expression  of  the  divine  wisdom  and  just- 
ness themselves,  and  hence  was  not  first  given  by  Moses,  but 
was  always  valid  from  the  very  beginning.  Melanchthon's  some- 
what extensive  examination  of  the  several  divine  laws  in  the 
order  of  the  Decalogue,  may  serve  in  many  respects  to  comple- 
ment his  philosophical  ethics.  He  writes,  here,  free  from  the 
cramping  fetters  of  the  long-observed  schemata,  and  reckons 
among  the  "  works  "  of  the  first  commandment :  a  proper  knowl- 
edge of  God,  God-fearing,  faith,  love,  hope,  patience,  and  hu- 


242  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  37. 

mility.  The  Romish  doctrine  of  the  counsels  he  refutes  and 
rejects.  The  distinction  between  mortal  and  venial  sins  he 
indeed  retains,  but  he  conceives  it  much  more  deeply, — under- 
standing under  the  latter  such  sins  as  are  committed  by  Chris- 
tians without  evil  intention  and  with  inner  resistance  to  the 
evil,  and  are  followed  by  honest  repentance,  and  under  the  latter 
those  which  are  committed  premeditatedly  and  against  con- 
science [Loc.,  11].  In  addition  to  this,  Melanchthon  examines 
in  special  treaties  and  letters  many  particular,  and  especially 
practico-moral,  questions,*  in  a  very  judicious  manner. 

In  his  scientific  conception  of  the  ethical  task,  Melanchthon 
furnishes  an  essential  complement  to  that  of  Luther,  who  fixed 
his  attention  simply  on  the  fact  of  the  moral  life  of  the  regener- 
ated as  such,  without  shaping  the  development  of  this  fact  out 
of  the  inner  heart  of  the  Christian  life,  into  an  ethical  science. 
Melanchthon  himself,  however,  did  not  complete  this  task,  but 
simply  began  it ;  and  although  we  find  in  him  frequently  a  slight 
over-estimation  of  Aristotle,  still  we  perceive  in  the  vigorous 
manner  in  which,  in  his  last  ethical  writings,  he  breaks  loose 
from  all  cramping  and  foreign  forms  and  thoughts,  and  lays  an 
entirely  new,  purely  Christian  foundation,  how  clearly  he  com- 
prehended his  task, — the  carrying-out  of  which  was  delayed 
by  the  soon-following  inner  struggles  of  the  evangelical  church  ; 
only  a  few  writers — Chytrwus,  Victorin  Strigel  and  Nicholas 
Hemming — followed,  in,  as  yet,  feeble  attempts,  upon  the  path 
marked  out  by  Melanchthon.f 

The  rigid  predestinarianism  of  Calvin  seems  at  first  thought 
still  more  unfavorable  for  the  development  of  ethics  than  the 
stand-point  of  Luther ;  in  reality,  however,  the  Reformed  church 
developed  an  independent  system  of  ethics  earlier  than  the 
Lutheran.  The  juridically-dialectic  ground-character  of  the 
Calvinistic  world-conception  necessarily  led  sooner  than  the 
more  mystically-inclined  subjective  Lutheran  view,  to  a  rigor- 
ous development  of  the  practical  phase  of  religion.  In  his  In- 
stitutio  [iii,  6-10]  Calvin  gives  a  short,  plainly- biblical  pres- 
entation of  the  bases  of  Christian  morality, — which,  of  course, 
can  be  actually  practiced  only  by  the  predestinated,  but  which 

*  De  conjugio  ;  quaestiones  aliquot  ethic(e,dejuramentis,  etc.,  1552;  in 
Corp.  lief.,  xvi,  453  sqq.     Consilia  8.  judicia  theol.,  ed.  Pezellii.     1(360. 
t  J.  C.  E.  Schwarz  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1853 ;  Pelt.,  ib.,  1848. 


§  37.]  CALVIN'S  ETHICS.  243 

is  however  for  them,  as  being  called  to  purity,  an  unconditional 
duty.  That  virtue  cannot  actually  obtain  for  us  salvation — 
communion  with  God — but  is  simply  the  necessary  fruit  of  the 
salvation  already  obtained  by  grace,  and  the  constant  bond  of 
this  communion  as  established  by  grace,  Calvin  affirms  very 
definitely.  Therein,  precisely,  consists,  in  his  view,  the  essential 
superiority  of  Christian  to  philosophical  ethics,  namely,  that  the 
former  gives  much  deeper-reaching  motives  for  the  good  than 
the  latter,  to  wit,  thankful  love  in  return  for  God's  love  as  re- 
vealed in  redemption,  and  confiding  love  to  the  Redeemer,  in 
whom  we  have  at  the  same  time  the  perfect  personal  pattern 
of  the  moral  life.  Out  of  this  love  to  God  in  Christ  flows  a 
love  of  justness  or  righteousness  (in  the  Biblical  sense  of  the 
word)  as  the  basis  of  the  entire  religious  life.  But  the  essence 
of  Christian  righteousness  consists  in  perfect  self-denial,  that  is, 
in  the  renunciation  of  all  self-will  and  self-reason  as  opposed  to 
God, — in  an  unreserved  surrender  to  God  and  his  will ;  it  draws 
us  away  from  love  to  the  world,  but  must  not  sink  into  self- 
mortification  and  false  asceticism.  Man  must  not,  by  arbitrary 
non- Scriptural  ordinances,  impose  upon  himself  a  yoke.  The 
moral  life  manifests  itself  [according  to  Titus  ii,  12]  in  three 
chief  virtues :  soberness,  righteousness  and  piety*;  to  the  .first 
(sobrietas),  which  relates  to  the  subject  himself,  belong  also 
chastity,  temperateness  and  the  enduring  of  privation;  the 
second  relates  to  other  men,  and  gives  to  each  his  dues ;  the 
third  separates  us  from  the  impurity  of  the  world  and  unites 
us  with  God. — Calvin  gives  expression,  on  the  whole,  also  in 
his  other  numerous  moral  essays,  especially  in  his  exegetical 
writings,  to  a  moral  view  which  is  no  less  earnest  than  sound, 
and  generally  keeps  clear  of  all  un-Biblical  austerity.  To  the 
Romish  seeking  of  holiness  by  abnegation,  he  opposes  the 
thought,  that  the  goods  of  this  world  are  designed  not  merely 
for  our  absolute  wants,  but  also  for  our  moral  delight;  their 
enjoyment  is  not  forbidden,  but  it  should  be  made  to  contribute 
to  the  glory  of  God.  The  strict  church  discipline  established 
and  exercised  by  Calvin  was  indeed  an  offense  to  a  gainsaying 
world,  but  was  morally  perfectly  justifiable.  His  unevangelical 
view  of  the  right  of  capital  punishment  against  heretics,  belongs 
less  to  the  sphere  of  ethics  proper  than  to  that  of  civil  right. 
In  all  essential  points  the  ethical  systems  of  the  Reformed 
17 


244  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  37. 

and  of  the  Lutheran  churches  are  in  harmony;  there  is  manifest 
throughout,  however,  a  general  characterizing  difference  in  the 
coloring  given  to  the  otherwise  essentially  harmonizing  forms ; 
this  difference  we  cannot  here  follow  into  its  finer  shades;*  a 
few  of  the  more  general  traits  will  suffice.  The  ethics  of  the 
Lutheran  church  bears  predominantly  an  anthropologico-sub- 
jective  character,  that  of  the  Reformed  a  theologico-objective 
character ;  the  former  proceeds  from  the  inner  life-source  of  the 
regenerated  heart,  and  constructs,  therefore,  only  hesitatingly 
an  ethical  system  proper, — as,  in  some  degree,  superfluous;  the 
latter  sets  out  from  the  unconditional  will  of  God  to  man,  and 
hence  felt  much  earlier  the  need  of  a  scientific  expression  of  the 
moral  law,  objective  to  the  consciousness;  the  former  wears 
rather  a  Paulino-free  stamp,  the  latter  rather  an  Old  Testament 
stamp  ;  in  the  Reformed  church  sermons  on  morals  have  a  much 
more  prominent  place  than  in  the  Lutheran.  Lutheran  ethics 
expresses,  also  in  its  christology,  the  transfiguration  of  the  hu- 
man through  indwelling  grace,  Reformed  ethics,  rather  the 
glorifying  of  God  in  and  through  the  elect.  With  both,  the 
goal  of  morality  is  the  glory  of  God, — in  the  Lutheran  church, 
however,  more  through  the  witness  of  the  salvation-experience 
of  the  redeemed,  in  the  Reformed,  more  through  the  offering 
of  willing  obedience  under  the  law ;  in  the  former  predominates 
rather  the  manifestation  of  the  filial  relation,  in  the  latter, 
rather  that  of  submissive  service ;  in  the  former  there  is  greater 
freedom  in  the  self-determination  of  the  believing  subject,  even 
to  the  danger  of  Antinoniianism,  in  the  latter  greater  rigor  of 
outward  discipline,  incurring  danger  of  Puritanic  rigorism  and 
pedantic  externality.  The  moral  life  of  the  Lutheran  church 
bears,  so  to  speak,  a  lyric  character,  that  of  the  Reformed  a 
practice-juridical  one;  hence  the  former  expressed  itself,  natu- 
rally enough,  in  the  sublimest  soaring  of  church  hymnology, 
the  latter  crystallized  itself  into  a  sharply-defined  and  regular 
church  discipline;  in  the  former  predominates  the  mystical 
heart-element  of  union  with  God,  in  the  latter  predominates  a 
rational  contrasting  of  God  and  man.  In  the  former  all  that  is 
natural  is  ethically  exalted  and  taken  into  the  service  of  the 

*  Comp.  Schneckenburger:  Vergleichende  Darstellung  des  luth.  u.  ref. 
Lehrbegriffs,  1855;  Tholuck:  Das  Hrchl  Leben  des  17  Jahrh.,  i,  199  sqq., 
218  sqq.,  301  sqq.  ;  ii,  140  sqq.,  239  sqq. 


§  37.]  LUTHERAN    TEBSUS  REFORMED.  245 

holy ;  whereas,  in  the  latter,  the  spiritual  is  exalted  by  being 
divested  of  the  natural.  The  morality  of  the  Lutheran 
church  develops  itself  rather  from  the  fullness  of  inner  life 
toward  knowledge,  that  of  the  Reformed  rather  from  knowl- 
edge toward  life-fullness ;  the  former  is  more  immediate, 
natural  and  unconscious,  the  latter  is  more  mediate,  calcu- 
lating, doctrinary ;  the  former  is  directed  more  inwardly,  the 
latter  more  outwardly ;  the  former  is  more  an  outgush  out  of 
the  deep  and  overflowing  feeling  of  love  and  bliss,  the  latter, 
more  an  intentional  act  of  the  earnest  but  calm  will, — as  also, 
in  the  Lutheran  view  of  salvation,  the  attention  is  fixed  more 
upon  the  all-embracing  love  of  God,  and  in  the  Reformed 
more  upon  the  decrees  of  the  will  of  God ;  Mary  and  Martha 
are  types  of  the  respective  ethical  tendencies.  The  Lutheran 
Christian  does  good  works  because  he  is  certain  of  his  salva- 
tion through  faith ;  the  Reformed  does  them  in  order  that  he 
may  become  certain  of  his  saving  faith,  and  hence  of  his 
election, — good  works  are  to  him  necessary  unto  salvation, 
though  not  its  cause.  The  Lutheran  needs  the  law  and  its 
discipline,  strictly  speaking,  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  as  yet 
in  himself  sinful  elements  which  need  to  be  taken  into  disci- 
pline ;  but  to  the  Reformed,  the  law  is  a  real  and  necessary 
guide  for  the  regenerated  heart  itself.  Hence,  to  the  Re- 
formed, the  Gospel  wears  essentially  also  the  character  of  law 
in  the  Old  Testament  sense,  and  the  Old  Testament  law  is 
taken  literally  as  yet  binding, — hence  the  rigid  observance 
of  the  Sabbath  and  the  prohibition  of  statues  and  pictures. 
In  the  Lutheran  catechism  the  ten  commandments  precede 
the  confession  of  faith ;  in  most  of  the  Reformed  churches 
they  stand  after  the  same,  and  constitute,  in  the  French  and 
English  service,  an  essential  part  of  the  liturgy.  This  seem- 
ingly insignificant  circumstance  is  in  fact  very  significant ;  in 
the  Lutheran  view  the  law  has  essentially  the  purpose  of  edu- 
cating toward  the  true  freedom  of  the  children  of  God,  which 
freedom  itself,  when  once  attained  to,  has  no  longer  any  need 
of  an  outward  law;  in  the  Reformed  view  the  law  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  Christian  faith-life  itself,  but  an  objec- 
tive, purely-divine  element  still  external  to  the  regenerated 
subject.  The  Lutheran  is  fearful  rather  of  work-holiness,  the 
Reformed  rather  of  non-conformity  to  the  law ;  the  former 


246  CHEISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  37. 

has  the  law  rather  as  his  inward  personal  property,  the  latter 
rather  as  a  categorical  imperative  external  to  his  own  sub- 
jective will.     To  the  Lutheran,  Moses  and  Christ  stand  in 
sharp  contrast  to  each  other ;  to  the  Reformed  they  are  most 
intimately  united;  "one  must  live  as  if  there  were  no  Gospel, 
and  die  as  if  there  were  no  law,"  says,  very  significantly,  the 
Reformed  divine  Baile  (Praxis  pietatis,  1635).     To  the  Lu- 
theran,   Christ  is,  in   ethical  respects,   rather  the   beloved 
Saviour,  out  of  love  to  whom  and  in  communion  with  whom 
he  lives  in  holiness ;  to  the  Reformed  he  is  more  the  moral 
pattern  by  which  man  is   constantly   learning,    and   which 
he  endeavors  to  imitate.     Hence   Lutheran   ethics   appears 
predominantly  as  the  doctrine  of  virtue  and  of  goods,  Re- 
formed ethics  as  the   doctrine  of  the  law.     The   Lutheran 
Christian  conceives  the  good  essentially  as  the  morally-feaw- 
tiful,  and  hence  he  has  also  appreciation  and  love  for  the 
beautiful  in  general, — gives  expression  to  art,  and  makes  it 
even  a  moral  agency ;  the  Reformed  conceives  the  good  essen- 
tially as  the  right,  and  hence  he  has  little  taste  or  love  for 
art  as  a  moral  power,  but  all  the  higher  an  appreciation  for 
the  legally-disciplined   development  of  the  church  and  of 
moral  society ;  to  the  former  the  highest  virtue  is  believing 
love ;  to  the  latter,  righteousness.     The  moral  consciousness 
of  the  Lutheran  conceives  the  highest  good  rather  as  a  power 
directly  given  by  grace  and  reflecting  from  itself  the  moral 
life;  the  Reformed  consciousness  makes  the  moral  life  an 
essential  factor  in  the  obtaining  of  the  highest  good.     Hence, 
in  the  ethical  sphere,  the  antithesis  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine 
to  the  Romish  is  more  violent  than  that  of  the  Reformed ; 
hence  also  the  Reformed  church,  but  not  the  Lutheran,  de- 
veloped a  theocratical  form  of  the  church,   and  placed  in 
general   much   greater  emphasis  on  the  legal   and  govern- 
mental development  of  the  purely  moral  community  of  the 
church  as  in  contrast  to  the  state,   and  as  a  determining 
power  for  and  over  the  same,  whereas  the  subjective  inward- 
liness  of  Lutheran  Christians  manifested  little  interest  for 
such  development.     Such  are  the  differences  which,   while 
they  indeed  manifest  a  general  ethical  antithesis  of  the  two 
forms  of  doctrine,  yet  in  fact  constitute  only  two  correspond- 
ing  and   manifoldly-complementing,   but   not   rnutually-ex- 


§37.]  DANAEUS,  ETC.  247 

eluding  phases  of  the  same  unitary  evangelical  conscious- 
ness. 

The  theological  ethics  of  the  evangelical  church  was 
treated  as  a  separate  science,*  first  by  the  learned  Reformed 
divine  Dancem  (Daneau,  ob.  1596)  in  his  Ethica  Christiana 
(1577,  '79,  '88  and  1601),— in  a  rigidly  Calrtnistic  sense,  with  a 
large  using  of  Augustine,  Aristotle,  and  the  Schoolmen,  in 
strong  opposition,  however,  sometimes  to  the  two  latter 
sources,  resulting  in  a  learned  and  thoughtful  work,  though 
as  yet  somewhat  immature.  He  endeavors  especially  to  solve 
the  apparent  contradiction  between  the  doctrine  of  predesti- 
nation and  the  requirements  of  the  moral  consciousness, 
though  not  with  very  happy  results;  the  special  treatment  of 
duties  he  bases  on  the  Decalogue ;  in  respect  to  Church-dis- 
cipline he  requires  the  greatest  rigor, — for  heretics,  capital 
punishment.  (In  connection  with  this  ethics  stands  his 
Politico,  Christiana,  1596-1606).  The  antithesis  which  Danaeus 
makes  between  Christian  ethics  and  Aristotelian  philosophi- 
cal ethics,  was  rejected  by  JZeckermann  (ob.  1609  in  Heidel- 
berg), who  considered  ethics  as  essentially  a  philosophical 
science,  and  Aristotle  as  its  true  founder ;  t  while  the  severely 
Puritanical  Amesius  (in  Holland,  ob.  1634)  emphasized  again 
very  strongly  the  distinction  of  Christian  from  philosophical 
ethics,  placing  Christian  ethics  along-side  of  dogmatics,  f 
(The  distinguishing  pf  ethics  and  dogmatics  as  the  two  parts 
of  the  body  of  Christian  doctrine,  appears  also  in  the  Re- 
formed divine,  Polanus  of  Basle. )§  Walceus  (in  Holland,  ob. 
1639)  attempted  in  his  compendium  of  the  ethics  of  Aristotle 
(1620)  to  imbue  this  work  with  a  Christian  spirit.  More  im- 
portant, despite  its  rather  popular  style,  is  the  peculiar  work 
of  the  moderate  Calvinist  Amyraud  (Amyraldus,  at  Saumur, 
ob.  1664).  I  He  distributes  ethics  historically,  into  the  ethics 
of  the  pure  unfallen  state,  into  that  of  heathenism,  and  of 

*  On  the  history  of  the  earlier  Reformed  ethics,  see  Schweizer  in 
Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1850. 

t  Systema  etMcce,  in  his  Opp.,  1614. 

J  Medulla  theolagia,  1630,  and  frequently,  a  brief  compendium;  De 
conscientice  et  ej.jure  vel  casibvs,  1630,  and  subsequently, — casuistical. 

§  Syntagma  theol.,  1610. 

J  La  morale  chrestienne,  1652  sqq.,  6 1.,— rare  in  Germany  ;  see  Staudlin 
•v,  404  »qq.;  Schweizer  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1683. 


248  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§37. 

Judaism  and  of  Christianity ;  the  first  part  contains  the  gen- 
eral philosophical  considerations.  The  historical  treatment 
of  the  subject  gives  a  just  appreciation  also  of  heathen 
ethics,  -without  intermingling  Christian  ethics  therewith. — 
The  ethics  of  the  Reformed  church  was  casuistically  treated 
by  the  Puritan  Perkins  (of  Cambridge,  1611),  also  by  the 
above-mentioned  Amesius,  and  by  the  German  Alsted  (1621, 
1630),  who  distributed  the  subject-matter  according  to  the 
chief  heads  of  the  Catechism.  A.lsoJForbesius  d  Corse  treated 
the  subject  in  the  order  of  the  Decalogue,  in  his  learned 
though  quite  practically-written  work  on  moral  theology, 
considered  as  the  special  doctrine  of  duties.*  Ethics  was 
treated  in  a  popular,  edifying  manner  by  La  Placette,  Pictet, 
Basnage,  and  by  the  Englishman  Richard  Baxter.  The  sci- 
entific and  purely  theological  form  of  Reformed  ethics  was 
still  further  developed,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  by  Hoorn- 
beek  (1663),  by  Peter  of  Mastricht  (1699),  who  follows  Ame- 
sius, by  Heidegger  (1711),  by  Lampe  (1727),  and  by  others. 
In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  rigid  form  of 
Calvinistic  ethics  begins  to  give  way,  and  the  influence  of  the 
philosophy  of  Wolf  commences  to  break  down  the  confes- 
sional antithesis  in  the  field  of  morals. 

In  the  Lutheran  church  there  was  at  first  but  little  done 
beyond  the  already-mentioned  further  developments  of  the 
philosophical  ethics  of  Melanchthon,  with  the  exception  of  a 
single,  though  not  purely  theological,  attempt  of  the  Me- 
lanchthonian  Hamburger,  Von  Eitzen;\  theology  is  so  in- 
volved in  dogmatical  controversies  as  to  have  in  general  but 
little  inclination  toward  a  scientific  development  of  ethics ; 
it  treated  the  weightier  and  more  general  questions  only 
briefly,  in  dogmatics,  in  connection  with  the  doctrines  of 
free-will,  of  sin,  of  the  law,  and  of  sanctification,  leaving 
the  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  subject  rather  for  such 
practical  writers  as  worked  toward  the  Christian  edification 
of  the  masses, — writers  who  were  in  some  respects  related  to 
the  Mystics,  and  among  whom  two  deserve  especial  attention. 
The  first  of  these,  John  Valentine  Andreas,  of  Wurtemberg 
(ob.  1654),  is  a  very  morally-earnest  spirit,  thoroughly  do- 
voted  to  practical  Christianity,  of  slightly  mystical  tenden- 

*  Opp.,  Amst.,  1703.  t  Comp.  Pelt  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1848. 


§  37.]  ANDREAE— AARNDT.  249 

cies,  of  thorough  scientific  culture,  and  of  deep  acquaintance 
•with  human  nature.  Strongly  impressed  with  the  Calvinistic 
church  discipline  in  Geneva,  Andreae  devoted  his  unwearying 
efforts  to  the  bringing  about  of  moral  discipline  also  in  the 
German  church,  though  he  found  a  rather  unreceptive  age, 
and  was  much  deceived  in  his,  at  times,  somewhat  idealistic 
hopes.  His  numerous  moral  writings,  — often  clothed  in  poet- 
ical and  especially  allegorical  forms,  and  sometimes  satirical, 
though  always  hiding,  even  in  hilarity,  a  very  deep  and  often 
melancholy  earnestness, — are  always  directed  to  definite 
special  objects,  and  hence  present  no  connected  whole. 
Holding  fast  to  the  faith  of  the  church,  he  yet  rebuked  in- 
dignantly the  unfruitful  hair-splitting  spirit  of  dogmatic  con- 
troversy, and  insisted  on  the  one  thing  needful ;  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  true,  he  occasionally  too  lightly  esteemed  man's 
scientific  right  to  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  faith, 
as  well  as  the  significancy  of  the  doctrinal  differences  between 
the  churches ;  and,  in  his  desire  for  a  moral  reformation  of 
the  church,  he  too  little  considered  the  importance  of  pure 
doctrine,  and  was  too  indulgent  toward  many  opposers  of  the 
same. — The  second,  John  Arndt,  (ob.  1621),  was  spiritually 
kindred  to  Andreae  and  held  him  in  high  esteem ;  Arndt  was 
an  evangelical  Thomas  a  Kempis,  and  combined  evangelical 
fidelity  of  faith  with  mystical  subjectivity  and  practical  zeal 
for  morality,  and  exerted  a  deep-reaching,  beneficent  influ- 
ence on  the  evangelical  churches.  His  work  entitled  Four 
Books  of  True  Christianity  (at  first  in  1605-10) — with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Imitation  of  Christ,  the  most  widespread  of 
German  books  of  devotion — bears  indeed  sometimes  a  rather 
strong  mystical  coloring  (in  this  respect  following  somewhat 
in  the  path  of  Tauler  and  of  the  "German  Theology"),  and 
under-estimates,  in  many  respects,  the  significancy  of  the 
objective  means  of  grace,  and  lays  chief  emphasis  on  the 
mystical,  direct  union  of  the  soul  with  God ;  nevertheless  it 
constituted  so  essential  and  so  salutary  a  complementing  of 
the  somewhat  one-sidedly  theorizing  theological  spirit  of  the 
age,  and  so  powerfully  stirred  up  the  partially-dormant  moral 
consciousness,  that  Arndt  will  always  occupy  an  eminent 
place  in  the  history  of  morality  and  of  practical  ethics. 

A  per  se  unimportant  and  yet  fruitful  attempt  at  a  purely 


250  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§37. 

theological  system  of  ethics,  unconnected  with  dogmatics, 
was  made  by  George  Calixt  of  Helmstadt ;  his  Epitome  theol- 
ogicB  moralis  (p.  I,  1634;  1662,)  is  only  a  short,  incomplete 
outline,  giving  in  fact  only  an  introduction.  The  purpose  of 
ethics  is,  to  describe  the  way  to  blessedness,  the  life  of  the 
already  spiritually-regenerated  Christian ;  regeneration  itself 
is  presupposed ;  the  foundation,  even  of  Christian  morality, 
is  the  ten  commandments,  which  are  a  revealed  re-establish- 
ment of  the  original  law  of  nature ;  but  the  difference  of  Chris- 
tian ethics  from  Old  Testament  ethics  is  not  made  prominent 
enough.  In  the  footsteps  of  Calixt  followed  J.  C.  Diirr  of  Alt- 
dorf,  who,  for  the  first,  gave  a  tolerably  complete  and  learned 
treatise  on  ethics ;  *  he  distinguishes  between  virtues  toward 
God,  toward  others,  and  toward  ourselves;  in  regard  to 
theatrical  spectacles,  to  jesting,  etc.,  he  shows  a  less  rigid 
severity  than  the  ethical  writers  of  the  Reformed  church ;  and 
this  difference  of  view  is  manifest  also  among  the  other 
Lutheran  moralists,  if  we  except  the  Pietists.  Of  the  same 
tendency  was  also  G.  T.  Meier,  of  Helmstadt,  whose  erudite 
and  profound  introduction  to  ethics  t  examines,  for  the  first 
time,  with  critical  discrimination  the  presuppositions  of  this 
science.  (H.  Rixner,  in  a  briefer  work  in  1690.)  Aristotle 
is  used-  also  in  these  theological  treatises  on  ethics,  without, 
however,  damagingly  influencing  their  theological  character. 
The  ethics  of  the  Lutheran  church  was  treated  more  fre- 
quently casuistically  than  in  a  systematic  form ;  it  bore  this 
character  even  as  late  as  into  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
forms,  properly  speaking,  only  an  amassment  of  material  for 
a  subsequent  scientific  development.  As  occasioned  by  the 
casuistry  of  the  Romish  church,  the  casuistry  of  the  evan- 
gelical church,  in  express  antithesis  thereto,  manifests,  on 
the  basis  of  Scripture  and  of  spiritual  experience,  a  greater 
certainty  and  simplicity,  and  preserves  a  middle-ground  be- 
tween the  sophistical  laxity  of  the  Jesuitical  view  and  the 
rigid  severity  of  the  Calvinistic.  Many  of  these  works  con- 
tain also  many  dogmatic  questions  together  with  their  decis- 
ions. The  distribution  of  the  subject-matter  follows,  for  the 

*  Enchiridion  theol.  mor.,  1662  ;  later  as :  Compend.,  1675-98  4to. 
t  Introd.  in  univ.  theol.  mor.  studium,  1671.     And  as  the  beginning 
of  a  development  of  ethics  itself:  Bisputt.  theol.,  1679. 


§  37.]  OLEARUS— OSIANDER.  251 

most  part,  the  order  of  the  catechism ;  the  answer  is  given  on 
the  basis  of  the  Scriptures,  and  then  confirmed  by  the  decis- 
ions of  the  Fathers  and  of  later  writers,  especially  of  Luther 
and  of  the  other  Reformers.  The  first  work  of  this  kind, 
after  the  already-mentioned  Gonsilia  of  Melanchthon,  is  by 
Baldwin  of  Wittenberg,*  and  obtained  great  popularity;  it 
treats  chiefly  of  the  casus  conscientia,  that  is,  of  such  moral 
questions  as  the  common  conscience  cannot  immediately  and 
satisfactorily  decide,  but  in  regard  to  which  it  may  fall  into 
doubt,  and  which  consequently  can  be  decided  only  by  a 
careful  weighing  of  the  word  of  God.  He  classifies  these 
cases  according  to  the  moral  objects :  God,  angels,  the  sub- 
ject himself,  and  other  men.  (L.  Dunte  of  Reval,  gave  a 
thousand  and  six  decisions  on  conscience-questions  of  a  moral 
and  dogmatical  character,  in  1643.)  Olearius  of  Leipzig, 
who  had  already  previously  presented  ethics  in  tabular  form, 
examined  thoroughly,  and  with  the  most  minute  and  dis- 
criminating exactness,  the  purpose  and  the  nature  of  casu- 
istry ;  f  casuistry  was  more  fully  carried  out  by  Dannhauer,  J 
by  G.  Kb'nig,  §  but  especially  circumstantially  by  John  Adam 
Osiander,  \  who  introduces  into  the  subject  almost  the  entire 
body  of  dogmatics ;  he  classifies  the  cases  in  the  order  of  the 
Decalogue;  under  the  sixth  commandment,  e.  g.,  he  proposes 
the  question  whether  in  a  case  of  extreme  necessity  it  is  al- 
lowable to  eat  human  flesh,  and,  in  opposition  to  the  Jesuits, 
negatives  it  (ii,  p.  1367).  The  work  of  Mmgering  (superin- 
tendent in  Halle)  Scrutinium  conscientias  catecheticum,  that  is, 
a  "Reproving  of  Sin  and  Searching  of  the  Conscience,"  etc. 
(3  ed.  1686,  4to.),  more  especially  intended  for  moral  self- 
examination,  is  classified  minutely  and  circumstantially  ac- 
cording to  the  Decalogue,  and  is  morally  earnest  and  judi- 
cious, though  it  presents  also  a  few  peculiarities  (e.  (7.,  p.  752, 
as  to  the  inadmissibility  of  tobacco-smoking,  then  called 
tobacco-drinking).  Only  in  part,  belongs  in  this  place  the 
voluminous  work:  ConsUia  theologica  Witebergensia,  that  is, 

*  Tractatus  luculentus,  etc.,  1628,  '35,  and  later. 

t  Introd.  brevis  in  theol.  casuisticam,  1694. 

J  Liber  conscientice,  2  ed.  1679,  2  t.,  and  Theologia  casualit,  1706. 

§  Cams  consc.,  Altdorf,  1676,  4to. 

|j  Theol,  casualu,  1680,  6  t.,  4to. 


252  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  3T. 

"Wittenberg's  Spiritual  Counsels,"  etc. — (Frankfort  on  the 
Main,  1664) — which  contains,  in  an  immense  folio,  judg- 
ments of  Luther  and  of  his  co-laborers,  and  decisions  of  the 
Wittenberg  faculty  on  doctrinal  points,  moral  and  ecclesi- 
astico-legal  questions  (also  matrimonial  questions).  Of  a 
similar  character  is  the  Opus  novum  qucestionum  Practico-Theo- 
logicum  (Frankfort,  1667,  fol.),  which  treats,  in  the  order  of 
the  common  Loci,  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-seven  questions, 
— also  that  of  Dedekenn :  Thesaurus  consiliorum  theol.  etjurid. 
(1623),  revised  by  John  C.  Gerhard  (Jena,  1671,  4  vols. 
fol.). 

Also  the  theological  "  Bedenken  "  of  the  eighteenth  century 
belong  to  the  sphere  of  this  casuistical  ethics.  Among  these 
works  those  of  Spener  occupy  a  peculiar  and  significant  place, 
and  constitute,  together  with  his  other  more  or  less  ethical 
writings,  a  turning-point  in  the  development  of  the  evangelical 
moral  consciousness.  Their  significancy  rests  less  in  their  sin- 
gle judgments  than  in  their  peculiar  ground-thoughts.  Spener, 
— who  was  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  Thomas  &  Kempis/of 
Andreae  and  of  Arndt,  and  in  part,  even  of  Tauler,  and  who 
restlessly  labored  in  the  path  trod  by  these  men  for  a  moral 
bettering  of  the  Christian  church, — called  forth  by  the  Pietism 
which  proceeded  from  him,  a  deep-reaching,  beneficent  move- 
ment in  the  moral  life  and  in  the  moral  views  of  the  evangelical 
church,  although  indeed  in  consequence  of  his  one-sided  em- 
phasizing of  the  practical,  he  treated  science  itself  somewhat 
too  lightly,  and  set  too  high  an  estimate  on  certain  outward 
forms  of  devout  morality,  and  thus  needlessly  limited  the  legiti- 
mate liberty  of  a  regenerated  Christian.  Spener's  Pia  desideria  * 
are  directed  essentially  to  an  improving  of  the  ecclesiastical 
life,  to  a  stronger  emphasizing  of  holiness  in  the  spiritual  ac- 
tivity of  the  church,  to  a  stirring-up  of  the  church-member- 
ship to  churchly  spontaneity,  to  the  bringing  about  of  a  more 
edifying  manner  of  doctrinal  preaching,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  against  the  misuse  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  by 
faith.  His  ethical  works  proper,  though  only  bearing  on  par- 
ticular cases,  especially  of  the  inner  life,  are  found  in  his  Theo- 

*  Appearing  first  in  1675  as  a  preface  to  Arndt' s  Pastille,  afterward 
separately, — often  printed. 


§  37.]  SPENER  AND  PIETISM.  253 

logical  Considerations*  which  exercised  a  wide-reaching  and 
wholesome  influence  on  the  church. — Spener  insisted  with  much 
more  earnestness  on  the  significancy  of  spiritual  regeneration 
for  the  moral  life  than  did  the  orthodoxy  of  the  day,  in  its  one- 
sided emphasizing  of  theoretical  faith.  The  man  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  has  nothing  in  common  with  the  sinful  world  and  its 
lusts;  his  total  life-stream  flows  from  a  new  and  absolutely 
holy  fountain ;  worldly  pleasure  is  foreign  and  uncongenial  to 
him,  and  therefore  to  be  avoided.  The  morality  of  the  Pietists 
was  distinguished  primarily  by  an  especial  rigor  in  regard  to 
the  sphere  of  the  allowed,  inasmuch  as  it  viewed  as  absolutely 
unallowable  many  worldly  enjoyments  which  in  the  Evangelical 
Lutheran  church  had,  thus  far,  been  regarded  (too  unsuspi- 
ciously, it  is  true)  as  adiaphora,  and  consequently  as  not  strictly 
unallowable,  especially  such  as  dancing,  card-playing,  theater- 
visiting,  banqueting,  gayness  of  dress,  and  the  like;  it  denied 
altogether  that  there  are  any  morally  indifferent  things;  what- 
ever is  not  done  to  the  glory  of  God,  and  springs  not  of  faith, 
is  sin ;  and  these  amusements  cannot  consist  with  a  pious  frame 
of  the  heart, — cannot  take  place  in  faith,  and  to  the  glory  of 
God.  This  is.  however,  only  an  outer  manifestation  of  a  very 
deep-reaching  antithesis  of  Pietism  to  the  hitherto  prevalent 
views  of  the  Lutheran  church.  The  high  evangelical  thought 
of  Gospel-freedom  and  of  justification  by  faith  alone,  had  in 
fact,  in  the  time  of  the  declining  church-life,  led,  in  many 
respects,  to  erroneous  courses,  and  had  often  allowed  the  moral 
earnestness  of  holiness  to  give  place  to  mere  formal  orthodoxy, 
and  also  sometimes  occasioned,  in  contrast  to  the  severe  earn- 
estness of  the  discipline  of  the  Reformed  church,  too  careless  a 
regard  for  the  outward  forms  of  the  moral  life,  and  had  en- 
larged beyond  measure  the  sphere  of  morally-indifferent  things. 
The  notion  had  obtained  for  itself  vogue,  that  whatever  is  not 
forbidden  in  Scripture  is  allowable.  It  was  the  reaction  of  a 
truly.  Christian  conscience,  which  caused  Pietism  to  discard 
this  somewhat  presuming  maxim,  and,  in  any  case,  the  thought 
which  it  opposed  thereto  was  strictly  legitimate,  namely,  that 
there  is  nothing  indifferent  in  the  entire  life-sphere  of  a  regen- 

*  Theologische  Bedenken,  1700,  1712,  4  vols. ;  Letzte  theol.  Btdenken, 
1711,  3  vols. ;  Consilia  etjudicia  theol.,  1709,  3  vols.,  and  many  other 
smaller  works. 


\ 

254  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  37. 

erated  person,  but  that  every  thing  without  exception  must 
stand  in  living  relation  to  the  new  spiritual  life-principle,  and 
that  whatever  does  not  admit  of  a  true  association  with  the 
same  is  not  simply  indifferent,  but  is  un-Christian.  Pietism 
may  have  made  many  mistakes  in  the  application  of  this 
thought,  but  the  thought  itself  had,  as  in  contrast  to  the 
one-sided  orthodoxy  then  prevalent,  its  own  good  right.  Fur- 
thermore, Spener  brought  again  into  the  fore-ground  the  thought 
which,  while  indeed  dogmatically  admitted,  had  yet  never  been 
sufficiently  emphasized  morally,  namely,  that  faith  without 
works  is  dead ;  the  sanctification  of  the  heart  and  life  does  not 
simply  follow  upon,  and  stand  in  connection  with,  true  faith,  but 
is  in  such  faith  already  itself  directly  contained;  there  are  not 
two  spiritual  life- streams,  but  only  one ;  the  moral  personality 
itself  as  justified  by  faith  admits  of  no  falling  apart  of  faith 
and  morality ;  all  religious  life  is  immediately  and  necessarily 
at  the  same  time  moral, — is  not  simply  followed  by  the  moral 
as  a  second  collateral  element.  In  the  eyes  of  declining  ortho- 
doxy, religion  had  become  too  much  a  mere  objective  something 
by  which  the  religious  subject  is  simply  embraced  and  influ- 
enced, but  not  thoroughly  permeated  ;  Pietism  brought  religion 
and  its  divine  spirit-principle  again  entirely  within  the  Chris- 
tian subject,  and  caused  the  subject,  as  now  transformed,  to 
create  a  new  Spirit-witnessing,  objective  morality.  The  Chris- 
tian conscience  is  quickened  and  made  more  vigorously  active  by 
Pietism  ;  the  views  thus  far  prevalent  in  the  Lutheran  church 
are,  in  the  eyes  of  Pietism,  not  strictly  conscientious,  seeing 
that  they  tolerate  many  manners  of  action  which  do  not  flow 
from  the  Christian  conscience,  and  are  not  consistent  with  it. — 
The  morality  of  Pietism  is  by  no  means  of  a  predominantly 
outwardly-active  working  character, — is  in  fact  very  different 
from  the  more  recent  activity  of  the  "  inner  mission,"  but  is 
predominantly  subjective, — is  one-sidedly  directed  toward  the 
morally-pions  heart-condition  of  the  subject,  and  sustains  to 
the  outer  world  rather  a  rejecting,  negating  and  uninterested 
relation ;  the  ascetic  tendency  which  constantly  grew  more 
prominent,  especially  among  Spener's  followers,  rose  even  to  a 
manifest  preference  of  celibacy  to  marriage,  and  to  an  avoid- 
ance of  political  offices  (in  the  spirit  of  Tertullian),  and  to  a 
refusing  of  military  service.  When  its  orthodox  opponents  re- 


§  38.]  EOMISH   ETHICS.  255 

proached  Pietism  with  an  unevai.gelical  seeking  of  sanctiflca- 
tion  by  works,  with  a  tendency  to  the  monkish  spirit  and  the 
like,  they  did  not  do  it  full  justice ;  and  it  was  in  vain  that 
they  undertook  to  check  the  historically-justified  movement, 
and,  notwithstanding  all  their  hostile  exaggerations,  they  saw 
very  clearly  the  questionable  narrownesses  of  the  movement 
they  opposed — more  clearly  than  they  saw  their  own  ;  and  it  is 
not  exclusively  through  Pietism,  but  also  in  virtue  of  the  oppo- 
sition which  it  awoke,  that  the  religiously-moral  consciousness 
of  the  church  was  stimulated  to  a  higher  life. — The  Pietistic 
tendency  proper,  because  of  its  disinclination  to  abstract  sci- 
ence, produced  no  ethical  works  of  importance ;  most  im- 
portant are:  Breithaupt:  Theol.  moralis  (1732,  4to.  ;  Institt 
theol.,  3  parts,  1716),  and  the  moral  parts  of  Joachin  Lange's 
(Economia  salutis  (1728.)  But  the  popular  Pietistic  works, 
written  for  the  masses  of  the  church,  were  more  influential. 

SECTION    XXXVIII. 

The  ethics  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church,  after 
the  Reformation,  was  treated  for  the  most  part  as  a 
constantly  increasing  and  more  minute-growing  body 
of  casuistry.  The  highest  development  of  the  same, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  greatest  perversion  of  Chris- 
tian ethics,  also  in  regard  to  its  moral  contents,  ap- 
peared in  the  semi-Pelagianizing  ethics  of  the  Jesuits. 
The  place  of  the  unconditional  validity  of  the  moral 
idea  is  here  largely  usurped  by  outward  adaptability 
to  the  weal  of  the  visible  church,  as  the  highest  end  ; 
the  place  of  the  unshaken  authority  of  the  Scriptures 
and  of  early  Christian  tradition,  by  the  authority  of 
certain  special  Doctors ;  the  place  of  moral  convic- 
tion, by  probabilisni;  the  place  of  moral  honesty, 
by  a  sophistical  construing  of  the  moral  law  to  the 
present  fortuitous  advantage  of  the  church  and  of  the 
individual,  and  by  the  falsehood  of  reservationes 
mentales  ;  and  the  place  of  the  moral  conscience,  by 


256  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  38. 

rational  and  cunning  calculation  ;  thus  the  essence 
of  the  moral  law  becomes  entirely  unsettled;  and 
the  practical  application  of  moral  principles,  an  un- 
serious  exercise  of  sophistry. 

At  first  thought  we  are  surprised  at  the  exceeding  fruitfulness 
of  the  Romish  theology  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies in  ethical  writings,  in  comparison  with  which  the  evan- 
gelical church,  and  especially  the  Lutheran,  is  very  barren. 
Opposition  to  the  faith-principle  of  the  Evangelical  church, 
led  the  Romish  church  to  an  especial  development  of  the  prac- 
tical phase  of  religion,  as  in  fact,  in  the  order  of  the  Jesuits,  a 
vigor  of  activity  hitherto  unknown  in  the  Romish  church  makes 
at  this  time  its  appearance ;  and  precisely  this  order  was  the 
chief  representative  of  Romish  ethics. — The  more  purely  scien- 
fic  form  of  ethics  lingered  in  general  strictly  within  the  limits 
of  the  scholastico- Aristotelian  rut.  Francis  Piccolomini,  a  much- 
lauded  Aristotelian,  in  Italy  (ob.  1604)  produced  a  comprehen- 
sive and  discursive  moral  philosophy  *  based  on  Aristotle  and 
Plato ;  but  his  writings  do  not  give  proof  of  any  independence, 
and  fail  to  satisfy  the  Christian  consciousness. 

The  Order  of  the  Jesuits,  as  calculated  in  its  very  nature  for 
action,  for  the  championship  of  the  endangered  Romish  church, 
was  called  by  its  fundamental  principle  to  the  development  of 
a  special  system  of  morality, — a  system  the  highest  end  of  which 
is  the  glory  of  God  through  the  exaltation  of  the  visible  church. 
The  majority  of  the  Jesuitical  presentations  of  ethics  treat,  for 
the  most  part,  enly  of  the  more  or  less  classified  circle  of  single 
cases,  while  the  more  rare  systematic  works  follow  very  closely 
the  traditions  of  scholasticism.! — Very  soon  after  the  Reforma- 
tion the  Jesuits  appeared  in  the  field  of  ethics ;  we  will  men- 
tion only  the  more  important.  Among  the  Spaniards  were: 
Francis  Tolet  (a  cardinal,  ob.  1596,  Summa  casuum  comcientim, 
often  printed) ;  Azorio  (Institutiones  morales,  1600,  3t. ;  1625, 2t.) ; 
Vtisquez  (Opuso.  mor.,  1617);  Henriquez  (Summa,  1613fol.); 

*  Uhiver8aphilogop7iiamoribv8,Venct.l5SS;  Frkf.,  1595, 1627. 

tPerrault:  Morale  des  Jes.,  1667,  3t.  ;  Ellendorf:  Die  Moral  und 
Politik  der  Jcsuiten,  1840-^-not  sufficiently  scientific ;  Pragm.  Gesch.  d. 
Monschsorden,  1770,  vols.  9  and  10. 


§  38.]  JESUIT   MORALISTS.      *  257 

Thomas  Sanchez,  whose  learned  work,  De  matrimonio*  was 
highly  esteemed,  (but  which,  in  the  invention  and  discussion 
of  indelicate  questions,  transgresses  the  bounds  of  all  propriety), 
and  who  by  his  sweeping  doctrine  of  probabilism  deeply  un- 
settles the  foundations  of  all  morality;  (of  him  are  further: 
Opus  morale  s.  Summa  casuum,  Col.  1614,  2t. ;  Consilia  s.  opu- 
scula  mor.,  Lugd.  1635,  2  fol.) ;  Francis  Suarez,  in  numerous 
very  ingenious  works ;  Alphonso  Rodriguez  (Exercitium  perfec- 
tionis,  etc.,  1641);  Antonio  de  Escobar,  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant of  the  casuists  (Liber  tlieol.  moral.,  etc.,  Ludg.,  1646; 
Uniterm  theol.  moral,  problemata,  Ludg.,  1663,  7  fol.);  and 
Gonzalez  (Fundamentum  theol.  moralis.,  1694,  4to.)  Among  the 
Italians  were:  Tamburini,  and  Filliucci  (Moral,  qucest.,  1622, 
2  fol.)  Among  the  French :  Bauny,  and  Raynauld.  Among 
the  Germans:  Layman  (Theol.  mor.,  1625,  3  4to.);  Busenbaum, 
of  Munster,  whose  Medulla  casuum  consc.  has  had,  since  1645, 
more  than  fifty  editions,t — an  able,  clear,  compact  manual  in 
tolerably  systematic  order,  and  authoritative  almost  throughout 
the  whole  Order,  although  in  many  respects  assailed,  even  by 
popes,  and  in  some  countries  proscribed.  Among  the  Nether- 
landers  :  Leonard  Less  (in  several  works),  and  Besser  (De  con- 
scientia,  1638,  4to.)  The  contents  and  manner  of  treatment  of 
most  of  these  work.s  are  very  similar. 

The  peculiar  character  of  Jesuitical  ethics  rests  on  the  funda- 
mental purpose  of  the  order  as  a  whole,  namely,  the  rescuing 
of  the  Church,  the  bride  of  Christ,  as  endangered  by  the  Ref- 
ormation in  its  very  foundations,  and  hence  the  rescuing  of  the 
honor  of  God  from  a  most  pressing  danger.  In  a  struggle  of 
life  and  death  one  is  not  very  careful  in  the  choice  of  means, 
and  in  all  warfare  the  sentiment  holds  good,  though  involving 
manifold  violations  of  ordinary  right,  that  the  end  sanctifies 
the  means.  The  rescuing  of  the  Romish  church  at  any  price 
is  the  task,  even  should  it  involve  an  entering  into  alliance  with 
the  dark  powers  of  this  sinful  world,  and  with  the  passions 
and  sinful  proclivities  of  the  unsanctified  multitude.  The  one 

*  Genuse,  1592?  1602;  Antv.  1607,  1612,  1614,  1617,  3  fol. ;  Norimb. 
1706  ;  the  first  edition  has  become  rare ;  in  the  later  editions,  after  1612, 
the  smuttiest  passages  are  omitted  or  modified. 

t  Eewritten  and  enlarged  by  Lacroix,  1710,  9t.,  Col.  1729,  2  fol.,  and 
frequently. 


258  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  38. 

exclusively  aimed-at  end  makes  use  of  the  systematized  totality 
of  moral  ends  as  mere  means,  and  the  morally-contracted  view 
taken  of  this  one  end  leads  naturally  and  of  itself  to  morally 
unallowable  means.  The  real,  visible  church  is  not  measured 
by  the  idea  of  the  true  or  ideal  church,  but  all  moral  ideas  are 
measured  by  the  visible  church.  The  Jesuits  were  well  aware 
that  they  were  an  essentially  new  phenomenon  of  the  churchly 
life, — that  they  stood  upon  purely  human  invention  and  power; 
we  need  not  be  surprised  therefore  to  find  that  in  their  moral 
system  human  invention  and  human  authority  stand  in  the  fore- 
ground. The  expressed  opinion  of  a  church  doctor  forms  a 
sufficient  basis  for  a  legitimate  moral  decision.  The  eternal 
and  objective  foundations  of  the  moral  are  exchanged  for  the 
subjective  view  of  individual  persons  of  eminence.  The  con- 
tradictions thereby  resulting  render  the  single  subject  all  the 
less  trammeled, — enable  him  to  follow  the  decision  which  he 
most  prefers.  Another  of  their  peculiarities  is  their  discipline ; 
the  required  unconditional  obedience  to  the  commands  of  superi- 
ors takes  the  place  of  the  personal  conscience,  and  paralyzes  its 
power;  it  becomes  a  duty  of  the  members  of  the  order  to  have 
no  personal  conscience  whatever,  and  to  subordinate  the  indi- 
vidual conscience  unconditionally  and  blindly  to  the  general 
conscience  of  the  order ;  a  collective  conscience,  however,  is  a 
poor  one,  and  poorest  of  all  when  it  is  represented  by  one  single 
person.  Thus  the  Jesuit  accustoms  himself  from  the  very  start, 
blindly  to  follow  the  authority  of  a  single  eminent  man,  and 
Probabilism  is,  in  his  moral  theory,  an  inevitable  matter  of 
course. 

This,  then,  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  Jesuitical 
ethics, — that  in  the  place  of  the  eternal  objective  ground  and 
criterion  of  the  moral,  it  substitutes  subjective  opinion,  and  in 
the  place  of  an  unconditional  eternal  end,  a  merely  condi- 
tionally valid  one,  namely,  the  defending  of  the  actual,  visible 
church  against  all  forms  of  opposition, — that  in  the  place  of 
the  moral  conscience,  it  substitutes  the  human  calculating  of 
circumstantial  and  fortuitous  adaptation  to  the  promotion  of 
this  its  highest  end, — that  it  attempts  to  realize  that  which  is 
per  se  and  absolutely  valid  by  a  wide-reaching  isolating  of  the 
means,  but  in  so  doing  subordinates  morality  to  the  discretion 
of  the  single  subject. — While  the  ethics  of  the  Jesuits  appears 


§  38.]  SPIRIT  OF  JESUITISM.  259 

as  lax  and  quite  too  indulgent  toward  worldly,  sinful  proclivi- 
ties and  fashions,  yet  this  is  only  one  phase  of  the  matter.  A 
merely  worldly-lax  moral  system,  in  the  usual  sense,  seems  but 
little  applicable  to  the  members  of  a  brotherhood  the  first  rule 
of  which  is  a  perfect  renunciation  of  personal  will  and  personal 
opinion  and  self-determination,  in  a  word,  unconditional  obe- 
dience to  every  command  of  superiors,  and  which  has  actually 
accomplished  in  the  missionary  field  the  grandest  of  deeds,  and 
numbers,  among  its  members,  multitudes  of  heroic  martyrs.  This 
lack  of  strictness  in  one  direction  rests  by  no  means  on  mere  world- 
15 ness,  on  pleasure  in  the  delights  of  this  life,  but  follows,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  necessity  (as  well  as  does  also  the  rigor  of  obedience) 
from  the  subjectively-arbitrary  presupposition  of  the  entire  or- 
der, from  the  lack  of  an  objective,  unshaken  foundation,  and 
rests,  on  the  other  hand,  strictly  on  calculation, — is  itself  a 
cunningly-devised  means  to  the  end, — is  intended  to  awaken, 
especially  in  the  great  and  mighty  of  the  earth  (and  the  masses 
of  the  people  are  such  under  some  circumstances),  a  love  to  the 
church,  to  the  mild,  friendly,  indulgent  mother ;  and  these  con- 
cessions to  the  world  formed  a  contrast  to  the  severer  moral 
views  of  the  evangelical  church,  and  especially  to  the  over-rigid 
discipline  of  the  Reformed  church ;  and  the  contrast  was  tempt- 
ing.— The  purpose — zealously  pursued  by  the  Jesuits  in  the 
interest  of  Romish  domination — of  becoming  soul-guarding 
fathers  and  conscience-counselors,  especially  for  men  and 
women  of  eminence,  required,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  Jesuits 
themselves  should  acquire  for  themselves  the  highest  possible 
repute  in  ethics, — and  hence  it  was  requisite  that  they  should 
become  the  literary  representatives  thereof, — and,  on  the  other, 
that  this  ethics  should  bft  molded  in  adaptation  to  this  end, — 
should  make  itself  not  disagreeable  and  burdensome,  but 
should  become  as  elastic  as  possible  in  view  of  different  wants, 
— should  be  a  "  golden  net  for  catching  souls,"  as  the  Jesuits 
themselves  were  wont  to  call  their  own  pliableness.  The  more 
ramified  and  complex  the  net-work  of  casuistic  ethics  became, 
so  much  the  more  indispensable  were  the  practiced  conscience- 
counselors,  or  more  properly,  conscience-advocates;  the  more 
stairways  and  back  doors  they  were  able  to  turn  attention  to 
in  conscience  affairs,  so  much  the  more  prized  and  influential 
they  became.  This  explains  the  great  compass  and  the  peculiar 

18 


260  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§38. 

character  of  Jesuitical  ethics.  The  becoming  accustomed  to 
slippery  and  precipitous  ways,  and  the  pleasure  in  the  ready- 
finding  of  sophistical  authority  for  morally  novel  positions,  led 
of  itself  unconsciously  into  still  deeper  error.  ' '  Accommoda- 
tion "  was  the  magic  word  which  opened  the  way  for  a  surpris- 
ingly-rich storehouse  of  moral  rules.  Confession,  where  made 
to  Jesuits,  lost  much  of  its  seriousness,  and  nowhere  else  was 
absolution  so  easily  obtainable  for  those  who  were  to  be  won 
over,  nowhere  penance  and  satisfaction  so  readily  done  with, — 
and  this  not  merely  in  fact,  but  also  from  principle.  Penance 
is  to  be  chosen  as  light  as  possible ;  the  confessor  may  impose 
as  penance,  on  the  confessing  one,  the  good  or  evil  which  he 
can  do  or  suffer  on  the  same  day  or  in  the  same  week ;  the 
penance  may,  when  there  exists  a  sufficient  reason,  be  even  per- 
formed for  oue  person  by  another,  etc.*  Also  in  most  cases  it  is 
not  a  very  serious  matter  even  if  the  absolved  one  neglects  en- 
tirely the  imposed  penance. 

The  development  of  Jesuitical  ethics  is  by  no  means  a  phe- 
nomenon essentially  new  ;  the  bases  therefor  were  already  long 
extant ;  it  is  only  a  further  building  upon  the  same  foundations. 
The  Pelagianizing  view  of  the  moral  ability  of  the  human  will 
and  of  the  meritoriousness  of  outward  works  lay  already  at  the 
basis  of  the  entire  system  of  monkish  holiness,  and  the  Jesuits 
went  only  one  step  further  when  they,  in  contradiction  to 
Thomas  Aquinas,  taught  often  almost  entirely  as  Pelagius. 
The  earlier  casuistry  in  its  lack  of  fixed  principles  had  already 
shaken  the  moral  foundation ;  and  the  too  great  indulgence  in 
sophistry  on  particular,  and,  in  part,  entirely  imaginary,  cases, 
had  beclouded  the  unsophisticated  moral  consciousness;  the 
doctrine  of  probabilism  had  been  already  sanctioned  at  Con- 
stance, and  in  many  respects  practically  applied.  The  entan- 
glement of  the  church  with  the  then  so  manifoldly-complicated 
state  of  European  politics,  with  worldly  passions  and  rancors, 
and  its  very  worldly  struggles  against  the  worldly  state,  had 
already  long  since  undermined  the  purity  of  the  ecclesiastical 
conscience,  and  the  maxim,  that  the  end  sanctifies  the  means, 
had  already  been  long  practiced  and  approved  by  the  church 
before  it  was,  by  the  Jesuits  (if  not  sanctioned  in  express  words, 

*  Filliucci :  Moral,  quast.,  7,  tract.  6  c.  7 ;  Escobar:  Liber  th.,  VII, 
4  c.  7  (especially  n.  181,182),  comp.  Ellendorf,  263  sqq.,  312  sqq. 


§  38.]  PROBABILISM.  261 

yet  in  fact  on  the  largest  scale)  put  into  practice ;  the  per  se 
not  incorrect  distinguishing  of  venial  from  mortal  sins  offered 
easy  opportunity  of  indefinitely  enlarging  the  sphere  of  the 
former  by  a  limitation  or  a  ready  transforming  of  the  sphere  of 
the  latter,  while  at  the  same  time  the  ever-growing  readiness 
in  granting  indulgences  was  making  the  sphere  even  of  mortal 
sins  of  a  less  terrifying  character,  especially  for  those  at  whose 
command  stood  the  keys  to  the  treasure-chambers  of  indul- 
gence ;  and  in  fact  it  was  these  especially,  namely,  the  rich  and 
noble,  who  enjoyed  the  advantages  of  the  generosity  of  Jesuitic 
ethics.  Jesuitic  ethics  did  not  indeed  harmonize  with  the 
moral  consciousness  of  the  ancient  church ;  its  representatives 
were  also  well  aware  of  this,  and  they  hesitated  not  to  admit 
that  they  did  not  recognize  ancient  church  tradition  as  a  crite- 
rion for  morality,  but  wished  rather  to  lay  the  foundations  for 
a  new  tradition. 

The  chief  means  used  for  the  purpose  of  lightening  moral 
duty  was  the  so-called  moral  probabilism,  namely,  the  principle 
that  in  morally-doubtful  cases  the  authority  of  a  few  eminent 
church-teachers,  or  also  even  of  a  single  one  (if  he  is  a  doctor 
grams  et  probus),  suffices  to  furnish  a  sententia  probaMlis  as  to  a 
moral  course  of  action,  and  hence  to  justify  the  performing  of 
it,  even  if  the  opinion  followed  were  per  se  false ;  nay,  accord- 
ing to  some,  even  if  this  teacher  himself  had  declared  it  as 
only  morally  possible,  without  really  approving  of  it.  Hence, 
as  soon  as  I  can  hunt  up  for  an  action  which  seems  to  me  of 
doubtful  propriety,  or  even  positively  wrong,  a  consenting  opin- 
ion of  an  ecclesiastical  authority  (and  of  course  it  is  best  if  I 
find  it  among  the  Jesuit  doctors  themselves),  then  am  I  perfectly 
screened  by  the  same  ;*  in  which  connection  it  is  to  be  taken 
into  account  that  there  is  scarcely  any  one  moral  question  which 
is  not  answered  by  different  doctors  in  an  entirely  contrary 
sense.  That  thus  the  most  opposite  manners  of  action  may  be 
equally  readily  justified,  the  Jesuits  knew  very  well ;  and  Esco- 
bar even  found,  in  the  actual  variety  of  views  as  to  the  moral, 
an  amazing  trace  of  Divine  Providence,  inasmuch  as  thereby 
the  yoke  of  Christ  is  in  so  agreeable  a  manner  rendered 

*Laymann:  TJieol.  mor.  1625,  i,  p.  9;  Escobar:  Liber  th.,  proceem., 
exam.  3;  Bresser:  De  consc.  iii,  c.  1  $$.,  and  in  almost  all  the 
others. 


262  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  38. 

easy.*  Although  probabilism  was  not  so  immoderately  extended 
by  all  the  Jesuits,  nevertheless  it  was  the  decidedly  dominant 
teaching;  and  when  the  general  of  the  order,  Gonzales,  in  1694, 
disapproved  of  it,  many  were  minded  to  regard  him  as  thereby 
deposed  because  of  heresy,  and  only  the  protection  of  the 
Pope  saved  him.f 

Probabilism  is  not  a  merely  fortuitously  discovered  expe- 
dient, but  it  is  in  fact  an  almost  inevitable  consequence  of  the 
historical  essence  of  Jesuitism.  As  the  order  itself  arose 
neither  on  the  basis  of  Scripture  nor  of  ancient  church-tradi- 
tion, but  sprang  absolutely  from  the  daring  inventive  power 
of  a  single  man  breaking  through  the  limits  of  ecclesiastical 
actuality,  hence  it  is  not  at  all  unnatural  that  it  should  make 
the  authority  of  a  single  spiritually  preeminent  man  its  highest 
determining  power,  and  subordinate  to  this  the  historical, 
objective  form  of  the  moral  consciousness.  "When  the  learned 
moralists  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  determining  authority 
in  morals,  then  the  Jesuits  were  the  masters  of  the  world,  for 
they  were  themselves  the  most  excellent  doctors.  Though 
they  absolved  the  inquirer  from  so  many  burdensome  chains 
of  commanding  duty,  though  they  led  him  in  the  selection 
between  opposed  authorities  to  a  subjective  discretion  of  de- 
cision, yet  at  least  this  point  was  reached,  that  he  recognized 
the  Jesuit  priests  as  his  liberating  masters.  The  doctrine  of 
probabilism  can  by  no  means  be  explained  as  a  simple  sequence 
of  the  Roniish  tradition-principle ;  for  here  the  deciding  ele- 
ment is  not  the  authority  of  the  church,  but  simply  individual 
teachers  and  in  fact  not,  the  majority  of  authorities,  but  it 
is  expressly  permitted  to  follow  f  the  lesser  authority  in  face 
of  the  greater,  and  to  select  among  several  authorities  the 
one  which  best  pleases,  even  if  it  be  the  less  probable  one.§ 
Hence  also  the  father-confessor  is  not  at  liberty,  as  against 
the  probable  opinions  of  those  who  confess  to  him,  to  appeal 
to  other  and  higher  authorities,  but  he  must  admit  the  former 

*  Quia  ex  opinionum  varietatejugum  Christi  suavita  sustinetur  ( Univ. 
theol.  mor.,  t.  i,  lib.  2,  1,  c.  2  in  Crome,  x,  182.) 
t  Wolf:  Gesch.  d.  Jesuit.,  1,  173. 

J  Escobar:  Th.  mor.,  proceem.,  iii,  n.  9,  and  many  others. 
§  Sanchez:  Of.  mor.,  i,  9,  n.  12  sqq.,  n.  24. 


§  38.]  PROBABILISM.  263 

even  should  he  hold  them  for  entirely  false,*  and  a  doctor, 
when  asked  for  moral  advice  needs  not  to  impart  the  same 
exclusively  according  to  his  own  judgment,  but  may  also 
suggest  the  judgment  of  another  though  contradictory  to  his 
own,  in  case  it  is  more  favorable  to,  or  more  desired  by,  the 
inquirer  (si  forte  hoc  illi  favorcibilior  sen  exoptatior  sit);  hence 
he  may  give  to  different  persons  a  directly  contrary  answer  to 
the  same  question,  "only  he  must  in  this  matter  use  discre- 
tion and  prudence."!  Many  go  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  I 
not  only  need  not  follow  the  opinion  most  probable  to  me, 
but  that  I  may  even  follow  that  one  of  which  I  hold  only  that 
it  is  probable  that  it  may  be  probable  (Tamburini). — But  how 
is  the  doctrine  of  probability  to  be  reconciled  with  the  Cath- 
olic doctrine  that  the  assent  of  the  church  is  necessary  in 
order  that  any  course  of  action  may  be  ecclesiastically  valid? 
Bauny  gives  the  answer:  All  that  doctors  teach  in  printed 
books  has,  in  fact,  the  assent  and  approval  of  the  church, 
provided  that  the  church  has  not  expressly  declared  it  as 
invalid. 

Though  probabilism  per  se,  as  a  mere  formal  principle,  en- 
dangers morality  in  a  high  degree,  substituting  in  the  place 
of  the  moral  conscience  individual  and  arbitrary  authority, 
and  rocking  the  soul  into  false  security,  still  it  were  possible 
that  the  danger  of  this  principle  should  not  actually  realize 
itself,  in  that  it  might  be  presupposed  that  the  theological 
authorities  would,  in  all  essential  moral  thoughts,  harmonize 
with  each  other  and  with  the  Scriptures,  and  would  show 
some  difference  only  in  regard  to  more  external,  unimportant 
questions.  In  this  case  the  erroneousness  of  the  formal  prin- 
ciple would  in  some  measure  be  remedied  by  the  correctness 
of  the  material  contents.  The  question  rises  therefore :  What 
do  the  doctors  who  are  presented  as  moral  oracles,  positively 
teach  as  to  the  moral? 

One  would  be  largely  deceived  were  one  to  expect  to  find 
in  the  moral  writings  in  question  merely  the  loose  world- 
morality  of  moral  indifference,  selfishness,  and  pleasure-seek- 
ing; on  the  contrary,  they  often  present  anxiously,  minute 

•Escobar:  TJi.  mor.  proaem.,  iii,  n.  27;  Laymann,  i,  p.  12;  so  also 
Diana :  Besol. mor.,  ii,  tract.,  13,11  tqq.,  Antv.,  1637  ;  Summa,  1652,  p.  210. 
t  Laymann,  i,  p.  11. 


264  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  38. 

and  strict  prescriptions,  especially  in  churchly  relations,  so 
that  the  evangelical  liberty  of  a  Christian  man  would  feel 
itself  thereby  in  many  respects  largely  cramped.  One  must 
here  distinguish,  however,  between  the  ordinary  popular 
morality — as  it  were,  for  home  use,  and  indeed  also  for  show 
— and  the  higher  morality  which  relates  to  the  fundamental 
purposes  of  the  Jesuit  order,  that  is,  to  the  furtherance  of  the 
Romish  church,  and  which  is  chiefly  practiced  by  the  great, 
in  church  and  state,  and  hence  also  by  the  Jesuits  them- 
selves.— To  the  semi-Pelagianizing  explaining-away  of  the 
sinful  corruption  of  human  nature,  corresponds,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  lowering  of  the  moral  requirements  made  of  man ; 
for  the  natural  man,  downy  cushions  are  spread.  We  are 
not  obligated  to  love  God  throughout  our  whole  life,  in  the 
full  sense  of  the  word,  nor  even  every  five  years,  but  more 
especially  only  toward  the  close  of  life.*  In  fact,  the  French 
Jesuit  Sirmond  denies  the  obligation  of  love  to  God  on  the 
whole ;  it  is  sufficient  if  we  fulfill  the  other  commandments 
and  do  not  hate  God ;  t  and  he  found  in  his  Order  warm  con- 
currence. So  also  is  the  love  of  neighbor,  and  especially  of 
enemies,  lowered  to  a  degree  corresponding  to  anti-Christian, 
heathen  ways  of  thinking.  And  even  the  duties  of  children 
are  placed  lower  than  is  the  case  among  the  Chinese.  The 
fourth  commandment  is  fulfilled  by  the  fact  that  one  shows 
due  honor  to  his  parents,  though  without  loving  them ;  for 
love  is  not  required  in  the  commandment.  To  be  ashamed 
of  one's  parents,  to  banish  them  from  one's  presence,  to  treat 
them  as  strangers  and  the  like,  is  not  a  severe  sin ;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  allowable  for  the  son  to  accuse  his  father 
of  heresy  before  the  Inquisition  (Busenbaum),  and  according 
to  a  majority  of  the  Jesuits,  as  also  in  the  opinion  of  Diana, 
he  is  obligated  thereto ;  and  the  same  holds  true  of  brothers 
and  sisters,  and  of  consorts.  J  Some  of  them  declare  it  even 
as  allowable  that  a  son  should  wish  his  father's  death,  or 
should  rejoice  at  the  occurrence  of  his  death,  because  he 
has  now  the  happiness  of  coming  into  his  inheritance  (Tam- 
burini,  Vasquez),  or  that  a  mother  should  wish  the  death  of 
her  daughter,  in  case  the  latter  is  ugly  (Azorius).  Malignant 

*  Escobar :  i,  2,  n.  7  sqq.  ;  v,  4,  n.  1  sqq.        t  Defensio  virtutis,  i,  1. 

J  Diana :  Resol.  mor.  i,  tract.,  4,  4,  5, 


§  38.]  JESUITIC  DEPRAVITY.  265 

revenge  is  indeed  forbidden,  but  not  the  taking  revenge  in 
vindication  of  one's  honor. 

In  respect  to  moral  imputation  and  condemnation,  most  of 
the  teachers  make — in  view  of  rendering  moral  desert  easy — 
the  remarkable  distinction,  that  the  action  answering  to  the 
divine  law  is  good  and  meritorious  as  such,  without  it  being 
requisite  thereto  that  the  intention  should  be  good ;  and  that,  on 
the  contrary,  sin  exists  only  where  there  is  really  an  intention 
of  sinning.  Hence  if  the  intention  is  a  good  one,  that  is,  pro- 
motive  of  the  weal  of  the  church,  then  the  act  which  serves 
to  its  carrying-out  cannot  be  sinful ;  and  there  can  be  a  mortal 
sin  only  where  the  person  in  the  moment  of  the  act  had  the 
definite  intention  of  doing  evil,  and  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  same.  But  passion  and  evil  habit  becloud  one's  knowl- 
edge and  hence  render  the  sin  venial,  as  does  also  weighty 
evil  example ;  *  and  a  probable  opinion  entirely  excuses  even 
a  mortal  sin.  In  an  unimportant  matter  even  the  transgres- 
sion of  a  divine  law  is  not  a  mortal  sin.  Ignorance  of  the  law 
excuses  the  mortal  sin ;  and  inveterate  ignorance,  the  father- 
confessor  may  overlook  in  silence.  Repentance  over  a  com- 
mitted sin  is  indeed  necessary  to  the  forgiveness  of  the  same, 
but  a  very  slight  degree  of  repentance  suffices,  or  even  a  de- 
sire to  have  repentance,  or  the  fear  of  eternal  punishment ; 
and,  in  case  of  repeated  sins,  it  is  enough  to  feel  repentance 
for  only  one  of  them,  provided  that  all  are  confessed ;  nay, 
it  even  suffices  that  I  should  feel  pained,  not  because  of  the 
sin,  but  because  of  its  bad  consequences,  e.  g,,  disease, 
dishonor ;  t  it  is  therefore  not  to  be  wondered  at  when  some 
of  the  doctors  assert,  in  contradiction  to  others,  that  it  is  suf- 
ficient in  order  to  the  obtaining  of  absolution  that  we  feel  a 
regret  at  our  lack  of  repentance  (Sa,  Navarra).  An  actual 
bettering  of  one's  life  needs  not  to  follow  immediately  upon 
repentance,  as  in  fact  the  habit  of  sinning  renders  the  sin  itself 
venial.  Venial  sins  (and  in  the  eyes  of  the  Jesuits  this  field  is 
uncommonly  large)  need  not  to  be  confessed,  and  it  is  not 
even  necessary,  in  connection  with  the  sacrament  of  penance, 
to  repent  of  them,  and  to  form  a  resolution  to  avoid  them. 

*  E.  g.,  Laymann :  i,  2,  c.  3 ;  i,  9,  3 ;  Escob. :  i,  3,  n.  28  ;  Conseuetudo 
dbsque  advertentia  letale  peccatum  non,facit. 
t  Escobar :  Tr.  V,  4,  c.  7. 


266  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§38. 

Not  undeserved  is  the  notoriety  of  the  chapters  in 
Jesuitical  ethics  on  falsehood,  on  the  sexual  sin,  and  on 
murder.  One  may  intentionally  use  ambiguous  words  in 
one  sense  though  knowing  that  the  hearer  understands 
him  otherwise;  and  one  may  for  a  legitimate  end,  e.  g.,  for 
self-defense,  or  to  protect  one's  family,  or  to  practice  a 
virtue,  utter  words,  which,  as  uttered,  are  entirely  false,  and 
which  express  the  true  sense  (which  may  be  the  opposite  to 
the  sense  really  expressed)  only  through  mental  additions 
restrictio  s.  reservatio  mentalis) ;  of  such  cases  the  moralists 
abound  in  remarkable  illustrations;*  e.  g.,  when  some  one 
wishes  to  borrow  something  of  me  which  I  do  not  like  to  let 
him  have,  I  am  at  liberty  to  say,  "I  have  it  not,"  namely, 
by  adding  mentally,  "in  order  to  give  it  to  thee;"  if  some 
one  asks  of  me  something  which  I  do  not  wish  to  tell,  I  am 
at  liberty  to  answer,  "I  know  it  not, "namely,  as  obligated 
to  communicate  it ;  if  I  am  asked  as  to  a  crime  of  which  I  am 
the  sole  witness,  I  am  at  liberty  to  say,  ' '  I  know  it  not, " 
mentally  adding,  "as  a  thing  publicly  known;"  if  I  have 
hidden  away  a  quantity  of  provision  of  which  I  have  need, 
then  I  may  swear  before  the  court,  "I  have  nothing,"  men- 
tally adding,  "which  I  am  bound  to  disclose."  A  priest 
threatened  with  death  may,  without  real  intentio,  that  is, 
merely  in  appearance,  pronounce  absolution,  administer  sac- 
raments, etc.  An  adulterous  wife,  when  questioned  by  her 
husband,  may  swear  that  she  did  not  commit  adultery,  adding 
mentally:  "on  this  or  that  day,"  or  "in  order  to  reveal  it  to 
thee."  He  who  conies  from  a  scene  of  pestilence,  but  is  con- 
vinced that  he  is  not  infected,  may  swear  that  he  does  not 
come  from  such  a  place.  When  a  poor  debtor  is  pressed  by 
a  hard  creditor,  he  may  swear  before  the  court  that  he  owes 
nothing  to  the  other,  in  that  he  adds  mentally,  "in  order  to 
pay  it  right  away."  I  may  deny,  before  the  court,  every 
trespass  or  crime  which  has  any  manner  of  excuse,  namely, 
by  adding  mentally,  "as  a  crime."  Is,  qui  ex  necessitate  vel 
aliqua  utilitate  offert  se  ad  jurandum  nemine  petente,  pote&t  uti 
amphibologiis,  nam  habet  justam  causam  Us  utendi  (Sanchez, 

*  Sanchez:  Opusmor.,  iii,  6,  12  sqq.  /  Summa :  i,  3,  6  ;  Diana:  ii,  tr. 
15,  25  sqq.,'  iii,  tr.  6,  30,  where  many  cases  are  cited  and  approved ;  El- 
lendorf:  pp.  42  sqq.,  52  sqq.,  124  sqq.,  157  sqq.;  Crome:  x,  142  sqq. 


§  38.]  SEXUAL  LAXITY.  267 

Diana).  In  general,  all  such  untruths  are  allowed  EX  JUSTA 
CAUSA,  namely,  quando  id  necessario  est,  vel  utile  ad  salutem 
corporis,  honoris  aut  rerum  familiarum,  or  when  an  improper 
question  is  addressed  to  us ;  on  the  contrary,  to  swear  falsely 
without  a  good  reason  is  a  mortal  sin  (Diana) ;  this  is — 
though  not  in  express  words  yet  certainly  in  sense — the 
maxim  which  is  disavowed  by  the  more  recent  Jesuits, 
namely,  that  the  end  sanctifies  the  means.  A  promise  obli- 
gates to  its  fulfillment  only  when  one  actually  had,  at  the 
time  of  promising,  the  intention  of  fulfilling  it.*  Hence  an 
oath  is  binding  only  when  one  meant  it  earnestly ;  otherwise 
it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  blame-worthy  indeed,  though 
not  obligating,  piece  of  trifling  (Sanchez,  Busenbaum,  Es- 
cobar, Less,  Diana),  and  it  obligates  only  in  the  sense  in 
which,  by  mental  reservations,  it  was  intended,  and  not  in 
that  in  which,  by  its  form  of  expression,  it  would  have  to  be 
understood  by  the  other ;  and  knowingly  to  mislead  any  one 
into  a  false  oath,  who,  however,  acts  in  good  faith,  is  no  sin, 
since  in  fact  he  who  unknowingly  swears  falsely  does  no  evil 
thereby ;  f  to  swear  falsely  from  bad  habit,  is  only  a  venial 
sin.  If  any  one  swears  that  he  will  never  drink  wine,  then 
he  seriously  sins  only  when  he  drinks  much,  but  not  when  he 
drinks  but  little  (Escobar).  He  who  swears  before  a  court 
that  he  will  tell  all  that  he  knows,  is  not  bound  to  tell  that 
which  he  alone  knows  (Less).f 

The  sexual  relations  are  discussed  by  the  Jesuits  in  a  so  im- 
morally-detailed circumstantiality  that  the  laxity  of  moral 
judgment  (elsewhere  without  parallel)  is  rendered  thereby  all 
the  more  pernicious  and  condemnable.§  A  maiden  who  has 
committed  unchastity  for  the  first  time  is  not  required,  even 
when  she  is,  as  yet,  unfjer  the  oversight  of  her  parents,  to  give, 
in  making  her  confession,  this  circumstance,  namely,  that  it  ia 
the  first  and  hence  more  serious  case,  for  the  freely  consenting 
virgin  does  a  wrong  neither  to  herself  nor  to  her  parents,  inas- 
much as  she  has  discretionary  power  over  her  virginal  purity. 

*  Escobar :  iii,  3,  n.  48.  t  Ibid.,  i,  3,  n.  81. 

J  Compare  Diana :  iii,  t.  5, 100  sqq. 

§  Escobar :  i,  8 ;  v,  2 ;  Busenbaum :  iii,  4 ;  especially  Sanchez ;  D« 
matrim.;  so  also  Diana;  comp.  Ellendorf:  30  sqq.,  95  sqq.,  28$. sqq., 
331  sqq. 


268  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  38. 

(Quum  sit  domina  suce  integritatis  mrginalis)*  For  all  possible 
kinds  of  unchastity,  apologies  and  excuses  are  invented ;  t  and 
Tamburini  even  fixes  with  great  exactness  the  taxes  for  public 
women.  The  discussions  of  the  moralists  on  these  subjects  are, 
in  many  respects,  of  so  indelicate  a  character,  that  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Episcopal  censor,  printed  in  the  work  of  Sanchez, 
(t.  2.),  namely,  summa  voluptate  perlegi,  sounds  almost  too 
naive. — Under  the  head  of  murder,  the  Jesuits  had  the  task  of 
accommodating  themselves  to  the  then  prevalent  moral  notions 
of  the  South-European  nations,  and  the  result  of  their  labors 
was  an  ingeniously  constructed  code  of  murder.J  The  murder- 
ing of  a  person,  even  of  an  innocent  one,  may  under  circum- 
stances be  allowable,  not  indeed  simply  in  case  of  self-defense, 
but  also  in  other  cases, — for  example,  in  case  of  severe  insult, 
inasmuch  as  the  insulted  one  would  otherwise  pass  as  dishon- 
ored ;  and  even  when  the  insulted  one  is  a  monk  or  priest,  he 
may,  according  to  some  authorities,  kill  his  opposer  (Escobar  i, 
c.  3,  Less,  and  others) ;  and  several  Jesuits  directly  maintained 
that  any  one,  even  a  priest  or  monk,  is  entitled  to  anticipate 
an  intended  slander  or  false  accusation  by  secret  murder ;  for 
this  would  not  amount  to  murder,  but  simply  to  self-defense ;  § 
and  this  was  expressly  applied  to  the  case  where  a  monk 
should  have  reason  to  fear  the  disclosures  of  his  mistress. 
When  a  knight,  in  fleeing  from  the  enemy,  cannot  otherwise 
rescue  himself  than  by  riding  over  an  infant  child  or  a  beggar, 
then  is  the  killing  of  these  innocent  persons  allowable,  save 
only  in  case  that  the  child  is  not  as  yet  baptized  (Escobar,  c.  3, 
52), — which  would  apparently  be  rather  difficult  for  the  knight 
to  know.  Killing  in  self-defense  is  allowable  even  where  the 
self-defender  is  caught  in  a  crime,  and  that,  too,  where  the  kill- 
ing is  beforehand  intended,  e.  g.,  whpn  he  who  is  caught  in- 
adultery  kills  the  injured  husband  (Escobar  i,  7,  c.  2,  5,  13 ; 
3,  35 ;  i,  8,  n.  61).  A  woman  may  stiletto  her  husband  when 
she  knows  definitely  that  this  same  fate  threatens  her  from  him, 
and  when  she  knows  no  other  escape  (Less).  He  who  has  secretly 

*  Escobar:  Liber,  etc., princ.  ii,  n.  41 ;  so  also  Bauny. 

^  E.g.,  Diana :  ii,  1. 16,  54  ;  17,  62  sqq. ;  iii,  5,  87  sqq.  ;  iv,  4,  36,  37,— 
in  the  spirit  of  many  of  the  Jesuits. 

\  Especially  Escobar :  i,  7  ;  comp.  Ellendorf :  72  sqq. 

§  Sanchez :  Summa,  t.  i,  2,  39,  7 ;  Amicus  :  Dejure  etjustitia,  v,  sec. 
7,  118  ;  comp.  Diana:  iii,  tr.  5,  97,  ed.  Antv.  1637. 


§  38.]  CODE   OF  MURDER.  269 

committed  adultery  may  kill  the  single  witness  thereof  who  is 
on  the  point  of  accusing  him,  for  this  witness  is  not  under  ob- 
ligation to  make  this  accusation ;  however,  adds  the  Jesuit, 
civil  law  has  unfortunately  not  assented  to  this  probable  opin- 
ion (Escobar  i,  7,  n.  39).  He  who  without  his  own  fault  is  re- 
quired to  accept,  or  to  challenge  to,  a  duel,  does  wisely  to  put 
his  opponent  out  of  the  way  by  secret  murder,  for  thereby  he 
protects  himself  from  the  assault,  and  his  opponent  from  a 
serious  sin.*  Escobar  is  unwilling  to  see  him  who  murders 
his  enemy  secretly  shut  out,  just  like  a  common  murderer, 
from  the  right  of  asylum  (6,  4,  n.  26).  According  to  some 
teachers — the  majority,  however,  think  otherwise — a  pregnant 
maiden  may  procure  an  abortion  in  order  to  escape  the  shame,  t 
According  to  Azor,  a  physician  may  administer  a  less  certainly 
effectual  medicine  although  he  has  with  him  a  more  certain 
one,  and  even,  when  it  is  more  probable  that  the  less  effectual 
one  may  do  harm ;  for  he  has  after  all  some  probability  on  his 
side.}:  Tamburini  justifies  the  castration  of  singers  for  the 
service  of  the  church.  The  doctrine — notorious  in  church-his- 
tory— of  the  justifiableness  of  tyrant-murder,  we  need  only 
mention  in  passing,  as  well  as  also  the  almost  demagogic  doc- 
trine of  the  merely-relatively  valid  and  purely  human  right  of 
princes,  and  of  the  right  to  disobey  law  on  the  part  of  the 
people,  as  being  themselves  sovereign.  §  In  this  political 
respect  is  especially  notorious  the  work  of  the  Spanish  Jesuit, 
Mariana,  (De  rege.  1598,  1605),  according  to  which,  a  king 
who  oppresses  religion  or  violates  the  laws  of  the  state  may 
be  killed  by  any  of  his  subjects,  openly  or  by  poison ;  the 
murderer,  even  if  his  attempt  fails,  renders  himself  meritori- 
ous in  the  eyes  of  God  and  man,  and  wins  immortal  renown 
(cornp.  the  view  of  John  of  Salisbury,  §  34).  It  is  chiefly 
these  revolutionary  doctrines  that  brought  the  order  to  its 
fall ;  with  its  other  moral  views  the  secular  world  could  have 
put  up  with  much  better  grace. 

The  maxims  of  the  Jesuits  disseminated  themselves  like 

*  Sanchez :   Opus  mor.  ii,  39,  7. 
t  Crome,  x,  229  ;  Escobar,  i,  Y,  n.  59,  64. 

Jin  Escobar:  Princ.  iii,  n.  25, — who,  however,  himself  disapproves 
thereof. 
§  Perrault,  ii,  804  tqq.;  Staudlin,  503  ;  Ellendorf,  360  sqq. 


270  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  38. 

an  infectious  disease  far  beyond  the  circle  of  their  own  Order, 
as  is  shown  by  the  comprehensive  works  of  the  already  men- 
tioned Sicilian,  Antony  Diana  (clericus  regular  is),*  who 
taught,  under  the  express  approbatio  of  his  ecclesiastical  su- 
periors, and  also  of  the  Jesuits,  the  doctrine  of  probabilism 
in  its  worst  forms.  One  may  act  according  to  a  probable 
opinion  and  disregard  the  more  probable  one ;  man  is  not 
under  obligation  to  follow  the  more  perfect  and  the  more 
certain,  but  it  suffices  to  .follow  simply  the  certain  and  per- 
fect ;  it  would  be  an  unendurable  burden  were  one  required 
to  hunt  out  the  more  probable  opinions ;  t  the  most  of  the 
Jesuits  taught  the  same  thing.  In  relation  to  murder,  he 
teaches  like  Escobar ;  I  am  at  liberty  to  kill  even  him  who 
assails  my  honor,  if  my  honor  cannot  otherwise  be  rescued.  J 
When  some  one  has  resolved  upon  a  great  sin,  then  one  is  at 
liberty  to  recommend  to  him  a  lesser  one,  because  such  ad- 
vice does  not  relate  absolutely  to  an  evil,  but  to  a  good, 
namely,  the  avoiding  of  the  worse ;  for  example,  if  I  cannot 
otherwise  dissuade  a  person  from  an  intended  adultery  than 
recommending  to  him  fornication  instead  thereof,  then  it  is 
allowable  to  recommend  this  to  him,  not,  however,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  a  sin,  but  in  so  far  as  it  prevents  the  sin  of  adultery; 
Diana  appeals  in  this  connection  to  many  like-judging  Jesuit 
doctors.  §  If  a  priest  commissions  Peter  to  kill  Caius,  who  is 
weaker  than  Peter,  but  nevertheless  Peter  comes  out  second 
best  and  gets  killed  himself,  still  the  priest  incurs  no  guilt, 
and  may  continue  in  the  administration  of  his  office.  |  He  who 
resolves  upon  committing  all  possible  venial  sins,  does  not 
thereby  involve  himself  in  any  mortal  sin.  IT  He  who  ex  aliqua 
justa  causa  rents  a  house  to  another  for  purposes  of  prostitu- 
tion, commits  no  sin.**  To  eat  human  flesh,  in  case  of  neces- 
sity, he  holds  with  the  majority  of  the  Jesuits,  as  allowable,  ft 
He  who  in  virtue  of  a  promise  of  marriage  induces  a  maiden 
to  yield  to  him,  is  not  bound  by  his  promise,  in  case  he  is  of 
higher  rank  or  richer  than  she,  or  in  case  he  can  persuade 
himself  that  she  will  not  take  his  promise  in  serious  ear- 

*  Resolutions  morales,  Antv.,  1629-37,  4  fol.,  Lugd.  1667,  Venet.,  1728. 
t  Res.  mor.,  Antv.,  1637,  ii,  tract.  13  ;  iv,  tr.  3 ;  Summa,  1652,  p.  214. 
I  Ibid.,  iii,  5,  90 ;  Summa,  pp.  210,  212.         §  Res.  mor.,  Antv.,  1637, 
iii,  tract.  5,  37.  ||  Ibid.,  ii,  t-act.  15,  17.  1  Ibid.,  iii,  tr.  6,  24. 

**  Ibid.,  iii,  tr.  6,  45.  ft  Ibid.,  6,  48. 


§38.]  JESUITISM  AND   TALMUDISM.  271 

nest.  *  Marriage  between  brother  and  sister  can  be  made  legit- 
imate by  Papal  dispensation.! — In  such  moral  perversity  of 
view  Diana  seems  only  to  have  been  surpassed  by  the  Spanish 
Netherlander  Cistercian,  Lobkowitz,l  who,  in  his  skepticism, 
entirely  breaks  down  the  moral  consciousness,  and  declares 
that  nothing  is  evil  per  se,  but  only  because  it  is  positively 
forbidden;  hence  God  can  dispense  even  from  all  the  com- 
mandments (comp.  the  views  of  Duns  Scotus,  §  34), — can, 
e.  <7.,  allow  whoredom  and  other  like  sins,  for  none  of  these 
are  evil  per  se.  Monks  and  priests  are  at  liberty  to  kill  the 
female  misused  by  them,  when  they  fear,  on  her  account,  for 
their  honor.  This  writer  declares  himself  expressly  and  de- 
cidedly in  favor  of  the  views  of  the  Jesuits. — Also  the  Fran- 
ciscan order  became  infected  with  the  maxims  of  the  Jesuits, 
as  is  proved  by  the  very  voluminous  work  of  Barthol.  Mastrius 
de  Mandida,^  which  was  published  under  the  express  sanction 
of  the  officers  of  the  order,  and  who  justifies  restrictiones  men- 
tales  even  in  oaths,  ||  and  also  the  murder  of  tyrants,  IT  the 
murders  of  the  slanderers  of  an  important  person,  castration 
and  similar  things,**  as  well  as  also  probabilism. 

The  moral  system  of  the  Jesuits  is  not,  strictly  speaking, 
that  of  the  Romish  church;  many  of  their  more  extreme 
maxims  the  church  has  condemned,  and  the  more  recent 
Jesuits  themselves  find  it  advisable  no  longer  fully  to  avow 
their  former  principles.  Nevertheless  Jesuitism,  together 
with  its  system  of  morals,  is  the  ultimate  consequential  goal 
of  the  -church  in  its  turning-aside  from  the  Gospel,  just  as 
(though  in  other  respects  widely  different  therefrom)  Tal- 
mudism  was  the  necessary  goal  of  Judaism  in  its  rejection  of 
the  Saviour.  The  error  consists  in  the  placing  of  human 
discretion  and  authority  in  the  stead  of  the  unconditionally 
valid,  revealed  will  of  God.  Even  as  earlier  Catholicism  had 
intensified  the  divine  command  by  self-invented,  ascetic 
work-holiness  into  a  seemingly  greater  severity, — had  aimed 

*  Besol.  mor.,  Antv.,  iii,  6,  81 ;  in  the  spirit  of  Sanchez  and  Less, 
t  Ibid.,  iv,  tr.,  4,  94;  sanctioned  by  several  Jesuits. 
J  Theol.  mor.,  1645,  1652 ;  the  work  itself  1  have  not  been  able  to 
find ;  comp.  Perrault :  i,  331  sqq.  §  Ibid.,  1626. 

|  Disp.,  xi,  5-2,  171,  172,  183,  (ed.  Ven.  1723.)  H  Ibid.,  viii,  27. 

**  Ibid.,  viii,  25,  28 ;  xi,  110  sqq. 


272  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  38. 

at  a  higher  moral  perfection  than  that  required  by  God, — so 
Jesuitism  with  like  presumption  lowered  the  moral  law,  out 
of  consideration  to  temporal  relations,  to  a  merest  minimum 
requirement, — contented  itself  with  a  much  lower  moral  per- 
fection than  the  divine  law  calls  for,  and  sought  out  cunning 
means  for  lightening  even  this  minimum.  Jesuitical  ethics  is 
the  opposite  pole  of  monastic  ethics ;  what  the  latter  requires 
too  much,  the  former  requires  too  little.  Monastic  morality 
sought  to  win  God  for  the  sinful  world ;  Jesuitical  morality 
seeks  to  win  the  sinful  world,  not  indeed  for  God,  but  at 
least  for  the  church.  Monasticism  said  to  God,  though  not 
in  an  evangelical  sense :  "  if  I  have  only  thee,  then  I  ask  for 
nothing  else  in  heaven  or  earth ; "  Jesuitism  says  about  the 
same  thing,  but  says  it  to  the  world,  and  particularly  to  the 
distinguished  and  powerful.  The  former  turns  away  in  in- 
dignant contempt  from  the  worldly  life,  because  the  world 
is  immersed  in  sin ;  the  latter  generously  receives  the  same 
into  itself,  and  turns  attention  away  from  guilt,  by  denying 
it.  It  is  true,  the  Jesuits  represent  also  a  monastic  Order, 
but  this  order  is  only  a  means  to  an  end,  and  resembles  the 
other  nobler  orders  about  as  much  as  wily  Renard  resem- 
bles the  pious  Pilgrim ;  and  the  well-known  hostility  of  the 
older  orders  to  this  brilliantly  rising  new  one,  Avas  not  mere 
jealousy,  but  a  very  natural,  and,  for  the  most  part,  moral 
protest  against  the  spirit  of  the  same. 

Other  casuists  are:  Jacobus  h  Graffiis,  a  Benedictine  (Con- 
siliorum  s.  respons.  cas.  consc.  1610,  2,  4to.) ;  Pontas  of  Paris 
(Examen  general  de  conscience,  1728;  Latin,  1731,  3  fol.,  alpha- 
betical) ;  the  French  bishop  Qenettus  (ob.  1702,  Theologie  mo- 
rale;  also  in  Latin,  1706,  2,  4to.,  earnest  and  rigid);  the 
Dominican  Perazzo,  in  his  Thomisticus  ecdesiastes  (1700,  3  fol.), 
digested  the  ethics  of  Thomas  Aquinas  into  an  alphabetical 
register;  Malder  of  Antwerp  treated  it  more  systematically 
(De  virtutibus  theologicis,  1616). 

In  a  more  systematic  form,  a  purer  Christian  spirit,  and,  in 
many  respects,  opposed  to  Jesuitical  views,  and  correspond- 
ing rather  to  Mediaeval  ethics,  is  the  moral  treatise  of  the 
French  bishop  Godeau  (1709) ;  Natalis  Alexander  (1693)  treated 
the  same  subject  in  a  similar  spirit,  in  connection  with  dog- 
matics. 


§  39.]  JANSENISM.  273 

SECTION  XXXIX. 

In  striking  antithesis  to  the  morals  of  the  Jesuits, 
stand  the  teachings  of  the  Augustine-inspired  Jansen- 
ists,  who,  in  opposition  to  the  subjectively-individual 
character  of  the  Jesuitical  system,  hold  fast  to  the 
immutable  objectivity  of  the  moral  law,  and  teach 
the  latter  in  a  very  rigid  manner,  much  resembling 
that  of  Calvinists;  but  yet  because  of  their  leaning 
upon  the  earlier  mysticism  of  the  church  they  come 
short  of  carrying  fully  out  the  Reformatory  principle. 
— The  mystical  theology — present  in  Jansenism  only 
as  a  co-ordinate  element — perpetuated  itself  in  the 
Romish  church,  in  natural  antagonism  to  the  cold  casu- 
istic morality  of  the  Jesuits,  but  rather  in  a  popularly 
devotional  than  in  a  scientific  form,  and  rose,  in  the 
Quietism  of  Molinos,  to  a  one-sided  turning-aside 
from  all  vigorous  moral  activity,  while  F'anelon 
shaped  a  modified  and  moderated  mysticism  into  a 
noble,  moral  system  of  devout  contemplation. 

Jansen  of  Louvain  (afterward  bishop  of  Ypres)j  presses,  in 
his  Augustinus  (1640),  the  doctrine  of  Augustine  against  the 
semi-Pelagian  system  of  the  Jesuits,  and  occasioned  thereby 
a  powerful  theological  movement  which  led  almost  to  schism, 
and  which  demonstrated  again  by  historical  results  that  even 
the  most  rigid  teaching  of  predestination  brings  about  higher 
moral  views  than  the  doctrine  of  Pelagianism  and  semi-Pela- 
gianism, — and  for  this  simple  reason,  that,  in  the  former  sys- 
tem God  is  brought  absolutely  into  the  fore-ground,  while, 
in  the  latter,  the  individual  subject  is  put  forward  into  a  false 
position.  Love  to  God  and  to  his  will  is  the  essence  of  all 
morality ;  where  God  is  not  loved  in  an  action,  there  the 
action  is  not  moral ;  mere  love  to  created  things  is  sinful ;  but 
our  love  to  God  is  poured  out  into  our  hearts  by  God  him- 
self, and  hence  stands  in  need  of  grace,  which  inclines  the 
will  directly  and  irresistibly  to  the  working  of  the  good. 


274  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  39. 

The  four  chief  virtues  and  the  three  theological  virtues,  as 
adopted  from  Augustine,  are  only  different  manners  of  loving 
God ;  God  is  their  ultimate  goal,  as  also  their  source ;  his 
gracious  working  and  our  love,  both  inseparably  united,  con- 
stitute their  impelling  power ;  fear  does  indeed  bring  about 
order,  but  not  virtue. — Although  the  book  of  Jansen  was 
burned  at  Rome,  and  forbidden  by  Papal  bulls,  still  his 
opinions  continued  to  disseminate  themselves  in  the  Nether- 
lands and  in  France,  and  bade  defiance  to  Jesuitism.  The 
writings  of  Arnauld,  Pascal,  Nicole,  Quesnel,  developed  the 
moral  principles  of  Jansen  still  further,  and  though  they  in 
fact  remained  far  remote  from  evangelical  purity  of  faith, 
and  even  defended  as  a  high  virtue  the  afflicting  of  the  body 
by  fasting  and  other  severe  acts  of  penance,  even  to  self- 
mortification,  still  they  were  thoroughly  in  earnest  for  moral 
purity, — required  complete  moral  self-denial  out  of  love  of 
God,  and  placed  the  moral  worth  of  all  actions,  and  even  of 
their  ascetic  practices,  essentially  in  the  disposition  of  the 
heart ;  and  their  ground-principles  were  definite  and  clear, 
and  proof  against  all  sophistry.*  Arnauld  assailed  effectu- 
ally the  ethics  of  the  Jesuits.  Pascal's  (ob.  1662)  "Pensees" 
(1669  and  later),  consisting  of  thoughts  on  religion  without 
any  very  close  connection,  attained  to  a  very  wide  circula- 
tion. That  the  presentation  of  these  quite  plain  thoughts 
could  produce  so  great  an  impression,  is  evidence  of  how 
deeply  had  sunk  the  Christian  life,  and  of  how  great  was  the 
necessity  of  reformation.  Peter  Nicole  (ob.  1695)  worked  ef- 
fectually, through  his  numerous  popular  and  essentially  Scrip- 
ture-inspired writings  on  special  moral  topics,  toward  a  purer 
form  of  ethics ;  t  and  this  was  done  in  still  wider  circles  by 
QuesneVs  "Moral  Reflections"  (at  first  in  1671,  on  the  Pour 
Gospels,  afterward  on  the  entire  New  Testament)  which  were 
affected  with  a  slight  tinge  of  mysticism ; — (Sainte-Beuve : 
"Resolutions,"  etc.,  1689,  3,  4to.).  The  open  or  under- 
handed opposition  of  the  Jesuits  to  these  writings  simply 
awakened  the  attention  of  the  people  all  the  more  to  the 
great  difference  between  the  parties,  and  that,  too,  not  to  the 

*  Comp.  Reuchlin:  Geschichte  von  Portrayal,  1839,  and  the  same  au- 
thor's Pascals  Leben,  1840, — neither  work  entirely  unprejudiced, 
t  Rirchenhistor.  Archiv.  v.  Stiiudlin,  etc.,  1824,  1,  127. 


§  39.]  QUIETISM.  275 

advantage  of  the  Jesuits. — The  chief  strength  of  Jansenism 
lay  in  its  opposition  to  the  Jesuits ;  its  own  positive  contents, 
as  an  emphasizing  of  the  practical  phase  of  Augustinianism, 
was  not  consequentially  carried  out ;  it  was  not  able  to  disen- 
thrall itself  from  the  unevangelical  ground-thoughts  of  the 
corrupted  church,  but  halted  at  half- ways ;  and  hence  though 
it  had  a  wide-reaching,  it  did  not  have  a  permanent  and  pro- 
found, influence.  Discarding  the  system  of  external  work- 
holiness  and  insisting  on  the  inner  element  of  the  moral  life, 
it  yet  did  not  clearly  and  purely  embrace  the  evangelical 
thought  of  faith,  which  first  lays  hold  on  grace  and  then 
freely  carries  out  the  life  of  grace ;  but  it  regarded  morality 
not  merely  as  an  evidence  of  salvation,  but  also,  though 
without  merit  in  itself,  as  a  means  of  salvation ;  hence  its  in- 
sisting on  painfully-anxious  ascetic  practices. 

The  mystical  current  of  ethics,  with  which  the  Jansenists 
always  manifested  a  sympathy,  was  represented  by  Francis 
de  Sales  (bishop  of  Geneva,  ob.  1622,  and  subsequently  canon- 
ized) in  several  works;*  \>yVergier  (abbot  of  St.  Cyr,  ob.  1643) 
a  Jansenist,  who  was  already  powerfully  working  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Quietism,  and  who  encouraged  the  severest,  and  even 
cruel,  self-mortifications;  t  and  by  Cardinal  Bona  (ob.  1674.)  J 
Most  remarkable,  however,  though  quite  consequential,  was 
the  manner  in  which  mysticism  was  transformed  into  Quiet- 
ism §  by  the  Spaniard,  Michael  Molinos  (afterward  in  Rome,) 
whose  work  entitled  "Spiritual  Guide,"  originally  (1675)  in 
Spanish,  soon  disseminated  itself  throughout  Romish  Europe.§ 
As  the  goal  of  morality  is  union  with  God  through  an  entire 
turning  away  from  the  creature,  hence  true  morality  must 
manifest  itself,  not  in  acting  in  the  outer  world,  but  in  turn- 
ing away  from  it.  Such  is  the  doctrine  which  Molinos  de- 
rives from  his  favorites  among  the  earlier  mystics,  from 
Dionysius  the  Areopagite  down.  In  contemplation,  in  the 
path  of  faith,  in  immediate  spiritual  vision  of  God,  without 
the  intervention  of  an  inferential  process  of  thought,  the 
soul  already  possesses  eternal  truth.  True  vision,  inward 

*  (Euvres,  Paris,  1821,  16  t.,  1834.  t  Opp.  theol.,  1642, 1653. 

J  Manuductio  ad  calum,  1664,  and  frequently  ;  Opp.  Antv.,  1673,1789. 
§  Walch :  Einl.  in  d.  Bd.  ttreit.  ausser.  d.  ev.  K;  1^24,  ii,  p.  982 ; 
Staudlin  u.  Tschirner :  ArcMv.,  i,  2,  175. 

19 


276  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  39. 

rest  and  inward  composure, — the  remaining  silent  in  the 
presence  of  God,  the  beholding  of  God  without  figure  or 
form,  and  without  distinguishing  between  his  attributes,  as 
the  absolutely  One, — all  this  is  not  a  self-acquired  active 
state,  but  a  passive  one  imparted  by  God  himself  to  the  soul, 
so  that  consequently  God  alone  works  in  man,  and  the  soul 
itself  remains  motionless  and  inactive, — yields  itself  entirely 
to  the  solely-working  divine  activity, — is  entirely  united 
with  God ;  this  is  the  true,  pure  manner  of  prayer,  which 
cannot  be  uttered  in  words,  but  is  a  holy, keeping-silence  of 
the  soul.  Satiated  in  this  union  with  God  the  soul  is  entire- 
ly filled  with  the  divine,  and  hates  all  worldly  things, — feels 
a  repugnance  to  every  thing  earthly,  forgets  every  thing 
created,  is  divested,  in  its  inner  solitude,  of  all  affections 
and  thoughts,  of  all  inclinations  and  all  creature-will, — with- 
draws itself  into  its  most  innermost  depths,  and  enjoys,  in 
its  total  self-forgetfulness  (entirely  merged  into  God),  perfect 
inner  rest,  and  holy  peace  ;  self-mortification  and  self-denial 
are  but  disciplinary  helps  for  beginners  in  the  acquiring  of 
salvation,  but  do  not  themselves  lead  to  perfection ;  this  is 
attained  only  through  sinking  into  one's  own  nothingness, 
through  "self-annihilation,"  through  the  putting  on  of,  and 
becoming  united  with,  God. — Molinos,  though  at  first  favored 
by  the  Pope,  was  afterward  delivered  over,  by  the  influence 
of  the  Jesuits,  to  the  Inquisition,  and  was  required  to  disa- 
vow his  doctrines  (1687),  and  died  in  prison.  Many  of  the 
propositions  condemned  were  only  inferences  drawn  from 
his  writings,  though  not  expressly  taught  by  himself. — In 
spite  of  this  and  other  persecutions,  mysticism  still  continued 
to  exist,  also  in  its  quietistic  form,  in  the  Latin  nations. 
(Madam  Bouvier  de  la  Mothe  Guion — ob.  1717 — represented  it 
in  numerous  writings,  mostly  published  by  Poiret,  in  which 
she  sometimes  goes  in  fervent  mystical  depth  of  love,  even 
beyond  Molinos, — the  out-gush  of  a  glowingly  enthusiastic 
womanly  heart.) — Fenelon,  archbishop  of  Cambray,  favored 
the  doctrine  of  Madame  Guion,  and  endeavoreti  by  moderating 
her  quietistic  views  to  conjure  the  opposition;  and  his  writ- 
ings, which  portray  in  simple,  noble  eloquence  the  pious  life 
of  the  Christian,  and  keep  free  from  the  extremes  of  one- 
sided mysticism,  and  uniformly  place  love  to  God  in  the  fore- 


§  40.]  HUMANISM.  277 

ground  as  the  essence  of  the  moral,  offer  and  propose,  in  op- 
position to  the  pettifogging  dialectics  of  Jesuitical  morality, 
the  Christian  spirituality  of  the  heart.  His  mystical  master- 
piece (Explication  des  Maxims  des  Saintes,  1697,  and  often  sub- 
sequently) was  condemned  by  the  Pope  and  proscribed; 
Fenelon  yielded. 

SECTION  XL. 

Independently  pf  the  Reformation, — because  averse 
to  Christianity  itself,  and  standing  rather  in  connec- 
tion with  the  already  previously  existing  breaking- 
loose  from  the  evangelically-moral  consciousness 
which  showed  itself,  as  godlessness  on  the  one  hand, 
and  as  humanism  on  the  other, — there  was  developed, 
in  antithesis  to  the  Christian  religion  and  to  Mediaeval 
philosophy  (as  also  in  antithesis  to  the  riper  Greek 
philosophy,  and  consequently  to  the  historical  spirit  in 
general)  an  essentially  new  philosophical  movement, 
which,  while  moving  forward  under  manifold  modi- 
h'cations  of  form,  gradually  won  a  progressively 
greater  influence  on  theology,  and  in  fact  chiefly  also 
on  theological  ethics,  leading  the  same  astray,  on  the 
one  hand,  into  deep-reaching  errors,  but  also,  on  the 
other  (and  in  fact  because  of  these  errors)  bringing  it 
to  a  riper  self-examination  and  to  a  clearer  self-con- 
sciousness. Showing  a  preference, — in  contrast  to 
the  precedent  of  the  better  form  of  scholasticism, — 
to  those  ancient  moralists  who  already  represented 
the  decadence  of  Greek  thought,  namely,  to  the  Epi- 
cureans, the  Stoics,  and  the  Skeptics,  or  indeed  also, 
merely  in  a  general  way,  to  the  so-called  humanistic 
spirit  of  antiquity, — this  movement  (which  found 
favor  especially  in  Italy  and  France,  because  of  the 
there-increasing  demoralization  of  the  higher  classes), 
shows  itself  at  first,  for  the  most  part,  simply  in  the 


278  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  40. 

form  of  general  maxims  and  sentiments,  and  attained 
only  rarely  to  a  more  scientific  shape.  Scarcely  any- 
where save  in  Germany  did  this  current  of  thought 
rise  to  scientific  earnestness  and  philosophical  devel- 
opment, and  thereby  to  a  more  substantial  moral 
character.  Spinoza  broke  off  all  connection  with 
ancient  and  Mediaeval  philosophy,  and  developed  a 
consequential  Pantheistic  system,  in  which  ethics 
assumes  the  form  of  an  objective  describing  of  the 
absolutely  unfree,  purely  mechanically-conceived 
moral  life,  as  determined  with  unconditional  nature- 
necessity  by  the  life  of  the  universe,  although,  be- 
cause of  the  unhistorical  originality  of  his  manner  of 
thinking,  he  exerted  but  little  influence  upon  his  (for 
this  element,  yet  unreceptive)  age.  All  the  greater, 
however,  became  the  influence  of  the  philosophy  of 
Leibnitz,  representing  as  it  did  a  world-theory  the 
opposite  of  that  of  Spinoza,  and  placing  itself  rigidly 
on  monotheistic  ground,  and  standing  in  a  much 
^closer  connection  with  history; — especially  was  this 
influence  extended  through  the  labors  of  his  some- 
what independent  disciple,  Christian  Wolf,  who  cre- 
ated a  very  detailed  and  morally  earnest  system  of 
ethics,  essentially  under  the  form  of  the  doctrine  of 
duties,  which,  as  a  purely  philosophical  opposition- 
movement  to  the  above-mentioned  non-Christian  and 
anti-Christian  current,  attained  to  a  not  undeserved  in- 
fluence on  Christian  ethics  in  Germany,  and  gave  rise 
in  Crusius  to  an  evangelically  deeper,  though  not  phil- 
osophically carried-out,  development  of  moral  science. 

It  is  utterly  incorrect  and  -anti-historical  to  deduce  the 
collective,  and  (as  some  have  done)  even  the  anti-Christian 
philosophy  of  modern  times  from  the  Reformation,  or  even 
to  regard  it  as  standing  in  any  close  connection  therewith. 


§40.]  ERASMUS.  279 

The  essence  of  the  Reformation  is  not  the  freeing  of  the  in- 
dividual subject  from  all  objective  authority.  Historically, 
we  are  forced  to  hold  fast  to  the  fact  that  both  before,  and 
during,  and  after,  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  there  were 
prevailing  still  other  entirely  different  spiritual  influences 
than  the  religiously-evangelical  one, — influences  which  were 
in  part  entirely  independent  of  the  Reformation  and  of  its 
spirit,  nay,  even  utterly  opposed  thereto,  and  in  part,  though 
occasioned  in  their  development  by  the  movement  of  thought 
going  out  from  the  Reformation,  were  yet  not  caused  thereby. 
The  renewed  cultivation  of  ancient  classical  literature,  espe- 
cially of  the  belletristic  as  distinguished  from  the  philosophy 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  played,  in  the  Reformation-move- 
ment, only  a  very  subordinate  and  essentially  negative  role, 
namely,  in  that  it  undermined  the  credit  of  scholasticism. 
The  deep  earnestness  of  the  religious  life  in  the  evangelical 
church,  the  required  inward  purity,  and  the  repentance  of 
regeneration,  consisted  but  illy  with  a  love  for  the  exaltation 
of  the  natural  man,  as  exhibited  in  Greek  literature ;  and  it 
was  much  easier  for  humanism  to  find  an  undisturbed  patron- 
age within  the  Romish  church, — which,  though  indeed  not 
theoretically  approving  of  the  movement,  had  yet  practically 
already  long  since  accorded  it  favor.  Humanism  was  the 
name  self-assumed  by  this  movement,  which  in  antithesis  to 
the  Christian  world-theory  placed  man,  in  his  natural  devel- 
opment, into  the  fore-ground  even  of  its  moral  world-the- 
ory, and  threw  as  far  as  possible  into  the  back-ground  his 
need  of  redemption,  and  which  had  consequently  in  Chris- 
tianity only  a  scientific  and  aesthetic  interest.  The  unbeliev- 
ing impiety  which  prevailed  widely  in  the  Romish  church  of 
that  age,  and  which  found  its  way  even  into  the  Papal  chair, 
had  a  much  more  lively  sympathy  for  heathen  literature 
than  the  evangelical  church,  The  Pelagian  character  of  hu- 
manism stood  in  fact  nearer  to  the  view  of  the  Romish  church 
than  to  that  of  the  evangelical.  Luther  turned  the  un- 
evangelical  Erasmus  indignantly  away ;  Rome  offered  him  a 
cardinals  hat. 

It  was  quite  natural,  although  it  had  nothing  at  all  to  do 
with  the  evangelical  Reformation,  that  there  should  now  rise 
in  opposition  to  the  one-sided  idealism  and  spiritualism  of 


280  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§40. 

scholasticism,  an  equally  one-sided  realism  and  naturalism, 
which  would  naturally  enough  find  encouragement  in  the 
spirit  of  the  age  as  weaned  off  from  the  Mediaeval  ideals  of 
chivalry  and  poetry,  and  as  immersed  in  material  interests 
and  in  the  prose  of  politics.  This  thoroughly  non-Christian 
naturalistic  tendency,  which  attained  to  a  more  spiritual 
content  only  in  the  sphere  of  German  thought,  manifested 
from  the  very  start  a  decided  aversion  to  all  history,  an  aver- 
sion which  constantly  grew  more  marked  and  positive.  This 
anti-historical  spirit  began  already  to  show  itself  in  the  at- 
tempt to  call  again  into  life,  in  disregard  to  the  entire  his- 
tory of  Christian  thought,  an  ante-Christian  world-theory, 
namely,  to  effect  a  rehabilitation  of  the  spirit  of  the  heathen 
thought  of  Greece  and  Rome.  At  a  later  period  the  move- 
ment went  still  further, — broke  even  with  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy, pushing  it  entirely  aside  even  in  its  ancient  form, — 
and  the  "philosophical"  century  thought  to  display  its 
strength  in  speaking  disdainfully  of  the  spiritual  products 
of  a  Plato  and  an  Aristotle,  and  in  regarding  as  philosophers 
only  third  and  fourth  rate  minds,  such  as  Cicero,  and  in 
basing  itself,  in  boundless  self-sufficiency,  purely  and  simply 
upon  itself.  It  required  all  the  pretension  of  the  so-called 
philosophical  century  to  accept  men,  such  as  Rousseau  and 
Voltaire  (who  had  in  fact  scarcely  the  faintest  conception  of 
solid  philosophical  thought-work),  as  the  greatest  philoso- 
phers of  the  world's  history.  From  the  history  of  thought, 
these  men  were  unwilling  to  learn  any  thing,  but  solely 
from  nature ;  every  one  wanted  to  philosophize  on  his  own 
responsibility ;  every  thing  had  to  be  entirely  new ;  the  new  era 
wished  to  owe  nothing  to  the  past,  but  contemptuously  to 
tread  it  under  foot ;  and  the  reaction  from  this  anti-historical, 
and  hence  unspiritual  tendency,  begins  only  quite  late — with 
Schelling.  Now  as  the  Christianly-moral  world-theory  has  a 
thoroughly  historical  character,  hence  the  history  of  this  es- 
sentially naturalistic  form  of  ethics  admits  of  no  possible 
organic  incorporation  into  the  history  of  Christian  ethics ;  it 
simply  moves  side  by  side  with  the  Christian  current, — 
breaks,  especially  at  a  later  period,  disturbing,  confusing, 
and  perverting,  into  it, — but  is  with  only  slight  exception 
not  a  furthering  element  of  its  development. 


§  40.]  ERASMUS— SPINOZA.  281 

Erasmus,  who  enters  the  ethical  field  in  several  treatises,* 
does  not  as  yet  himself  directly  assail  the  Christianly-inoral 
consciousness,  but  only  presents  with  prudent  reserve  the 
ethics  of  Plato  and  Cicero  as  very  closely  related  to  Christian 
ethics,  and  mingles  faint  Christian  views  with  Grecian,  and 
thereby  reduces  them  to  the  level  of  Pelagianism.  His  as- 
saults on  the  moral  abuses  of  the  church  are  devoid  of  Chris- 
tian depth. — Pomponatiw  (of  Padua  and  Bologna,  ob.  about 
1525),  f  who,  under  the  patronage  of  the  Papal  court,  assailed 
the  doctrine  of  personal  immortality,  professed,  in  point  of 
ethics,  to  belong  to  the  Stoic  school, — taught  absolute  deter- 
minism, and  presented  the  Christian  view  only  ambiguously 
along-side  of  the  heathen. — Lipsius,  in  the  Netherlands  (ob.  > 
1606)  went  still  further  in  the  exaltation  of  Stoicism,  \  though 
his  opinions  received  no  very  favorable  commendation  from 
his  unbridled  life  and  from  his  threefold  change  of  faith — 
Romish,  Lutheran,  Eeformed,  and  then  Romish  again. — In 
all  essential  features  belongs  here  also  the  Socinian  ethics  of 
Crell,  which  is  in  many  respects  kindred  to  the  later  Ration- 
alistic system,  and  presents  (in  a  spirit  of  pure  Pelagianism) 
Christian  ethics  simply  as  improved  Aristotelian  ethics,  and 
prefers  the  latter  to  the  ethics  of  the  Old  Testament.  § — 
Agrippa  of  Nettesheim  (of  Cologne,  ob.  1535),  undermined,  by 
a  far-reaching  skepticism,  the  certainty  of  all  moral  con- 
sciousness, and  explained  this  consciousness  simply  by  mere 
fortuitous  habit  and  by  fortuitously-adopted  public  man- 
ners ;  I  his  magico-alchemistic  superstitiousness  forms  the 
back-ground  thereto.  (Giordano  Bruno,  the  forerunner  of 
Spinoza,  produced  no  system  of  ethics.) 

Less  influential  upon  his  own  age  than  upon  recent  times, 
was  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza.  His  chief  work,  Ethica 
(1677),  which  appeared  only  after  his  death,  constitutes  al- 
most an  entire  philosophical,  system,  of  which  the  ethical 

*  Enchiridion  militia  christ. ;  Motrimonii  chrigt.  institt.  ;  Institt.  prin- 
cipis  christ. ;  and  others. 

t  Opp.,  Bas.  1567,  3  t. 

I  ManuHuctio  ad  Stoicam  philosophiam,  2d  ed.,  1610. 

§  Ethica  Arietotelica,  etc.,  Selenoburgi,  s.  a.,  4to.,— later :  Cosmopoli, 
1681,  4to. 

ij  De  incertitudine  et  vanitate  scientiarum,  1527  (?)  then  in  Col.,  1531. 


282  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§40. 

part  proper  forms  indeed  the  largest  but  not  the  most  philo- 
sophical and  important.  This  perspicuous  arid  mathemati- 
cally-exact treatise  presents  not  so  strictly  a  speculative  devel- 
opment of  the  subject-matter  as,  rather,  rational  elucidations 
and  proofs  of  assumed  propositions,  among  which,  however, 
some  very  important  ones,  which  needed  to  be  demonstrated, 
are  presented  merely  as  axioms  not  needing  proof,  or  are  dis- 
guised in  definitions.  That  the  Jewish,  but  also  Judaism- 
rejecting,  philosopher  should  feel  himself  obliged  also  to 
ignore  the  history  of  the  human  spirit  in  general,  was  nat- 
urally to  be  expected ;  his  system  (if  we  except  the  philosophy 
of  Descartes,  which  had  likewise  but  little  connection  with 
earlier  philosophy,  and  whose  monotheistical  character  Spi- 
noza assails)  has  no  historical  antecedents  proper,  but  in 
fact  begins  anew  the  philosophical  thought-work  from  the 
very  beginning,  and  develops  the  Pantheistic  world-theory 
so  consequentially  and  undisguisedly  as  is  nowhere  else  to  be 
found. — God,  as  the  solely  existing  substance  whose  two  at- 
tributes are  thought  and  extension,  has  not  a  world  different 
from  and  outside  of  himself,  but  is  this  world  himself,  as 
considered  simply  under  a  particular  aspect.  All  particular 
being  is  only  a  mode  of  the  existence  of  God ;  and  all  these 
modes  are  conditioned  by  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  divine 
life,  and  cannot  be  otherwise  than  as  they  really  are ;  all  that 
is,  is  what,  and  as,  it  is,  from  necessity ;  of  every  thing  which 
is  or  takes  place  the  principle  holds  absolutely  good :  omnia 
sunt  ex  necessitate  natures  divines  determinata.  Hence  tins  holds 
good  equally  also  of  man,  who  is  likewise  a  particular  mode 
of  the  being  of  God.  When  we  say :  "  the  human  soul  thinks 
something,"  this  is  the  same  as  to  say:  "God  thinks,"  not 
however  in  so  far  as  God  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  con- 
stitutes the  essence  of  the  human  spirit.  Hence  human 
thought  is  just  as  necessarily  determined  as  is  all  being  in 
general, — and  hence  knows  per  se,  and  necessarily,  the  truth. 
— Now,  thinking  has  two  phases :  knowing  and  willing.  Of 
willing  the  same  holds  good  as  of  knowing,  namely,  it  is  ab- 
solutely determined  in  all  its  activity.  Every  will-act  has  a 
definite  cause,  by  which  it  is  absolutely  determined.  Will- 
ing can  never  contradict  knowing,  but  is  the  immediate  and 
necessary  product  of  the  same,  an.d  is,  strictly  speaking, 


§  40.]  SPINOZA.  283 

identical  therewith ;  willing  is  affirming,  and  non-willing  is 
denying.  He  who  believes  that  he  speaks,  or  keeps  silent,  or 
does  any  thing  else,  by  free  choice,  dreams  with  open  eyes. 
Men  delude  themselves  into  thinking  that  they  are  free  in 
their  volitions,  only  because  they  are  not  conscious  of  the 
cause  which  absolutely  determines  them ;  all  that  takes  place 
through  the  activity  of  the  will  is  necessary,  and  therefore 
good.  This  doctrine  renders  the  heart  calm  and  makes  us 
happy ;  with  it  we  have  no  longer  any  occasion  for  fear,  for 
we  know  that  every  thing  takes  place  according  to  the  ever- 
lasting decree  of  God,  with  the  same  necessity  as  it  follows 
from  the  idea  of  a  triangle,  that  its  three  angles  are  equal  to 
two  right  angles, — teaches  us  to  hate,  to  despise,  to  mock  no 
one, — teaches  us  unlimited  contentment  (ii,  prop.  48,  49). 

All  this  is  clear  and  consequential ;  but  how  can  the  exist- 
ence of  a  moral  consciousness  be  reconciled  therewith  ? 
How  can  any  thing  be  morally  required  or  done,  if  every  thing 
takes  place  with  unconditional  necessity,  and  if  will-freedom 
is  only  a  false  appearance  ?  That  there  can  be  no  question 
of  a  moral  command  proper,  of  an  "ought,"  Spinoza  himself 
virtually  admits,  inasmuch  as  he  declares  it  his  purpose  to 
speak  of  human  actions  just  as  if  the  matter  in  question 
were  lines,  surfaces,  and  solids  (iii.  prowm.)  We  are  active 
in  so  far  as  any  thing  takes  place  within  or  without  us, 
of  which  we  are  the  perfect  cause ;  and  the  more  we  are  act- 
ive, and  the  less  we  are  passive,  so  much  the  more  perfect 
are  we.  Even  as  all  other  things,  so  also  the  spirit  strives  to 
retain  and  to  enlarge  its  reality ;  its  striving  is  its  willing ; 
the  end  is  •  not  different  from  the  cause — from  the  unf ree- 
acting  impulse  of  nature ;  the  passing-over  to  a  higher  real- 
ity awakens  the  feeling  of  pleasure ;  the  opposite,  that  of 
displeasure.  Pleasure  in  connection  with  the  consciousness 
of  its  cause,  is  love;  the  opposite  is  hate.  For  a  real  differ- 
ence between  good  and  evil  there  is,  in  this  world-theory,  no 
place  whatever.  Neither  good  nor  evil  is  a  reality  in  things 
themselves,  but  both  are  simply  subjective  conceptions  and 
notions,  which  we  form  by  a  comparison  of  things,  and  are 
hence  only  relative  relations  having  their  basis  not  in  things 
but  in  ourselves, — are  only  modes  of  oar  thinking;  for  exam- 
ple, a  particular  piece  of  music  is  good  for  a  melancholic 


CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  40. 

person,  not  good  for  a  different  one,  and  is  of  no  significancy 
at  all  for  a  deaf  one ;  hence  it  is  per  se  neither  good  nor  bad, 
(iv,  prcef.)  Hence  we  cannot  say  in  general  that  any  thing 
at  all  is  good  per  se ;  it  is  only  by  comparing  one  thing  with 
another  higher  entity,  or  with  a  notion  formed  by  ourselves, 
that  we  find  any  thing  to  be  good ;  good  and  evil  are  only 
expressions  of  our  subjective  judgment  as  to  that  for  or 
against  which  we  have  a  desire  or  an  aversion.  Per  se,  how- 
ever, every  thing  is  good,  because  necessary ;  nothing  is  or 
transpires  without  God  or  against  his  will ;  every  thing  is 
just  as,  according  to  eternal,  divine  destination  and  necessi- 
ty, it  ought  to  be ;  hence  the  notion  of  evil  is  only  a  limited 
and  ungrounded  manner  of  thinking  on  the  part  of  our  own 
understanding, — is  nothing  on  the  part  of  God.  Evil  is  in 
fact,  even  in  our  own  conception,  only  a  negative  something, 
a  privation ;  but  God  knows  no  mere  negative  something, 
hence  God  knows  absolutely  nothing  of  evil  (comp.  the  view 
of  Erigena,  §  83),  and  hence  there  is  in  reality  no  such  thing  as 
evil ;  for  what  God  does  not  know  does  not  exist,  and  outside 
of  God's  thinking  there  is  no  other  thinking.  Moreover, 
were  evil  or  sin  a  real  something,  God  would  necessarily  not 
only  know  it,  but  also  be  the  cause  of  it,  for  God  is  the  sub- 
stance and  the  cause  of  all  that  is ;  and  what  is  of  God  can- 
not be  evil.  Hence  it  is-  only  a  false  manner  of  looking  at 
things,  an  imagination,  when  we  find  anything  evil  in  the 
real  world, — false,  in  that  we  bring  things  into  relation  to 
ourselves,  to  our  fortuitous  feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeas- 
ure, instead  of  contemplating  them  in  their  own  nature ;  in 
and  of  itself,  and  hence  in  truth,  every  thing  real  is  good  and 
perfect.  In  all  seemingly  free  action  nothing  else  can  take 
place  than  what  results  with  necessity  from  the  existing  cir- 
cumstances of  the  acting  subject.  Even  the  stings  of  con- 
science are  a  self-deception,  and  are  nothing  other  than  a 
sadness  or  chagrin  which  we  feel  over  some  kind  of  a  failure. 
Let  it  not  be  objected  to  this,  that  if  men  do  every  thing 
from  necessity,  and  hence,  also,  sin  from  necessity,  they  can- 
not consequently  be  blamed  therefor,  but  that  all  men  would 
then  be  necessarily  happy.  On  the  contrary,  man  can  be 
without  guilt,  and,  notwithstanding  that,  be  also  devoid  of 
happiness.  The  horse  is  not  guilty  for  its  not  being  man, 


§  40.]  SPINOZA.  285 

and  nevertheless  it  still  remains  a  horse ;  and  he  who  is  bitten 
by  a  mad-dog  is  also  not  guilty  therefor,  and  yet  he  goes 
mad ;  he  who  is  blind  was  in  fact  destined  in  the  concatena- 
tion of  beings  to  be  blind  and  not  seeing  (Ep.,  32,  34.)  This 
is  surely  the  most  wonderful  justification  of  the  moral  order 
of  the  universe  which  one  could  possibly  fall  upon ;  for,  in 
fact,  whence  can  mad-dogs  originate  in  an  absolutely  neces- 
sary and  good  world  ?  If  every  thing  is  necessary,  and  the 
entirely  innocent  can  be  made  mad  by  mad-dogs,  this  is  evi- 
dently a  very  bad  sort  of  world-order.  And  we  must  ask  : 
if  all  human  thinking  is  the  thinking  of  God  himself,  and  is 
absolutely  necessary,  how  is  there  in  fact  possible  any  man- 
ner of  false  thinking  and  imagining  ?  If  men  really  regard 
evil  as  real,  then  this  is,  in  fact,  an  error  on  the  part  of  God 
himself,  which  our  philosopher  should  endeavor  to  account 
for;  but  if  there  is  no  evil,  then  there  is  also  no  error,  and 
the  system  thus  entangles  itself  in  its  own  meshes.  And 
when  Spinoza  makes  error  to  be  just  as  necessary  as  truth 
(ii,  prop.,  35,  36),  he  still  cannot  evade  this  contradiction  by 
declaring  error  to  be  merely  relative,  for  a  merely  seeming 
error  would  yet  in  reality  be  the  truth,  and  hence  would  not 
admit  of  the  turn  here  taken  by  Spinoza. 

Hence — so  infers  Spinoza — all  is  good  which  is  useful; 
and  all  is  evil  which  hinders  from  a  good  (iv,  def., 
1,  2.)  Hence  virtue  is  the  power  or  capacity  of  acting  in 
conformity  to  our  own  nature ;  virtus  nihil  aliud  est,  quam  ex 
legibus  proprice  natures  agere;  hence  every  one  must  follow  the 
necessity  of  his  nature,  and  by  it  judge  of  good  and  evil. 
Hence  sin  is  avoided  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  is  contrary 
to  our  nature ;  but  why  sin  is  yet  in  fact  committed,  Spinoza 
needs  not  to  answer,  because  sin  in  the  proper  sense  of  the 
word  cannot  be  committed  at  all ;  of  sin  there  can  be  any 
question  only  in  the  State,  and,  there,  it  is  disobedience  to 
civil  law  (iv,  37,  schol.  2).  As  reason  can  require  nothing 
which  would  be  against  nature,  hence  it  requires  that  each 
should  strive  for  that  which  is  useful  to  himself ;  and  useful 
is  that  which  brings  each  to  a  higher  reality.  Hence  morali- 
ty requires  that  each  should  love  himself,  should  seek  to 
preserve  as  much  as  possible  his  existence,  and  to  bring  it 
to  higher  perfection  and  reality ;  and  man  is  all  the  more 


286  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§40. 

virtuous  the  more  he  seeks  after  that  which  is  useful  to  him, 
(iv,  prop.  18). — As  the  essence  of  reason  is  knowledge,  hence 
knowledge  is  the  most  useful  of  things,  and  the  rational  man 
holds  nothing  for  truly  useful  save  that  which  contributes  to 
knowledge.  Hence  the  highest  good  is  the  knowledge  of 
God,  and  the  highest  virtue  is  the  striving  thereafter;  and 
every  man  has  the  strength  necessary  thereto ;  and  as  the  body 
is  directly  connected  with  the  spirit,  and  as  the  spirit  is  all 
the  more  vigorous  the  more  vigorous  the  body  is,  hence  it  is 
useful  and  virtuou^  to  make  the  body  skillful. 

The  good  always  awakens  delight ;  hence  delight  is  per  se 
necessarily  good,  and  sadness  necessarily  evil,  as  well  as 
whatever  leads  to  sadness.  Hence  compassion  is,  for  the 
rational  man,  evil  and  irrational ;  true,  it  often  inclines  us  to 
beneficence,  but  this  we  should  do  at  any  rate  even  without 
compassion,  (this  is  the  virtue  of  generositas) ;  and  the  truly 
wise  man  knows  indeed  that  nothing  is  or  takes  place  in  the 
world  over  which  we  could  grieve ;  moreover  compassion 
easily  leads  astray  to  false  acting  (Efh.  iv,  50). — Also  humility 
as  including  a  feeling  of  sadness  is  not  a  virtue,  and  springs 
not  from  reason,  but  from  error,  inasmuch  as  in  it  man  recog- 
nizes himself  as,  in  some  respect,  powerless,  whereas,  in  vir- 
tue of  the  prevalence  of  universal  necessity,  he  has  all  the 
power  necessary  to  his  destination  (iv,  53).  Repentance  over 
committed  sin  is  not  only  not  virtuous,  but  it  is  irrational,  be- 
cause it  rests  on  the  delusion  of  having  done  a  free  and,  that 
too,  evil  action,  whereas  the  action  was  in  reality  necessary, 
and  hence  good ;  he  who  feels  repentance  is  consequently 
doubly  miserable.  However,  our  moralist  appears  to  shrink 
back  from  the  practical  consequences  of  this  doctrine ;  he 
declares  it  as  very  dangerous  when  the  great  masses  are  not 
kept  in  bounds  by  humility,  repentance  and  fear  (iii,  59,  def. 
27;  iv,  prop.  54), — an  apprehension  which  is,  of  course,  en- 
tirely inexplicable  from  the  ground-principle  of  his  system, 
and  must  be  banished,  as  a  mere  "imagination,"  into  the 
sphere  of  unreason ;  for  how  can  there  be,  in  Spinoza's 
world,  a  dangerous  populace  to  be  curbed  only  by  false  no- 
tions, seeing  that  indeed  every  thing  that  takes  place  is  abso- 
lutely a  necessary  divine  act  ?— The  notion  that  any  thing  is 
bad  or  evil  is,  according  to  Spinoza,  per  se  already  an  evil ; 


§  40.]  SPINOZA.  287 

if  man  is  truly  rational  and  has  only  correct  ideas,  then  he 
can  have  no  notion  of  evil  at  all,  for  it  in  fact  does  not  exist ; 
whatever  affects  us  as  pain  or  suffering,  is  such  only  in  vir- 
tue of  an  erroneous,  confused  conception,  an  "imagination;" 
if  we  have  correct  knowledge,  then  are  we  free  from  all 
pain ;  the  more  we  recognize  all  things  as  necessary,  so  much 
the  less  are  we  subject  to  suffering ;  every  painful  state  of 
the  emotions  disappears  so  soon  as  we  form  to  ourselves  a  clear 
notion  thereof.  Hence,  according  to  Spinoza,  the  sole  evil 
is  false  conceptions,  but  how  these  could  arise  we  are  not  in- 
formed.— He  who  truly  knows  himself  and  his  circumstances, 
has  necessarily  joy ;  and  as  in  all  true  knowing  he  also  knows 
God,  and  as  this  knowing  is  attended  with  joy,  hence  he  also 
loves  God ;  hence  in  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God  consists 
the  highest  joy.  God  himself,  however,  (conceived  as  the 
universe)  is  without  states  of  emotion,  without  love  or  aver- 
sion. God  can  neither  love  nor  hate,  save  in  the  love  or 
hate  of  man  himself ;  and  when  any  one  who  loves  God  de- 
sires to  be  loved  in  turn  by  God,  he  desires  in  fact  that  God 
should  cease  to  be  God.  True,  we  may  indeed  speak  of 
God's  love,  but  not  in  such  a  manner  as  that  God  as  a  per- 
sonal spirit  should  love  man,  but  only  that  God  loves  in  our 
love ;  God  loves  not  me  but  God  loves  himself,  namely,  in 
that  I  love  Him. 

Spinoza's  ethics  appears  at  once  as  very  widely  different 
from  all  preceding  ethics ;  its  essential  characteristic  is,  un- 
historicalness.  Greek  philosophy,  and  also  scholasticism,  are 
the  fruit  of  a  long  and  vigorous  development  of  an  historical 
current  of  human  thought, — presuppose  an  already  historical 
moral  consciousness,  for  which  they  aim  to  create  a  scientific 
form.  Spinoza's  ethics  sprang,  in  no  sense  whatever,  from 
the  spirit  of  an  historical  people, — has  no  historical  antece- 
dents, no  historical  consecration,  and  hence  wears  in  its  lofty, 
reality-spurning  bearing,  also  the  character  of  historical  im- 
possibility. Plato's  idealistic  state  is  historically  possible 
on  a  Greek  basis ;  Spinoza's  ethics  can  absolutely  never  and 
nowhere  be  the  expression  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  a 
people, — can  be  appropriated  only  as  their  isolated  moral 
consciousness  by  single  persons,  who  in  proud  selfishness 
imagine  themselves  far  above  the  morally-religious  conscious- 


288  -CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§40. 

ness  of  the  masses,  whereas  in  fact  they  owe  the  very  possi- 
bility of  their  moral  existence  in  society  simply  to  this  con- 
sciousness of  the  masses.  Spinoza  has  learned  nothing, 
whether  from  the  philosophers  of  Greece,  from  the  Middle 
Ages,  from  the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament,  or  from  Chris- 
tianity ;  his  ethical  speculations  are  devoid  of  preparatory 
antecedents, — are  an  absolutely  revolutionary  breaking-off 
from  all  historical  spirit-development, — base  themselves 
purely  upon  individual  thinking.  His  unimportant  depend- 
ence on  Descartes^is  not  in  conflict  therewith.  If  he  had 
had  even  the  slightest  appreciation  for  the  significance  and 
the  rights  of  history,  he  would  have  been  required,  on  the 
very  ground  of  his  own  system,  to  recognize  the  Christian 
world-theory  as  a  highly  important  revelation  of  the  alone- 
ruling  God,  and  to  regard  history  in  general  as  a  normal  and 
necessary  life-manifestation  of  God.  Whereas  in  fact  he  turns 
himself  contemptuously  away  from  all  history-  of  thought, 
as  if  God  had  come  to  true  self-consciousness  alone  and  sole- 
ly in  himself.  He  does  not  free  himself  in  any  sense  from 
the  contradiction  of  declaring,  on  the  one  hand,  all  reality  as 
necessary  and  good,  and  all  evil  as  mere  appearance,  and  of 
regarding  on  the  other  hand,  all  previously-existing  spiritual 
reality  as  absolutely  wrong,  senseless,  and  irrational. 

Plato  and  Aristotle,  for  the  reason  that  they  stand  more 
within  the  current  of  histo'ry,  stand  also  far  nearer  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness  than  Spinoza.  In  his  wide-reaching  antith- 
esis to  the  real  essence  of  spirit,  which  is  in  fact  necessarily 
history,  he  is  the  father  of  the  Naturalism  of  more  recent 
times.  Only  the  unf ree,  the  nature-entity,  is  real ;  the  free, 
the  spiritual,  and  hence  also  the  moral,  in  general  has  no  ex- 
istence whatever.  Though  indeed  he  contrasts  thought  and 
extension  in  space,  as  being  of  different  nature,  yet  this 
thinking  is  in  fact  not  free  and  spiritual,  but  bears  absolute- 
ly a  nature-character, — has  not  ends  before  it,  but  simply 
presents  manifestations  of  a  necessary  ground ;  so  in  the  case 
of  God,  so  in  the  case  of  man.  Ethics  is  therefore  degraded 
to  a  mere  describing  of  necessary  nature-phenomena;  and 
where  it  falls  into  the  tone  of  moral  exhortation  in  view  of 
rational  ends,  then  this  is  to  be  understood  either  in  a  mere- 
ly improper  sense,  and  is  indulged  in  simply  in  view  of  the 


§40.]  SPINOZA.  289 

unwise  multitude,  or  it  comes  into  irreconcilable  contradic- 
tion with  the  ground-thought  of  the  system.  The  Jew  contin- 
ues a  Jew,  in  this  Christian  age,  only  through  hatred  against 
history,  which  has  in  fact  pronounced  his  condemnation ;  he 
is  either  the  petrified  guest  in  the  midst  of  living  society, 
or  the  insolently  mocking  despiser  of  all  historical  reality, 
utterly  devoid  of  reverence  and  respect  for  the  historical 
spirit, — a  champion  of  the  wildest  radicalism.  Spinoza, 
breaking  loose  from  the  petrified  form  of  Talmudic  Juda- 
ism, stands  entirely  isolated  in  the  worle^  of  the  historical 
spirit;  he  can  find  for  himself  no  proper  place  in  this  world, 
— makes  only  an  attempt  to  build  up  an  entirely  new  world 
out  of  himself.  The  same  self-delusion  which  prevails 
throughout  post-Christian  Judaism,  namely,  in  that  it  dreams 
of  still  having  an  historical  character,  whereas  it  has  in  fact 
sunk  utterly  into  mere  lifeless  matter,  is  also  potent  in  Spi- 
noza. He  dreams  of  creating  a  system  of  ethics,  whereas  it 
proves  to  be  really  nothing  else  than  the  theoretical  describ- 
ing of  a  moral  instinct  devoid  of  a  rational  end.  Where 
the  "must"  dominates,  there  all  "should"  and  "would" 
cease.  In  sharp  contrast  to  the  pure  idealistic  Pantheism  of 
Erigena,  who  really  recognizes  only  God  and  not  the  world, 
and  who,  like  the  Indians,  finds  evil  only  in  the  distinguishing 
of  the  worldly  and  finite  from  God,  Spinoza  holds  in  fact  fast 
to  the  reality  and  divinity  of  the  finite, — merges  God  into  the 
world,  and  regards  the  real,  simply  as  it  is,  in  its  isolated 
separateness,  as  good  and  perfect.  The  Pantheism  of  Erige- 
na leads  to  an  ascetic  turning-away  from  the  world ;  that  of 
Spinoza,  to  a  contented  and  absolutely  satisfied  merging  of 
self  into  the  world;  and  the  "akosmism"  which  Hegel 
thinks  he  discovers  in  Spinoza  is  not  to  be  found  in  him, 
but  rather  in  the  nobler  and  far  more  spiritual  John  Scotus 
Erigena. 

Spinoza  exerted  in  his  own  age  but  little  influence.  Not- 
withstanding the  deep  spiritually-moral  declension  of  that 
'dark  period,  the  religious  God-consciousness  was  as  yet  too 
vital  to  fall  in  with  this  naturalistic  Pantheism ;  and  the  re- 
quirement to  recognize  all  reality  as  necessary  and  good, 
could  find  little  response  at  a  time  of  profound  disorganiza- 
tion and  far-reaching  material,  misfortune  in  Germany.  It 


290  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§40. 

was  reserved  for  a  later  age,  when  a  wide-spread  irreligious 
sentiment  was  attempting  to  create  for  itself  a  scientific  jus- 
tification, to  emphasize  the  doctrine  of  Spinoza  not  merely  in 
its  undeniable  (though  yet  not  to  be  overestimated)  philo- 
sophical significancy,  but  also  to  attempt  to  exalt  it  to  a 
religious  character,  nay,  even  to  a  pretended  transfiguration 
of  Christianity,  and  "to  offer  a  lock  to  the  manes  of  the  holy 
Spinoza" — (Schleierni.,  Reden;  2  ed..  p.  68). 

That  from  this  doctrine  there  could  arise  for  the  moral  life 
itself  only  a  perverting  influence,  needs  for  the  unpreju- 
diced mind  no  proof.  The  letting  of  one's  self  alone  in  his 
immediate  naturalness  and  reality,  is  here  even  lauded  as 
wisdom ;  repentance  and  sanctification  within,  and  sanctify- 
ing activity  without,  become  folly,  because  no  one  has 
either  the  right  or  the  ability  initiatively  to  interfere  with 
the  eternally  necessary  course  of  things.  That  Spinoza  him- 
self was  an  upright  man,  proves  nothing  in  favor  of  his 
system;  the  weight  of  custom  and  the  natural  moral  senti- 
ments are  often  stronger  than  a  perverse  theory ;  nor  is,  in 
fact,  mere  uprightness  in  our  social  relations  the  full  mani- 
festation of  the  moral. 

Leibnitz, — though  also  stimulated  by  Descartes,  but  op- 
posed to  Spinoza  in  his  fundamental  thoughts,  and  more 
imbued  with  an  historical  spirit,  and  standing  in  closer  con- 
nection with  the  results  of  precedent  spiritual  development, 
— did  not  produce  a  system  of  ethics  proper,  though  he  broke 
the  way  for  the  development  of  such.  Though  highly  re- 
specting the  Christian  consciousness,  he  yet  had  no  very  deep 
appreciation  for  the  same,  and  hence  his  thoughts  in  relation 
to  religion  and  morality  are  of  a  somewhat  external  character. 
He  is  unable  to  comprehend  evil  in  the  purely  spiritual 
sphere,  but  seeks  for  its  roots,  beyond  this  sphere,  in  the 
essence  of  the  creature  as  such.  God  as  the  absolutely  per- 
fect rational  spirit  has  indeed  realized,  among  all  possible 
conceptions  of  a  world,  the  best  one ;  but  as  the  world  does 
not  contain  the  fullness  of  all  perfection,  which  in  fact  exists 
in  God  alone,  nor  yet  all  possible  perfections,  as  in  fact  all 
that  is  possible  has  not  become  real,  hence  there  lies  in  the 
conception  even  of  the  best  world  still  at  the  same  time  the 
necessity  of  a  certain  imperfection,  without  which  a  World  is 


§  40.]  LEIBNITZ.  291 

in  fact  not  conceivable,  and  which  consequently  belongs  to 
the  essence  of  the  world  as  such,  and  is  a  malum  metaphysi- 
cum ;  this  is,  however,  not  per  se  a  reality,  but  only  a  non- 
being,  a  limit.  The  reality  of  the  morally  evil  is  fortuitous, 
is  the  fault  of  man ;  only  the  possibility  of  it  is  necessary. 
In  his  popularly- written  work  "  Theodicee"  (1710),  he  further 
develops  this  thought,  although  elucidatorily  rather  than 
scientifically. — Though  Leibnitz  recognizes  the  freedom  of 
the  will  and  the  guilt  of  man  in  relation  to  sin,  still  he  does 
not  sufficiently  deeply  conceive  of  this  guilt,  and  above  all 
of  the  significancy  and  workings  of  sin  as  an  historical  world- 
power,  otherwise  he  would  have  constructed  his  theory  quite 
differently.  He  constantly  seeks  the  roots  of  evil  elsewhere 
than  in  committed  sin.  The  naturalistic  determinism  of 
Spinoza,  however,  he  utterly  rejects;  to  the  free  personal 
God,  corresponds  the  freedom  of  the  rational  creature.  The 
rational  man  never  acts  from  mere  fortuitous  fancies,  but 
only  from  rational  grounds.  But  this  moral  necessity  does 
not  interfere  with  liberty,  because  the  possibility  of  irrational 
determinations  still  remains. — Leibnitz  conceives  of  ethics 
essentially  as  the  doctrine  of  right,  inasmuch  as  moral  duty 
is  a  right  of  God  upon  us.  Right,  in  the  wide  sense  of  the 
word,  has  three  stages :  mere  right,  which  requires  that  we 
injure  no  one ;  equitableness,  which  leaves  and  imparts  to 
every  one  his  own ;  and  piety,  which  fulfills  the  will  of  God 
and  thereby  preserves  the  harmony  of  the  world.  Hence 
faith  in  the  personal,  almighty  and  all- wise  God  is  the  found- 
ation of  all  right ;  and  the  essence  of  piety  is  love  to  God, 
from  which  all  other  forms  of  love,  constituting  the  essence 
of  justness,  receive  their  power.  To  love  signifies  to  be  re- 
joiced by  the  happiness  of  another,  or  to  make  that  happi- 
ness one's  own.  The  proper  object  of  love  is  the  beautiful, 
that  is,  that,  the  contemplation  of  which  delights ;  but  God 
is  the  highest  beautiful.  Piety  as  the  highest  stage  of  right, 
creates  also  the  highest  moral  communion — the  church — which 
is  destined  to  embrace  entire  humanity.  The  three  forms  of 
society,  corresponding  to  the  three  stages  of  right,  have  also 
a  threefold  uniting-bond :  mere  power,  and  reverence,  and 
conscience ;  but  also  the  first  two  receive  their  real  character 
of  right,  only  through  the  latter.  Love  to  God  leads  us  into 

20 


292  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  40. 

the  way  of  the  highest  happiness, — is  in  itself  already  the 
beginning  of  the  same  in  the  "this-side,"  and  works  a  con- 
stant progress  in  perfection  also  in  the  "yon-side."  * 

In  an  original  spirit,  and,  in  the  moral  sphere,  almost  in- 
dependently of  Leibnitz,  wrote  Christian  Wolf.  He  created 
a  complete  ethical  systern.f  His  great  reputation,  and  the 
authoritative  character  which  he  enjoyed  with  his  contem- 
poraries, were,  however,  almost  entirely  overthrown  in  the 
Kantian  period ;  that  over-estimation,  as  also  the  subsequent 
under-estimation,  were  equally  unjust.  A  many-sided  boldly- 
exploring  spirit,  and,  though  in  many  respects  deceiving 
himself  as  to  the  scientific  value  of  propositions  which  he 
uttered  with  the  greatest  confidence,  and  attempted  to  dem- 
onstrate in  a  not  unfrequently  stiff  mathematical  form,  he 
yet  attained  to  an  extraordinary  influence,  because  of  the 
clearness  and  precision  of  his  ideas,  and  of  their  manner  of 
presentation,  and  gave  rise,  also  in  the  sphere  of  ethics,  to  a 
very  vigorous  scientific  movement ;  and  though  his  com- 
mendable effort  to  remain  in  harmony  with  Christian  revela- 
tion was  not  by  any  means  always  realized,  yet  it  helped  to 
preserve  for  a  long  while  in  Germany,  as  in  contrast  to  the 
frivolous  hatred  of  Revelation  prevalent  in  France  and  in 
England,  a  more  earnest  Christian  and  scientific  spirit. 
Precisely  in  the  field  of  morals  Wolf  was  greatly  influential 
toward  the  independent  shaping  of  German  science;  and  he 
broke  off  the  excessive  dependence,  also  of  theological 
ethics,  on  Aristotle.  While  Wolf,  in  his  decided,  scientifi- 
cally-grounded recognition  of  the  personal  God — whom  he 
conceives  of  indeed  rather  merely,  in  his  relation  to  the 
world,  as  Creator  and  Governor,  and  less,  in  relation  to  him- 
self, in  his  inner  essence — holds  fast  to  the  objectively- 
religious  basis  of  ethics-,  he  yet  at  first  view  seems  to  en- 

*In  various  essays,  especially  fn  the  preface  to  Cod.  juris  diplom., 
1693;  Gubrauer:  Leibnitz,  1842,  i,  p.  226  sqq. 

t  Verniinft.  Gedanken  v.  d.  Metischen  Tfvun  n.  Lassen  (1720) ;  more 
elaborate  is :  PMlosopMa  moralis  s.  EtMca,  methodo  scientifico  pertractata 
(1750),  both  works  forming  the  first  part  of  a  whole  which  he  presented 
in  his  PMlos.  prac.  univ.  (1738),  the  second  part  of  which  embraces  the 
doctrine  of  society  or  politics ;  also  in  his  Jus  natures  (1740)  there  is 
much  ethical  matter. 


§40.]  WOLF.  293 

danger  the  subjective  foundation  thereof,  namely,  the  moral 
freedom  of  the  will,  by  his  determinism. 

Whatever  takes  place,  also  the  seemingly  fortuitous,  has  a 
sufficient  ground,  either  in  itself  or  in  its  connection  with 
other  things,  and  is  in  so  far  determined ;  there  takes  place 
no  change  whatever  which  is  not  conditioned  in  the  pecul- 
iarity of  the  concatenation  of  the  universe,  and  determined 
by  the  antecedent  circumstances  thereof,  just  as  a  clock,  set 
in  motion  for  a  whole  year,  is  determined  in  each  moment  of 
its  movement  by  this  its  first  starting ;  the  world  is  just  such 
an  absolutely,  determined  clock-work, — is  a  machine.  Also 
in  the  freedom  of  the  human  will,  every  real  determination 
has  its  sufficient  ground,  and  is  not  arbitrary.  This  freedom 
consists  in  the  possibility  of  choosing  and  doing  the  opposite 
of  what  we  really  do,  but  that  the  opposite  possible  should 
become  real  pre-supposes  motives,  and  in  so  far  as  the  motive 
is  sufficient,  this  determination  to  realization  is  also  condi- 
tioned by  the  motive.  It  is  impossible  that  a  person  who 
knows  something  as  better,  should  prefer  to  it  the  worse,  and 
hence  in  such  a  case  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  choose  the 
better ;  but  the  will  is  free  in  this  nevertheless,  as  in  fact 
man  has  the  ground  of  his  determination  of  will  in  himself. 
— This  sounds  at  once  very  questionable,  and,  as  is  well 
known,  Wolf  was,  because  of  this  doctrine,  driven  from  the 
Prussian  states,  as  politically  dangerous.  However,  it  is  not 
to  be  overlooked  that  when  man  is  considered  as  a  rational 
creature  per  se  irrespective  of  the  already-existing  depravity, 
his  freedom  is  in  faet  not  a  groundless  and  irrational  caprice, 
but  is  determined  by  rational  knowledge,  and  that,  for  the 
really  moral  man  in  possession  of  correct'  knowledge,  there 
does  in  fact  exist  a  moral  necessity  of  following  the  rational. 
Hence  Wolf's  thought  is  not  per  se  incorrect,  but  only  too 
unguarded,  and  therefore  liable  to  misunderstanding.  As, 
however,  Wolf  expressly  declares  himself  against  determin- 
ism as  held  by  Spinoza,  and  as  he  distinctly  and  repeatedly 
asserts  the  real,  free  will -determination  of  man,  though  in- 
deed not  as  irrational  caprice,*  we  are  consequently  not  at 
liberty  to  attribute  to  him  the  full  determinism  of  Spinoza. — 
The  question  as  to  whether,  and  in  how  far,  our  knowledge  is 

*  Introduction  to  the  2d  ed.  of  his  Moral. 


294  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  40. 

conditioned  by  and  dependent  on  our  moral  nature,  and  hence 
as  to  whether  this  knowledge  is  freely,  or  absolutely  unfree- 
ly,  determined,  Wolf  does  not  answer,  but  simply  holds, 
that  our  willing  is  conditioned  and  determined  by  our  knowl- 
edge ;  and  with  him,  as  with  Socrates,  the  essential  point  is 
simply  to  correct  and  disseminate  knowledge,  and  then  the 
corresponding  moral  action  follows  of  itself  with  inner 
necessity.  Hence  we  can  explain  the  almost  unbounded 
pretensions  which  the  Wolfian  ethics  makes,  and  hence  also 
the  per  se  correct,  but  (in  view  of  the  actual  condition  of 
humanity)  erroneous  thought  that  ethics  is  not  simply  a  sci- 
entific consciousness  of  the  moral  life,  but  also  an  essential 
motive  to  the  moral  life  itself, — that,  properly  understood, 
ethics  is  the  source  of  virtue.  This  thought  stands  forth 
more  or  less  clearly  throughout  Wolf's  writings;  practice 
follows  theory  of  necessity.  The  moral  life  is  like  a  mathe- 
matical question  proposed  for  solution ;  it  is  only  necessary 
to  have  clear  notions  of  virtue  and  vice  and  of  duty,  and 
then  evil  disappears  of  itself,  and  man  becomes  virtuous. 
"I  have,"  says  Wolf,  (in  the  preface  to  his  second  edition), 
"not  a  little  lightened  the  entire  practice  of  the  good  and 
the  avoidance  of  the  evil,  by  the  fact  that  I  have  shown  that 
when  one  wishes  to  turn  the  will,  it  is  just  the  same  as  when 
one  disputes,  namely,  in  that  one  has  at  all  times  in  the 
one  case,  as  in  the  other,  simply  to  answer  to  one  of  the  prem- 
ises of  an  inference;  "  and  later  (in  the  preface  to  the  third 
edition)  he  says:  "When  my  writings  on  world-wisdom  and, 
among  them,  the  present  one  on  what  men  are  to  do  and 
what  not  to  do,  appeared,  those  who  are  able  to  understand 
and  judge  of  the  matter  for  themselves,  and  who  were  not 
prepossessed  by  unfavorable  prejudices,  judged  that  thence- 
forth reason  and  virtue  would  become  universal,  and  that 
every  tody  would  strive,  by  this  means,  to  attain  to  happiness 
of  life."  Wolf,  however,  expressly  deprecates  the  miscon- 
ception, that  in  his  ethics  he  ' '  ascribes  too  much  to  nature 
and  leaves  no  room  for  grace;  the  doctrines  taught  by  me," 
says  he,  "serve  much  rather  to  make  clearly  understood  the 
difference  between  nature  and  grace,  and  especially  the  great 
help  which  the  latter  is  to  the  former,  so  that  consequently 
they  are  guides  to  grace ;  "  the  Christian  religion  offers  more 


§  40.]  WOLF.  295 

than  world-wisdom  can  do ;  rather  does  man  learn  by  this 
rational  morality,  that  his  natural  powers  do  not  suffice,  and 
hence  he  perceives  all  the  better  the  necessity  and  excellency 
of  the  grace  which  is  offered  to  us  in  the  Christian  religion, 
and  which  supplies  that  which  nature  lacks.  How  it  can  be 
that  the  natural  powers  do  not  suffice,  and  how,  on  the  pre- 
sumption of  such  a  lack  of  strength,  the  philosophical  ethics 
of  "Wolf  can  yet  be,  independently,  effectual  in  itself,  we  are 
not  informed. 

Ethics  has  to  do  with  the  free  actions  of  men  as  distin- 
guished from  the  necessary  ones ;  and  freedom  consists  in  the 
possibility  of  choice  between  several  possible  things.  The 
condition  of  a  man  is  perfect  when  his  earlier  and  later 
conditions  agree  with  each  other,  and  all  of  them  with  the 
essence  and  nature  of  man.  The  free  actions  of  man  pro- 
mote or  diminish  this  perfection,  that  is,  they  are  either  good 
or  lad.  When,  therefore,  actions  are  to  be  judged  according 
to  their  moral  worth,  then  we  must  inquire  what  change  they 
bring  about  in  the  condition  of  our  body  or  soul.  Hence 
free  actions  become  good  or  evil  in  virtue  of  their  effect ;  and 
as  the  effect  follows  from  them  necessarily  and  cannot  fail, 
hence  actions  are  good  or  evil  in  and  of  themselves,  and  are 
not  made  so  simply  by  God's  will ;  hence  if  it  were  possible 
that  there  were  no  God,  and  that  the  present  inter-depend- 
ence of  things  could  exist  without  him,  still  the  free  actions 
of  men  would  nevertheless  remain  good  or  evil. — Here  the 
per  so  correct  ground-thought  of  the  moral  receives  an  ex- 
ternal and  therefore  misleading  application,  inasmuch  as  the 
result  of  our  actions  is  dependent  on  other  powers  than  these 
actions  themselves ;  only  in  an  ideal  and  as  yet  not  sin-per- 
verted condition  of  humanity,  would  such  a  judging  of  the 
moral  worth  of  actions  from  their  result,  hold  good,  though 
even  then  it  would  be  certainly  more  appropriate  to  deter- 
mine this  worth  from  the  essence  of  the  action  itself  and  not 
simply  from  its  result.  In  this  respect  Wolf  clings  so  fast 
to  the  merely-outward  that  he  says  :  "Thus,  he  who  is 
tempted  to  steal  learns  that  stealing  is  wrong,  because  it  is 
followed  by  the  gallows."  Equally  one-sided  is  the  con- 
trasting of  the  goodness  per  se  of  an  action  and  of  the  will 
of  God.  The  general  maxim  of  ethics  is  therefore  this:  "Do 


296  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§40. 

that  which  renders  thee  and  thy  condition,  or  that  of  others, 
more  perfect ;  avoid  that  which  makes  it  more  imperfect ; " 
this  is  a  universal  rule  of  nature.  [This  "or  that  of  o'thers" 
is  only  thrust  in,  and  is  not  at  all  derived  from  the  ground- 
thought  ;  the  dualism  involved  therein,  and  the  possible  con- 
tradiction, are  in  no  manner  reconciled.] — The  sufficient 
motive  of  the  will  is  the  knowledge  of  the  good ;  and  it  is 
impossible  that  one  should  not  will  a  per  se  good  action,  when 
one  only  clearly  comprehends  it ;  hence  when  we  do  not  will 
it,  it  is  for  no  other  reason  than  that  we  do  not  comprehend 
it."  Likewise  is  the  knowledge  of  evil  the  motive  of  non- 
willing  or  aversion,  and  hence  it  is  likewise  impossible  that 
one  should  will  a  per  se  evil  action  when  one  clearly  under- 
stands it.  Hence  all  moral  willing  and  doing  of  the  good  or 
of  the  evil  rests  absolutely  on  our  knowing  or  non-knowing. 
True,  man  can  indeed  act  contrary  to  his  conscience,  but  this 
takes  place  only  when,  because  of  special  circumstances,  he 
regards  the  good  as  evil,  or  the  'fevil  as  good,  and  hence, 
after  all,  from  error.  The  ultimate  end  of  all  moral  actions, 
and  hence  of  our  entire  life,  is  the  perfection  of  ourselves  and 
of  our  condition,  or  happiness,  which  is  consequently  the 
highest  good  for  man. 

Ethics  proper,  Wolf  treats  as  the  doctrine  of  duties.  Duty 
is  an  action  which  conforms  to  law.  Law  is  a  rule  to  which 
we  are  bound  to  conform  our  free  actions ;  it  is  either  a  nat- 
ural, a  divine,  or  a  human  law.  Reason  is  the  teacher  of  the 
law  of  nature ;  this  law  fully  embraces  the  whole  moral  life, 
and  is,  for  this  life,  sufficient  and  absolutely  valid  and  un- 
changeable, for  it  rests  on  the  harmonizing  of  our  actions 
with  our  nature.  But  as  this  our  nature  is  established  by  the 
divine  creative  will,  hence  the  law  of  nature  is  at  the  same 
time  also  a  divine  law,  an  expression  of  the  divine  will, 
though  this  will  is  not  to  be  conceived  of  as  an  arbitrary 
one,  so  that,  for  example,  God's  will  might  declare  the  per  se 
good  for  evil,  and  the  per  te  evil  for  good.  The  duties  are : 
(1)  duties  of  man  toward  himself,  and  more  specifically, 
toward  his  understanding,  toward  his  will,  toward  his 
body,  and  the  duty  in  regard  to  our  outward  condition 
(that  is,  our  social  position) ;  (2)  duties  toward  God,  and 
more  specifically,  love  to  God,  fear  and  reverence,  trust, 


§40.]  WOLF.      .  297 

prayer  and  thankfulness,  and  outward  worship;  (3)  duties 
toward  other  men,  and  more  specifically,  toward  friends  and 
enemies,  duties  in  regard  to  property,  and  duties  in  speech 
and  in  contracts.  This  general  classification  of  duties  became 
subsequently  very  usual. — Upon  ethics  is  based  natural  right, 
which  treats  of  the  allowable,  as  ethics  proper  treats  of  the 
obligatory;  all  rights  rest  on  duties.  The  ground-thought 
of  right  is :  thou  mayest  do  whatever  sustains  and  promotes 
the  perfection  of  thy  own  condition  and  that  of  the  condition 
of  others,  and,  thou  mayest  do  nothing  which  is  contrary 
thereto.  In-  the  further  application  of  right  to  society,  and 
hence  as  politics,  the  welfare  of  society  is  the  norm  of  action. 
Wolfian  ethics  has  manifestly,  both  in  form  and  in  contents, 
great  defects.  In  respect  to  form,  it  may  be  reproached  with 
a  manifold  commingling  of  empirical  maxims  with  specula- 
tion ;  notions  derived  from  experience  are  often  simply  ana- 
lyzed and  then  used  as  bases  for  further  inferences,  and  that, 
too,  with  the  pretension  of  philosophical  validity ;  also  there 
is  abundant  philosophical  dogmatism,  inasmuch  as  the 
thoughts  are  very  frequently  not  really  developed  in  regular 
process  from  the  ground-thought,  but  are  only  associated  and 
joined  with  it.  In  respect  to  matter,  there  prevails  through- 
out this  ethics,  despite  all  its  monotheistic  presuppositions, 
a  naturalistic  tendency;  Wolf  knows  only  the  immediate 
natural  existence  of  the  moral  spirit,  but  not  the  history 
thereof,  that  is,  the  life  proper  of  the  same.  His  ethics  has 
a  history  of  the  spirit  neither  as  its  presupposition  nor  as  its 
goal ;  there  is  created  by  the  moral  activity  not  a  moral  his- 
tory of  humanity,  but  only  a  state  of  the  individual.  Hence 
the  question  as  to  whether  indeed  the  actual  nature  of  man 
is  not  already  in  some  respects  a  product  of  such  a  moral 
history  of  humanity, — whether  or  not  it  is  a  pure  unchanged 
original  nature, — falls  outside  of  this  circle  of  thought,  and 
in  fact  remained  unheeded  by  philosophical  ethics,  and  hence 
also  to  a  large  degree  by  theological  ethics,  throughout 
the  eighteenth  and  a  part  of  the  nineteenth  century ;  and  in 
this  respect  Wolf  was,  in  fact,  the  forerunner  of  the  modern 
Rationalistic  school.  And  what  he  says  of  sinfulness,  of 
divine  grace  and  of  Christianity,  by  way  of  guarding  against 
this  naturalistic  ground-tendency,  is  rather  mere  personal 


298  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  40. 

good-will  than  a  consequential  result  of  his  system.  All  real 
interest  is  directed  here  to  the  sufficient  reason,  and  not  to 
the  end ;  there  is  lacking  to  morality  and  to  history  the  vital 
heart-blood  of  free  spiritual  productive  creation.  Chris- 
tianity can  be,  to  this  world-theory,  at  best  only  a  higher 
revelation  of  the  truth,  a  furthering  of  knowledge,  but  not 
an  historical  history-creating  fact.  Hence  in  the  further 
theological  development  of  this  stand-point,  Christianity 
constantly  sunk  more  and  more  to  a  mere  revealed  system  of 
morals,  which,  however,  contained  and  could  contain  nothing 
other  than  the  Wolfian  doctrine  itself.  Positive  contents 
proper,  Wolf  does  not  really  give  to  the  moral  law ;  he  does 
not  rise  beyond  mere  formal  definitions.  What  the  good  is, 
in  and  of  itself,  we  are  not  informed ;  we  learn  only  that  it 
stands  in  harmony  with  reason  and  makes  us  happy ;  hence 
it  is  embraced  only  in  its  relations  to  something  else,  but 
not  in  its  inner  contents. 

In  the  spirit  of  Wolf,  though  with  some  independence, 
Cans  labored  further,  in  Tubingen ;  his  Discipline  morales 
omnes,  1739,  is  an  able  survey  of  the  entire  ethical  field  as 
then  known ;  more  theological  is  his  Instruction  in  the  Duties 
of  Christians,  (1745,  4to.,  presenting  ethics  as  "duty-impos- 
ing God-acquaintance  "  and  prefacing  the  doctrine  of  duties 
simply  by  an  essay  on  the  four  chief  springs  of  all  human 
action  and  omission,  namely,  the  flesh,  nature,  reason,  and 
the  gracious  workings  of  the  Holy  Spirit).  Alexander  Baum- 
garten  (a  brother  of  the  noted  theologian)  perfected,  in  his 
PhilosopTiia  ethica  (1740,  1751),  the  Wolfian  ethics,  especially 
in  formal  respects ;  he  places  our  duties  toward  Ged  (as  those 
which  condition  all  the  others)  at  the  head. — G.  F.  Meier  of 
Halle  wrote,  on  the  basis  of  Baumgarten's  book,  a  fuller  and 
more  popular  work :  Philosophical  Ethics  (1753). — (The  volu- 
minous and  superficial  Eberhard  appears  in  his  Ethics  of  Rea- 
fnn  (1781)  merely  as  a  feeble,  barren  imitator  of  Wolf.) 

Nearly  contemporaneously  with  Wolf,  had  Thomasius  (of 
Leipzig  and  Halle)  presented  ethics  from  the  stand-point  of 
u. ere  common  sense  in  a  very  popular  form,*  offering  indeed 

*  Von  der  Kunst  verniinftig.  u.  tugenhaft  zu  LIEBBN,  etc.,  1710  ;  Von 
der  Artzenei  wider  die  unvernunftige  Liebe,  1704  ;  comp.  Fiilleborn : 
Betir.  z.  Gesch.  d.  "Phil,  1791,  iv. 


§  40.]  CRUSIUS.  299 

many  good  observations,  but  containing  neither  precision 
of  thought  nor  a  really  scientific  development.  He  places 
Christian  ethics  higher  than  philosophical,  but  conceives  of 
the  former  very  superficially;  Aristotle  and  the  schoolmen 
he  despises  and  combats  without  understanding  them.  The 
essence  of  virtue  is  love,  or  the  desire  naturally  inherent  in 
man  to  unite  himself  to,  and  to  remain  in  union  with,  that 
which  the  understanding  recognizes  as  good  ;  in  this  love  lies 
blessedness,  that  is,  repose  of  soul  and  absence  of  pain,  as 
the  highest  good ;  love  is  irrational  when  it  aims  at  vain, 
transitory,  and  hurtful  things,  or  when  it  is  too  violent,  or 
wills  the  impossible ;  from  such  love  spring  all  the  vices. 
General  love  to  man,  as  the  essence  of  morality,  embraces  five 
chief  virtues:  sociableness,  truthfulness,  modesty,  forbear- 
ance, patience ;  self-love  should  rest  only  on  love  to  man. 
The  necessity  of  revelation,  Thomasius  recognizes ;  philoso- 
phy does  not  supply  its  place,  but  leads  to  it,  in  that  it  leads 
to  self-acquaintance. 

Clear-headedly  and  with  deep  Christian  knowledge,  Chris- 
tian August  Crusius  (of  Leipzig,  ob.  1776)  opposed  the  Wolfian 
philosophy,  but  was  abler  in  criticizing  than  in  creating,  and 
hence  of  more  limited  influence  than  Wolf,  ("Directions  for 
Living  Rationally,"*  etc.,  1744;  third  edition,  1767).  He 
declares  himself  very  definitely  against  the  determinism  of 
Wolf ;  the  human  will  is  not  absolutely  determined  by  its 
knowledge,  but  remains,  in  relation  thereto,  free,  and  can 
act  contrarily  thereto ;  he  appeals  in  proof  thereof  to  the  per- 
fectly unambiguous  evidence  of  consciousness,  and  to  the 
full  responsibility  of  man  for  his  sins.  The  determinations  of 
the  will  are  indeed,  as  rational,  not  arbitrary  and  fortuitous, 
but  have,  on  the  contrary,  a  sufficient  reason ;  but  this  reason 
ifl  by  no  means  a  necessarily-determining  one,  but  the  will 
has  always  the  possibility  of  acting  contrarily  even  to  a  suffi- 
cient reason ;  and  Crusius  goes,  in  this  respect,  so  far  as  to 
find  perfect  freedom  only  in  holding  that  the  will  can  deter- 
mine itself  as  easily  for  the  one  course  as  for  the  other.  All 
duties  he  considers  as  contained  in  our  duty  toward  God,  and 
hence  he  does  not  co-ordinate,  but  subordinates,  them  to  this 
duty.  Moral  effort  has  indeed  happiness  and  perfection  for 

*  Anweisutig  vernilnftig  zu  leben. 


800  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§40. 

its  goal,  but  it  has  its  law  in  the  divine  will,  which  likewise 
aims  thereat.  Man's  relation  of  dependence  to  his  Creator 
directs  him  to  make  his  entire  life  dependent  on  the  holy  will 
of  God;  our  striving  toward  the  rational  God-willed  goal, 
becomes  truly  moral  only  when  it  is  the  expression  of  loving 
obedience  to  the  revealed  divine  will.  Hence  it  is  incorrect 
that  the  good  is  good  per  se  even  without  reference  to  God's 
will ;  rather  is  it  good  simply  because  God  wills  it,  though 
this  divine  willing  is  not  irrational  caprice,  but  a  morally 
necessary  act  of  his  holy  essence.  Hence  morality  rests  in 
its  very  essence  on  religion ;  and  the  moral  law  may  not,  as 
in  Wolf's  system,  stand  apart  from  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, but  requires  a  free  God-obeying  course  of  acting  answer- 
ing to  the  divine  will,  and  therefore  also  to  the  end  of  the 
perfection  of  the  creature.  A  natural,  though  not  absolutely 
sufficing  manifestation  of  the  divine  will,  is  given  in  the  con- 
science, which,  however,  does  not,  as  with  Wolf,  simply  form 
a  theoretical  judgment,  but  contains  also  at  the  same  time  a 
feeling  of  joy  or  anguish,  and  hence  an  impulse.  Crusius 
separates  prudence  from  the  doctrine  of  morality  proper,  .as 
the  ability  of  finding,  for  rational  ends,  also  the  special  ap- 
propriate means. — A  more  popular  presentation  of  this  view 
is  contained  in  the  so-long-esteemed,  widely-read,  and  influ- 
ential "Moral  Lectures"*  of  Gellert  (1770),  which,  however, 
are  estimable  more  for  their  noble  sentiments  and  warmth 
of  feeling  than  for  depth  of  thought;  and  which,  in  their 
rhetorically  verbose  and  often  dull  and  tedious  manner  could 
have  made  so  great  an  impression  only  in  an  age  which  had 
lost  all  taste  for  strong  food  ;  discursive  discussions  on  "the 
utility  of  health,"  etc.,  were  then  regarded  as  interesting 
reading.  Gellert  addresses  himself  more  to  the  feelings 
than  to  the  cognizing  understanding,  but  the  former  are  not 
embraced  in  Christian  depth,  but  rather  as  mere  feeble  senti- 
mentality. 

Since  the  middle  of  this  century  the  taste  for  really  philo- 
sophical thinking  had  been  declining  in  Germany,  in  the  pre- 
cise measure  in  which  the  pretension  to  the  name  of  ' '  philo- 
sophical century  "  was  put  forward ;  instead  of  a  spiritually- 
vigorous,  constantly-progressing  development  of  thought,  we 

*  Moralische  V&rleaungen. 


§41.]  ENGLISH   ETHICS.  301 

find,  for  the  most  part,  only  a  self-complacent  superficial 
criticising  tendency  and  arbitrarily-brought-together,  un- 
grounded assertions  and  observations,  derived  more  from 
outward  experience  than  from  reason,  and  often  delighting 
in  rhetorical  bombast. — The  voluminous  Feder  of  Gottingen 
(Pralct.  Philos.,  1776;  Unters.  ub.  d.  menschlichen  Willen, 
1779-85),  reminds  indeed  often  of  Wolf  by  his  pedantic 
minuteness,  but  not  by  depth  of  thought ;  and  he  bases  him- 
self in  the  main  on  the  empiricism  of  Locke. — Game,  who 
Avas  highly  esteemed  by  his  contemporaries,  derived  the  most 
of  his  matter  from  the  English  moralists,  and  limited  his  own 
moral  thoughts  to  annotations  on  other  writers  (Cicero),  and 
to  disconnected  but  clear  and  elegantly  written,  though 
neither  profound  nor  ingenious,  dissertations. 

SECTION  XLI. 

In  England  and  France  an  anti-Christian  tendency 
gave  rise  to  a  progressively-degenerating  moralism, 
which, — resting  on  an  idealess  empiricism,  and,  though 
vigorously  resisted,  yet  maintaining  a  rising  influence 
for  a  long  time, — based  itself  in  part  on  a  superficial 
deism,  but  also  in  part,  and  more  consequentially, 
advanced  to  pure  atheism  and  materialism,  and  ex- 
alted into  a  moral  law  the  lowest  form  of  Epicurean 
self-seeking.  But  it  was  especially  reserved  to  the 
French  mind  to  draw  the  ultimate  consequences  of 
these  premises,  and  to  seek  in  the  wildest  demoral- 
ization the  highest  civilization  and  "philosophy," 
and,  through  a  destruction-loving  dissolution  of  all 
moral  consciousness  in  the  higher  classes  (a  dissolu- 
tion which  swept  over  devastatingly  into  the  un- 
German  circles  of  the  German  literary  world)  to 
prepare  the  way  for  that  general  convulsion  in 
Europe  which  at  length  attained,  only  through 
horrors  and  anarchy,  to  some  presence  of  mind  and 
to  some  degree  of  calm.  English  moralism  lingered 


302  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§41. 

iD  general  in  a  state  of  capricious  wavering  between 
the  principle  of  happiness  and  the  principle  of  spirit- 
ual perfection,  between  the  principle  of  subjective 
eudemonism  arid  the  principle  of  objective  spiritual- 
ism. The  reaction  of  this  freethinking  on  Germany 
shows  itself  mostly  in  the  superficial  utilitarian 
morality  of  the  period  of  self-styled  "  illuminisrn" 

Quite  otherwise  than  in  Germany  was  philosophical  ethics 
shaped  in  England  and  France.  While  in  Germany,  notwith- 
standing the  deep  spiritual  and  moral  disorder  consequent 
upon  the  Thirty  Years'  war,  there  prevailed,  for  a  long 
while  still,  a  predominantly  Christian  spirit,  (which  remained 
proof  against  the  Spinozistic  Pantheism,  and  sought  to  de- 
velop philosophy  in  harmony  with  Christianity,  and  only 
gradually  and  at  a  late  hour  was  enervated  by  French  free- 
thinking  through  the  un-German  culture  of  the  higher 
classes),  in  England  the  religious  contests  had  resulted  in  a 
deep  spiritual  laxity  and  in  a  growing  aversion  to  Christianity 
and  to  the  spiritual  in  general.  The  unspiritual  empiricism 
of  Bacon  and  Locke  seconded  this  superficial  empirical  turn- 
ing-away  to  the  immediately  visible  and  prosaic  reality  of  the 
world.  At  first  it  was  regarded  as  a  progress  to  disregard 
the  doctrinal  contents  of  Christianity  and  to  insist  only  on 
its  morals;  then  it  followed  very  naturally  that  this  morality, 
as  divorced  from  its  doctrinal  basis,  should  be  divorced  also 
from  its  historical  presuppositions  in  general,  and  be  derived 
only  from  the  consciousness  of  the  natural  man,  and  that  re- 
ligion in  general,  as  in  contrast  to  the  Christian  religion, 
should  be  conceived  simply  as  a  system  of  moralism,  over 
which  then,  not  as  a  foundation  but  as  a  protecting  super- 
structure, a  superficial  deism  was  constructed; — or,  indeed, 
this  tendency  was  followed  out  further,  and  men  rejected 
also  this  deism,  and  contented  themselves  with  the  superficial 
morality  of  individual  self-love ;  and  it  must  be  regarded  as 
a  real  progress  (as  in  contrast  to  this  spiritual  superficiality), 
when  clearer  thinkers  skeptically  undermined  also  this  pre- 
tended natural  religion  and  natural  morality,  and  insisted  on 
the  vanity  of  all  human  knowledge. 


§  41.]  BACON— LOCKE.  303 

Bacon  of  Verulam,  though  not  himself  constructing  an 
ethical  system,  opened,  by  his  empiricism  (which  opposed  all 
previous  philosophy,  and  according  to  which,  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  knowledge  h  priori,  but  only  such  as  springs  from 
immediate  and  primarily  sensuous  experience),  a  current  of 
thought  which  was  dangerous  to  the  Christian  world-theory, 
although  he  himself  did  not  in  the  least  oppose  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness,  but  rather  placed  Christian  faith  above 
all  philosophical  knowledge.  However,  he  was  not  clearly 
conscious  of  the  tendency  of  his  fundamental  thoughts.  On 
this  basis,  Locke  (ob.  1704)  subsequently  developed  a  system 
of  philosophy  which  attained,  especially  in  England,  to  a 
wide-reaching  influence,  but  which  is  in  fact,  properly  speak- 
ing, the  very  opposite  of  all  speculation.  True  knowledge 
arises  only  from  the  experience  of  our  sensuous  existence ; 
general  notions  are  not  the  first  but  the  last ;  the  human  mind 
per  se  has  and  produces  neither  notions  nor  ideas,  but  is 
rather  a  tabula  rasa  upon  which  the  experience  of  the  object- 
ive world  first  writes  its  characters ;  and  it  is  only  through 
impressions  from  objective  existence  that  the  spirit  attains, 
through  abstraction,  comparison,  and  analysis,  to  ideas.  Out 
of  this  empiricism,  however  harmless  and  pretentionless  it 
might  seem  at  first  examination,  was  destined  logically  to 
result  a  system  of  religion  and  morality  essentially  different 
from  the  Christian  world-theory ;  and  historical  facts  realized 
this  logical  sequence.  It  sweeps  away,  in  fact,  at  a  single 
blow  all  ideal  contents  of  the  scientific  and  religious  con- 
sciousness, in  so  far  as  these  lie  outside  of  sensuous  experi- 
ence. But  experience  furnishes  not  ideas,  but  only  impres- 
sions ;  and  at  furthest  one  attains  only  to  abstracted  notions, 
which,  however,  have  no  general  and  unconditional  validity ; 
for  the  ideas  of  the  divine  and  eternal,  there  is  no  place. 
But  man  must  have  something  ideal ;  if  he  has  it  not  in  and 
above  himself,  so  that  he  has  simply  to  accept  it  in  his  ra- 
tional self-consciousness  and  in  religious  faith,  then  he  must 
have  it  before  himself, — must  practically  and  productively 
create  it,  in  action ;  the  ideal  is  indeed  not  yet  real,  but  it  is 
to  become  so.  It  is  consequently,  at  least,  a  presentiment  of 
reason  which  turned  this  idealess  empiricism  toward  ethics. 
But  precisely  this  one-sided  moralism  shows  most  evidently, 


304:  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§41. 

the  incorrectness  of  the  ground-principles ;  an  idealess  mo- 
rality sinks  at  once  to  a  morality  of  the  most  ignoble  self- 
seeking  and  materialism.  A  moral  consciousness  is,  accord- 
ing to  this  system,  derived  only  from  direct  experience ; 
what  is  good  I  know  only  from  the  fact  that  it  makes  upon 
me  a  pleasant  impression,  affects  me,  as  a  particular  individual, 
with  the  feeling  of  pleasure ;  individual  happiness  becomes 
the  measure  of  the  moral,  and  thus  Epicureanism  has  again 
attained  to  validity. 

Already  before  "the  more  complete  development  of  the 
Baconian  empiricism  by  Locke,  Thomas  Hobbes  had  drawn 
the  natural  and  clear  consequences  of  the  same.*  Only  what 
we  experience  is  true ;  but  we  can  experience  only  through 
the  senses,  and  hence  only  the  sensuous ;  only  this  is  true  and 
real,  even  in  man  himself.  Human  action  has  not  a  purpose, 
for  a  purpose  is  a  mere  idea  without  reality,  but  only  a  ground, 
namely,  in  his  sensuously-material  reality,  and,  in  virtue  of 
this  ground,  it  is  also  fully  determined ;  hence  the  moral  law 
-is  in  no  respect  different  from  the  law  of  nature.  Good  or 
evil  is  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  state  of  the  individual 
person,  and  hence  is  determined  by  our  immediate  feelings, 
and  has  in  no  sense  a  general  significancy  beyond  the  indi- 
vidual being;  what  is  good  for  me  is  not  so  for  another; 
hence,  in  regard  to  the  good  there  can  be  no  general  decision ; 
every  one  determines  this  according  to  his  feelings  and  ex- 
perience ;  every  one  strives,  and  rightly  too,  to  have  the  most 
possible  feelings  of  pleasure,  and  in  this  he  is  rational  and 
moral.  Self-love  in  this  sense,  namely,  of  referring  every 
thing  to  one's  own  enjoyment  of  the  agreeable,  is  the  highest 
moral  law ;  each  has  a  right  to  all.  From  this  it  follows,  in- 
deed, that  through  mere  morality  no  harmonious  life  of  men 
in  common  is  possible,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  all  strive 
against  each  other, — a  war  of  all  against  all;  but  this  leads 
not  to  a  proof  of  the  unreality  of  the  moral  law,  but  only  to 
the  necessity  of  the  State;  but  also  the  state,  because  of  the 
lack  of  a  universally-valid  objective  norm  of  morality,  can 
rest  only  on  the  individual  will  of  the  strong.  The  unlimited 
despotism  of  a  single  person  is  alone  capable  of  bringing 

*  Especially  in  Ms  Leviathan,  1651,  and  in  his  De  cive.  1647;  comp. 
Lechler :  Gesch.  de»  engl.  Deismw,  1841,  p.  67  sqq. 


,§  41.]  HOBBES — CUMBERLAND.  305 

order  and  harmony  into  the  chaos  of  individual  strivings; 
and  all  individuals  must  submit  themselves  unconditionally 
to  the  will  of  this  ruler, — a  will  which  knows  no  other  law 
than  its  own  pleasure,  and  which  consequently  is  alwaya 
right,  let  the  ruler  decree  what  he  will,  and  which  is  for  all 
the  citizens  of  that  state  the  unassailable  law  and  conscience, 
aud  which  has  consequently  to  determine  what  shall  consti- 
tute right  and  morality.  Also  all  religion  in  the  state  de- 
pends exclusively  on  the  will  of  the  ruler ;  and  he  alone  has 
to  determine  what  shall  be  believed  and  not  believed ;  no  one 
has  a  right,  in  the  state,  to  hold  any  thing  else  for  good  and 
true  in  the  moral  and  religious  sphere,  than  what  the  king 
declares  as  good  and  true ;  sin  is  only  a  contradiction  to  the 
king's  will.  Whatever  is  not  by  him  prescribed  or  forbidden, 
is  morally  indifferent. — We  cannot  deny  to  this  system  full 
consequentiality,  and  the  unabashed  nakedness  of  the  same 
is  at  least  more  honest  than  those  more  recent  views,  which 
seek  to  bemantle  the  very  same  ground-thoughts  with  more 
moral  forms  and  disguises. 

In  express  antagonism  to  this  materialism,  Cumberland 
made  general  benevolence  the  principle  of  morality ;  *  but  he 
rendered  it  difficult  for  himself  to  refute  the  consequential 
Hobbes,  by  the  fact  that  he  placed  himself  essentially  upon 
the  stand-point  of  sensuous  experience,  and  undertook  there- 
from to  rise  to  higher  religious  and  moral  ideas.  He  attains 
thus  to  the  principle  which  he  makes  the  foundation  of  all 
morality,  namely,  that  the  striving  for  the  common  good  of 
the  entire  system  of  rational  creatures  leads  to  the  good  of 
all  the  single  parts  of  the  same,  whereof  our  own  happiness 
constitutes  a  portion.  Hence  the  chief  end  of  moral  effort 
is  not  one's  own  but  the  general  good,  although  the  former 
is  contained  in  the  latter.  This  moral  law,  to  the  observ- 
ance of  which  man  is  obligated  by  nature  itself,  is  especially 
seconded  by  religion,  and  sanctified  by  the  will  of  pod,  as 
Lawgiver,  who  associates  with  the  law  rewards  and  punish- 
ments. But  the  idea  of  God  is  not  already  pre-supposed  in 
the  moral  consciousness,  but  this  idea  pre-supposes  this  con- 
sciousness.— Hobbes  was  opposed  from  a  stand-point  diamet- 
rically opposed  to  this,  and  related  to  that  of  Plato,  and 
*  D6  legibus  naturae,  1672,  83,  94. 


306  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  41. 

hence  also  more  effectually  and  consequentially,  by  Citdicorth,* 
who  entirely  rejected  the  empirical  basis  of  the  moral,  and 
appealed  to  original  moral  ideas  given  in  reason  itself.  He 
assails  materialism  and  atheism  in  a  learned  and  ingenious 
manner,  and  declares  the  moral  ideas  which  transcend  all 
experience,  and  which  can  never  be  adequately  explained  by 
experience,  as  a  seH-revelation  of  God  himself,  impressed 
upon  finite  reason;  and  in  his  opposition  to  empiricism,  he 
goes  so  far  as  to  hold  that  the  moral  idea  stands  even  above 
the  will  of  God,  so  that  this  will  does  not  determine  the 
good,  but  is  determined  by  the  per  se  valid  idea  of  the  good 
as  existing  in  God.  A  complete  moral  system  Cudworth  did 
not  carry  out ;  and  his  influence  was  less  extensive,  because  of 
the  prevalent  tendency  of  the  English  mind  toward  empirical 
reality,  than  it  deserved  to  be. — Basing  himself  upon  Cud- 
worth's  theory,  Henry  More  presented  a  brief  but  compre- 
hensive treatise  on  philosophical  ethics,  t  (The  end  of  mo- 
rality is  the  perfection,  and  therefore  the  happiness,  of  man, 
which  rests  essentially  on  virtue ;  sensuousness  has  no  right 
in  itself,  but  stands  under  the  dominion  of  moral  reason ;  the 
antecedent  condition  of  morality  is  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
as  itself  not  determined  by  any  thing,  not  even  by  knowl- 
edge.) In  a  similar  spirit,  Samuel  Clarice  (1708)  insisted  on 
the  view,  that  creatures  are  for  each  other.  Morality  con- 
sists in  conducting  one's  self,  by  virtue  of  free  rationality,  in 
harmony  with  the  universe,  and  in  the  proper  relation  to 
one's  self  and  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  even  as  irrational 
creatures  do  from  inner  impulse.  This  relation  cannot  be 
arbitrarily  fixed  by  man,  but  is  fixed  by  the  nature  itself  of 
things,  and  man  is  morally  to  conform  himself  to  this  rela- 
tion ;  thereby  he  realizes  his  happiness. 

Locke  endeavored  to  avoid  the  inferences  which  Hobbes 
had  drawn  from  the  ground-thought  of  empiricism,  at  least 
in  the  moral  sphere.  J  Inborn  moral  ideas,  or  ideas  that  lie 
in  the  essence  of  reason  itself  and  in  the  conscience,  do  not 
exist ;  all  moral  laws  are  derived  simply  from  the  observation 
of  real  life, — are  inferred  from  the  benefit  which  certain 

*  Sygtema  intelleetvale,  etc.,  in  English  in  1678. 

f  Enchiridion  ethicvm,  in  his  Opp.  omn.,  1670,  2  fol. 

J  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  1690. 


§41.]  LOCKE.  307 

modes  of  action  have  for  the  well-being  of  the  actor  or  of 
others,  and  hence  may,  under  different  circumstances,  be 
very  different ;  and  the  actual  differences,  nay,  even  contra- 
dictions, of  moral  views  that  do  exist,  prove  that  these  views 
do  not  lie  in  reason  itself.  It  is  only  through  education  and 
dominant  custom  that  moral  opinions  rise  into  pretended 
fixed  moral  principles, — into  laws  of  conscience ;  there  is  no 
innate  primitive  conscience ;  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  a 
particular  organized  society  is  the  sole  sufficient  measure  of 
virtue  and  vice.  Here,  however,  it  is  natural  that  such 
modes  of  action  as  are  useful  not  merely  to  the  subject  him- 
self, but  also  to  others  and  to  the  community,  should  also  be 
regarded  in  general  as  praiseworthy,  and  hence  virtuous,  so 
that  for  a  certain  circle  of  actions,  there  may  indeed  be  found 
an  essential  agreement  of  moral  judgment,  and  hence  a  cer- 
tain natural  law  lying  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  which  is  to 
be  regarded  as  also  God's  law.  However,  Locke  derives  this 
law  not  from  the  nature  of  the  moral  thought  itself,  but  in 
fact,  simply  from  public  opinion,  and  hence  from  experience, 
and  he  rises  only  through  inferences  from  facts  of  experience 
to  more  general  notions,  which,  however,  have  by  no  means 
a  validity  absolutely  and  per  se.  Hence  the  moral  idea  does 
not  transcend  reality, — does  not  so  much  say  what  should  be, 
as  rather  what  already  is;  a  moral  judgment  upon  the  actual 
moral  consciousness  of  a  society  is,  according  to  Locke's 
theory,  impossible ;  for  not  the  idea  is  the  measure  for  reality, 
but  reality  is  the  measure  for  the  ide-i.  The  question  whether 
indeed  the  condition  and  the  moral  consciousness  of  society 
themselves  might  not  be  perverted  and  untrue,  is  entirely 
out  of  place, — is  indeed  absurd, — as  it  would  assume  to 
measure  moral  reality  by  an  idea  independent  thereof ;  the 
moral  consciousness  of  society  is  always  right. — The  limiting 
of  these  far-reaching  assertions  by  the  interposing  of  a  super- 
ficially-conceived divine  revelation  is  without  any  sufficient 
foundation  in  Locke's  system. — The  Lockian  view  has  in- 
deed, as  compared  with  that  of  Hobbes,  a  somewhat  more 
respectable  tone,  but  it  has  on  the  other  hand  less  inner  con- 
sequentially. The  thought  of  self-love,  or,  more  properly, 
self-seeking,  is  at  least  intelligible  and  clear ;  but  the  taking, 
as  a  basis,  the  judgment  of  society  must  be  regarded  as  en- 

21 


308  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§41. 

tirely  ungrounded,  and  is  in  reality  utterly  meaningless,  in- 
asmuch as,  in  every  society,  moral  views  the  very  opposite  of 
each  other  are  represented,  so  that  consequently  the  indi- 
vidual is,  after  all,  referred  to  his  own  private  judgment, 
which,  as  it  rests  upon  no  per  se  valid  idea,  can  in  fact  be 
based  only  on  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  displeasure. 

The  consequences  of  this  unspiritual  ethics  showed  them- 
selves very  soon.  The  position  of  Wollaston  *  is  as  yet  moder- 
ate, but  for  that  reason  all  the  more  indefinite  and  unclear. 
He  reduces  all  religion  to  morality ;  religion  is  only  the  obliga- 
tion to  do  the  good  and  avoid  the  evil.  The  good  is  identical 
with  the  true ;  every  action  is  good  which  gives  expression  to 
a  true  proposition,  that  is,  which  actually  recognizes  that  a 
thing  is  as  it  really  is,  and  which  hence  corresponds  to  the  na- 
ture or  end  of  a  thing ;  things  should  be  treated  as  being  what 
they  are.  The  destination  of  man  himself  is  happiness ;  but 
happiness  is  pleasure, — the  consciousness  of  something  agree- 
able, of  that  which  is  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of  man ; 
hence  true  pleasure  springs  only  from  that  which  corresponds 
to  the  destination  of  man,  and  consequently  to  reason.  Moral- 
ity or  religion  is,  therefore,  the  seeking  of  happiness  through 
the  realizing  of  truth  and  of  reason. — The  next  advancement 
of  this  tendency  consisted  in  this,  that  the  thought  of  happi- 
ness was  fixed  more  definitely  in  view.  Man  wills  by  his  very 
nature  to  be  happy,  that  is,  he  has  inclinations  the  fulfillment 
of  which  renders  him  happy.  These  inclinations  man  does  not 
give  to  himself,  but  he  has  them  from  nature, — finds  them  in  a 
definite  form  existing  within  himself ;  they  are  the  norms  of 
man's  actions,  that  is,  he  is  good  when  he  follows  his  natural 
inclinations.  This  advance  to  Epicurean  ethics  is  made  by  the 
plausible  and  fashionable  writer,  Lord  8hafte»bury.^  Every 
action  springs  from  an  inner  determinateness  of  the  actor,  from 
a  proclivity  or  propensity ;  hence  the  moral  worth  of  an  action 
lies  essentially  in  this  propensity ;  the  propensity  aims  at  that 
which  gives  pleasure,  and  avoids  that  which  gives  displeasure ; 
that  which  by  its  presence  gives  pleasure,  and  by  its  absence 
displeasure,  is  good ;  the  opposite  thereof  is  evil;  as  objects  of 
effort,  the  former  is  the  good,  the  latter  the  evil ;  between  these 

*  The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  1724. 

t  Characteristic^,  (1711),  1714;  comp.  Lechler,  p.  240  aqq. 


£  41.]  LOCKE.  309 

there  lies  the  sphere  of  the  indifferent.  The  decision  as  to 
good  and  evil  is  not  arbitrary ;  but  that  is  good  which  corre- 
sponds to  the  peculiarity  of  a  being,  and,  for  that  very  reason, 
gives  pleasure  to  the  being  experiencing  it.  Happiness  is  the 
greatest  possible  sum  of  satisfactions  or  experiences  of  pleas- 
ure ;  spiritual  pleasure-impressions  stand  higher,  however,  than 
the  merely  sensuous;  and  the  generally-useful  or  benevolent 
propensities  are,  in  turn,  the  better  among  the  spiritual  ones, 
for  they  duplicate  the  enjoyment  by  the  participation  of  others ; 
and  they  do  not  stand  in  contradiction  to  our  own  personal 
good,  because  they  relate  to  the  whole  of  which  we  ourselves 
form  a  part.  Hence  true  morality  consists  in  the  striving  after 
the  proper  relation  and  harmony  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
whole ;  the  one  is  not  to  be  merged  into  the  other,  for  man  is 
just  as  much  an  individual  as  he  is  a  member  of  the  whole, 
and  self-love  is  per  se  just  as  legitimate  as  the  propensity  of 
general  benevolence.  Hence  virtue  consists  in  a  rationally- 
calculated  weighing  out  of  the  measure  of  the  reciprocally  lim- 
iting propensities,  that  is,  in  preserving  a  proper  equilibrium. 
The  decision  in  this  case  is  given  primarily  by  our  innate  feel- 
ing for  good  and  evil,  by  the  moral  sense  or  instinct, — not  taken 
in  the  sense  of  a  conscious  thought,  but  of  a  feeling,  a  feeling 
of  pleasure  in  the  presence  of  the  good,  and  of  displeasure  in 
the  presence  of  the  evil.  This  moral  sense  is  developed  by  ex- 
ercise and  reflection  into  a  moral  judgment.  Virtue  is  indeed 
independent  of  religion,  and  even  atheism  does  not  directly 
endanger  it ;  but  yet  it  receives  its  proper  force  and  life  only 
in  the  belief  in  a  good,  all-wise  and  justly-governing  God. — 
Shaftesbury  endeavors  to  rise  above  the  fortuitousness  of  the 
determination  of  the  moral  in  Hobbes  and  Locke,  and  to  attain 
to  a  per  se  valid  determination  of  the  same ;  but  after  all,  he  also 
finds  the  deciding  voice  only  in  the  fortuitous  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  displeasure ;  his  empiricism  is  essentially  subjective.  That, 
as  differing  from  Locke,  he  regards  the  moral  feeling  as  innate, 
does  not  yet  guarantee  its  objective  truth,  and,  at  all  events,  the 
objection  of  Locke  holds  good  against  it,  namely,  the  actually- 
existing  diversity  of  moral  views.  But  this  moral  feeling  is 
not  a  moral  idea ;  it  has  no  contents,  but  utters  itself  only  in 
each  separate  case,  when  it  is  stimulated  by  an  action  or  an  ob- 
ject, even  as  a  piano  gives  a  note  only  when  it  is  struck  •,  other- 


310  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§41. 

wise  this  feeling  is  silent  and  dead,  whereas  an  idea  is  living 
and  conscious  even  in  the  absence  of  any  reality  affecting  it ; 
this  subjective  feeling  itself  is  moreover  incapable  of  being 
tested  by  a  per  se  and  absolutely  valid  idea. 

While  Collins,  the  eulogist  of  Epicurus,  a  disciple  and  friend 
of  Locke,  and  the  first  who  called  himself  Freethinker,  denied 
the  freedom  of  the  will  and  regarded  human  action  as  abso- 
lutely determined  by  the  influences  surrounding  us,  Hutcheson 
(of  Glasgow)  endeavored  to  rectify  the  moral  system  of  Shnftes- 
bury  by  assuming  good-will  toAvard  others,  in  contradistinction 
to  self-love,  as  the  contents  proper  of  the  innate  moral  sense. 
To  the  purely  empirical  foundation  of  ethics,  however,  he  held 
fast  in  his  "  System  of  Moral  Philosophy  "  (1755).  We  find  that 
certain  actions  in  men,  even  when  these  men  are  not  affected  by 
the  consequences  of  the  same,  meet  with  approbation  or  disap- 
probation; from  this  it  follows  that  the  ground  of  this  judg- 
ment is  not  personal  advantage  or  disadvantage,  but  a  natural 
moral  sense,  which  perceives  the  moral  irrespective  of  personal 
interest,  and  has  therein  pleasure,  and  which  therefore  also,  equal- 
ly disinterestedly,  impels  to  moral  action.  This  inborn  moral 
sense  is  not  a  conscious  idea,  but  an  immediate  feeling  which 
differs  from  the  interested  self-feeling, — just  as  we  have  an  im- 
mediate pleasure  in  a  beautiful,  regular  form,  without  being 
conscious  of  the  mathematical  laws  thereof,  or  having  any 
benefit  therefrom.  The  moral  approbation  and  striving  are  con- 
sequently also  all  the  purer  the  less  our  personal  interest  is  in- 
volved in  the  case.  The  selfish  and  the  benevolent  propensi- 
ties mutually  exclude  each  other,  for  benevolence  begins  only 
where  personal  interest  ceases.  Therefore  we  have  to  make 
our  choice  between  the  two  propensities,  and  as  the  benevolent 
one  is  the  purer,  hence  the  moral  proper  consists  exclusively  in 
it.  Virtue  is  not  practiced  for  the  sake  of  a  benefit  or  an  en- 
joyment, but  purely  out  of  inner  pleasure  in  it;  our  nature  lias 
an  inner  innate  tendency  to  promote  the  welfare  of  others  with- 
out having  any  regard  therein  to  personal  benefit.  This  benev- 
olence toward  others  is  the  essence  of  all  the  virtues ;  for 
even  our  care  for  our  own  welfare  is  exercised  in  order  to  pre- 
serve ourselves  for  the  good  of  others ;  the  degree  of  virtue 
rises  in  proportion  to  the  happiness  procured  for  others,  and  to 
the  number  of  persons  benefited  by  us.  The  preliminarily- 


§  41.]  SMITH — HUME.  311 

ignored  moral  relation  of  man  to  God,  Hutcheson  afterward 
brings — not  without  violence — into  his  system,  by  holding  that 
the  moral  sense  leads  also  to  the  union  of  the  moral  creature 
with  the  Author  of  all  perfection. — The  fundamental  thoughts 
of  this  ethical  system  are  indeed  well  meant,  but  they  are  sci- 
entifically weak  and  arbitrary ;  from  the  Christian  view  they 
are  far  remote,  for  the  self-complacent  mirroring  of  self  in  the 
pretendedly  pure  virtuousness  of  one's  own  benevolent  heart, 
and  the  easy  contenting  of  self  in  a  certain  circle  of  benevolent 
outward  actions,  are,  in  one  direction,  quite  as  dangerous  for 
correct  self-knowledge,  as  is  the  system  of  pure  self-seeking  in 
the  other. — A  related  system,  but  one  manifoldly  complicated 
in  unclear  originality,  was  developed  by  Adam  Smith  (1759, 
and  later).  He  emphasized,  more  strongly  still,  the  element  of 
feeling  for  others  in  the  innate  moral  sense,  and  conceived  of  it 
as  the  feeling  of  sympathy,  in  virtue  of  which  we  share  in  nat- 
ural participation  in  the  joy  and  in  the  pains  of  others,  and 
strive  for  the  participation  and  harmony  of  others  with  our 
own  feelings  and  actions ;  in  this  harmony  we  find  the  good, 
and  in  the  opposite  the  evil.  The  morality  of  our  action  we 
recognize  by  the  fact  that  it  is  adapted  to  awaken  the  sympa- 
thies of  others;  a  perfectly  isolated  man  could  not  possibly 
have  a  moral  judgment  as  to  himself,  because  he  would  lack 
the  criterion,  the  mirror.  Hence  man  must  always  so  act  that 
others  not  standing  in  the  same  fortuitous  relations,  that  is, 
impartial  persons,  can  sympathize  with  him.  The  obscure  con- 
viction that  the  moral  consciousness  must  rest  on  a  per  se  valid 
idea,  brings  the  empiric  to  this  strange  and  certainly  very  diffi- 
cult and  inadequate  procedure,  which,  however,  though  ex- 
pressly intended  to  throw  off  the  accidentality  of  individual 
being,  yet  cannot,  after  all,  get  rid  of  it. 

Also  David  Hume  treats  of  the  subject  of  ethics,  thovjgh 
with  less  acumen  than  that  wherewith,  in  the  sphere  of  religion 
and  of  theoretical  philosophy,  he  skeptically  undermines  the 
certainty  of  all  knowledge.*  While,  in  the  field  of  philosophy, 
he  ingeniously  exposed  the  feeble  superficiality  of  the  preva- 
lent empiricism,  he  yet  hesitated  to-  introduce  his  skepticism, 
with  like  consequentiality  into  the  practical  sphere  of  morals. 
A  real  science  of  the  moral  there  cannot,  be,  in  the  opinion  of 
*  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  1730 ;  Essays,  etc.,  1742. 


312  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§41. 

Hume,  seeing  that  the  moral  is  not  an  object  of  the  cognizing 
understanding,  but  only  of  mere  feeling  or  sensation.  The 
ultimate  end  of  all  action  is  happiness ;  but  that  which  renders 
happy  can  be  determined  only  by  sensation ;  hence  a  sense,  or 
tact,  or  feeling  innate  in  all  men,  decides  as  to  good  a,nd  evil, 
in  that  the  good  excites  a  pleasant,  and  the  evil  an  unpleasant 
feeling.  Hence  we  must  learn  by  way  of  pure  observation 
what  actions  violate,  or  answer  to,  the  moral  feeling ;  and  we 
find,  now,  that  the  useful  excites  moral  approbation,  and  more 
particularly,  that  which  is  useful  to  the  community.  General 
and  necessary  moral  ideas  there  are  none ;  and  even  the  moral 
feeling  is  veiy  different  in  different  nations ;  hence  moral  con- 
ceptions have  always  only  a  varying  worth  and  rest  essentially 
upon  custom.  The  obligation  to  virtue  rests  on  the  fact  that  in 
virtue  there  is  furnished  the  greatest  guarantee  for  actual  hap- 
piness ;  and  also  the  working  for  the  good  of  others  reacts  in 
the  end  upon  our  own  good.  Thus  Hume  coincides  essentially 
with  Locke.  That  he  regards  suicide  as  allowable  is  easily 
explainable  from  his  ground-thoughts. — By  means  of  a  feeble 
and  unfounded  eclecticism,  Adam  Ferguson  (of  Edinburgh)* 
endeavors  to  avoid  the  one-sidedness  of  other  moralists,  but 
only  involves  himself  in  worse  confusion.  To  the  moral  he 
gives  three  fundamental  laws :  the  law  of  self-preservation,  the 
law  of  community  or  society,  and  the  "  law  of  estimation," 
(the  latter  relating  to  the  per  se  excellent), — without  reducing 
this  threefoldness  to  any  kind  of  clear  unity,  He  attains  to 
an  unpredjudiced  consideration  of  the  moral  in  detail  only  at 
the  expense  of  the  consequentially  of  his  system. 

The  ultimate  consequences  of  empiricism  were  not  drawn  by 
the  systematic  moralists,  but  by  other  so-called  Freethinkers 
who  wrote  more  for  the  general  public.  Such  was  the  case 
especially  with  the  most  influential  among  them,  Lord  Boling- 
~broke,  the  chief  representative  of  deism  (ob.  lT51),t  who  de- 
clared Plato  to  be  half  crazy,  and  all  philosophy  proper  to  be 
mere  narrow-mindedness.  The  moral  law  is,  as  the  law  of  na- 
ture, clearly  revealed  to  all  men  through  the  observation  of 
existence.  All  morality  rests  on  self-love ;  this  law  incites  'to 
marriage,  to  the  family,  and  to  society,  and  to"  the  duties  that 
result  therefrom.  The  end  of  all  effort  is  the  greatest  possible 
*  Institutes  of  Moral  Philosophy,  1769.  t  Works,  1754. 


§  41.]  BOLINGBROKE.  313 

happiness,  that  is,  the  greatest  possible  number  of  pleasure- 
sensations.  But  this  natural  law  teaches  Bolingbroke  some 
very  strange  things ;  shamefulness,  e.  g.,  is  only  an  aspiration 
of  man  to  be  something  better  than  the  brute,  or  it  is  a  mere 
social  prejudice;  polygamy  is  not  immoral;  on  the  contrary,  it 
harmonizes  with  the  law  of  nature,  because  it  effects  a  greater 
increase  of  the  race ;  wedlock-communion  is  disallowable  only 
between  parents  and  children ;  all  other  degrees  of  relationship 
admit  of  it,  for  the  highest  law  and  end  of  marriage  is  propa- 
gation. The  pretentious  superficiality  of  this  writer  obtained 
for  him  in  the  "  cultured  "  world  the  highest  repute. 

English  moralism  checked  itself,  for  the  m<  st  part,  at  half- 
ways;  it  found  as  yet  too  much  moral  consciousness  alive 
among  the  masses,  not  to  feel  bound  in  general  to  hold  fast 
still  to  a  respectable  code  of  morality,  even  though  at  the  cost 
of  the  consequentially  of  the  system.  In  France,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  demoralization  had  made  sufficient  progress  among 
the  cultivated  classes  to  be  enabled  to  throw  off  all  reserve, 
also  in  the  sphere  of  theory.  The  scanty  remnants  of  religious 
and  moral  contents  still  retained  in  the  freethinking  ethics  of 
Englishmen,  had  to  be  thrown  out,  in  the  further  fermenting 
process,  as  discoloring  dregs,  in  order  that  the  unmingled 
wisdom-beverage  of  the  natural  man  might  attain  to  its  life- 
giving  purity;  deistic  moralism  had  to  pass  over  into  atheistic 
materialism.  The  French  ethics  of  frivolity  became,  also  for 
German  ears,  a  sweet-sounding  music ;  and  French  parasites  at 
the  little  German  ducal  courts  charged  themselves  with  the 
task  of  distilling  the  decoction  of  trans-Rhenane  moral  notions 
also  into  the  lower  strata  of  the  German  population. 

Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson  had  endeavored  to  secure  the 
innate  moral  feeling-  against  the  threatening  overthrow  of  all 
morality,  by  placing  over  against  the  feeling  for  self,  a  feeling 
for  the  social  whole,  either  as  of 'like  worth,  or  as  of  a  still 
higher  validity.  This  course  was  arbitrary,  and  not  grounded 
in  their  fundamental  principle ;  for  every  man  is,  as  an  individ- 
ual, the  nearest  to  himself.  And  a  feeling  inborn  in  me  relates, 
after  all,  first  and  last,  always  to  myself ;  as  a  merely  natural 
being  inspired  by  no  higher  idea,  I  feel  for  others  only  in  so  far 
as  I  am  myself  interested  in  them.  Feeling  clings  absolutely 
to  the  subject,  and  egotism  is  the  inner  essence  of  any  natural 


314  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§41. 

moral  feeling  which  is  not  willing  to  be  dominated  by  an  idea. 
In  order  to  this  further  development  of  ethics,  there  was  need 
of  a  still  further  carrying  out  of  empiricism  as  a  theory.  This 
we  meet  with  in  Condittac,  a  French,  nobleman,  an  abbot  and 
prince-educator, — one  of  the  most  superficial  and,  therefore, 
most  preferred  authors  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury.— All  knowledge  rests  on  sensuous  impressions;  man  is 
acted  upon  and  filled  with  spiritual  contents,  simply  as  a  ma- 
chine, through  outward  impressions  ;  of  all  the  senses  the  sense 
of  touch  is  the  highest ;  it  alone  gives  us  certainty  as  to  the 
objective  reality  of  things,  and  raises  man  above  the  brute. 
with  whom  in  other  respects  he  is  essentially  identical.  The 
pleasure  and  displeasure  of  impressions  work  desire  and  repug- 
nance, and  hence  awaken  and  determine  the  will.  It  is  incred- 
ible what  stupid  absurdities  Condillac  offers  in  the  name  of 
metaphysics ;  and  it  is  a  significant  index  of  the  spirit  of  the 
age,  that  he  was  one  of  the  most  influential  and  feted  writers 
of  France.  The  ethics  of  this  world-theory  was  easily  inferred, 
and  was  pronounced  with  open  boldness.  Long  previously 
Gassendi  (of  Paris,  ob.  1655)  had  presented  the  satisfaction  of 
desire  as  the  end  of  human  life ;  this  satisfying  is  rational  when 
it  is  orderly,  natural,  and  not  excessive ;  and  it  effects  peace  of 
heart  and  painlessness  of  bpdy.  He  recommended,  consequen- 
tially enough,  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus  as  the  highest  wisdom. 
— The  full  and  clear  consequence  of  empiricism,  however,  was 
drawn  by  Helvetius,  who  expressly  based  his  doctrine  on  the, 
by  him,  highly  esteemed  theory  of  Locke.  As  an  affluent  gen- 
tleman of  leisure,  and  living  only  for  his  pleasures,  he  became 
greatly  renowned  by  his  work,  De  Pesprit  (1758),  throughout 
the  luxurious  fashionable  circles  of  Europe.  His  book  was 
proscribed  in  France,  but  all  the  more  circulated  throughout 
Europe ;  and  the  author,  in  his  gravels  to  different  courts,  espe- 
cially the  German  ones,  was  feted  as  a  great  philosopher.  His 
second  more  important  work,  (a  further  development  of  the 
first  one,)  De  rhomme,  appeared  only  after  his  death  (1772).  The 
highly-colored  and  daring  tone  of  his  writings,  with  their  rich 
setting  of  wit,  and  of  indelicate  anecdotes,  furnishes  a  clear 
image  of  the  then  prevalent  spirit  of  the  higher  classes  of  cul- 
tivated Europe. — All  thoughts,  according  to  Helvetius,  spring 
from  sensuous  perceptions,  and  our  knowledge  extends  only  so 


§41.]  FRENCH    SENSUALISM.  315 

far  as  the  senses  extend ;  of  any  thing  super-sensuous,  and 
hence  also  of  God,  we  know  nothing.  The  motives  to  activity 
are  essentially  the  passions,  which  spring  from  our  inclination 
to  pleasure  and  our  aversion  to  displeasure.  The  fundamental 
stimulus  of  all  moral  activity  is  self-love,  the  expression  of 
which  is,  in  fact,  the  passions ;  nothing  great  is  accomplished 
without  great  passion ;  he  who  is  not  passionate  is  stupid.  As, 
now,  all  thoughts  rest  on  sensuous  impressions,  so  rest  also  all 
self-love  and  all  passion,  and  hence  all  morality,  on  the  impulses 
of  sensuous  pleasure ;  and  even  the  decision  as  to  truth  is  en- 
tirely dependent  on  the  interest  of  the  self-loving  subject. 
Should  the  case  arise,  says  Helvetius,  that  it  would  be  more  ad- 
vantageous for  me  to  regard  the  part  as  greater  than  the  whole, 
then  I  would  in  fact  assume  this  to  be  the  case.  The  good,  or 
the  moral,  is  neither  an  absolutely  valid  idea,  nor  is  it  any  thing 
arbitrarily  assumed,  but  the  determination  as  to  it  rests  in  the 
experience  of  the  individual ;  but  experience  teaches  that  each 
regards  as  good  that  which  is  useful  to  him ;  and  consequently 
each  judges  of  the  morality  of  actions  simply  according  to  his 
own  interest ;  hence  the  best  actions  would  be  such  as  corre- 
sponded to  the  interest  of  all  men ;  but  there  are  no  such  ac- 
tions. Hence  we  must  limit  our  view ;  and,  on  closer  exami- 
nation, we  find  to  be  truly  good  that  which  promotes  the  inter- 
est not  merely  of  the  individual  but  of  our  nation ;  the  political 
virtue  is  the  highest,  and  the  'political  transgression,  the  high- 
est sin  ;  that  which  does  not  contribute  to  the  public  good  of 
the  nation,  as,  for  example,  the  so-called  religious  virtues,  is 
not  a  virtue,  and  what  does  not  conflict  therewith  is  not  a  sin ; 
virtues  which  profit  nothing  must  be  regarded  as  virtues  of 
delusion,  and  be  discarded.  Hence,  true  ethics  has  its  norm 
essentially  in  the  civil  law-book  and  in  public  utility ;  that 
which  lies  outside  of  these  is,  for  the  most  part,  morally  indif- 
ferent ;  when  it  is  useful  to  the  public  weal,  even  inhumanity  is 
just.  The  motive  to  moral  activity  remains,  even  in  this^so 
narrowly  limited  sphere,  self-love ;  the  thought  of  doing  the 
good  for  the  good's  sake,  is  antiquated  and  exploded.  To 
sacrifice  my  own  private  advantage  to  that  of  the  public,  I  am 
under  no  obligation ;  rather  must  I  seek  in  the  best  manner  pos- 
sible to  combine  the  two.  When  any  one  helps  an  unfortunate, 
out  of  compassion,  this  is  only  self-love,  for  he  simply  aims  to 


316  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  41. 

rid  himself  of  the  sight  of  misery,  which  is  unpleasant  to  him. 
Ethics  is  utterly  fruitless  and  vain  so  long  as  it  does  not  defi- 
nitely regard  personal  interest,  and  hence  sensuous  pleasure  and 
the  avoidance  of  sensuous  pain,  as  the  highest  principle  of 
morality ;  nothing  is  forbidden  but  what  causes  us  pain  ;  with 
religion,  ethics  has  nothing  whatever  to  do.  Morality  is  there- 
fore also,  at  different  times  and  under  different  relations,  essen- 
tially different ;  there  is  no  crime  which  under  some  circum- 
stances— (when  it  should  be  useful) — would  not  also  be  right. 
True,  the  vicious  man  seeks  also  his  own  advantage,  and  the 
only  trouble  in  the  matter  is  that  he  deceives  himself  as  to  the 
means  thereto ;  hence,  he  is  to  be  pitied  because  of  his  error, 
but  not  to  be  despised.  The  fact  that  among  all  nations,  some 
actions  are  regarded  as  virtuous  which  offer  no  profit  whatever 
for  this  life,  is  simply  a  hurtful  delusion.  As  self-interest  is  the 
ground  of  all  virtue,  hence  it  is  also  entirely  legitimate  that 
the  state  should  stimulate  its  citizens  to  obedience  by  rewards 
and  punishments ;  in  fact,  it  thereby  hits  upon  the  solely  cor- 
rect moral  motives  to  the  good ;  rewards  and  punishments  are 
the  gods  which  create  virtue.  All  statesmanship  consists  in 
awakening  the  self-love  and  self-interest  of  men,  and  in  thereby 
stimulating  them  to  virtue. 

The  intellectual  revolution — represented  by  great  names — 
made  sweeping  advances  in  France  and  also  in  the  fashion- 
able world  servilely  dependent  on  France,  at  the  courts  of 
the  rest  of  Europe,  and  especially  of  Germany,  and  had  al- 
ready long  since  reached  its  ultimate  results,  before  the 
political  revolution  enabled  also  the  lower  classes  to  speak 
their  word  in  the  same  sense.  It  was  fashionable  at  this 
period  to  designate  by  the  word  "esprit"  (as  the  privilege 
of  the  giddy,  freethinking  world)  that  which  was  subse- 
quently called  "revolution"  among  the  great  masses,  and 
which  was,  in  fact,  simply  the  consequence  of  the  former. 
Every  thing  which  hitherto  had  passed  as  philosophy,  (with 
the  exception  of  the  Epicurean),  was  regarded  as  nonsense ; 
the  most  stupid  superficiality,  provided  only  that  it  ridiculed 
sacred  things,  passed  as  philosophy ;  wit  and  frivolous  fan- 
cies took  the  place  of  earnest  science.  The  "  philosophical  " 
century  sank,  in  the  appreciation  of  really  philosophical 
thought,  deeper  than  even  the  earlier  and  as  yet  barbarous 


§41.]  ROUSSEAU'S  ETHICS.  317 

Middle  Ages  had  sunk.  The  higher  the  encomiums  they 
heaped  upon  what  they  called  "spirit,"  so  much  the  more 
utter  became  the  spiritual  vacuity ;  men  extolled  reason  more 
pretentiously  than  ever,  and  yet  they  placed  in  her  temple, 
as  goddess,  a  public  woman.  Rousseau  and  Voltaire  passed 
as  the  profoundest  thinkers  of  all  ages ;  their  spiritual  tri- 
umphs and  attainments  were  unparalleled,  and  Voltaire's  re- 
nown transcended  in  glory  all  renown  ever  heaped  upon  an 
author.  The  history  of  the  human  mind  has  no  second 
century  to  refer  to  in  which  un-reason  dominated  with  such 
complete  omnipotence. 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  produced  indeed  no  system  of 
ethics,  but  he  exerted  in  the  sphere  of  moral  opinion  an 
influence  such  as  no  author  before  or  after  him  ever  exerted, 
and  felt  even  up  to  the  present  day, — not  indeed  because  he 
uttered  deep  thoughts,  but  because  he  gave  expression  to 
what  lay  in  the  spirit  of  the  age, — himself  an  utterly  un- 
genuine  character — under  the  form  of  a  severe  moralist 
undermining  all  morality,  under  the  form  of  earnest  thought 
bidding  defiance  to  all  philosophy  and  science,  under  the 
form  of  a  censorious  sage,  in  hermit-like  seclusion  from  the 
world,  preparing  soft  cushions  for  the  vices  of  the  "cultured  " 
great.  And  precisely  in  this  his  peculiar  character  he  chimed 
in  with  the  tastes  and  desires  of  the  age ;  he  simply  made,  in 
the  dike  of  the  as  yet  somewhat  cramped  current  of  the  age, 
the  little  breach  through  which  its  pent-up  waters  dispersed 
themselves  over  the  low-lands  so  as  subsequently,  as  morasses, 
to  exhale  the  pestilential  miasma  of  revolution.  Of  scientific 
ground-thoughts  there  can  in  Rousseau  be  no  question ;  bold 
assertions  and  rhetorical  phrases  take  almost  every -where  the 
place  of  scientific  demonstration.  The  writings  of  Locke 
exerted  upon  him  the  greatest  influence ;  sensuous  experience 
is  also  for  him  the  source  of  all  ideas.  His  moral  views  re- 
ceive their  proper  commentary  in  his  utterly  immoral  life. 
His  Ccmtrat  social  (1761)  became  the  theoretical  basis  of  the 
French  Revolution;  his  narrow-minded  sophistical  work, 
Emile  (1762)  had  an  immeasurable  and  bewildering  influence 
on  education,  and  is  yet  to-day  the  catechism  of  all  un-Chris- 
tian  schemes  of  education.  Rousseau's  religion  of  nature,  as 
he  called  it,  is  a  shallow  idealess  deism  grouped  around  the 


318  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  41. 

three  thoughts :  God,  virtue,  and  immortality,  in  high  sound- 
ing rhetorical  phrase.  He  bases  morality  upon  the  natural 
conscience,  which,  as  a  direct  feeling  for  the  moral,  renders 
unnecessary  all  instruction  and  all  science  as  to  the  moral, 
and  guides  man  with  unerring  certainty.  All  immorality 
springs  simply  from  "civilization,"  and  from  perverted  edu- 
cation ;  true  education  consists  in  non-educating.  Let  -the 
child  be  simply  let  alone  in  its  naturalness ;  let  it  be  guarded 
against  perverting  influences,  and  then  it  will  spontaneously 
develop,  itself  as  normally  as  a  tree  in  a  good  soil.  In  the 
nature  of  man  there  lies  nothing  evil  whatever;  all  natural 
impulses  are  good;  every  child  is  by  nature  still  just  as 
good  as  the  first  man  was  in  coming  from  the  hands  of  the 
Creator.  The  sole  inborn  passion  is  self-love,  and  this  is 
good.  The  child  should  learn  every  thing  through  per- 
sunal  experience,  and  nothing  through  obedience  ;  the  words 
"obey"  and  "command"  must  be  erased  from  its  diction- 
ary, as  also  the  words- "duty"  and  obligation;"  the  child 
must  by  all  means  be  kept  in  the  belief  that  it  is  its  own 
lord,  and  that  its  educator  is  subordinate  to  it.  Make  the 
child  strong,  and  it  will  be  good ;  for  all  defects,  the  edu- 
cator alone  is  to  blame.  The  sole  moral  instruction  for  the 
child  is:  "Do  wrong  to  no  one ; "  of  love  and  religion  there 
should,  in  education,  be  no  question  whatever.  Instruction 
should  by  no  means  be  imparted  before  the  twelfth  year,  and 
even  after  this  period  only  at  the  desire  of  the  pupil;  at 
twelve  years  it  should  yet  be  incapable  of  distinguishing  its 
right  hand  from  its  left.  It  should  never  believe  or  do  any 
thing  on  the  mere  word  of  another,  but  must  always  do 
simply  what  it  has  found  to  be  good  from  personal  experi- 
ence. The  end  of  this  "inactive"  method  of  education,  as 
Rousseau  himself  designates  it,  is  the  end  of  human  life, 
namely,  freedom ;  but  true  freedom  consists  in  this,  that  we 
wish  nothing  other  than  what  we  can  do  or  obtain ;  and  in 
this  case  we  will  also  do  nothing  other  than  what  pleases  us ; 
and  this  is  always  the  right.  Hence  the  essence  of  .all  mo- 
rality is  the  giving  free  scope  to  our  natural  propensities. 
The  highest  moral  law  is;  "seek  thine  own  highest  welfare 
with  the  least  possible  detriment  to  others."  Christianity  is 
the  natural  enemy  of  true  morality  and  of  human  society,  for 


§  41.]  VOLTAIRE — DIDEROT.  319 

it  desires  the  absolute  purity  of  human  nature, — directs  man 
away  from  the  earthly,  and  preaches  only  servitude  and 
tyranny.  These  were  sweet  words  for  the  ears  of  the  great 
multitude,  and  they  did  not  die  away  unheeded,  but  found 
enthusiastic  welcome. — Although  the  almost  apotheosized 
prince  of  the  "philosophical"  century,  Voltaire,  whose  pre- 
tended philosophy  rests  almost  exclusively  on  Locke,  wrote 
both  moral  phrases  and  un-nioral  poems,  yet  in  neither  case 
has  he  produced  any  thing  peculiar  or  original,  much  less 
philosophical,  notwithstanding  his  frequent  allusion  to  his 
"metaphysics."  Morality,  he  repeats  time  and  again  in  the 
strongest  affirmations,  is  entirely  independent  of  religious 
faith, — rests  upon  a  natural  innate  impulse,  and  is  conse- 
quently in  all  men  and  in  all  ages,  so  soon  as  they  use  t*heir 
reason,  uniform  and  the  same.*  Virtue  or  vice,  the  morally 
good  or  evil,  is  always  and  every-where  that  which  is  either 
useful  or  hurtful  to  society;  incest  between  father  and 
daughter  may,  under  circumstances,  be  allowable,  and  even 
a  duty,  as,  for  example,  when  a  single  family  constitutes  an 
isolated  colony ;  falsehoods  uttered  out  of  a  good  purpose 
are  legitimate,  and  the  same  holds  good  of  almost  every 
thing  that  is  in  ordinary  cases  unallowable.  Divinely-re- 
vealed moral  laws  there  are  none ;  but  a  certain  benevolence 
toward  others  is  inborn  in  man,  at  the  same  time  with  self- 
love.  To  the  objection,  that  with  so  uncertain  a  basis,  one 
might  seek  his  own  welfare  by  stealing,  robbing,  etc.,  Vol- 
taire has  the  ready  answer:  then  he  would  get  hanged.f 
And  all  this  he  calls  metaphysics. 

What  little  of  a  superficial  religious  consciousness  had  yet 
remained  with  Rousseau  and  Voltaire,  entirely  vanished  with 
the  Encyclopedists,  and  especially  with  Diderot  (ob.  1784). 
Diderot  endeavored,  above  all  things,  entirely  to  divorce 
morality  from  religion ;  the  latter  is  for  the  former  rather  a 
hindrance  than  a  help.  In  morality  itself  he  wavers,  unde- 
cided, between  naturalistic  determinism  and  a  very  super- 
ficial society-morality.  The  Epicurean  view  he  regards  as 
the  most  true.  All  the  vices  spring  from  covetousness,  and 
hence  they  can  all  be  got  rid  of  by  the  abolition  of  property, 

*  (Euvres,  Paris,  1830,  t.  31,  p.  262 ;  t.  12,  p.  160 ;  t.  42,  p.  583. 
t  Ibid.,  t  37,  p.  336 ;  t.  38,  p.  4.0. 


320  CHRISTIAN    ETHICS.  [§41. 

by  a  community  of  goods ;  for  the  discovery  of  this  universal 
panacea  of  human  ills,  he-  takes  to  himself  great  credit. — 
Naturalistic  morality  appears  in  its  most  gross  form  and  in 
shameless  nakedness  in  La  Mettrie  (ob.  1751),*  whom  even 
Voltaire  despised,  but  whom  Frederick  the  Great,  from  some 
incomprehensible  caprice,  made  his  reader  and  daily  com- 
panion (from  1748  on),  and  even  nominated  him,  ignoramus 
that  he  was,  to  membership  in  the  Academy  of  Sciences. 
Religion  and  morality  stand  in  irreconcilable  antagonism  to 
philosophy ;  they  rest  only  in  politics,  and  serve  for  the 
bridling  of  the  masses  who  are  yet  unable  to  rise  to  philosophy, 
just  as,  for  a  similar  reason,  there  is  as  yet  need  also  of  hang- 
man and  death-penalties.  But  humanity  as  a  whole  cannot 
be  happy  until  all  the  world  embraces  atheism.  Religion  has 
poisoned  nature  and  cheated  her  out  of  her  rights.  Where 
the  truth,  that  is,  atheism,  prevails,  there  man  follows  no 
other  law  than  that  of  his  particular  natural  propensity. 
And  thus  alone  can  he  be  happy.  Man  is  not  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  the  brute,  not  even  by  any  peculiar  moral  con- 
sciousness ;  he  stands  in  many  respects  below  the  brute,  and 
has  only  this  advantage,  that  he  has  a  greater  number  of 
wants,  whereby  a  greater  culture  becomes  possible.  Man — as 
sprung  from  the  mingling  of  different  races  of  animals,  and 
as  formed  from  matter  of  the  same  kind  as  that  constituting 
the  brute,  save  only  that  it  has  simply  gone  through  a  higher 
fermentation-process,  and  as  being  of  a  merely  material  or- 
ganism (for  the  soul  is  only  the  brain,  which  is  itself  only  a 
slightly  organized  piece  of  dirt), — is  simply  a  mere  machine, 
and  is  set  into  motion  by  outward  impressions,  and  hence  he 
is  necessarily  determined  in  all  his  volitions,  and  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  any  of  his  actions.  Repentance  is  folly;  for 
individual  man  is  not  at  fault  for  his  being  a  poorly  con- 
structed machine.  Hence  also  we  should  not  despise  the 
seemingly  vicious,  nor  judge  them  severely.  As,  at  death, 
all  is  over,  hence  we  should  enjoy  the  present  as  much  as  we 
possibly  can.  To  defer  an  enjoyment  when  it  offers  itself,  is 
the  same  as  waiting  at  a  banquet  without  eating,  until  all  are 
done ;  enjoyment,  and  indeed  primarily  and  principally,  sen- 
suous enjoyment,  is  our  highest  and  sole  destination. — It  was 
*  IShomme  machine;  Dart  dejouir.,  1751. 


§41.]  LA   METTRIE — D'HOLBACH.  321 

precisely  during  his  stay  in  Potsdam  that  La  Mettrie  wrote  his 
most  audacious  glorification  of  the  wildest  and  even  unnatural 
wantonness.  His  writings  were  very  much  sought  after  in 
the  higher  circles  of  society. 

The  total  result  of  materialistic  ethics  is  summed  up  in  a 
work  written  very  probably  by  Baron  Holbach  with  the  co- 
operation of  Diderot  and  other  Encyclopedists :  System  de  la 
nature,  par  Mirabaud  (1770),  constituting  the  gospel  proper 
of  atheism,  and  presenting  nakedly  and  undisguisedly,  in  a 
dull  and  spiritless  form,  the  results  of  the  philosophy  of 
Locke,  Hobbes,  and  Condillac,  who  are  in  fact  expressly  cited 
as  sources.  As  man  is  only  a  material  machine,  hence  there 
is  between  the  physical  and  the  moral  life  no  difference ;  all 
thinking  and  willing  consist  simply  in  modifications  of  the 
brain.  All  propensities  and  passions  are  purely  corporeal 
states — are  either  hatred  or  love,  that  is  "  repulsion  or  attrac- 
tion ; "  the  absurd  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  has 
been  invented  simply  to  justify  the  equally  absurd  one  of 
divine  providence.  Man  is  only  a  part  of  the  great  world- 
machine,  determined  in  all  his  movements, — a  blind  instru- 
ment in  the  hands  of  necessity;  the  concession  of  freedom 
even  to  a  single  creature  would  bring  the  whole  universe  into 
confusion';  hence  whatever  takes  place  takes  place  neces- 
sarily. Religion  and  its  ethics  are  the  greatest  enemies  of 
man,  and  occasion  him  only  torment.  The  system  of  nature 
alone  makes  man  truly  happy, — teaches  him  to  enjoy  the 
present  as  fully  as  possible,  and  gives  him,  in  relation  to 
every  thing  which  is  not  an  object  of  enjoyment,  the  indiffer- 
ence that  is  essential  to  his  happiness.  Hence  there  is  no 
need  of  a  special  moral  system.  Its  fundamental  principle 
would  necessarily  be :  "enjoy  life  as  much  as  thou  canst;" 
but  every  man  does  this  already  of  himself  without  instruc- 
tion. Self-love,  one  of  the  manifestations  of  the  law  of  grav- 
itation, is  the  highest  moral  law.  The  chief  condition  of 
happiness  is  bodily  health ;  the  true  key  of  the  human  heart 
is  medicine ;  the  most  effectual  moralists  are  the  physicians ; 
he  who  makes  the  body  sound,  makes  the  man  moral.  Every 
man  follows  by  nature  and  necessarily  his  own  special  in- 
terest, a  course  of  conduct  which  in  fact  follows  immediately 
and  necessarily  from  his  bodily  organization ;  vice  and  crime 


322  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§41. 

are  but  consequences  of  morbid  corporeality, — are  not  guilt 
but  necessity.  Hence  only  the  unwise  can  repent;  in  any 
case  repentance  is  only  a  pain  arising  from  the  fact  that  an 
act  has  had  bad  consequences  for  us.  Now  as  the  instincts 
and  passions  are  the  sole  motive  of  human  action,  hence  we 
can  influence  other  men  only  by  working  upon  their  passions. 
Each  is  obligated  only  to  that  which  procures  him  an  advan- 
tage. Hence  a  good  man  is  he  who  satisfies  his  passions  in 
such  a  manner  that  other  persons  must  contribute  to  this 
satisfaction  so  as  that  they  also  thereby  satisfy  their  own  pas- 
sions and  interests.  Hence  the  atheist  is  necessarily  a  good 
man,  whereas  religion  makes  men  bad  in  that  it  embitters  to 
them  the  passions.  That  suicide  is  held  as  legitimate  for 
those  who  are  weary  of  life,  is  a  matter  of  course. — This 
godless  world-theory  disseminated  itself  in  rapid  develop- 
ment deeper  and  deeper  among  the  masses;  and  the  ten 
years  of  the  French  Revolution  are  the  practical  realization 
of  this  ethics  as  a  social  power. 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  difference  of  national  spirit  that 
the  naturalistic  tendency  could  not,  in  its  stark  crudity,  take 
hold  upon  the  German  people,  but  came  to  expression  only  in 
association  with  other  higher  principles,  with  Christ ianly-moral 
elements,  namely,  in  the  Rationalistic  "  illuminism "  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  Open  unbelief  proper  and  materialistic 
morals  spoke,  in  Germany,  almost  exclusively  French ;  and  the 
sycophant  court-atheists  were  too  much  despised  to  find  hearty 
favor  with  the  masses.  The  demoralizing  revolution  which  pro- 
ceeded from  the  upper  classes,  met  with  a  powerful  opposition 
in  the  German  national  spirit.  Even  while  a  popular  gchool  of 
poetry  divorced  itself  from  the  Christian  consciousness,  still 
this  school  held  fast  to  the  antithesis  of  the  spiritual  and  the 
naturalistic  world-theories,  recognizing  the  former  as  the  high- 
er ;  l%  let  him  who  cannot  believe,  enjoy ;  let  him  who  can  be- 
lieve, deny  himself.''' — The  superficial  deistic  ethics  attains  to 
greater  influence  in  Germany  than  the  materialistic,  though 
without  giving  rise  to  any  important  scientific  works.  On  the 
basis  of  the  uncorrupted  purity  of  human  nature  there  was 
developed  a  superficial  utilitarian  morality  without  deeper  con- 
tents;-and  this  morality  was  looked  upon  as  the  essence  proper 
of  Christianity.  Basedoic's  demagogic  attempt  at  world-reno- 


§  41.]  BASEDOW— STEINBART.  323 

vation  by  a  new  system  of  education  based  on  Rousseau,  became 
very  soon  too  ridiculous  to  exert  any  enduring  influence, 
Steinbart  *  (professor  of  theology  at  Frankfort  on  the  Oder)  in 
his  utterly  superficial  but  greatly  lauded  System  of  Pure  Philos- 
ophy or  Christian  Doctrine  of  Happiness  (1778,  '80,  '86,  '94), 
regarded  the  chief  contents'of  the  Christian  religion  and  of 
Christian  ethics  as  simply  the  answering  of  the  question : 
"  What  have  I  to  learn,  and  to  do,  in  order  to  have  the  great- 
est possible  sum  of  pleasure  ? "  "  Happiness  is  the  end  of  the 
entire  human  life,  and  consists  in  the  heart-state  of  a  continuous 
contentment  and  of  frequently  recurring  enjoyment."  Every 
man  is  by  nature  perfectly  good  and  pure,  though  indeed  not 
as  a  spirit  but  as  an  animal,  and  he  rises  only  gradually  from  the 
animal  to  the  man.  Self-love  is  the  ground  of  all  morality, 
and  morality  is  the  infallible  way  to  a  state  of  enjoyment ;  of  a 
checking  of  self-love  there  can  be  no  occasion ;  hence  Christian 
virtue  is  "  nothing  else  than  a  preparedness  to  enjoy  one's  exist- 
ence to  the  highest  degree,  under  all  circumstances  " ;  the  high- 
est state  of  enjoyment  is  of  course  only  in  the  life  after  death, 
where  alone  we  can  really  survey  the  consequences  of  our  benefi- 
cent, meritorious  actions  ;  "  but  our  glimpses  into  that  life  en- 
courage us  to  a  better  using  of  the  present  one,  and  the  fullest 
enjoyment  of  this  life  enlarges  our  receptivity  for  higher  degrees 
of  happiness  in  the  future  world."  This  is  the  pure  doctrine 
of  Jesus,  which  unfortunately  has,  for  eighteen  centuries,  been 
lost  sight  of. — Steinbart  was  favored  in  the  highest  degree  by 
the  Prussian  government,  and  aided  in  his  plan  of  founding  a 
"  general  normal  school  in  which  teachers  might  be  educated 
for  the  true  enlightenment  of  the  nations." 

It  was  only  the  revival  of  the  Pantheism  of  Spinoza  in  the 
nineteenth  century  that  gave  rise,  in  Germany,  to  a  scientific 
form  of  ethics ;  but  also  this  system,  though  of  a  far  higher 
character  than  the  freethinking  of  France,  yet,  in  its  later  un- 
scientific offshoots,  ultimated  in  like  results  ;  and  the  fact  that 
in  our  own  day  a  resuscitated  materialism,  resting,  however, 
more  on  natural  science  than  on  philosophy,  presents  us  again 
with  the  ethics  of  the  "  System  of  Nature,"  is  certainly  no  indi- 
cation of  progress  in  spiritual  development,  though  indeed  an 

*  System  der  reinen  Phil,  oder  GliickseliglceUslehre  dee  CJtristen- 
t&ums. 

22 


324  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  42 

evidence  of  a  progress  of  the  intellectual  blight  consequent  on 
the  too  great  stagnation  of  the  religious  and  philosophical 
spirit  in  the  present  age. 

SECTION  XLII. 
* 

The  theological  ethics  of  the  evangelical  church  of 
the  eighteenth  century  made  but  a  quite  temperate 
use  of  German  philosophy  before  the  time  of  Kant, 
and  insisted  but  little  (not  without  some  influence 
from  Pietism)  on  the  antithesis  of  the  two  evan- 
gelical churches  in  the  sphere  of  ethics.  JBuddceus 
furnished  the  first  scientific  system  of  ethics,  though 
in  its  philosophical  elements  it  is  rather  eclectic. 
Stapfer,  Bauingarten  and  others,  applied  the  Wolfian 
philosophy  in  pedantic  minuteness  to  Christian  ethics ; 
while  Mosheim  constructed  it  more  upon  a  purely 
Biblical  basis,  and  upon  that  of  practical  life-experi- 
ence. Toward'the  close  of  the  century  the  superfic- 
iality of  Rationalism  began  already  to  make  itself  felt. 

Francis  Buddceus  of  Jena,  one  of  the  most  learned  and  sound 
theologians  of  the  eighteenth  century,  a  man  of  comprehensive 
philosophical  culture  and  who  wrote  also  a  thoughtful,  evangel- 
ically-inspired system  of  practical  philosophy  (Elementa  phi- 
losophic practices,  1697,  and  often),  prepared  the  way,  with  his 
Institut.  theologies  moralis  (1712,  '23,  4to. ;  in  German  as  "In- 
troduction to  Moral  Theology,"  1719),  for  a  more  thorough, 
systematic  treatment  of  ethics.  The  rich,  carefully  and  some 
times  rather  lengthily  treated  subject-matter  rests  upon  sound 
Scripture  exegesis  and  careful  observation  of  human  life.  Influ- 
enced somewhat  by  Spener,  this  writer  combines  practical  sense 
with  a  scientific  spirit.  He  begins  at  once  with  the  thought 
of  the  corruption  of  human  nature  and  with  that  of  divine 
grace,  and  hence  gives  not  a  general  philosophical,  but  only  a 
specifically-Christian  system  of  ethics,  in  view  of  man  as  regen- 
erated. The  ground-thought  of  morality  is :  man  must  do 
every  thing  which  is  essential  to  a  constant  union  with  God 


§  42.]  BUDD^US— BAUMGARTON.  325 

and  to  the  restoration  of  God's  image,  and  must  avoid  the 
contrary  thereof.  The  whole  subject-matter  is  distributed, 
(1),  into  moral  theology  (in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word),which 
treats  of  the  nature  of  regeneration  and  sanctification  in  their 
collective  development, — (2)  into  jurisprudentia  dimna,  which 
treats  of  the  divine  laws  and  of  the  duties  resting  thereupon, — 
and  (3)  into  the  doctrine  of  Christian  prudence,  which  presents 
the  practical  carrying  out  of  the  moral  in  detail,  and  especially 
by  clergymen.  For  the  future  development  of  evangelical 
ethics,  the  thorough  treatment  of  the  first  part  is  especially 
valuable ;  Buddseus  finds  in  Christian  ethics  not  merely  the 
manifestation,  but  also  the  progressive  development  of  the 
spiritual  life  of  the  regenerated.  He  presents  as  chief  virtues  : 
piety,  ternperatenesfc  and  justness.  (Budda3us  has  been  much 
used  by  other  writers,  also  by  J.  J.  Rambach,  1739,  and  by 
J.  G.  Walch,  1747). 

The  Reformed*  divine,  John  F.  Stapfer  of  Bern  made,  in  his 
rather  comprehensive  than  scientifically-important  system  of 
ethics  (1757),  a  very  moderate  use  of  the  Wolfian  philosophy. 
The  earlier  Calvinistically-rigorous  spirit  is  here  already  very 
much  modified.  Sigismund  Jacob  Baumgarten  (of  Halle,  a 
brother  of  the  philosopher)  follows,  in  his  discursive  "  Theolog- 
ical Ethics  "  (1767,  4to.),  the  painfully-minute  manner  of  Wolf, 
which  is  applied  also  in  his  numerous  other  writings,  and  which 
leaves  absolutely  nothing  unsaid,  not  even  that  which  every 
reader  could  supply  for  himself;  and  this  pedantic  discursive- 
ness detracts  considerably  from  the  otherwise  real  thoroughness 
of  the  treatment. — (The  "Wolfian  philosophy  was  applied  to 
theological  ethics  by  Cam  (§  40),  by  Bertling  [1753],  and  by 
Reusch  [1760] ;  J.  C.  Schubert  [1759,  '60,  '62]  is  more  indepen- 
dent.)— The  not  sufficiently  prized  P.  Hanssen  (of  Schleswig- 
Holstein)  gave  in  his  "  Christian  Ethics  "  (1739,  '49)  a  very 
clear  and  sound  presentation  of  the  evangelical  doctrine, — a 
work  which  gives  evidence  of  a  truly  philosophical  spirit,  and 
protests  against  the  one-sidedness  of  Wolf;  in  the  first  general 
part,  he  develops  the  threefold  form  of  the  moral  life — in  the 
state  of  innocence  or  perfection,  in  the  state  of  sin,  and  in 
that  of  regeneration.  T.  Criiger  (of  Chemnitz)  develops,  in  his 
Apparatus  theol.  moral.  Ohristi  et  renatorum  (1747,  4to.),  the 
thought  of  the  moral  pattern  as  found  in  Christ,  and  hence  of 


326  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  42. 

an  ethical  Christology  and  of  its  application  to  the  life  of  Chris- 
tians, with  great  profoundness  and  uncommon  erudition,  though 
in  a  somewhat  stiff,  over-carefully-classified,  scholastic  form. 

Mosheim's  comprehensive  "  Ethics  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,"  * 
though  in  its  sometimes  almost  hortatory  discursiveness,  often 
unnecessarily  detailed,  yet  differs  from  works  of  the  Wolfian 
and  the  earlier  schools  by  a  beautiful,  animated  and  popular 
form,  free  of  all  stiff  scholastic-elements,  and  gives  evidence  of 
a  close  observation  of  life,  of  impartial  and  profound  study  of 
the  Scriptures,  of  a  simple,  mild,  evangelical  spirit,  and  of  a 
thorough  and  careful  attention  to  details ;  but  the  scientific 
demonstration  and  development  are  frequently  feeble,  and, 
despite  all  his  insisting  on  the  rationality  of  Christian  morality, 
the  philosophical  element  is  almost  entirely  overlooked ;  the 
antitheses  of  view,  as  developed  in  the  two  churches,  are  not 
made  prominent.  The  whole  subject  is  distributed  into  the 
consideration  of  the  inner  holiness  of  the  soul,  and  into  that 
of  the  outer  holiness  of  the  walk.  Miller's  continuation  of  the 
work,  though  furnished  with  more  learned  apparatus,  is  less 
mature  and  also  less  inviting  in  form. — Crusius,  whom  we  have 
already  mentioned  as  a  philosophical  moralist,  wrote  also  a 
"  Moral  Theology  "  (1772)  which  is  inspired  with  a  philosophic- 
al spirit,  and  gives  evidence  of  deeply  Christian  knowledge. — 
Ttillner,  1762,  wrote  rather  on  the  treatment  of  ethics  than  on 
ethics  itself, — already  quite  Rationalistic;  Reuss,  1767,  uncom- 
pleted ;  the  work  of  G.  Less,  (1777,  and  subsequently),  is  not 
important;  H.  C.  Tittmann,  1783,  '94,  endeavors  to  be  strictly 
Biblical  but  is  without  depth ;  'Morns'  work,  1794,  is  imper- 
fectly edited  from  his  lectures, — partially  based  on  Crusius, 
frequently  rationalistic.  The  Englishman,  Thomas  Stackhouse, 
wrote  on  Christian  ethics  in  a  plain  and  Biblical  spirit,  treating 
mainly  only  of  general  questions.  The  Reformed  divine,  End&- 
mann  of  Marburg,  closes  the  series  of  Reformed  moralists 
(1780),  but  he  bears  the  distinctively  Reformed  character  only 
in  very  feeble  traits. 

*  1735-70 ;  continued  by  Miller,  1762;  Miller  -wrote  also  a  special 
Einleit,  in  die  theol.  Moral,  1772,  and  a  short  Lehrbuch,  i?7S. 


§  43.]  KANT.  327 


SECTION  XLIH. 

In  the  system  of  Kant  philosophical  ethics  put 
off  the  naturalistic  or  subjectivistic  character;  the 
moral  idea  attained,  on  the  basis  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  to  an  objective  significancy,  and  became  an 
end  per  se,  and  not  simply  a  means  to  the  end  of  in- 
dividual happiness.  Independently  of  the  theoretical 
reason  and  of  the  God-consciousness,  the  moral  idea 
became  the  presupposition  and  basis  of  all  specula- 
tion on  the  supersensuous,  and  hence  also  of  rational 
religion.  The  universal  validity  of  the  moral  law 
became  the  formal,  and,  pretendedly  also,  the  mate- 
rial principaf  of  morality.  But  the  one-sided  rational 
character  of  this  morality  left  essential  phases  of  the 
moral  unaccounted  for  ;  and  the  merely  formal  char- 
acter of  the  moral  law  admitted  of  no  consequential 
carrying-out  in  detail. — The  application  of  Kantian 
ground-thoughts  to  theological  ethics  was  of  two-fold 
effect, — raising  it  indeed  above  the  utilitarian  ethics 
of  the  "illuministic  "  current,  but  robbing  it,  in  its 
divorce  from  religion,  of  a  part  of  its  Christian  char- 
acter. 

Previous  philosophical  ethics  had  gone  astray  in  two  respects. 
The  two  equally  true  and  necessary  thoughts,  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  moral  idea  has  a  universally  valid  significancy,  that 
it  cannot  be  dependent  in  its  obligating  character  on  the  chance 
caprice  of  the  individual  subject,  and  that  yet,  on  the  other,  it 
has  in  fact  for  its  end  the  perfection  of  the  person,  and  hence 
also  his  happiness,  had  been  one-sidedly  held  fast  to,  each  for  it- 
self. Naturalistic  Pantheism  gave  validity  simply  to  the  objec- 
tive significancy  of  the  moral, — absolutely  annihilated  the  free- 
dom of  the  will,  and  conceived  by  the  moral  law  as  a  mere  fatal- 
ism unalterably  determining  every  individual ;  and  when,  with 
the  champions  of  materialistic  atheism,  this  notion  of  the  unfree 


328  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  43. 

determination  of  the  individual,  ultimated  practically  in  an 
entire  letting-loose  of  the  passions,  it  was  not  without  the 
countenance  of  strict  consistency  with  the  ground  principle. 
The  opposite  tendency  proceeded  from  the  subject,  emphasizing 
his  free  will,  and  hence  looking  less  to  the  ground  than  to  the 
end  of  the  moral  activity ;  man  was  to  be  determined  by  noth- 
ing which  does  not  leave  him  absolutely  free,  which  does  not 
contribute  to  his  own  individual  advantage,  in  other  words, 
by  the  thought  of  individual  happiness.  While  the  first  ten- 
dency undermined  morality  by  the  fact  that  it  annihilated  the 
moral  subject,  sinking  him  into  a  mere  unfree  member  of  the 
great  world-machine,  the  other  tendency  imperiled  morality 
in  its  innermost  essence,  in  a  no  less  degree,  by  the  fact  that  it 
required  no  self-subordination  of  the  subject  under  a  per  se 
valid  idea,,  but  emphasized  the  absolute  claims  of  the  individ- 
ual personality,  so  that  in  fact  in  their  ultimate  consequences 
the  two  opposite  tendencies  resulted,  equally,  in  the  letting- 
loose  of  the  individual  in  his  unbridled  naturalness. — Christian 
ethics  could  not,  save  by  letting  itself  be  led  astray  by  philos- 
ophy, fall  into  either  of  these  errors.  That  the  moral  idea  is 
valid  per  se,  that  it  has  an  unconditional,  universally-obligating 
significancy,  is  here  a  point  settled  from  the  very  start,  inas- 
much as  it  conceives  this  idea  as  the  holy  will  of  God.  He 
who  inquires  first  as  to  himself,  and  only  afterward  as  to  the  will 
of  God,  has  absolutely  reversed  the  moral  relation.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is,  in  Christian  ethics,  not  in  the  least  doubtful, 
that  this  will  of  God  has  in  view  the  perfection  of  man,  and 
hence  also  his  perfect  happiness, — that  man,  in  fulfilling  God's 
will  becomes  also  truly  happy,  and  does  not  lose  his  freedom 
but  brings  it  to  perfection. — It  was  high  time,  toward  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  to  set  bounds  to  the  decline  of 
philosophical  ethics ;  the  two  opposed  currents  had  attained  to 
their  last  corrupt  consequences,  subversive  of  all  morality. 
The  "  eudemonistic  "  tendency  could  oppose  nothing  else  to 
the  frivolous  enjoyment-seeking  and  conscienceless  self-seeking 
of  the  materialistic  tendency,  than  an  insipid  utilitarian  moral- 
ity essentially  identical  at  bottom  with  the  other,  and  which 
differed  from  it  only  by  an  air  of  external  decency,  but  not  by 
profundity  of  th'ought  or  moral  worthiness.  It  was  a  great 
forward-step  of  philosophical  thought-development  when 


§43.]  KANTIAN  ETHICS.  329 

Kant,  with  mighty  hand,  dashed  to  atoms  both  these  moral 
structures,  and  built  up  a  new  firmer-based  system ;  although 
his  own  age,  in  its  enthusiasm  for  him,  no  less  than  he  himself, 
sadly  deceived  themselves  as  to  the  perfection  and  durability 
of  the  same. 

His  first  and  by  no  means  unimportant  service  consists  in 
the  fact  that  basing  himself  primarily  on  the  skepticism  of 
Hume,  he  annihilated,  at  a  single  stroke,  all  confidence  in  pre- 
vious methods  of  philosophizing,  whether  speculative  or  em- 
pirical, and  deprived  both  empiricism  and  the  pure  theoretical 
reason,  in  so  far  as  it  had  thus  far  been  developed,  of  all  right 
to  pretend  to  establish,  in  respect  to  the  supersensuous,  or 
the  ideal,  any  thing  whatever  as  philosophical  knowledge. 
Though  in  his  "Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason"  (1781)  Kant 
had  ascribed  to  the  speculative  reason,  in  the  sphere  of 
theoretical  knowledge,  really  only  the  function  of  formal 
thought  or  logic,  he  yet  attained  in  fact  to  a  positive  knowl-- 
edge  of  reality  in  the  sphere  of  the  practical  reason,  that  is, 
in  that  of  morality.*  Reason  is  not  merely  a  cognizing,  but 
also  a  volitionating  power;  hence  there  is  not  merely  a  ra- 
tional knowledge  of  that  which  is,  namely,  theoretical  or 
pure  reason,  but  also  of  that  which,  through  rational  volition, 
ought  to  be,  namely,  practical  reason;  the  former  seeks  in 
every  given  reality  for  the  rational  beginning,  the  ground ; 
the  practical  reason  seeks  for  the  rational  goal,  the  end.  This 
end  can,  as  a  rational  one,  not  be  fortuitous,  arbitrary,  or 
doubtful,  but  must  have  an  unconditional  absolutely-valid 
character.  The  office  of  reason  is  here  entirely  other  than  in 
the  sphere  of  pure  theoretical  cognition ;  the  practical  reason 
directs  itself  toward  something  which  is  not  yet  real,  but 
which  should  through  reason  become  real,  and  which,  conse- 
quently depends  upon  reason;  hence  reason  is  here,  as  in 
contrast  to  the  other  sphere,  in  its  own  sphere  proper,  where 
it  itself  actively  creates  its  own  object, — is  free  and  responsi- 
ble. Man,  as  a  spirit,  can  choose  whatever  object  of  action 
he  pleases,  but  as  a  rational  spirit  he  should  set  before  hiin- 

*  Qrundlegung  sur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  1785;  Krittie  der  prakti- 
scTien  Vernunft,  1788,  the  chief  work  of  the  Kantian  form  of  ethics ; 
Metaph.  Anfangtgrilttde  der  RecTitslehre,  1797;  Metaph.  Anf.  der  Tit- 
gendlehre,  1797. 


330  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§43. 

self  only  a  rational,  and  hence  absolutely  valid  object.  As 
he  acts  here  in  a  sphere  determined  by  himself,  hence  he  is 
dependent  only  upon  himself ;  in  willing  and  acting,  man  is 
free.  A  rational  end  is  such  a  one  as  must  be  recognized  by 
every  rational  man,  as  his  own  end ;  for  reason  is  not  a  merely 
individual  quality,  but  is  in  all  men  the  same ;  hence  the  ra- 
tionality of  the  end  consists  in  its  universal  validity.  Hence 
the  highest  principle  of  all  rational  moral  action  is  the  law : 
"act  in  such  a  manner  that  the  maxim  of  thy  conduct  is 
adapted  to  become  a  universal  law  for  all  men."  (Maxim  is 
here  taken  as  the  subjective  principle  of  moral  action  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  objectively-valid  law.)  The  obligatori- 
ness  of  such  action  lies  exclusively  in  my  rationality,  and  is 
hence  entirely  unconditional ;  should  I  act  otherwise  I  would 
not  be  rational;  hence  this  law  of  the  reason  is  the  "cate- 
gorical imperative.'"1  I  am  here  to  inquire  not  after  my  own 
happiness,  but  only  after  that  which  is  rational ;  I  ought  to  be 
rational ;  to  this  end  I  need  no  other  motive  than  my  own  ra- 
tional nature  itself.  To  make  my  own  happiness  the  end  of 
my  moral  activity — eudemonism — is  irrational  and  immoral ; 
for,  because  of  the  fortuity  of  the  outward  conditions  of  hap- 
piness, and  of  the  heterogeneousness  of  claims  upon  happi- 
ness, the  moral  would  be  rendered  dependent  upon  accident 
and  caprice.  The  moral  reason  is  absolutely  free  only  when 
it  has  absolutely  within  itself  the  law  and  the  motive  of  ac- 
tion, and  where  it  makes  itself  dependent  on  no  other  con- 
ditions not  given  within  itself.  kl Autonomy"  constitutes 
the  essence  of  reason  and  the  dignity  of  human  nature. 
Reason,  in  a  practical  law,  determines  the  will  directly,  and 
not  by  means  of  an  intervening  feeling  of  pleasure  or  dis- 
pleasure. To  be  happy  is  indeed  the  legitimate  and  naturally- 
necessary  striving  of  every  rational  being,  but  such  a  ground 
for  action  can  be  known  and  recognized  only  empirically, 
whereas  the  moral  law  must  necessarily  have  objective  un- 
conditional validity.  What  is  good  or  evil  cannot  be  known 
through  any  thing  outside  of  reason,  but  only  through  reason 
itself ;  but  feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeasure  belong  not  to 
reason,  but  to  the  lower'sphere  of  the  spirit-life. 

Though  morality  as  resting  exclusively  upon  the  categori- 
cal imperative  of  the  reason  has  not  happiness  for  its  motive, 


§43.]  KANTIAN   ETHICS.  331 

yet  it  earns  a  right  to  happiness ;  virtue  is  the  subjective  fit- 
ness for  and  worthiness  of  happiness,  that  is,  for  that  condi- 
tion of  a  rational  being  to  whom,  in  its  entire  existence, 
every  thing  goes  according  to  wish  and  will,  and  where 
consequently  also  the  outward  relations,  including  those  of 
nature,  harmonize  with  the  spiritual  and  moral  reality  of  the 
person.  Neither  virtue  per  se,  nor  happiness  per  se,  but  hap- 
piness as  attendant  upon  virtue,  constitutes  the  true,  perfect 
life-condition  of  man — his  highest  good.  The  moral  law  per  sc 
is  the  sole  true  motive  of  the  will,  while  the  idea  of  the 
highest  good  is  an  object  of  reason.  Happiness  depends  not 
merely  upon  our  rational  will,  but  also  upon  outer  conditions 
which  lie  not  within  our  power.  Hence  happiness  and  virtue 
are  not  identical  (as  the  Greek  moralists  taught),  but  have 
primarily  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  each  other ;  the  virtu- 
ous man  may  possibly  be  very  unhappy,  namely,  in  so  far  as 
his  condition  is  not  dependent  upon  himself, — which  is  in 
fact  another  proof  that  the  striving  after  virtue  and  the 
striving  after  happiness  are  not  one  and  the  same  thing,  and 
that  the  striving  after  happiness  per  se  is  neither  moral  nor 
leads  to  morality.  In  this  distinction  lies  the  dialectics  of 
the  practical  reason;  happiness  is  not  already  included  in 
virtue  itself, — stands  therewith  not  in  analytical  but  in  syn- 
thetic connection ;  and  hence  we  are  brought  to  the  important 
question :  how  is  the  highest  good  practically  possible  f  that 
is,  how  can  the  two  essentially  different  elements  of  this  good 
be  brought  into  perfect  harmony? — The  highest  good  is  a 
demand  of  the  practical  reason;  the  demand  of  happiness  for 
the  virtuous  is  just  as  rational  as  that  of  virtue  itself ;  but  its 
realization  rests  not  (as  that  of  virtue)  within  our  free  power, 
but  is  rather  a  morally  necessary  demand  upon  the  moral  gov- 
ernment of  the  world, — a  " postulate  of  the  practical  reason." 
The  demand,  the  postulate,  of  a  perfect  morality  which  is 
not  fully  to  be  attained  to  in  this  temporal,  sensuously-limited 
life,  and  of  a  correspondent  happiness,  that  is,  the  demand 
of  the  highest  good,  finds  its  fulfillment  only  in  the  assump- 
tion of  an  immortality  of  the  rational  personality,  and  of  a 
universal  government  of  an  all-wise,  just  and  almighty  Q-od. 
These  postulates  have,  in  virtue  of  the  moral  nature  of  man, 
entire  moral  certainty,  because  it  is  only  on  the  assumption 


332  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  43. 

of  their  truth  that  the  morally-rational  life  can  attain  to  its 
goal.  Thus  the  moral  law  leads,  through  the  idea  of  the 
highest  good  as  the  object  and  end  of  the  practical  reason, 
to  religion,  that  is,  to  the  conceiving  of  all  duties  as  divine 
commands, — not  indeed  as  arbitrary  prescriptions  of  an  ex- 
ternal will,  but  as  essential  and  morally-necessary  laws  of 
every  free  rational  will  per  se,  which,  however,  must  be 
looked  upon  as  divine  commands,  because  it  is  only  on  the 
supposition  of  a  moral  Infinite  Will  that  we  can  attain  to  the 
highest  good.  Thus  the  moral  striving  is  preserved  from 
becoming  selfish,  and  the  thought  of  happiness  is  not  made 
the  motive  of  morality,  but  this  motive  is  and  remains  abso- 
lutely nothing  else  but  the  moral  law;  but,  through  the 
religious  consciousness,  our  reason  attains  to  certainty  and 
confidence  in  its  moral  aspirations.  Ethics  will  never  be- 
come a  doctrine  of  happiness,  an  art  of  becoming  happy ;  it 
becomes  simply  the  doctrine  as  to  how  we  may  make  our- 
selves worthy  of  happiness.  Hence  the  moral  idea  rests  not 
upon  religion,  but,  conversely,  religion  rests  upon  the  pe>'  se 
certain  and  necessary  moral  idea, — follows  by  moral  neces- 
sity from  this  idea.  Man  is  not  moral  because  he  is  pious, 
but  he  is  pious  because  he  is  moral.  Morality  in  so  far  as  it 
'rests  upon  the  idea  of  a  free  and  rational  creature,  has  no 
need,  per  se,  of  religion,  because  it  has  no  end  nor  motive 
outside  of  itself,  but  it  leads  necessarily  to  religion,  and  thus 
gives  rise  to  the  idea  of  an  almighty  moral  Lawgiver  and 
world-Governor. — A  special  carrying-out  of  philosophical 
ethics,  Kant  has  not  really  given ;  we  find  only  a  scanty  ap- 
proach thereto  in  his  "Doctrine  of  Virtue,"  a  work  of  no 
great  importance,  and  which  already  betrays  marks  of  intel- 
lectual senility.  He  contents  himself  mostly  with  the  mere 
general  foundation-laying,  whereas  in  fact,  the  chief  question 
is :  in  how  far  the  general  thoughts  admit  also  of  being  car- 
ried out  in  detail?  Duties  toward  God  belong,  according  to 
Kant,  not  to  ethics  proper,  but  to  the  doctrine  of  religion.* 

Unquestionably  there  lies  in  the  ethics  of  Kant  a  decided 
advance  beyond  antecedent   philosophical  ethics,  and  espe- 
cially beyond  the  empirical  and  naturalistic.     He  raised  it 
from  the  low  region  of  a  self-seeking  or  external  utilitarian 
.  *  *  Met.  d.  Sitten,  ed.  1838,  p.  355  sqq. 


§  43.]  KANT  CRITICIZED.  333 

morality  into  the  dignity  of  the  science  of  a  purely  rational 
idea  transcending  all  mere  reality, — rejected  all  inferior  self- 
seeking  motives  to  morality,  and  insisted  on  the  unconditional 
validity  and  obligatoriness  of  the  moral  law.  While  there 
lies  in  this  a  decided  approximation  to  the  Christian  concep- 
tion of  the  moral,  still  the  great  difference  of  this  from  the 
Christian  view,  and  the  inner  weakness  of  the  Kantian  system 
as  a  whole,  are  unmistakable.  The  independence  of  morality 
on  religion  which  follows  from  Kant's  theory  of  rational 
knowledge,  makes  it  impossible  for  the  moral  principle  to  ob- 
tain positive  contents ;  his  much  admired  moral  law,  and  for 
which  he  puts  forth  such  high  claims,  says  in  fact  absolutely 
nothing,  and  does  not  lead,  save  by  arbitrarily  calling  in  aid 
from  without,  a  single  step  further ;  and  it  is  manifestly  not 
without  good  reason,  that  Kant  developed  no  system  of  ethics 
proper.  The  above-mentioned  formula  expresses  not,  properly 
speaking,  the  moral  law  itself,  but  only  the  universal  validity 
of  the  law  which  is  yet  to  be  discovered, — says,  in  fact,  noth- 
ing else  than:  "act  according  to  rational,  and  hence  univer- 
sally-valid law  ;  "  but  if  we  now  ask,  what  then  is  this  law,  we 
are  left  entirely  without  answer.  The  application  of  this 
formal  principle  becomes  in  each  particular  case  an  experi- 
ment, an  examination  of  the  question :  can  I  will  that  all  men 
should  act  according  to  the  same  maxim  by  which  I  act?  But 
we  have  absolutely  no  clue  or  criterion  as  to  whence  and  on 
what  basis  the  answer  is  to  be  given,  inasmuch  as  the  moral 
law  is  utterly  destitute  of  positive  contents ;  we  could  at  best 
only  start  the  inquiry  as  to  what  the  result  would  be  in  case 
all  men  acted  as  we ;  but  this,  as  a  judging  of  morality  by 
the  result,  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  other  moral  views 
of  Kant,  and  would  be  the  worst  of  all  empiricism, — as  in  fact 
not  the  real,  but  only  the  possible  or  probable  result  could 
be  taken  into  consideration.  But  in  case,  now,  some  one 
should,  in  view  of  some  per  se  immoral  action,  come  to  the 
manifestly  possible,  though  erroneous  conviction,  that  such 
action  is  adapted  to  be  practiced  universally,  then  such  a 
person  would  be  entirely  unassailable  and  unreformable  from 
the  stand-point  of  Kant,  and  thus  an  error  in  the  calculating 
understanding  would  jeopardize  the  entire  moral  conduct  of 
the  person.  And  in  fact  Helvetius  and  La  Mettrie  affirmed 


CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  43. 

without  hesitation,  that  their  own  maxim  was  adapted  to  be 
a  universally  valid  law ;  what  could  Kant  then  object  to  them, 
seeing  that  they  recognized  his  formal  principle  ?  The  Kantian 
moral  law,  which  he  himself  declared  to  be  purely  formal,  is 
moreover  incorrect  even  in  formal  respects.  Inasmuch  as, 
according  to  Kant,  a  maxim  is  the  subjective  rule  which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  my  conduct,  hence  it  is  for  that  very  reason 
per  se  utterly  unadapted  to  be  made  into  a  universal  law  for 
all  men ;  a  maxim  is  the  law  as  subjectively  conditioned  and 
shaped,  and  has  in  fact,  in  its  subjective  form,  validity  only 
for  this  particular  subject.  The  moral  maxim  of  an  educator 
and  guide  is  not  adapted  to  be  also  the  maxim  of  him  who  is 
to  be  guided  and  led, — that  of  a  warrior  cannot  be  that  of  a 
clergyman.  Although  it  is  true  that  the  law  which  forms  the 
basis  of  my  maxim  must  be  universally  valid,  yet  I  cannot 
derive  the  law  from  the  maxim,  but  only  the  maxim  from  the 
law.  Kant  gives  not  the  contents  of  the  law,  but  only  the 
way  in  which  the  contents  may  be  found ;  this  way,  however, 
is  in  contradiction  to  his  entire  system,  and  is  not  merely  a 
purely  empirical  or  rather  experimental  one,  but  also  an  en- 
tirely false  one.  In  the  very  attempt  at  rejecting  every 
merely  individual  element  as  determinative,  Kant  exalts  it  in 
fact  to  the  solely  determining  one. 

Kant  undertakes,  now,  actually  to  advance  further  by  the 
aid  of  this  formal  principle,  and  infers  from  it,  as  a  second 
formula,  the  principle:  "act  in  such  a  manner  as  to  consider 
and  use  rational  nature,  that  is,  humanity  in  general,  both  in 
thy  own  person  and  also  in  the  person  of  every  other  one, 
always,  at  the  same  time,  as  an  end,  and  never  merely  as  a 
means," — namely,  because  rational  nature  is  personality,  and 
personality  is  an  end  in  itself.  Kant  himself  admits  that 
this  formula  is  merely  formal ;  but  precisely  in  this  fact  lies 
its  defectiveness,  for  it  is  just  as  impossible  to  attain  to  posi- 
tive contents  from  merely  formal  principles  as  to  obtain  a 
real  value  from  a  purely  algebraic  equation.  When  the  prin- 
ciple is  only  a  mere  empty  space  which  is  first  to  be  filled 
from  without,  and  not  the  fountain  which  unfolds  itself  into 
a  stream,  there  is  no  possibility  of  advancing  a  step  further. 
And  hence,  the  above  formula  may  be  applied  equally  well 
morally  and  immorally ;  the  whole  question  depends  on,  what 


§43.]  KANT  CRITICIZED.  335 

the  end  is,  for  which  I  consider  the  person ;  it  might  in  fact ' 
be  an  end  of  Satanic  malice.  This  second  principle  is,  in  its 
arbitrarily-determined  form  (and  which  in  fact  embraces  only 
a  limited  part  of  morality)  still  less  adapted  to  its  purpose 
than  the  first,  with  which  in  fact  it  stands  in  no  logical  con- 
nection. 

Another  wide-reaching  defect  of  Kantian  ethics  is  this,  that 
morality  appears  as  a  mere  one-sided  affair  of  the  understand- 
ing, while  the  heart  entirely  disappears,  and  is  left  utterly 
unexplained.  This  one-sidedness  results  of  course  from  the 
divorce  of  morality  from  religion.  It  sounds  plausibly,  and 
is  likewise  very  easily  said,  that  the  good  must  be  done  for 
its  own  sake,  that  the  law  of  the  reason  must  be  per  se  the 
direct  motive  to  moral  action ;  but  as  Kant  positively  admits 
elsewhere  the  possibility  that  man  can  act  also  against  his 
better  knowledge,  and  consequently  against  his  conscience, 
hence  this  undenjable  fact  proves  that  rational  knowledge  is 
not  per  se  a  sufficient  motive  to  moral  action.  The  thought 
of  love  is  wanting ;  man  can  indeed  act  against  his  knowledge, 
but  not  against  his  love.  It  is  only  in  a  love  of  the  good  that 
a  sufficient  motive  for  moral  action  is  found;  but  in  this  God- 
ignoring  morality  of  the  understanding,  love  has  no  ground 
and  no  place.  The  love  of  the  living  God  can  enkindle  love, 
but  an  abstract  thought  cannot.  Kant  demands  simply  un- 
conditional obedience,  but  not  love ;  he  expressly  declares 
that  the  law  must  often  be  fulfilled  even  against  our  inclina- 
tions, yea,  in  the  face  of  decided  repugnance ;  but  this  would 
amount  only  to  an  outward  fulfilling  of  duty.  Kant's  mo- 
rality is  possible  only  for  beings  who  have  in  themselves  no 
manner  of  sin  and  no  germ  of  sin ;  but  so  soon  as  even  the 
mere  possibility  of  an  already-existing  sinfulness  is  admitted, 
this  ethical  system  loses  all  foundation ;  for  both  the  certainty 
and  also  the  potency  of  the  rational  law  as  a  motive,  are  there- 
by undermined.  And  now  Kant  in  fact  admits, — in  his  re- 
ma'rkable  work:  "  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Pure  Rea- 
son "  (1792,  '94)—  (which,  with  the  exception  of  the  one  point 
here  in  question,  became  the  catechism  of  Rationalism) — the 
indwelling  of  an  evil  principle  in  man  along-side  of  the  good 
one,  a  "  radical  evil  in  human  nature,"  existing  there  already 
anterior  to  any  exercise  of  freedom, — a  tendency  to  evil  in- 


336  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  43. 

hering  in  all  men  without  exception,  as  a  subjective  motive- 
power  antecedent  to  all  action, — apeccatum  originarium,  which 
he  describes  with  such  dark  colors  that  even  the  strongest 
presentations  of  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  hereditary  sin  would 
fail  to  depict  the  natural  man  so  unfavorably ;  but  by  this  admis- 
sion, Kant  undermines  his  entire  moral  system,  for  he  thereby 
renders  it  entirely  incomprehensible,  how  the  mere  knowledge 
of  the  moral  law  (if  indeed,  under  such  circumstances,  such  a 
knowledge  could  in  fact  be  certain  and  unclouded)  could  be 
the  motive  to  a  willing  fulfillment  of  the  same,  seeing  that, 
in  fact,  the  love  of  man  is  turned  in  the  direction  of  evil. 
And  though  it  is  true  that  often  precisely  in  the  contradic- 
tions of  a  system,  the  deeper  presentiment  of  the  truth  is  in 
fact  contained,  still  the  system  itself  is  thereby  overturned 
and  proven  untrue.  And  in  general  the  antithesis  of  reason 
and  sensuousness,  which  extends  through  Kant's  entire  world- 
theory,  is  in  no  respect  rendered  comprehensible,  nor  concili- 
ated; it  appears  simply  as  a  fact,  broadly  prominent  and 
defying  all  comprehension. — Another  peculiarity  of  Kantian 
ethics  is  its  utter  lack  of  appreciation  for  history,  although 
this  was  in  fact  characteristic  of  the  entire  epoch ;  his  ethics 
has  history  neither  as  its  presupposition,  nor  as  its  end,  nor 
as  its  contents.  Each  man  stands  unconnected  with  the  his- 
torical development  of  the  spirit, — is  considered  only  as  a 
rational  unity,  and  acts  only  as  such ;  and  there  is  also  a  lack 
of  all  appreciation  for  an  historical  goal  of  the  moral,  for  a 
morality  of  humanity,  for  the  rational  moral  significancy  of 
universal  history. 

The  Kantian  ground-principles  of  ethics  were  further  carried 
out  and  applied,  with  partial  modifications,  by  Kiesewetter 
(1789),  by  K.  C.  E.  Schmid  (1790),  by  the  Roman  Catholic 
Mutschelle  (1788,  '94),  by  Snell  (1805)  in  smooth,  popular  style, 
by  L.  H.  Jacob  (1794),  by  Heydenreich  (1794),  by  Tief trunk 
(1789  and  later),  and  by  others. 

Kant's  moral  system  was,  in  its  general  character,  very  poorly 
adapted  to  be  applied  to  Christian  ethics.  Its  absolutely  un- 
historical  character,  its  merely  formal  principle  the  application 
of  which  rests  simply  on  reflective  calculation,  its  lack  of  any 
other  moral  motive  than  the  authority  of  an  abstract  law,  and 
above  all  the  reversing  of  the  Christian  relation  between  mor- 


§43.]  KANT  AND   CHRIST.  337 

ality  and  religion, — all  this  could  not,  on  its  application  to 
theological  ethics,  fail  to  endanger  the  Christian  character 
thereof,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  opposed  with  moral 
earnestness  the  insipid  utilitarian  morality  of  deistical  "  illu- 
minism."  Precisely  this  divorcing  of  morality  from  religion — 
a  direct  contradiction  to  the  Christian  view — was  very  much 
in  harmony  with  the  dominant  spirit  of  the  age ;  and  this  in 
fact  accounts  in  part  for  the  warm  welcome  which  Kant's 
moral  system  met  with  also  within  the  sphere  of  the  already 
deeply  sunken  theological  world ;  and  upon  this  adoption  of 
Kantian  views  rests  the  general  development  of  the  system 
of  Rationalism.  The  dogmatic  element  of  the  Christian 
religion, — reduced  now  to  the  ideas  of  God,  of  immortality 
and  of  Christ  as  the  ideal  of  virtue, — sank  into  secondary  im- 
portance— into  dependence  on  the  morality  given  with  full 
certainty  in  reason  itself;  the  historical  phase  of  Christianity 
was  without  worth ;  Christ  himself  was  admired  only  in  so  far 
as  he  had  realized  in  himself  the  moral  law  given  already  in 
reason, — only  as  a  teacher  of  "  illuministic  "  morality,  and  as  a 
living  exemplification  of  the  same.  It  was  not  evangelical 
faith  that  could  lean  with  confidence  upon  Kant,  but  rather 
only  the  anti-Christian  tendency,  which  had  thus  far  been 
represented  in  "  illuminism, "  and  which  now,  in  fact,  received 
from  Kant  a  more  earnestly-ethical  and  scientific  character. 
We  have  no  wish  to  deny  this  scientific  impulse  given  to  the- 
ology ;  but  when  (as  is  done  by  Daniel  Schenkel  in  his  Dog- 
matics) Kant  is  exalted  into  an  essential  and  necessary  reformer 
of  the  whole  field  of  evangelical  theology,  through  whom  there 
has  been  wrought  "  a  deep-reaching  reaction  on  the  part  of  the 
ethical  factor  against  the  fanatical-grown  doctrinism  of  the 
dogmatics  of  the  seventeenth  century  "  which  had  annihilated 
all  interest  in  ethics, — such  a  manner  of  viewing  the  matter  sim- 
ply indicates  a  forgetfulness  of  the  fact  that  this  orthodoxy  in 
question  had  been  already  for  almost  a  century  devoid  of 
vitality,  and  that  in  the  meantime  the  philosophy  of  Wolf  and 
the  movement  of  Pietism  had  given  theology  an  entirely  other 
direction,  and  that  Pietism  especially  had  in  fact  almost  one- 
sidedly  emphasized  £he  moral  phase  of  Christianity, — so  that 
there  could  hardly  have  been  need  of  the  Kantian  moralism  as 
the  sole  salvation  against  said  doctrinal  "  fanaticism." 


338  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§44. 

The  most  important  theological  presentations  of  ethics  from 
the  Kantian  stand-point  are :  J.  W.  Schmid  ("  Spirit  of  the 
Ethics  of  Jesus,"  1790;  "Theological  Ethics,"  1793;  "Chris- 
tian Ethics,"  1797),  who  presents  the  founding  of  ethics  on 
Kantian  principles  as  the  sole  mission  of  Jesus ;  J.  E.  C.  Schmidt 
(1799),  in  a  similar  spirit;  S.  G.  Lange ;  S.  Vogel.  Staudlin 
treated  theological  ethics  (from  and  after  1798)  with  constant 
changing  of  title  and  stand-point,  until  in  his  "  New  Treatise 
on  Ethics"  (1813,  third  edition,  1825)  he  despaired  of  any  su- 
perior principle  at  all,  and  brought  together,  in  a  wavering 
eclecticism  of  heterogeneous  thoughts,  a  feeble  whole.  The 
self-metamorphosing  C.  F.  von  Amman  repeated  at  first 
(1795-'98)  simply  the  ethics  of  Kant,  but  soon  after  (1800) 
broke  entirely  away  from  him,  without  yet  getting  rid  of  his 
own  superficiality. 

SECTION   XLIV. 

The  philosophy  of  Fichte,  resting  upon  Kant,  but, 
with  rigid  consequentially,  proceeding  beyond  him, 
manifested  itself  predominantly  upon  the  ethical 
field.  Fichte  endeavored  indeed  to  complement  the 
formal  principle  by  a  material  one,  but  both  of  them 
are  so  absolutely  devoid  of  ethical  contents,  and  the 
material  principle  stands  even  so  positively  in  antag- 
onism to  the  contents  of  a  really  moral  conscious- 
ness, that  an  actual  ethical  development  of  these 
principles  became  impossible;  and  the  occasionally 
sound  and  morally-earnest  contents  of  the  develop- 
ment in  detail  could  only  be  loosely  associated  with 
these  principles,  but  not  scientifically  developed  from 
them.  The  immaturity  of  the  entire  stand-point 
rendered  it  also  impossible  that  any  important 
ethical  tendency  in  philosophy  or  theology  should 
arise  therefrom.  Fichte  labored  indeed  fruitfully  in 
a  time  which  had  lost  all  solid  philosophical  foot 
hold,  but  he  formed  no  school. 


§44.]  FICHTEAN  ETHICS.  839 

Fichte's  "  System  of  Ethics  according  to  the  Principles  of 
the  Doctrine  of  Science  "  (1798)  is  the  most  important  attempt 
to  apply  tlie  ground-thoughts  of  the  "  Doctrine  of  Science  "  to 
one  particular  science.  We  would  do  injustice  to  the  Fichtean 
philosophy  were  we  to  consider  its  unfruitful  eccentricities 
apart  from  their  connection  with  the  immediately-preceding 
philosophy;  his  philosophy  is  a  scientifically-justified  and 
necessary  advance  beyond  Kant.  As  Kant  had  denied  to  the 
pure  reason  all  objective  knowledge,  and  also  placed  all  con- 
tents of  the  practical  reason  exclusively  in  the  subject,  and 
derived  the  objective  validity  of  the  law  of  reason  simply  from 
the  subject ;  so  Fichte  simply  made  the  validity  of  the  indi- 
vidual subject,  the  ego,  all-predominant, — conceived  all  object- 
ive existence  merely  negatively  as  the  non-ego,  and  based  cog- 
nition and  volitionating  absolutely  on  the  individual  ego.  The 
ego  and  the  non-ego  reciprocally  determine  each  other,  and 
hence  stand  in  reciprocal  relation.  The  ego  posits  itself  as 
determined  by  the  non-ego,  that  is,  it  cognizes  ;  and  it  posits 
itself,  on  the  other  hand,  as  determining  in  relation  to  the  non- 
ego,  that  is,  it  wlitionates.  The  two  are  only  two  phases  of 
the  same  thing,  inasmuch  as  the  non-ego  in  its  entire  being  ex- 
ists only  in  so  far  as  it  is  posited  by  the  ego,  so  that,  strictly 
speaking,  the  ego  is  its  own  object.  The  ego  should  in  all  its 
determinations  be  posited  only  by  itself, — should  be  absolutely 
independent  of  all  non-ego.  Only  as  volitiouating,  as  abso- 
lutely determining  the  non-ego,  is  the  ego  free  and  independ- 
ent. The  ego  as  rational,  should  not  permit  itself  to  be  deter- 
mined by  any  non-ego  independent  of  it, — should  be  absolutely 
independent,  should  make  all  non-ego  absolutely  dependent  on 
itself, — should  exercise  absolute  causality  upon  the  same.  In 
freedom,  in  volitionating,  I  am  rational ;  and  in  that  I  deter- 
mine my  freedom  as  an  absolutely  self-poised  power,  that  is. 
affirm  my  freedom,  I  am  moral ;  hence  morality  is  self-determi- 
nation to  freedom.  I  should  act  freely  in  order  that  I  may 
become  free,  that  is,  I  should  act  with  the  consciousness  that  I 
determine  myself  in  absolute  independence.  Hence  the  formal 
principle  of  morality  is :  "  act  according  to  thy  conscience,"  or 
"  act  always  according  to  the  best  conviction  of  thy  duty ; " 
and  as  material  principle  of  ethics,  there  results  this:  "  make 
thyself  into  an  independent  or  free  being."  "I  should  be  a 

23 


340  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  44. 

self-dependent  being ;  this  is  my  destination ;  and  the  destination 
of  things  is,  that  I  use  them  in  furthering  my  independence." 

So  absolutely  void  a  principle  of  morality  was  probably 
never  before  proposed.  The  formal  principle  expresses  nothing 
other  than  :  act  according  to  a  yet  unknown  material  principle. 
As  to  what  the  "  conscience  "  is  and  contains,  we  are  as  yet 
utterly  uninformed ;  and  the  material  principle  gives  only  the 
formal  presupposition  of  morality,  but  not  its  contents  proper ; 
I  must  in  fact  already  be  free,  in  order  to  be  able  to  act  morally ; 
freedom  is  not  the  contents,  but  the  form,  of  moral  action.  If 
this  material  principle  is  to  be  taken  in  its  entire  significancy 
(and  according  to  the  philosophical  presupposition  this  is 
strictly  consequential),  then  the  very  opposite  of  all  morality 
would  be  thereby  expressed,  namely,  the  acting  absolutely  with- 
out law,  the  virtualizing  of  freedom  in  its  simple  form  without 
contents,  and  hence  as  mere  individual  caprice — amounting  to 
a  radical  absolutism  of  the  individual  subject,  whereas  all 
morality  consists  in  fact  most  essentially  in  a  determining  of 
individual  freedom  by  an  unconditionally  and  objectively  valid 
law, — is-  a  subordinating  of  the  subject  to  a  universally-obligat- 
ing idea  standing  above  the  subject.  From  Fichte's  principle 
there  results,  not  a  system  of  ethics,  but,  consequentially,  only 
a  theory  of  license.  While  it  is  true  that  in  his  examinations 
of  particular  moral  questions  only  loosely  connected  with  his 
system,  Fichte  shows  himself,  for  the  most  part,  high-minded 
and  earnest,  though  indeed  often  strangely  unpractical,  still 
there  lies,  at  least  in  his  ground-principle  and  in  his  general 
system,  no  justification  thereof.  Th*e  cold,  heartless,  non-los- 
ing, intellectual  character  of  his-  discussions,  is  moreover  not 
very  well  adapted  to  awaken  a  moral  interest. 

What  Fichte.  says  on  moral  questions  in  his  later,  more 
rhetorical  than  scientific,  writings-,  bears  in  general  the  same 
unfruitful  stamp, — often  widely  misunderstanding  the  reality 
of  life ;  we  need  only  call'  to  mind  the  new  system  of  education 
proposed  in  his  much  admired  "  Addresses  to  the  German  Na- 
tion," which  was  presented  with  the  assumption  of  world- 
regenerating  significancy,  but  at  which,  in  fact,  no  experienced 
educator  can  avoid  smiling,  and  also  his  "  Doctrine  of  the 
State "  which  is  even  more  than  fantastical.  The  public 
often  allowed  itself  to  be  deceived  by  the  ring  of  his  periods, 


§45.]  FICHTEAN   RELIGION.  341 

and  by  the  loftily  enigmatic  character  of  the  expression.  And 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  fanaticism  of  the  philosopher  him- 
self, or  that  entertained  for  him  by  others,  was  the  greater; 
certain  it  is,  however,  that  very  soon  there  was  a  vast  sobering- 
down  of  both.  We  will  here  only  refer  to  the  fact  that  Fichte 
was  personally  very  far  from  drawing  the  very  natural  conse- 
quences of  his  dangerous  moral  principle,  but  that  on  the  con- 
trary in  his  rhetorical  "  Direction  for  a  Holy  Life  "  (1807),  in 
which  he  already  largely  departs  from  his  earlier  views,  and 
takes  a  rather  mystico-Pantheistic  turn,  he  expressly  presents, 
as  the  goal  of  morality,  complete  "  self-annihilation " — not, 
however,  in  the  Christian  sense  of  moral  self-denial,  but  rather 
in  the  sense  of  the  religion  of  India.  The  belief  in  our  self- 
existence  must  be  absolutely  destroyed ;  by  this  course  the  ego 
that  was,  sinks  away  into  the  pure  divine  essence ;  we  should 
not  say :  let  the  love  and  the  will  of  God  become  mine,  because 
in  fact  there  are  no  longer  two,  but  only  One,  and  no  longer 
two  wills  but  simply  one.  So  long  as  man  yet  desires  to  be 
any  thing  himself,  God  comes  not  to  him ;  but  so  soon  as  he 
annihilates  himself  fully,  utterly  and  radically,  then  God  alone 
remains  and  is  all  in  all.  In  annihilating  himself  man  contin- 
ues in  God,  and  in  this  self-annihilation  consists  blessedness. 
The  scientific  justification  of  this  (in  some  respects)  not  un- 
ambiguous requirement,  is  not  given. — Notwithstanding  ,the 
enthusiasm  which  Fichte's  pretentious  philosophy  excited, 
especially  among  the  youth,  it  was  unable  to  create  any  long- 
enduring  movements  of  thought.  Feeble  attempts  to  develop 
it  further,  or,  in  fact,  to  apply  it  to  Christian  ethics  (Mehmel : 
"Elements,"  1811),  fell  very  soon  into  deserved  oblivion. 

SECTION  XLV. 

Schelling,  after  passing  from  Idealism  to  Panthe- 
ism, and  from  Pantheism  to  a  dualistic  Theosophy, 
endeavored,  in  this  his  third  development-period,  to 
reconcile  the  freedom  of  the  individual  with  the  sway 
of  necessity,  and  indeed  of  necessary  evil,  by  regard- 
ing individual  man  as  determining  himself  for  evil 
in  an  ante-mundane  self-determination  as  influenced 


CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§45. 

by  a  principle  of  darkness  lying  in  God  himself, — 
but  as  necessary  for  the  self-revelation  of  divine  love. 
The  presentations  of  philosophical  ethics  which  based 
themselves  on  Schelling,  have  been  unable  to  attain  to 
any  permanent  significancy. — The  imperfectly  devel- 
oped anti-Schellingian  philosophy  ofJacobi  answered, 
in  its  ethical  phases,  more  to  the  Christian  view,  but 
it  also  has  given  rise  to  no  real  ethical  system. 

Schelling,  appearing  at  first  as  a  disciple  of  Fichte  (at  a 
period  which  was  very  receptive  and  thankful  for  philosophy, 
even  for  a  youthfully  unripe  one),  and  then,  in  a  more  highly 
speculative  spirit  passing  beyond  him,  and  also  in  constant 
metamorphoses  progressively  rising  above  even  himself, — never 
settled,  never  bringing  any  thing  to  perfection, — did  not  de- 
velop in  his  earlier  period  any  ethical  system,  and,  at  furthest, 
only  gave,  on  purely  Pantheistic  foundations,  more  or  less  clear 
suggestions  toward  an  ethical  system ;  however,  in  his  last  pro- 
ductive period  (when,  under  the  stimulation  of  Jacob  Bb'hnie 
and  Francis  Baader,  he  plunged  into  a  current  of  phantasy- 
speculation  not  un-akin  to  Gnostic  dualism),  he  furnished,  in 
his  "  Philosophical  Inquiries  as  to  the  Essence  of  Human  Lib- 
erty" (1809),  a  less  dialectically  developed,  indeed,  than  theo- 
sophically-portrayed.  though  certainly  deeply  suggestive,  pres- 
entation of  the  presuppositions  and  bases  of  a  system  of  phil- 
osophical ethics. — In  God  there  exists,  before  all  reality,  his 
eternal  ground,  his  per  se  unintelligent  nature,  out  of  which  in 
all  eternity  the  divine  understanding  generates  itself  as  the 
eternal  antithesis  to  this  ground-nature,  which  understanding 
stands  dominatingly  over  against  this  nature, — rules  creatingly 
in  it,  and  by  its  acting  upon  it  creates  the  finite  world.  Eveiy 
creature  has  consequently  a  twofold  nature  in  itself :  an  essen- 
tially dark  principle  corresponding  to  the  nature-element  in 
God,  and  also  the  principle  of  light  or  understanding.  In  the 
highest  creature,  man,  there  exists  the  entire  power  of  the  dark 
principle,  namely,  the  unintelligent  self-will,  and  also  the  entire 
power  of  light — the  deepest  abyss  and  the  highest  heaven. 
From  the  fact  of  his  springing  from  the  ground  or  nature- 
element  in  God,  man  has  in  himself  a  principle  relatively  inde- 


§45.]  SCHELLINGTAN  ETHICS.  343 

pendent  of  God,  which,  answering  to  this  ground,  is  darkness, 
but  which  becomes  transfigured  by  the  light,  the  spirit.  But 
while  in  God  the  two  principles  are  indissolubly  united,  in  man 
they  are  separable,  that  is,  man  has  the  possibility  of  good  and 
evil.  The  dark  principle  can,  as  selfishness,  separate  itself  from 
the  light ;  self-will  can  endeavor  to  be,  as  a  separate  will,  that 
which  it  truly  is  only  in  unity  with  the  universal  will,— can 
endeavor  to  be,  also  in  the  periphery  or  as  a  creature,  that 
which  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  it  remains  in  the  divine  center ; 
this  self-severing  of  self-hood  from  the  light  is  evil.  Evil,  as 
the  dissevering  of  the  two  principles,  is  necessary  in  order  to  a 
revelation  of  God ;  for  if  these  principles  remained  in  man  as 
unseparated  as  they  are  in  God,  then  there  would  be  no  differ- 
ence between  God  and  man,  and  God  could  not  manifest  his 
omnipotence  and  love ;  but  God  must  of  necessity  so  reveal 
himself.  For  this  reason,  the  self-will  of  man  is  influenced  by 
that  dark  unintelligent  principle  in  God, — man  is  tempted  to 
evil,  in  order  that  the  will  of  divine  love  may  find  an  opposing 
element,  an  antithesis,  wherein  it  can  realize  itself.  Hence 
evil  exists  in  man  as  a  natural  tendency,  for  the  reason  that  the 
disorder  of  his  powers,  as  occasioned  by  the  awakening  of  self- 
will  in  the  creature,  communicates  itself  to  him  in  his  very 
birth ;  and  this  ground-element  in  God  works  also  constantly 
in  man,  and  excites  his  self-hood  and  individual  will,  in  or- 
der that  in  antithesis  to  it,  the  will  of  divine  love  may  find 
scope  for  action.  Hence  results  a  general  necessity  of  sin, 
which,  however,  by  no  means  does  away  with  the  personal 
guilt  of  man,  for  the  dark  ground  in  God  realizes  not  evil  as 
such,  but  only  prompts  thereto.  The  actions  of  actual  man 
result,  indeed,  with  necessity  from  his  essence,  but  this  es- 
sence man  himself  has  determined  by  an  act  of  self-determi- 
nation beyond  all  time  and  co-incidently  with  creation  itself. 
Man  is  indeed  born  in  time,  but  he  has,  himself,  determined 
his  life  and  character  before  his  temporal  life,  yon  side  of 
time,  in  eternity.  Hence  our  actual  act.-'ons  are,  on  the  one 
hand,  necessary,  and,  on  the  other,  within  our  own  respon- 
sibility. That  Judas  betrayed  Christ,  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary; neither  himself  nor  another  could  have  changed  the 
matter;  and  nevertheless  it  was  his  own  guilt,  for  he  had  so 
determined  himself  from  eternity.  As  every  man  now  acts, 


344:  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  45. 

so  acted  he,  as  the  identical  person,  already  at  the  beginning 
of  creation ;  he  is  not  simply  now  forming  his  character,  but 
his  character  is  already  formed.  All  men  have  determined 
themselves  from  eternity  to  egotism  and  self-seeking,  and  are 
born  with  this  dark  principle  essential  in  their  being.  Evil, 
however,  ought  not  to  remain,  but  to  be  overcome  by  the 
good  principle. 

Schelling  promised  a  fuller  development  of  these  ground- 
thoughts,  but  did  not  carry  it  out.  The  enthusiasm  with 
which  this  philosophy  of  his  (which  promised  the  solution  of 
all  the  enigmas  of  existence),  was  received, — an  enthusiasm 
which  was  not  dampened,  but  rather  heightened  by  its  orac- 
ular tone  and  by  the  boldness  of  assertion  which  often  as- 
sumed in  it  the  place  of  scientific  proof, — gave  occasion  also 
in  the  ethical  field,  to  various,  though  mostly  feeble,  fruit- 
less and  soon  abandoned,  attempts  at  a  further  carrying-out 
of  his  ground-principles, — some  of  them  in  greater  approxi- 
mation to  the  Christian  consciousness  ;  (Buchner,  1807;  Than- 
ner,  1811;  Klein,  1811;  Holler,  1819;  Krame,  1810,  though 
deviating  considerably  from  the  master,  and  rather  independ- 
ent).— The  facility  with  which  other  kindred  currents  of 
thought  admitted  of  being  joined  into  Schelling's  theosophi- 
cal  outbursts,  was  indeed  very  tempting  to  the  book-prolific 
spirit  of  the  age,  but  it  also  soon  awakened  in  the  sobering- 
down  spirit  of  the  time  a  degree  of  distrust ;  and  the  fame 
obtained  by  the  master  in  his  meteoric  flight,  showed  itself 
less  partial  for  his  zealously-imitating  scholars;  and  when 
Daub,  after  welcoming,  in  their  regular  order  of  succession, 
all  the  philosophies  from  Kant  to  Hegel,  advanced  in  his 
"Judas  Iscariot"  (1816),  on  the  principles  of  Schelling,  to  a 
sort  of  personality  of  evil,  to  a  philosophical  Satanology, 
which  indeed  is  yet  far  different  from  the  Christian  view, — 
then,  at  last,  the  predominantly  Rationalistic  spirit  of  the  age 
began  to  lose  confidence  in  the  worth  of  the  more  recent 
philosophy  as  a  whole. 

F.  H.  Jucobi  of  Munich,  who,  in  antithesis  to  all  Pantheism, 

took  his  departure  from  the  stand-point  of  the  free  personal 

spirit,    has    given   in    his    miscellaneous    and    unsystematic 

writings  *  only  hints  and  suggestions  toward  an  ethical  sys- 

*  Werke,  1812,  4  vols. 


§  46.]  JACOBI— HEGEL.  345 

tern.  He  opposed  to  the  Pantheistic  philosophy,  however, 
rather,  merely  the  consciousness  of  its  untruth  than  a  sci- 
entifically-constructed theory.  He  emphasized  very  strongly 
the  personal,  moral  will-freedom  of  man  as  opposed  to  all 
necessary  determination,  without,  however,  creating  for  it  a 
really  scientific  basis,  appealing  here,  as  also  in  the  case  of 
the  idea  of  the  personality  of  God,  to  inner  spiritual  experi- 
ence— to  feeling.  Morality,  he  based  on  a  primitive  feeling 
for  the  good,  which  is  independent  of  the  striving  after  hap- 
piness ;  the  good  must  be  accomplished  for  its  own  sake,  and 
not  as  a  means  to  happiness.  In  general,  Jacobi  did  not  rise 
beyond  the  views  of  Rationalism. — The  few  moralists  who 
followed  in  his  wake,  defend  indeed  the  Christian  stand-point 
as  against  the  Pantheistic  tendency,  but  they  have  no  -very 
great  scientific  significancy.  Among  them  belongs  essentially 
also  the  Roman  Catholic  theologian,  Salat  (1810  and  later). 

SECTION  XLVL 

The  philosophy  of  Hegel  knows  nothing  of  ethics 
under  this  name;  upon  its  Pantheistic  ground  no 
really  personal  freedom  can  find  foothold,  although 
it  makes  all  possible  endeavors  to  find  scope  therefor. 
The  reality  of  freedom  appears  essentially  only  under 
the  form  of  necessity,  as  that  right  which,  on  the 
part  of  the  subject,  is  duty  ;  ethics  appears  only  as  the 
Doctrine  of  Right ;  its  scientific  significancy  lies  in 
its  decided  advance  beyond  the  previous  subjective 
stand-point  (which  appears  even  yet  in  Kant)  to  the 
objective  validity  and  reality  of  morality  in  the 
family,  in  society  and  in  the  state,  as  real  moral 
forms  of  humanity.  In  the  fact,  however,  that  only 
the  State  is  conceived  as  the  highest  realization  of 
objective  morality,  lies  also  the  one-sidedness  of  the 
view,  inasmuch  as  the  full  reality  of  moral  freedom 
remains  unrecognized. — The  Hegelian  school  has  not 
developed  philosophical  ethics  beyond  the  positions 


346  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  46. 

of  the  master;  its  application  to  theological  ethics 
by  Daub  and  MarTieineke  presents  the  un  refreshing 
picture  of  a  vain  attempt  at  harmoniously  reconcil- 
ing irreconcilable  contradictions. — The  school  of  Pan- 
theistic radicalism,  which  is  nominally  connected 
with  Hegel  but  is  in  reality  based  rather  on  Spinoza, 
has  produced  no  real  system  of  ethics,  but  only  nar- 
row-minded and  absurd  essays  on  particular  ethical 
topics. 

The  ethics  of  Hegel,  as  presented  in  his  "Philosophy  of 
Right,"  (1821;  better  by  Gans,  1833)—  the  field  occupied  by 
which  constitutes  a  part  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit, — 
rests  on  the  Pantheistic  current  set  in  motion  by  Spinoza, 
and  appears,  in  higher  scientific  maturity  than  in  Schelling. — 
The  rational  spirit,  as  the  unity  of  the  objective  conscious- 
ness and  of  the  self-Consciousness,  is  the  true  free-become 
spirit;  it  cognizes  every  thing  in  itself  and  itself  in  every 
thing, — is,  as  reason,  the  identity  of  the  objective  All  and  the 
ego.  In  that  the  rational  spirit  recognizes  rationality  in 
nature,  and  hence  nature  as  objective  reason,  it  is  theoretical 
spirit.  But  reason  knows  its  own  contents  also  as  its  object, 
objectivizes  the  same,  posits  them  outwardly,  that  is,  the 
spirit  is  practical  spirit — volitionates.  But  in  so  far  as  it  is 
determined  to  this  volitionating  by  no  other  object  foreign  to 
itself,  but  determines  itself  simply  by  virtue  of  its  rational 
being,  it  is  free  spirit.  Hence  the  spirit  posits  itself  out- 
wardly from  within,  objectivizes  itself  in  freedom,  realizes 
itself  in  an  objective  manner.  This  its  realization  is  not 
nature,  but  is  essentially  of  a  spiritual  character,  is  a  spiritual 
world,  a  kingdom  of  the  spirit  which  exists  not  merely  in  the 
ego,  but  has  an  objective  reality  the  creator  of  which  is  the 
free  rational  spirit ;  the  objective-become  spirit  is  the  historical 
world  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word.  The  freedom  of  the 
rational  spirit  is,  however,  with  Hegel,  by  no  means  a  real 
freedom  of  choice ;  such  a  freedom  finds  in  the  Pantheistic 
world-theory  no  legitimate  place ;  it  is  only  the  spirit's  active 
relating  to  itself,  its  being  independent  upon  any  other  ex- 
ternal entity,  but  it  is  nevertheless  essentially  at  the  same  time 


§46.]  HEGELIAN  ETHICS.  347 

necessity.  Thus  the  free  spirit  creates  a  world  as  the  objective 
reality  of  freedom,  a  reality,  however,  which  has  a  general 
significancy  transcending  the  individual  being,— becomes  a 
power  over  the  individual  spirit,  assumes  the  form  of  necessity, 
whereby  the  individual  subject  is  determined  in  his  freedom, 
and  which  consequently  must  be  recognized  by  the  individual 
as  the  higher  factor, — is  a  general  will  over  against  the  individ- 
ual will, — is  right,  which  becomes  for  the  individual,  duty. 

The  Philosophy  of  Right  falls  into  three  parts.  (1)  The 
free  will  is  primarily  immediate,  as  individual  will.  The 
subject  of  right  is  the  person,  which  stands  to  other  persons 
primarily  in  an  excluding  relation.  The  person  confers 
upon  itself  the  reality  of  its  freedom  posits  a  special  sphere 
of  its  subjective  freedom  in  property.  I  declare  an  ob- 
jective entity  as  my  own,  and  hence  as  that  upon  which 
another  has  no  right.  This  is  primarily  as  yet  an  outward 
and  not  necessary  action ;  it  lies  not  in  the  essence  of  the 
thing  itself  that  I  declare  it  as  my  property ;  hence  right  in 
this  sphere  is  the  merely  formal,  abstract  right.  The  freedom 
of  the  subject  is  assured  and  recognized  by  the  fact  that 
other  subjects  must  concede  the  validity  of  my  freedom,  my 
property,  my  right ;  freedom  receives  thus  a  general  signifi- 
cancy, becomes  right.  The  freedom  of  individual  subjects 
is  regulated  by  law,  is  reduced  to  general  harmony.  But 
that  the  reality  of  this  right  rests  primarily  on  the  subjective 
will,  and  that  the  general  will  is  the  product  of  the  individual 
will,  is  as  yet  an  irrational  state  of  things,  and  abstract  right 
advances  now,  (2),  to  morality,  wherein  the  individual  will 
becomes  the  product  and  expression  of  the  general  will,  but 
on  the  basis  of  freedom,  through  free  recognition.  In  the 
first  sphere  the  subjective  freedom  of  the  individual  is 
bound  by  the  right  of  the  other,  and  hence  trammeled. 
But  in  the  free  recognition  of  this  right,  the  bondage,  the 
trammeling  element,  is  thrown  off;  right  and  law  are  no 
longer  a  merely  outward  limiting  element,  but  become  the 
personal  law  of  the  subject,  the  contents  of  his  free  self- 
determination.  In  the  mere  fulfillment  of  right  the  disposi- 
tion does  not  come  into  question ;  I  may  concede  to  another 
his  right  unwillingly,  and  hence  immorally ;  so  soon,  how- 
ever, as  right  becomes  morality,  the  disposition,  the  intention, 


348  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  46. 

becomes  the  chief  thing,  and  the  outward  act  a  merely  second- 
ary matter.  A  man  may  be  forced  to  right,  but  not  to  mo- 
rality ;  only  free,  cheerful  action  is  moral.  That  which  in  the 
sphere  of  right  is  wrong,  becomes  in  the  moral  sphere  moral 
guilt.  The  intention  of  the  moral  action  directs  itself  pri- 
marily upon  the  rational  subject  himself,  wills  his  welfare ; 
but,  as  rationality  has  a  general  significancy,  this  intention 
looks  also  to  the  general  welfare,  to  the  realizing  of  the 
rational  will  and  hence  of  rationality  in  general,  that  is,  to 
the  good.  To  realize  the  good,  is  for  the  individual  subject, 
duty, — is  no  longer  a  merely  outward  law,  but  an  inner, 
freely  appropriated  one.  The  good  as  the  unity  of  the  no- 
tion of  the  rational  will  and  of  the  particular  will  of  the 
individual  subject,  is  the  end,  the  goal  of  the  universe. 

But  in  the  accomplishing  of  this  duty  of  realizing  the 
good,  the  subject  finds  himself  involved  in  a  multitude  of 
contradictions  and  conflicts;  the  outer  objective  world  is, 
as  related  to  the  subject,  a  something  different  from  and  in- 
dependent of  him;  hence  it  is  doubtful  and  fortuitous 
whether  or  not  it  is  in  harmony  with  the  subjectively  moral 
ends, — whether  or  not  the  subject  finds  his  well-being  in  it. 
The  abstract  right  was  a  merely  outward  and  formal  one ; 
morality  is  a  merely  inward  subjective  something, — has 
harmony  only  as  a  postulate,  as  an  "ought;"  the  good 
is,  as  yet,  only  the  abstract  idea  of  the  good ;  hence  there 
is  need  of  a  third,  higher  stage  wherein  the  subjective  and 
the  objective  phases  are  united,  where  the  postulate  of  the 
harmonizing  of  the  two  spheres  is  realized,  where  the  ought 
is  also  reality,  where  the  good  is  no  longer  an  abstract  gen- 
eral something  over  against  which  the  subject  stands  as  yet 
as  an  isolated  individual,  but  where  the  good  has  attained  to 
reality,  where  freedom  has  become  nature,  and  law  has  be- 
come custom.  This  brings  us,  (3),  to  the  sphere  of  customari- 
nesit — the  completion  of  the  objective  spirit.  In  customariness 
the  spirit  enters  into  its  true  reality ;  the  person  finds  the 
good  outside  of  himself,  as  a  reality  to  which  he  subordinates 
himself,  as  a  moral  world.  Thus  Hegel,  deviating  from  the 
ordinary  usage  of  language,  distinguishes  morality  [moralitat] 
from  customariness  [sittlichkeit],  conceiving  the  former  as 
the  merely  subjective  and  individual  morality,  and  the  latter 


§46.]  HEGELIAN   ETHICS.  349 

as  civic  or  social  morality.  In  the  sphere  of  morality  man  is 
considered  as  an  individual  who  determines  himself  accord- 
ing to  abstract  moral  laws ;  in  that  of  customariness  he  is 
considered  as  an  essential  member  of  a  moral  community,  of 
a  moral  whole,  so  that  he  now  fulfills  not  abstract  laws,  but 
the  requirements  of  the  concrete-become  spirit  of  a  moral, 
social  reality.  Hence  the  end  of  customariness  is  primarily 
and  immediately,  not  the  individual,  but  the  moral  whole. 
The  moral  organisms  constituted  by  reason  as  become  object- 
ive, present  themselves  in  the  three  development-stages  of 
the  family,  of  civil  society  (in  which  the  individual  subjects 
are  bound  together  only  by  legal  relations),  and  of  the  state, 
in  which  appears  the  full  reality  of  morality. — The  state  is 
the  moral  substance  as  conscious  of  itself, — the  objectively- 
realized  moral  and  rational  spirit,  the  union  of  the  principle 
of  the  family  and  of  civil  society,  the  outer  full  realization 
of  freedom, — inasmuch  as  here  the  moral  reality  rests  no 
longer  (as  in  the  case  of  the  family)  upon  a  nature-ground, 
and  no  longer  (as  in  the  case  of  civil  society)  upon  merely 
outward  legal  relations,  but  upon  the  common  conscious- 
ness wherein  the  individuals  are  conscious  of  themselves  as 
organic  members  of  the  whole.  Hence  the  state  is  the  per  se 
rational  existence,  the  highest  manifestation  of  moral  reason 
in  general. — Hegel  conceives  the  state  in  higher  significancy 
than  antecedent  philosophers,  namely,  not  as  a  mere  means 
for  the  end  of  the  individual  citizens,  but  as  end  per  se,  to 
which  the  individual  must  sacrifice  his  particular  and  finite 
ends.  This  is  a  decided  advance,  especially  in  contrast  to 
the  utterly  perverse  and  entirely  anti- Christian  state-doc- 
trine of  the  eighteenth  century,  when  it  was  regarded  as 
perfectly  self-evident  that  the  state  has  no  other  task  than 
to  serve  the  interests  of  individuals,  whether  the  interests 
of  the  individual  citizens  of  a  state,  or  the  interests  of 
a  class  in  society,  or  those  of  a  prince,  but  not  to  fulfill  a 
moral  idea.  But  the  state  is  also  here  the  ultimate  and  high- 
est form  of  all  morality,  as,  indeed,  Hegel  recognizes  no  higher 
existence  yon-side  the  finite  reality  of  the  natural  All,  but 
not  an  absolutely  self-existent,  infinite,  personal  spirit.  The 
purely  moral  reality  of  the  church, — which  in  its  purely  spir- 
itual interests  is  far  above  the  necessary  outward  limitations 


350  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§46. 

of  the  state,  far  above  classes  of  society  and  national  bound- 
aries, and  has  a  super-mundane  eternal  goal,  and  which,  as 
resting  absolutely  upon  freedom,  does  not  exert  coercive 
power, — finds  no  room  for  itself  in  Hegel's  system.  All 
morality,  without  exception,  appertains  to  the  state,  and  all 
reality  of  the  church  must  be  merged  into  it, — a  doctrine 
which  of  course  was  especially  favorable  to  the  absolutism 
of  politics  then  in  vogue.  All  that  was  usually  ascribed  to 
the  church  in  its  significancy  for  the  moral,  falls  here  to  the 
state,  while  religion  is  regarded  only  as  tlie  basis,  but  not  as 
the  essential  reality,  of  the  moral  spirit.  "The  state  should 
be  reverenced  as  an  earthly-divine  element ;  the  state  is 
divine  will  as  present  and  developing  itself  into  the  real 
form  and  organism  of  a  world."  Hence  with  Hegel,  as  also 
with  the  Greeks,  morality  is  merged  in  the  state,  and  has  no 
significancy  beyond  it.  "  What  man  has  to  do,  what  the  du- 
ties are  which  he  has  to  fulfill,  is,  in  a  moral  community,  easy 
to  determine :  nothing  else  is  to  be  done  by  him  than  that 
which  is  prescribed,  expressed,  and  made  known,  in  his  rela- 
tions. "  That  this  moral  community  may  also  be  morally  a  very 
perverted  one,  and  that  consequently  man  may  be  morally 
obligated  to  resist  it,  and  that  even  the  most  perfect  actual 
state,  does  not  embrace  the  whole  field  of  the  moral  commu- 
nity-life,— of  all  this  the  Hegelian  system  takes  no  account. 

In  the  carrying-out  of  the  classification  of  the  moral  subject- 
matter,  the  "  Philosophy  of  Right "  varies  largely  in  many 
places  from  the  presentation  given  in  the  "Encyclopedia" 
and  in  the  "Phenomenology  of  the  Spirit."  The  transition 
from  morality  to  customariness  seems  artificial  and  very  ar- 
bitrary. The  freedom  of  choice  here  largely  brought  into 
requisition  is  entirely  without  justification  in  the  system,  and 
even  contradictory  thereto.  The  classification  itself  is  also 
not  rigorously  kept  apart,  nor  indeed  can  it  be ;  the  sphere 
of  right  falls  largely  into  that  of  civil  society,  in  so  far  as 
there  is  any  real  attempt  at  carrying  it  out ;  and  the  protec- 
tion of  right,  which  according  to  Hegel  falls  into  the  sphere 
of  civil  society,  is  utterly  impossible  without  the  state. 
Furthermore,  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  Hegel,  in  perfect  con- 
sistency with  the  principle  naturally  following  from  his  sys- 
tem, namely,  that  "all  that  is  real  is  also  rational,"  regards 


§46.]  DISCIPLES   OF  HEGEL.  351 

war,  not  as  an  evil,  but  as  a  phenomenon  necessarily  con- 
nected with  the  highest  moral  community-life  or  the  state, 
and,  hence,  as  entirely  rational,  and  which  simply  expresses 
in  act  the  frailty  and  finiteness  inherent  in  all  finite  being, 
and  which  has  in  the  moral  sphere  the  same  inner  necessity 
and  normalcy,  as  death  in  the  nature-sphere;  war  is  death 
exalted  into  the  moral  sphere.* 

The  Hegelian  school,  dividing  itself  soon  after  the  master's 
death  into  a  right  wing,  which  progressively  drew  nearer  to 
the  Christian  consciousness,  and  into  a  left  wing,  which  sank 
lower  and  lower  in  the  direction  of  radicalism  and  destruc- 
tiveness,  has  not  produced  any  very  important  results  in  the 
ethical  field.  (Michelet  gave  a  "  System  of  Philosophical 
Ethics,"  1828;  Von  Henning  presented  the  "Principles  of 
Ethics,"  historically,  1824);  Vatke  ("Human  Freedom  in  its 
Relation  to  Sin  and  to  Grace,"  1841)  develops,  in  opposition 
to  Julius  Muller's  "Presentation  of  the  Christian  Doctrine 
of  Sin,"  the  Hegelian  view  in  a  very  ingenious  manner,  with- 
out, however,  succeeding  in  reconciling  the  unf reedom  essen- 
tially inherent  in  the  Pantheistic  System  with  the  general 
consciousness  of  moral  freedom  of  choice ;  evil,  though  re- 
garded as  ultimately  to  be  overcome,  is  yet  held  to  be  an 
absolutely  necessary  incident  of  the  good.  Daub  and  Mar- 
Tieineke  undertook,  in  their  ethical  works, t  the  vain  and 
thankless  task  of  giving  to  the  Pantheistic  ground-thoughts 
of  Hegel  such  a  turn,  and  of  clothing  them  in  such  forms  of 
expression,  as  to  make  them  appear  as  a  higher  scientific  ex- 
pression of  the  Christian  doctrines.  But  the  rapidly  disen- 
chanted age  soon  saw  clearly  enough  the  impossibility  of  this 
undertaking.  Daub's  Ethics,  as  edited  from  his  lectures  in 
an  easy  and  often  conversational  style,  though  proposing  to 
present  Biblical  ethics,  is  yet  unwilling  to  derive  the  moral 
law  from  the  Scriptures,  but  seeks  for  it  only  in  reason,  re- 
garding it  as  inherent  therein,  and  forces  the  Biblical  teach- 
ings, frequently  with  violence,  into  conformity  to  the  already 
adopted  system;  the  lofty  self-complacency  of  the  philoso- 
phizing theologian  looks  often  contemptuously  down  upon 

*  Phanomenol.,  p.  358 ;  Phil,  des  Rechtt,  pp.  417,  427,  sqq. 
t  Daub :  Prolegomena  sur  Moral,  1839 ;  System  d.  theol.  Moral.,  1840 ; 
Marheiueke:  System  d.  theol.  Moral.,  1847. 


352  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  46. 

the  churchly  consciousness,  and  oftener  still,  artfully  explains 
away  its  significancy.  Marheineke  divides  ethics  into  the 
doctrine  of  the  law  as  the  objective  phase,  into  the  doctrine 
of  virtue  as  the  subjective  phase  (virtue  being  taken  as  the 
harmonizing  of  the  will  with  the  law)  and  into  the  doctrine 
of  duty.  Despite  a  very  pretentious  style,  the  positive  con- 
tents, consisting  in  many  places  merely  in  a  loose  series  of 
single,  and  not  always  ingenious,  and  sometimes  even  insipid, 
observations,  are  really  quite  barren,  and  often  involved  in 
violent  self-contradiction. 

The  left  wing  of  the  Hegelian  school, — which  strayed  still 
further  from  the  master  in  the  direction  of  a  vulgar  Panthe- 
ism based  on  Spinoza,  and  which  does  not  rise  in  the  ethical 
field  even  to  the  honest  consequentiality  and  earnestness  of 
Spinoza,  but,  for  the  most  part,  sinks  back  into  the  most 
vulgar  freethinking  of  French  materialism, — has  shown  itself 
utterly  unfruitful  in  ethical  works ;  it  has  made  itself  felt,  on 
the  field  of  ethics,  less  by  scientific  productions  than  by  im- 
pudent assertion.  David  Strauss  is  unwilling  to  admit  the 
fatalistic  necessity  of  all  the  individual  phenomena  of  life,  so 
consequentially  affirmed  by  Spinoza ;  but  he  gives  scope,  with- 
out hesitation,  to  chance  and  to  arbitrary  discretion,  and  affirms 
(of  course  without  any  justification  in  his  system)  even  the 
freedom  of  the  human  will.  What  the  world  had  not  as  yet 
known,  Strauss  presumes  to  assert,  and  takes  the  liberty  of 
blankly  contradicting  the  principle  of  Spinoza,  that  the  hu- 
man will  is  a  causa  non  lihera,  sed  coacta.  In  his  view,  Pan- 
theism alone  guarantees  the  free  self-dependence  of  man.  If 
God  is  immanent  in  the  world,  and  hence  also  in  man ;  if,  as 
in  the  Christian  world-theory,  the  finite  stands  over  against 
the  absolute  Agent  as  a  distinctly  different  object,  then  is  this 
finite  (the  world)  only  in  a  condition  of  absolute  passivity ; 
but  in  Pantheism  the  absolute  actuosity  lies  in  the  collec- 
tivity of  finite  agencies,  as  their  own  activity.  While  in 
monotheism  it  holds  good,  that  as  truly  as  God  is  almighty 
so  truly  are  men  unfree,  in  Pantheism  it  holds  good  that  as 
certainly  as  God  is  self-active  so  truly  are  men  also  so,  in 
whom  He  is  so.*  What  the  drift  of  this  special-pleading 
inference  is,  appears  at  once  from  the  following  observations : 
*  Glaubenslehre,  ii,  364. 


§46.]          STRAUSS—  FEUERBACH.  353 

"This  holds  good,  of  course,  only  of  our  conception  of  the 
divine  essence;   whether  it   holds   good   also  in  the  recip- 
rocal relation  of  finite  things,  where    Spinoza  denies   it,  is 
another  question,  and  one  which  does  not  concern  us  in  this 
place."     He  makes,  however,  in  this  connection,  in  order  to 
maintain  against  Spinoza  the  freedom  of  the  will,  also  the 
following  very  curious  observation :   "Spinoza  declares  indi- 
vidual man  as  unfree,  for  the  reason  that  only  that  determined- 
ness  of  his  essence  and  activity  remains  to  him  which  all  other 
tilings  leave  to  him;  but  in  this  connection  he  overlooked 
the  fact  that  also,  conversely,  only  that  much  remains  to  all 
other  things  which  the  individual  leaves  to  them ;  this  is  of 
course  not  freedom  of  choice,  but  it  is  also  not  coercion."    The 
honest  Spinoza  would  doubtless  have  shaken  his  head  in  as- 
tonishment at  this  naive  objection. — Strauss,  naturally  enough, 
recognizes  also,  as  the  highest  moral  reality,  the  state  as  sepa- 
rated from  the  church  and  as  entirely  swallowing  it  up  within 
itself ;  in  the  place  of  the  worshiping  of  God  must  be  substi- 
tuted art,  and  especially  the  theater;  for  genuine  morality, 
that  is,  for  the  life  in  the  state,  religion  is  not  only  super- 
fluous but  hurtful ;  for  whoever  thinks  he  has,  outside  of  his 
duties  as  a  citizen  of  the  state,  still  other  duties  as  a  citizen 
of  heaven,    will,    as  a   servant  of  two  masters,    necessarily 
neglect  the  first  class  of  duties.*     In  this  expression  of  opin- 
ion he  gives  to    governments  a  very  significant  hint,  as  to 
how  dangerous  for  the  state  is  an  ecclesiastically  pious  dis- 
position in  the  people,  and  how  great  is  the  duty  of  an  en- 
lightened government  to  guard  against  it. — Lewis  Feuerbach, 
who  finds  in  religion  only  a  morbid  delusion,  namely,  in  that 
man  regards  his  own  being  as  a  divine  object,  declares  re- 
ligion, and  especially  the  Christian  religion,  as  the  destruction 
of  morality,  inasmuch  as  it  makes  the  validity  of  the  moral 
law  dependent  on  religious  faith.     Nature  is  every  thing,  and 
exclusively  so ;  to  follow  the  voice  of  nature  is  the  highest 
principle  of  morality.     This  voice,  however,  teaches  us  love 
to   our   fellow-men,    whereas    religion   teaches   only   hatred 
against  those  who  believe  differently  from  us,  and  directs 
the  love  and  activity  of  man,  not  toward  other  men,  but  to- 
ward a  non-existing  being — God ;  only  the  religiouless  man 
*  Glaubenslehre,  ii,  615  sqq. 


354  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  46. 

can  have  universal  love  to  man,  which  is  per  se  always  practi- 
cal atheism,  namely,  a  denial  of  God  in  heart,  in  sentiment, 
and  in  act.  For  a  scientific  justification  of  these  wonderful 
assertions  we  seek  in  vain;  morbid  bombast  supplies  its 
place.  That  this  theory  of  morality  must  lead  to  the  vul- 
garest  enjoyment- seeking,  is  perfectly  natural ;  and  Feuerbach 
himself  explains  himself  as  to  the  nature  of  this  morality  of 
human  love,  very  clearly,  thus:  "When  I  am  hungry  then 
nothing  is  more  important  to  me  than  the  enjoyment  of  food, 
— after  the  meal,  nothing  more  than  rest,  and  after  rest, 
nothing  more  than  exercise;  after  exercise,  nothing  more 
than  conversation  with  friends ;  after  the  completion  of 
the  work  of  the  day,  I  court  the  Brother  of  Death  as  the 
most  beneficent  of  beings ;  thus  every  moment  of  the  life 
Of  man  has  something, — but  nota  bene! — something  human 
in  it."* 

Thus  the  philosophy  of  "  modern  science  "  has  returned,  in 
rapid  circuit,  back  to  the  morality  of  French  materialism,  to 
the  practical  morality  of  Philip  of  Orleans  under  Louis  XV. 
The  more  advanced  and  almost  insane  productions  of  the  still 
more  "radical"  circle,  especially  of  the  circle  of  "emanci- 
pated" ones, — which  formed  itself  around  Bruno  and  Edgar 
Bauer,  and  by  whom  even  Feuerbach  was  soon  stigmatized 
(Max  Stirner)  as  belonging  among  "theologians,"  "believing 
hypocrites  "  and  "  slavish  natures," — belong  not  in  the  sphere 
of  a  history  of  science,  but,  at  best,  only  in  that  of  the  his- 
tory of  the  morals  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

We  will  mention  additionally,  in  passing,  only  the  material- 
istic world-theory,  which,  though  not  directly  springing  from 
the  Pantheistic  philosophy,  yet  coincides  with  it  in  its  ulti- 
mate results,  and  which  has  its  origin  more  in  the  empirical 
study  of  nature  than  in  philosophy,  and  which  in  its  moral 
riews  has  sunk  back  to  the  French  materialism  of  the  Systeme 
de  la  Nature  (Moleschott,  Vogt,  Biichner,  etc.).  If  spirit  is  sim- 
ply a  phenomenon  of  brain-force,  and  if  man  is  nothing  more 
than  a  highly  organized  animal,  then  the  moral  catechism  is 
very  easy  and  short.  Vogt  declares  it  as  presumption  in  man 
to  pretend  to  be  any  thing  essentially  different  from  the  brute ; 
man  belonged  originally  to  the  ape  race,  and  has  only  gradu- 
*  Werkt,  i,  355. 


§  47.]  VOGT— MOLESCHOTT.  355 

ally  developed  himself  somewhat  more  highly.  Man  is  guided 
and  impelled,  just  as  the  brute,  by  his  own  nature,  that  is, 
by  the  laws  of  his  material  existence,  and  with  inner  irresist- 
ible necessity;  every  so-called  act  of  the  will  is  strictly  a 
necessary  product  of  the  material  conditions  of  the  brain  and 
of  the  outer  sensuous  impressions,  as  determined  by  nutrition 
and  by  the  peculiarity  of  the  brain-substance.  Hence  also 
there  can  be  no  manner  of  moral  responsibility;  all  so-called 
sins  and  crimes  are  only  "consequences  of  a  defective  nutri- 
tion and  of  an  imperfect  organization  of  the  brain."  The 
distinguishing  between  morally  good  and  evil  actions  is 
merely  a  self-deception;  "to  comprehend  every  thing  in- 
volves also  the  justifying  of  every  thing, "  says  Moleschott. 
Hence,  the  moral  amelioration  of  man  takes  place  solely 
through  suitable  and  strengthening  nutrition.  "  The  more 
fully  we  are  conscious  that  by  the  proper  proportioning  of 
carbonic  acid,  ammonia,  and  the  salts,  etc.,  we  are  contrib- 
uting to  the  highest  development  of  mankind,  so  much  the 
more  are  also  our  efforts  and  work  ennobled."  Upon  eating 
and  drinking,  these  writers  naturally  enough  lay  very  great 
emphasis ;  it  appears  to  them  as  a  sacred  rite,  and  Moleschott 
is  not  ashamed  even  to  compare  it  with  the  holy  eucharist. 
It  was  also  reserved  for  this  writer  to  stigmatize  the  Christian 
world-theory  and  Christian  custom  as  detrimental  to  the 
public  good,  and  for  this,  among  other  reasons,  that  thereby 
the  national  wealth  suffers  a  considerable  loss  from  the  prac- 
tice of  burying  corpses  in  special  graveyards,  whereas  the 
bodies  of  the  dead  should  rather  be  used  for  manuring  the 
fields.  Those  who  look  always  for  the  truth  simply  in  a 
"progress"  beyond  that  which  has  hitherto  been  known  and 
practiced,  can  perhaps  inform  us  what  the  next  further 
progress  beyond  this  world-theory  will  lead  to. 

SECTION  XL VII. 

The  philosophical  ethics  of  the  two  last  decades, 
based  in  general  on  Hegel  or  on  Herbart,  shows  a 
manifestly  growing  approximation  to  the  Christian 
world-theory  ;  but  because  of  the  rather  unphilosophi- 

24 


356  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  47. 

cally-inclined  spirit  of  the  age,  it  has  exerted  less  in- 
fluence upon  society  at  large  than  the  immediately 
preceding  philosophy. 

The  most  recent  times  have  suddenly  shown,  after  an  ex- 
cessive and  almost  morbid  intensity  of  enthusiasm  for  philoso- 
phy, an  all  the  greater  lack  of  earnest  interest  therein.  The 
excessive  expectations  were  soon  followed  by  discouraging 
disappointments;  and  while  at  the  beginning  of  the  century 
the  most  crude  products  of  philosophy,  if  they  were  only 
presented  with  assurance,  were  sure  of  an  enthusiastic  wel- 
come, the,  in  general,  far  more  mature  and  more  scientific 
and  profound  works  of  recent  times  have  met  with  but  cold 
indifference ;  and  though  the  philosophers  of  the  present  day 
have  some  reasons  to  complain  of  the  thanklessness  of  the 
educated  world,  and  that  only  ambitious  rhetoric  is  now  able 
to  win  applause,  nevertheless  this  state  of  things  is  clearly 
explainable  as  a  reaction  from  the  wild  intoxication  of  the 
past. 

Nearly  contemporaneously  with  Hegel  wrote  Herbart  of 
Konigsberg.  Taking  up  his  position  outside  of  the  histor- 
ical development-course  of  philosophy,  and,  in  keen  skepti- 
cism, discarding  the  unity  of  the  principle  of  reality,  he  had 
in  his  elegantly  written  "  Practical  Philosophy  "  (1808)  thrown 
open  a  new  path.  In  his  view  the  previous  treatment  of 
ethics,  as  the  doctrine  of  goods,  of  virtues  and  of  duties, 
makes  the  will  of  a  twofold  character — a  norming  or  com- 
manding one,  and  a  derived  or  obeying  one, — and  hence 
makes  of  the  will  its  own  regulator ;  but  this  is  impossible 
and  absurd.  On  the  contrary,  a  will-less  judgment  as  to  willing 
precedes  all  actual  willing;  this  judgment  cannot  command, 
but  only  approve  or  disapprove;  but  it  never  acts  upon  the 
will  as  strictly  isolated!,  but  always  as  a  member  of  a  relation. 
Hence  all  willing  presu'pposes  moral  taste,  which  has  pleasure 
in  the  morally-beautif uf ;  thus  the  moral  is  conceived  essen- 
tially esthetically.  The  esthetical  judgment  as  to  the  will 
leads  it  to  action,  but  not  necessarily ;  the  will  should  be  obe- 
dient, but  it  can  be  disobedient ;  taste  is  immutable,  the  will 
is  flexible ;  thus  manifests  itself  the  idea  of  inner  freedom. 
Together  with  this  idea  Herbart  assumes  still  others, — ideas 


§  47.]  HERBART — CHALYBAUS.  357 

which  are  connected,  but  reduced  to  no  real  unity,  with  this 
idea,  and  which  precede  all  exertion  of  will,  namely,  the 
ideas  of  perfection,  of  benevolence,  of  right,  and  of  fitness ; 
by  virtue  of  these  five  ideas  the  moral  taste  passes  upon  an 
act  of  the  will,  directly  and  involuntarily,  a  judgment  of  ap- 
proval or  disapproval.  The  full  realization  of  the  moral  is 
society^as  expressing  itself  in  different  stages. — This  work 
of  Herbart,  though  little  regarded  in  its  day,  contains  in  its 
details  many  profound  and  ingenious  thoughts ;  the  violently 
original  character  of  the  whole  is  very  stimulating,  but  not 
satisfying;  the  unity* of  the  theory  as  a  whole  is  defective. — 
Hartenstein  wrote  in  the  spirit  of  Herbart,  his  "Fundamental 
Notions  of  the  Ethical  Sciences,"  1844,  a  work  full  of 
thought,  and  presenting^  a  much  more  candid  view  of  the 
realities  of  life  than  the  writers  of  the  Hegelian  school,  and 
not  unfrequently  assailing  Schleiermacher  and  Hegel  with 
keenness  and  success.  As  primitive  ethical  ideas,  he  assumes 
those  of  inner  freedom,  of  benevolence,  of  right  and  of  fitness. 
Similarly  also  Allihn:  "Fundamental  Doctrines  of  General 
Ethics,"  1861. — (Beneke:  "Elements  of  Ethics,"  1837,  en- 
tirely empirical,  and  only  partially  bas»d  on  Herbart. — 
Ehenich:  "Moral  Philosophy,"  1830,  based  on  evangelically- 
modified  Kantian  views.) 

The  "Speculative  Ethics"  (1841)  of  Wirth  sprang  from 
the  Hegelian  school,  but  deviates  therefrom  in  many  respects ; 
the  Pantheistic  fundamental  view  is  not  entirely  overcome ; 
(ethics  is  "the  science  of  the  absolute  spirit  as  will  realiz- 
ing its  absolute  self-consciousness  into  its  likewise  infinite 
reality ; "  in  details  it  offers  many  good  thoughts,  though  also 
many  mere  empty  phrases,  especially  where  it  treats  of  relig- 
ious" morality;  to  close  the  development  of  ethics  with  an 
amateur-theater  as  one  of  the  most  important  moral  agencies, 
is  surely  a  very  odd  fancy). — ChalyMm  of  Kiel:  "System  of 
Speculative  Ethics,"  1850, — doubtless  the  most  important 
treatise  on  philosophical  ethics  in  modern  times.  Chalybaus, 
in  his  work,  breaks  entirely  away  from  the  Pantheistic  view 
of  Hegel,  and  treats  ethics  on  the  basis  of  the  idea  of  per- 
sonal freedom,  and  does  not,  as  Hegel,  regard  the  ideal  and 
the  real  as  in  perfect  harmony,  but  on  the  contrary  recog- 
nizes evil  as  merely  possible  in  virtue  of  freedom,  and  hence 


358  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§47. 

its  reality  as  only  fortuitous  and  guiltily-incurred,  but  not  as 
necessary.  A  candid,  sound  view  of  reality  is  combined  with 
an  ingenious  development  of  thought  in  clear  vigorous  lan- 
guage ;  and  notwithstanding  a  few  cases  of  the  lowering  of 
Christian  doctrines,  this  philosophical  ethics  expresses  the 
Christian  consciousness,  in  many  cases,  more  faithfully  than 
does  Rothe's  "Theological  Ethics."— Also  J.  H.  FWte  (son 
of  the  philosopher)  places  himself  in  his  "  System  of  Ethics," 
1850,  upon  a  decidedly  theistical  stand-point,  and  strongly 
emphasizes  the  idea  of  personality,  whiph  in  Hegel  falls  into 
so  dubious  a  back-ground.  (The  essence  of  the  moral  ap- 
pears as  love,  which,  as  an  "unselfing  of  the  personal  ego,"  is 
carried  out  somewhat  one-sidedly  so  far  as  to  throw  the  valid- 
ity of  self  and  of  right  quite  too  much  into  the  back-ground.) 
— K.  P.  Fischer  (of  Erlangen):  "Elements  of  a  System  of 
Speculative  Ethics,"  1851, — briefer  than  the  preceding  works, 
freighted  with  thought, — likewise  an  essential  advance  of  re- 
cent philosophy  toward  a  deeper  comprehension  of  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness.  (Martensen :  "  Outlines  of  a  System  of 
Moral  Philosophy,"  1845.  Schliephake:  "  The  Bases  of  the 
Moral  Life,"  1855,— inspired  by  Krause,  empirical  toward  the 
close,  but  keen  and  judicious). — In  this  place  belongs  also,  in 
part,  the  ingenious  and  deeply  Christian  work  of  StaJil :  "  The 
Philosophy  of  Right — "*  based  in  the  beginning  rather  on 
Schelling,  but  afterward  more  independent ;  the  idea  of  the 
human  personality  as  a  copy  of  the  personality  of  God  is,  in 
contrast  to  all  naturalistic  philosophy,  raised  to  the  full  sig- 
nificancy  and  to  the  foundation  of  all  morality  and  of  all 
right. 

(The  preposterously  original  Schopenhauer  goes  back  to  In- 
dian conceptions,  and  finds  morality  only  in  an  annihilating 
of  the  individuality.  The  will  to  live  is  the  root  of  all  evil ; 
the  denying  of  this  will  is  virtue.  The  will  must  turn  away 
from  existence,  must  turn  to  will-lessness ;  for  existence  is  ab- 
solutely null,  and  the  will  a  delusion,  from  which  we  must 
become  free.  Vulgar  suicide  is  indeed  not  right,  for  it  is  a 
phenomenon  of  a  strongly-affirming  will ;  on  the  contrary,  a 
voluntary  starving  of  one's  self  to  death  is  a  real  moral  sacri- 

*1830,  3'ed.,  1851. 


§  48.]  THEOLOGICAL  ETHICS.  359 

ficing  of  the  will  to  live.  "The  two  Fundamental  Problems 
of  Ethics,"  1841;  "The  World  as  Will  and  Conception," 
1819,  '44,  '60.) 

SECTION  XLVIH. 

The,  Theological  ethics  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
in  so  far  as  it  came  not  into  a  relation  of  complete 
dependence  upon  some  particular  philosopher  of  the 
day,  remained  either  upon  a  purely  Biblical  ground, 
making  no  use  or  only  a  very  moderate  use  of  philo- 
sophical thoughts,  or  assumed  a  rather  eclectico-phil- 
osophical  character.  Rationalism  proved  surprisingly 
unfruitful. 

Ethics  was  treated  in  a  predominantly  original 
manner  by  Schleiermacher,  in  a  widely  differing  and 
irreconcilable  double-form  of  philosophical  and  of 
theological  ethics, — in  the  former  case  entirely  irre- 
spective of  the  God-consciousness,  and  in  the  latter, 
from  the  inner  nature  of  the  pious  Christian  con- 
sciousness,— with  great  richness  and  ingenuity  of 
thought,  but  also  without  a  rigidly  scientific  form, 
and,  in  a  violently-revolutionary  originality,  in  many 
cases  beclouding  the  Biblical  view  with  foreign 
thoughts. — Rothe  shaped  his  "Theological  Ethics" 
into  a  system  of  theosophic  speculation,  resting  upon 
the  philosophy  of  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher,  but 
carried  out  in  an  unclear  originality,  covering  almost 
the  entire  field  of  Christian  doctrine, — constituting  a 
work  in  which  a  pious  mind,  and  exotic  thoughts 
deeply  endangering  the  Christian  consciousness,  go 
hand  in  hand. 

Although  the  scientific  treatment  of  the  subject-matter  of 
ethics  in  the  earlier  and  (in  the  main)  Biblical  moralists  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  may  be  regarded  as  relatively  feeble, 


360  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§48. 

yet  they  have  this  not  to  be  despised  significancy,  that  in  an 
age  almost  entirely  estranged  from  Biblical  Christianity  they 
kept  alive  the  consciousness  of  this  estrangement,  and  faith- 
fully held  fast  to  the  indestructible  bases  of  Christian  Ethics. 
ReinharcTs  "System  of  Christian  Ethics"  (1780-1815)  has 
indeed  neither  any  special  depth  of  thought  nor  a  rigidly 
scientific  form,  and  contains  many  insipid  and  useless  discus- 
sions, and  furnishes  no  just  comprehension  of  the  inner 
essence  of  the  moral  idea ;  but  yet  it  gives  indication  of  a 
thorough  examination  of  the  Scriptures,  and  of  an  unpreju- 
diced observation  of  real  life,  furnishing  often  in  detail  good 
and  morally  earnest  discussions,  and  avoiding  all  eccen- 
tricity. His  classification  of  the  whole  is  poorly  adapted  to 
give  a  clear  steadily-progressive  development  of  the  subject- 
matter.  In  his  third  edition  Reinhard  declares  himself  very 
decidedly  against  Kant. — Flatt  of  Tubingen  in  his  "Lect- 
ures on  Christian  Ethics"  (published  by  Steudel  in  1823) 
gives  only  carefully-compiled,  purely  Biblical  material,  with- 
out impressing  upon  it  a  scientific  form. — F.  H.  C.  ScJiicarz 
of  Heidelberg  in  his  "Evangelically-Christian  Ethics," 
1821,  presents  ethics  in  two  different  forms,  in  the  first  vol- 
ume in  a  scientific,  in  the  second  in  an  edificatory  form,  but 
which  is  designed  to  serve  at  the  same  time  in  elucidation  of 
the  first, — presenting  for  the  most  part  a  simple  evangelical 
view,  brief,  clear,  but  without  deeper  foundation. 

De  Wette  has  furnished  a  threefold  treatment  of  ethics, 
which  more  than  the  above-mentioned  works  is  imbued  with 
philosophical  thoughts  (from  the  stand-point  of  the  Kantian 
Fries).  His  "Christian  Ethics"  (1819)  one  half  of  which 
is  occupied  by  the  history  of  ethics  (which  is  introduced  be- 
tween the  general  and  the  special  part),  is  more  ingenious 
than  profound,  and  does  not  appreciate  the  full  significancy 
of  the  evangelical  consciousness.  His  "Lectures  on  Chris- 
tian Ethics,"  1824,  are  intended  for  a  wider  circle  of  readers. 
(His  Compendium  of  Christian  Ethics,  1833,  is  only  a  brief 
outline.)  With  the  exception  of  this  rather  Rationalistic 
than  evangelical  treatment  of  ethics,  Rationalism  has,  con- 
trary to  what  might  have  been  expected,  produced  but  very 
little  in  the  ethical  field.  The  next  most  noticeable  work 
is  Amman's  (comp.  §  43)  later  "Hand-book  of  Christian 


§48.]  SCHLEIERMACHER.  361 

Ethics."  (1823,  '38),  scientifically  very  unimportant,  and  con- 
taining, besides  many  examples  and  anecdotes,  mostly  only 
commonplace  thoughts  and  mere  objective  observations, 
without  in  any  degree  going  into  the  depth  of  the  subject. — 
Biiumgarten-Crusius  in  his  "Compendium,"  *  breaks  already, 
in  many  respects,  with  Rationalism ;  his  work  is  ill-digested, 
but  in  many  respects  instructive.  KaJiler,  in  his  "Christian 
Ethics"  (1833;  a  "Scientific  Abridgment,"  1835)  hesitat- 
ingly endeavors  to  rise  beyond  the  Rationalistic  stand-point, 
and  gives  much  that  is  peculiar,  and  also  much  that  is  super- 
fluous. 

Philosophical  and  theological  ethics  were  treated  very 
profoundly  and  very  peculiarly,  but  in  a  manner  violently 
revolutionary  and  different  from  all  precedent  treatment  of 
the  subject,  by  Schleiermacher;  indeed  in  no  other  science 
does  the  inner  and  unmediated  scientific  dualism  of  this 
writer  appear  so  prominently  as  here.  His  critical  acumen, 
his  restlessly  changing  and  almost  fitfully  metamorphosing 
productiveness,  showed  itself  here  under  the  most  brilliant 
forms ;  but  there  is  for  that  reason  all  the  greater  need  of  a 
cautious  guarding  against  being  deceived  by  the  arts  of  his 
dialectic  genius.  Introduced  into  the  field  of  philosophy  by 
the  study  of  the  Greeks,  and  especially  of  Plato,  enthusi- 
astic for  Spinoza,  and  building  mostly  upon  him,  but  also 
powerfully  incited  by  Fichte  and  Schelling,  and  uniting  in 
himself  the  collective,  anti-historical  and  anti-Christian  cul- 
ture of  his  day,  Schleiermacher  was  not  able  to  harmonize 
his  Pantheistic  and  unhistorical  metaphysics  with  his  heart- 
Christianity,  which  latter,  though  sometimes  drooping  and 
wounded,  yet  grew  constantly  more  and  more  vital  with  the 
advance  of  his  years ;  he  left  these  two  forces  standing  side- 
by-side  in  his  soul,  and  honestly  entertained  and  expressed 
religious  convictions  with  which  his  philosophical  opinions 
stood  in  irreconcilable  antagonism ;  and  it  would  be  a  great 
mistake  to  undertake  to  interpret  the  ones  by  the  others. 
Schleiermacher  did  not  rise  above  this  inner  dualism, — 
a  state  which  not  every  mind  would  be  able  to  endure.  In 
his  first  period,  he  manifested  in  the  field  of  ethics  a  keen 
critical  power,  but  also  as  yet  great  unclearness  as  to  the 

*  Lehrbuch,  1826. 


362  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§  48. 

positive  essence  of  Christian  morality;  and  he  did  not  keep 
free  from  some  of  the  serious  errors  of  the  uncurbed  spirit 
of  the  age.  The  moral  laxity  of  the  "  geniuses  "  then  reign- 
ing supreme  in  the  world  of  letters,  threw  its  dusky  shadows 
also  over  this  mighty  spirit.  His  justificatory  "Letters"  011 
Schlegel's  immoral  "Lucinde, "  1800,  were  of  a  nature  to  be 
used,  and  unfortunately  not  without  ground,  by  Gutzkow  in 
countenancing  the  " rehabilitation  of  the  flesh"  which  was 
then  taught  by  this  writer,  and  in  casting  reproach  upon  the 
sacredness  of  wedlock.* — In  his  "Discourses  on  Religion," 
1799,  which  breathe  a  Spinozistic  spirit  under  the  drapery  of 
poetic  rhetoric,  Schleiermacher  declares  also  evil  as  belonging 
to,  and  co-ordinate  in,  the  beauty  of  the  universe.  Morality 
rests  upon  religion.  In  his  "Monologues,"  1800,  which  em- 
phasize the  ethical  phase,  there  is  manifested  a  bold,  high- 
aiming  self- feeling, — the  full,  overflowing  self-consciousness 
of  the  youthful  genius.  Self-examination  appears  here  as 
the  basis  and  fountain  of  all  wisdom, — not  indeed  in  the 
sense,  that  man  is  to  compare  himself  in  his  reality  with  an 
idea  or  a  divinely-revealed  law,  in  order  to  arrive  at  humility 
and  at  a  consciousness  of  his  need  of  redemption,  but  on  the 
contrary  it  is  an  immersing  of  self  in  one's  own  immediate 
genial  reality  as  the  fountain  of  all  truth  and  strength, — 
a  full,  self-satisfying  enjoyment  of  self,  a  pride-inspired  self- 
mirroring  of  a  nobly-aspiring  spirit,  f  Though  this  unhumble 
spirit  of  self-enjoying  was  not  peculiar  to  him,  but  was 
rather  the  spirit  then  dominant  among  the  excessively  self- 
conscious  "geniuses"  of  the  day,  still  there  hiy  therein  the 
germ  of  an  ethico-scientific  peculiarity  of  Schleiermacher, 
as  against  the  Kantian  school.  In  the  latter,  individual  man 
is  a  mere  moral  exemplar  shaped  after  a  general  pattern, 
merely  a  single  fulfiller  of  an  impersonal  moral  law,  the 
essence  of  which  consists  precisely  in  not  recognizing  the 
peculiarity  of  the  person,  but  in  throwing  it  off,  and  in  giv- 
ing validity  only  to  the  general.  Schleiermacher  maintains, 
on  the  contrary,  that  every  man  is  to  represent  humanity  in  a 

*  Comp.  Vorlander's :  ScMeierm.'s  Sittenlehre,  p.  69 ;  C.  H.  Weisse 
in  Tholuck's  Litter.   Am.,   1835,  408  sqq. ;  Twesten,  in  his  preface  to 
Schleiermacher's  Grundriss,  p.  76  sqq. 
t  Compare  the  dissenting  judgment  of  Twesten,  idem,  p.  83  sqq. 


§48.]  H  SCHLEIERMACHER.  363 

peculiar  manner,  and  that,  accordingly,  it  is  the  very  opposite 
of  correct  to  propose  to  one's  self  simply  the  question, 
"  whether  this  my  maxim  is  adapted  to  be  exalted  into  a 
law  for  all  men."  Even  as  the  artist  does  not  produce  an 
object  of  beauty  by  representing  simply  abstract,  mathematic- 
ally-correct forms,  but  by  expressing  that  which  is  individu- 
ally-peculiar, so  is  also  the  moral  man  to  be  an  artist,  an 
artist  whose  task  it  is  to  develop  himself  into  a  personally 
peculiar  art-work,  and  not  merely  into  a  monotonous  expres- 
sion of  the  species.  He  is  not  to  strip  off,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, artistically  to  develop,  his  personal  peculiarity, — he  is 
not  to  cast  himself  down  before  duty  as  a  thought  different 
from  his  individual  personality,  but  rather  on  the  contrary 
"constantly  to  become  more  fully  what  he  is ;  this  is  his  sole 
desire."  Thus  Schleiermacher,  in  opposing  the  Kantian  one- 
sidedness,  involves  himself  in  the  opposite  one ;  both  posi- 
tions are  equally  true  and  equally  untrue,  and  the  Christian 
view  stands  in  the  middle-ground  between  them.  If  the 
Kantian  view  answers  rather  to  the  Old  Testament  law-system, 
then  that  of  Schleiermacher  would  answer  rather  to  the  Chris- 
tian idea  of  the  freedom  of  the  children  of  God  (at  least, 
— in  case  it  were  applied  to  spiritually-regenerated  children 
of  God,  which,  however,  is  not  the  case),  so  that  consequent- 
ly the  presentiment  of  the  higher  truth  turns  into  untruth, — 
into  a  perilous  holding-fast  to  self,  ariQ  this  all  the  more  so 
for  the  reason  that  it  is  absolutely  and  independently  based 
upon  mere  self,  for  "from  within  came  the  high  revelation, 
produced  by  no  teachings  of  virtue  and  by  no  system  of  the 


The  "Elements  of  a  Criticism  of  Preceding  Ethics,"  1803, — 
able  but  in  a  heavy  and  often  unclear  style,  and  hence  more 
celebrated  than  known, — relate  only  to  philosophical  ethics, 
and  discard,  in  keen  but  sometimes  unjust  criticism,  all  previ- 
ous methods  of  treating  this  science,  and  present  (as  opposed 
to  the  more  usual  method  of  treating  of  ethics  as  the  doctrine 
of  virtues  or  duties)  the  doctrine  of  goods  as  the  basis  of  the 
science,  and,  hence,  ethics  as  an  analysis  of  the  highest  good; 
the  good  is  the  objective  realization  of  the  moral.  The  criti- 
cism of  the  work  is  applied  not  so  much  to  the  contents  as  to 
the  scientific  form,  and  seeks  to  show  that  the  contents  can  be 


364  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  "  [§  48. 

true  only  when  the  form  is  perfect ;  there  is  no  other  criterion 
of  truth  in  ethics  than  the  scientific  form.  Plato  and  Spinoza 
are  esteemed  most  highly.  In  explaining  away  the  almost 
unbounded  self-feeling  of  the  author,  large  account  must  be 
made  for  the  spirit  of  the  times;  less  care  is  given  to  the 
demonstration  of  his  own  view  than  to  the  many-sided  assail- 
ing of  the  views  of  others. 

The  "Sketch  of  a  System  of  Ethics"  (published  in  1835  by 
Schweizer,  from  Schleiermacher's  posthumous  papers,  in  an 
imperfect  digest  of  different  sketches  ;  in  a  briefer  and  more 
general  form  in  1841  as  "Outlines  of  Philosophical  Ethics" 
with  an  introductory  preface  by  Twesten)  *  rests  upon  the 
philosophy  of  Spinoza  and  the  earlier  views  of  Schelling,  but 
contains  speculations  in  many  respects  peculiar,  and  not  always 
sufficiently  developed.  In  this  philosophical  ethics  Schleier- 
macher  leaves  entirely  out  of  consideration  the  Christian 
consciousness,  and  indeed  the  religious  consciousness  in 
general, — knows  nothing  of  a  personal  God  as  moral  Law- 
giver, nor  of  an  immortal  personal  Spirit  independent  of 
nature;  this  religious  basis  is  left  so  entirely  in  the  back- 
ground that  Schleiermacher  (as  late  as  in  1825)  answered 
the  question :  whence,  then,  arose  in  the  moral  law  the  idea 
of  a  "  should,"  which  seems  to  refer  to  a  commanding  will  ? 
by  saying,  that  in  the  Jewish  legislation  the  divine  will  had 
been  conceived  as  of  a*magisterial  character  demanding  obe- 
dience ;  and  that  this  form  had  also  been  adopted  in  Christian 
instruction,  and  "  thus  arose  the  custom  of  associating  with 
moral  knowledge  also  the  '  should,'  and  this  custom  was  re- 
tained even  after  men  had  begun  to  reduce  moral  knowledge 
to  a  general  form,  wherein  there  was  no  longer  any  reference 
to  an  outwardly-revealed  divine  will,  but  human  reason  itself 
was  regarded  as  the  legislating  factor."  f  The  two  manifes- 
tation-forms of  God  in  Spinoza,  namely,  thought  and  exten- 
sion, and  the  primitive  antithesis  of  Schelling,  reappear  here  as 
the  antithesis  of  the  universe  in  reason  and  nature,  in.  the  ideal 
and  the  real.  The  highest  antithesis  in  the  world  is  the  an- 
tithesis of  material  (known)  and  of  spiritual  (knowing)  exist- 
ence. The  existence  in  which  the  former  element  predominates 

*Comp.  Vorlander :  Schleierm? '«  Sittenlehre,  1851, — keen  and  clear 
but  not  evangelical.  t  Werlce,  iii,  2,  403. 


§48.]  "    SCHLEIERMACHER.  365 

is  nature;  the  existence  in  which  the  knowing  element  predomi- 
nates is  reason,  the  two  appearing  in  man  as  body  and  soul. 
Hence  reason  is  essentially  knowing,  and.  in  so  far  as  it  is  self- 
active,  willing.  Speculative  reason  is  ethics,  which  has,  then, 
physics  over  against  itself,  the  two  embracing  the  whole  field 
of  science,  so  that  ethics  appears  essentially  as  the  collective 
philosophy  of  the  spirit, — an  entirely  unjustifiable  deviation 
from  all  previous  nomenclature.*  Ethics  presents  the  col- 
lective operation  Of  active  human  reason  upon  nature.  Hence 
the  aim  of  moral  effort  is,  the  perfect  interpenetration  of  rea- 
son and  nature,  a  permeation  of  nature  by  reason,  and  indeed 
of  all  nature  in  so  far  as  standing  in  connection  with  human 
nature.  This  interpenetration  is  the  highest  good,t  the  sum 
total  of  all  single  goods ;  it  is  embodied  in  the  thought  of  the 
Golden  Age,  where  man  dominated  absolutely  over  nature,  and 
in  the  thought  of  everlasting  peace,  of  the  perfection  of 
knowledge,  and  in  the  thought  of  a  kingdom  of  heaven,  and 
in  a  free  communion  of  the  highest  self-consciousness  by  means 
of  spiritual  self-representation.  In  the  individual  the  attain- 
ment of  the  moral  goal  appears  as  personal  perfection,  as  a 
perfect  unity  of  nature  with  intelligence,  and  hence  as  a  per- 
fect blessedness. — But  the  unity  of  reason  and  nature  is  to"  be 
conceived  in  a  threefold  manner :  (1)  In  reference  to  the  end- 
point  of  the  moral  striving,  namely,  the  real  unity  of  reason 
and  nature,  as  the  highest  good ;  herein  is  embraced  the  mul- 
tiplicity of  particular  manifestations  of  said  unity,  and  hence 
of  good ;  this  is  ethics  as  the  doctrine  of  goods  or  as  the  doc- 
trine of  the  highest  good;  (2)  in  reference  to  the  beginning- 
point  of  the  moral  striving,  namely,  the  efficiency  of  reason  in 
human  nature,  and  hence  said  unity  conceived  as  power,  that 
is,  as  virtue, — the  doctrine  of  virtue ;  \  (3)  in  reference  to  the 
relation  between  the  beginning-point  and  the  end-point,  and 
hence  in  the  movement  of  the  power  toward  the  goal,  and 
consequently  a  modus  operandi  of  reason  in  realizing  the  high- 
est good;  this  is  the  doctrine  of  duties.^  Hence  a  threefold 

*  See  his  discussion  of  the  difference  between  natural  and  moral  law : 
Werke,  iu,  2,  397. 

t  Ueber  das  hocJiste  Gut,  1827,  '30 ;    Werlce,  iii,  2,  446. 
J  Comp.  Abh.  ub.  d.  Behundlung  des  Tugendbegriffs,  1819 ;  idem  850. 
§  Comp.  Abh.  ub.  d.  Behandlung  des  Pftlchtbegrifes,  1824;  idem  379. 


366  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§48. 

manner  of  presenting  ethics  is  possible  and  necessary  ;  each 
embraces  really  the  whole  field  of  the  moral,  but  as  considered 
from  a  different  point  of  view,  each,  however,  refers  to  the 
others.  In  giving  all  the  goods,  one  must  give  at  the  same 
time  all  the  virtues  and  duties,  and  the  converse.  However, 
the  doctrine  of  goods  is  the  most  self-based  and  independent, 
because  it  embraces  the  ultimate  goal.  ''Every  definite  ex- 
istence is  good  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  world  for  itself,  a  copy  of 
absolute  being,  and  hence  in  the  disappearing  of  the  antithe- 
ses";* a  good  is  "every  harmony  of  particular  phases  of  rea- 
son and  nature," — that  wherein  "the  interpenetration  of  rea- 
son and  of  nature  is  independently  brought  about,  in  so  far  as 
this  unity  of  reason  and  nature  bears  itself  like  the  whole  in  an 
organic  manner. t — The  doctrine  of  goods  alone  is  fully  de- 
veloped, while  the  doctrine  of  virtue  and  of  duties  is  treated 
but  very  briefly  and  meagerly. 

In  the  doctrines  of  goods  Schleiermacher  distinguishes -a 
twofold  moral  activity  :  (1)  In  so  far  as  reason  exerts  itself 
upon  nature  as  external  to  it,  it  is  organizing,  in  that  it  makes 
nature  an  organ  of  reason ;  (2)  in  so  far  as  the  interpretation 
of  reason  and  nature  is  already  posited,  the  activity  of  reason 
is  of  a  symbolizing  character,  in  that  it  makes  itself  recogniz- 
able in  its  work.  These  two  activities  manifest  themselves  in 
turn  in  two  different  manners.  In  as  far,  namely,  as  reason  is 
the  same  in  all  men,  in  so  far  also  these  two  activities  are  alike 
in  all ;  but  in  as  far  as  individual  men  are  originally  and  in 
their  very  idea  different  from  each  other,  in  so  far  also  is  the 
activity  of  an  individual  character,  shaping  itself  in  a  peculiar 
manner  in  each  individual.  This  notion  of  a  legitimate  per- 
sonal peculiarity,  Schleiermacher  emphasizes  very  strongly, 
without,  however,  really  grounding  it  philosophically. —  Virtue 
expresses  itself  either  as  enlivening  or  as  militant:  as  enliven- 
ing, it  expresses  the  harmonious  union  of  reason  and  nature ; 
as  militant,  it  overcomes  the  resistance  of  nature ;  under  anoth- 
er phase  it  is  either  cognoscitive  or  representative;  thus  we  arrive 
at  four  cardinal  virtues : — the  enlivening  virtue  as  cognoscitive 
or  representative  is  wisdom  or  soundness  of  judgment;  as  repre- 
sentative it  is  love  ;  the  militant  virtue  as  cognoscitive  is  pru- 

*  System,  p.  54.  t  Ibid. ,  p.  7 2. 


§  48.]  SCHLEIERMACHER.  367 

dence;  as  representative  it  is  persistence.  (In  his  academical 
Dissertation  on  the  notion  of  virtue,  Schleiermacher  varies  in 
form  somewhat  from  his  System  of  Ethics.) — The  very  unequal 
currying  out  of  the  subject  in  detail  presents,  together  with 
great  acumen,  also  much  unsound  and  fruitless  sophistry ;  the 
brilliant  thoughts  shoot  forth  in  every  direction  in  sharp-cut 
crystal-gleams  before  the  dazzled  eye  of  the  beholder,  but  often 
only  to  dissolve  themselves  suddenly  again  into  a  state  of  form- 
less fluidity.  The  interrupted,  incomplete,  un-uniform  presenta- 
tion, as  given  in  the  hastily-edited  edition,  render  the  reading 
of  this  work  very  difficult,  and  the  ethical  results  appear  by  no 
means  so  rich  as,  from  the  pretensions  of  the  system,  one  might 
be  led  to  expect ;  and  it  is  often  impossible  to  resist  the  impression 
that  the  work  abounds  in  unprofitable  sophistry.  The  academ- 
ical Essays  that  belong  here,  though  ably  developed,  present 
after  all  but  mere  fragments  of  the  whole. 

A  wholly  different  picture  is  furnished  by  the  Theological 
Ethics,  which  was  edited  by  Jonas  in  1843,  from  Schleier- 
macher's  posthumous  papers,  and  from  notes  written  by  his 
hearers,  under  the  title:  "Christian  Ethics  according  to  the 
Principles  of  the  Evangelical  Church."  *  The  idea  of  the  moral 
is  developed  from  the  Christianly-determined  self-conscious- 
ness ;  hence  ethics  is  the  analysis  and  presentation  of  the  Chris- 
tian self-consciousness,  in  so  far  as  the  same  tends  to  pass  over 
into  act.  The  moral  subject  is  not  considered  as  a  mere  iso- 
lated individual,  but  predominantly  as  being  a  member  of  the 
Church,  and  as  influenced  by  the  spirit  of  the  Church.  The  state 
of  the  human  self-consciousness  as  in  communion  with  God 
through  Christ,  is  salvation  and  blessedness.  This  salvation, 
however,  is  primarily  merely  an  incomplete  but  progressive  one, 
seeing  that  we  are  always  still  in  need  of  redemption ;  hence 
our  life  is  a  constant  alternation  of  pleasure  and  unpleasure, 
and  therein  lies  an  "impulse"  to  activities  in  view  of  arriving 
at  true  blessedness.  In  unpleasure  lies  the  impulse  to  a  man- 
ner of  action  whereby  the  momentarily-disturbed  normal  state 
is  to  be  restored,  that  is,  a  restorative  or  purifying  manner  of 
action ;  in  pleasure  lies  the  impulse  to  a  manner  of  action  which 
subordinates  a  lower  life-power  (as  willingly  yielding  itself  to 
a  higher  one)  directly  and  without  any  resistance  to  the  higher 
*  Die  christliche  Sitte,  etc. 


368  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§48. 

one,  thus  educating  the  lower  power,  and,  hence,  deepening 
and  extending  the  harmony  of  the  two, — the  deepening  and  ex- 
tending manner  of  acting.  Both  manners  of  acting  aim  at 
effecting  something,  at  bringing  about  a  change,  and,  hence, 
constitute  unitedly  the  operative  form  of  action,  whereby  man 
is  to  pass  from  one  condition  into  another.  The  purifying 
form  of  action  relates  primarily  to  Christian  communion,  and 
appears  as  Church-discipline  and  as  Church-reform  (reformatory 
action) ;  and  then  again,  in  relation  to  civil  society,  as  domestic 
discipline,  as  the  administration  of  civil  justice,  as  State- 
reformation,  and  as  purifying  action  in  the  relation  of  one 
state  to  another. — The  extending  form  of  action,  which  is  essen- 
tially the  educating  of  the,  as  yet  lower,, but  willing  life  through 
the  higher,  takes  place  primarily  in  the  sphere  of  the  Church, 
— aims  to  widen  and  intensify  the  efficaciousness  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  as  dwelling  in  the  Church,  and  of  Christian  sentiment. 
This  presupposes  the  propagation  of  the  human  race,  the  pro- 
duction of  human  personalities.  Hence  the  extending  form  of 
activity  in  the  Church  is  primarily  the  communion  of  the  sexes, 
and  then  the  inner  extending  and  heightening  of  the  life  of  the 
Church.  Then  also  the  extending  form  of  action  relates  to  the 
state,  and  looks  to  the  training  of  all  human  talents,  and 
to  the  transforming  of  nature  for  the  spirit, — in  both  cases 
as  one  common  act  of  all  the  individuals  belonging  to  the 
human  race,  and  hence  a  maturing  of  all  the  citizens  through 
spiritual  and  material  commerce ;  (in  this  connection  it 
is  treated  of  property,  of  trade,  of  money,  etc.).  This  is 
the  first  part  of  ethics,  that  which  embraces  the  operative  form 
of  action. 

Now,  between  the  moments  of  pleasure  and  unpleasure  there 
occur  moments  of  satisfaction  (and  which  are  consequently 
distinguished  from  those  of  pleasure),  that  is,  of  relative  bless- 
edness, the  fundamental  feeling  proper  of  the  Christian,  and 
which  is  at  the  same  time  also  an  impulse  to  acting.  This 
acting,  however,  aims  not  at  effecting  a  change,  but  only  at 
revealing  itself  outwardly,  at  making  known  its  condition  of 
happiness  to  others,  and  hence  is  not  an  operative  but  a  repre- 
sentative acting.  The  operative  form  of  acting  is  only  the 
way  for  attaining  to  the  perfect  dominion  of  the  spirit  over 
the  flesh,  that  is,  to  the  feeling  of  blessedness ;  and  the  active 


§  48.]  SCHLEIERMACHER.  369 

expression  of  this  feeling  and  of  this  dominion  is  the  repre- 
sentative form  of  action,  which  manifests  this  inner  self-con- 
sciousness by  means  of  communion  with  others,  and  hence 
from  motives  of  love.  The  essence  of  love  is  the  inner  neces- 
sity of  the  constant  intercommunion  of  self-consciousness  as 
separated  by  personality, — rests  upon  communion,  and  devel- 
ops it  to  a  higher  degree.  Although  the  representative  form 
of  action  takes  its  rise  from  the  communion  of  the  subject  with 
God,  yet  this  communion  is  mediated  by  the  Holy  Spirit  that 
dwells  in  the  Christian  society.  Hence  the  representative  fonn 
of  action  relates  primarily  to  the  evangelically-religious  com- 
munion,— is  divine  worship,  or  the  sum  total  of  all  actions 
whereby  we  present  ourselves  as  organs  of  God  by  means  of 
the  Holy  Spirit ;  it  embraces,  in  the  wider  sense,  also  the  vir- 
tues of  chastity,  patience,  endurance,  humility,  in  so  far  as  in 
them  is  manifested  the  dominion  of  the  flesh  over  the  spirit. 
Then  again,  this  form  of  action  relates  to  general  human 
communion,  which  is  the  outer  sphere  of  this  action,  as  divine 
worship  is  the  inner,  in  other  words,  the  sphere  of  social  life, 
the  representative  form  of  action  in  the  intercourse  of  men,  as 
not  immediately  connected  with  Christian  communion,  not, 
however,  as  an  operative  form  of  action,  but  predominantly 
merely  as  beholding  and  enjoying.  In  this  connection,  Schleier- 
macher  considers,  first,  the  social  life  proper,  and  particu- 
larly social  intercourse  in  eating  and  drinking  under  circum- 
stances of  luxury  and  decoration,  and,  then,  art,  and  lastly 
play. 

However  much  we  may  admire  the  creative  genius  whereby 
Schleiermacher  endeavored  to  establish  and  carry  out  his 
highly  peculiar  classification  of  ethics,  still  in  reality  we  can- 
not but  declare  it  as  unadapted  and  unsuccessful ;  and,  in 
spite  of  the  great  and  almost  idolizing  admiration  shown  by 
the  public  for  the  skillful  thought-  artist,  this  piece  of  art  has 
not  succeeded  in  calling  forth  any  imitation.  At  the  veryrtirst 
glance  one  recognizes  the  utter  unnaturalness  of  making  Chris- 
tian ethics  begin  with  Church-discipline  and  Church-reforma- 
tion, and  close  with  the  subject  of  play ;  while,  in  the  second 
part,  is  presented  the  widening  form  of  action  in  Church-com- 
munion, and,  in  the  third,  the  ecclesiastical  worship  of  God, — 
as  also  the  unnaturalness  of  placing  sexual  communion  along- 


370  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  48. 

side  of  Church-communion  as  simply  its  presupposition,  and 
of  treating  it  only  subsequently  to  the  discussion  of  Church- 
discipline  and  domestic  discipline, — and  of  treating  of  four 
Christian  virtues,  in  isolation  from  all  the  others,  under  the 
head  of  divine  worship,  and  among  them  that  of  chastity, 
which  of  course  falls  under  the  head  of  sexual  communion, 
whereas  in  fact  all  and  every  other  of  the  Christian  virtues 
might  with  just  as  good  right  be  treated  under  the  rubric  of 
divine  worship.  The  chief  subdivisions  of  Christian  acting  as 
purifying,  extending  and  representative  acting,  cannot  by  any 
means  be  sharply  separated  from  each  other ;  on  the  contrary, 
in  each  one  of  them  also  the  other  is  necessarily  involved ;  the 
extending  or  distributive  acting  is  not  possible  otherwise  than 
by  a  representing.  At  all  events  the  purifying  activity  could 
not  be  the  first,  for  the  obtaining  and  confirming  of  life-com- 
munion with  God  must,  as  moral  activities,  precede  the  purify- 
ing of  the  already-obtained  communion.  The  feelings  of 
pleasure  and  displeasure  are,  as  pure  states  of  experience,  not 
by  any  means  per  se  the  bases  of  the  Christianly-moral  activ- 
ity ;  both  feelings  may  per  se  be  just  as  readily  immoral  as 
moral ;  and  the  first  moral  striving  must  be  directed  to  the  end 
that  the  pleasure  and  displeasure  themselves  be  moral,  whereas 
they  are  here  presupposed  unconditionally  as  "  impulses  "  to  the 
moral ;  but  this  system  of  ethics  is  not  written  for  saints  (who 
might  indeed  be  regarded  as  determining  themselves  by  the 
simple  feeling  of  pleasure  or  unpleasure  per  se),  since  it  sets 
out  with  a  purifying  form  of  action,  relating  to  the  subject 
himself.  It  is  true,  Schleiermacher  brings  this  pleasure  and 
displeasure  into  relation  to  communion  with  God;  but  the 
apostle  distinguishes,  also  in  the  saints,  a  pleasure  and  a  dis- 
pleasure in  this  God-communion  (Rom.  vii,  22  sqq.) ;  hence  if 
there  exists  also  in  the  Christian,  before  his  final  perfection,  as 
yet  an  unpious  pleasure  and  an  impious  displeasure,  it  follows 
that  the  moral  striving  must  in  fact  direct  itself  primarily  upon 
this  pleasure  and  unpleasure.  Furthermore,  the  entirely  unu- 
sual separating  of  the  pious  pleasure-feeling  and  of  the  blessed- 
ness-feeling (so  fully  that  two  chief-divisions  of  ethics  are  based 
thereupon),  is  neither  justifiable  nor  practical.  The  objective 
goal  of  the  moral  activity,  that  is,  the  doctrine  of  moral  good, 
is  rather  presupposed  than  developed.  Knowledge  or  Chris- 


§48.]  ROTHE.  871 

tian  \visdom  is  thrown  quite  disproportionately  in  the  back- 
ground, behind  the  subjects  of  feeling,  of  disposition,  and  of 
acting.  In  general  we  find,  notwithstanding  the  great  dialec- 
tic art  employed,  especially  in  the  analysis  of  ideas,  still  quite 
frequently  an  indefiniteness  and  unfruitfulness  of  the  moral 
ideas  in  their  practical  significancy, — an  excessive  prominence 
of  the  subjective  peculiarity  and  a  corresponding  unprominence 
of  a  simple  Biblical  spirit.  The  ecclesiastical  element  with 
which,  from  unecclesiastical  quarters,  Schleiermacher  has  been 
reproached,  is  in  fact  reduced  in  him  to  its  merest  minimum. 
"  With  the  exception  of  the  free  activity  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
nothing  is  to  be  regarded  as  absolutely  fixed  by  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  but  every  thing  as  accepted  only  provisionally,  and 
to  be  regarded  as  remaining  subject  to  a  constant  revision." 
All  symbolical  settlings  of  doctrine  are  Romanizing,  and  must 
be  made  revocable.*  We  cannot  see,  however,  why  precisely 
the  activity  of  the  Holy  Ghost  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  abso- 
lutely-established point,  and  not  also  subject  to  a  constant  re- 
vision,— why  it  is  not  "  revocable  " ;  and  just  as  little  can  we 
see  why  this  activity,  if  it  is  valid  at  all,  should  not  lead  to  a 
real  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and  hence  to  a  definitively-estab- 
lished knowledge. 

Richard  Rotht,  standing  in  part  upon  Schleiermacher's 
stand-point,  but  also  making  use  of  Hegelian  and  Schel- 
lingian  philosophy  in  combination  with  his  own  somewhat 
peculiar  and  daring  form  of  speculation,  furnishes,  in  his 
"Theological  Ethics"  (1845-'49,  thoroughly  revised,  1867)  a 
system  of  theosophy  embracing  also  a  large  portion  of  dog- 
matics and  even  some  extra-theological  topics,  which,  how- 
ever much  we  may  admire  its  erudition  and  earnest  thought- 
labor,  yet,  in  view  of  its  wonderful  commingling  of  Christian 
faith,  extra-Christian  philosophy  and  extra-philosophical 
fantasy,  we  cannot  avoid  regarding  as  a  failure.  Rothe 
manifests,  in  contrast  to  a  large  number  of  more  recent 
speculative  theologians,  an  estimable  sense  for  scientific 
honesty ;  and  where  he  deviates  from  the  ecclesiastical  and 
Biblical  view  (and  this  occurs  in  very  essential  and  funda- 
mental things)  there  he  does  not  disguise  the  antithesis  in 
fine-sounding  words ;  not  every  one,  however,  could  succeed 

*  CJirittl.  Sittc.,  etc.,  £eil.,  p.  184. 
25 


372  CHKISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§48. 

so  naively  as  Rothe  in  harmonizing  with  a  pious  faith  in  other 
respects,   such   questionable   contradictions  to  the   general 
Christian  consciousness  as  are  found,  e.  g.,  in  his  doctrines 
of  the  omniscience  of  God  (which  he  limits  to  the  past,  the 
present,  and  the  necessary),  and  in  his  doctrine  of  the  church 
(which  he  treats  in  the  spirit  of  entire  anti-ecclesiasticism). 
His    merely-apparently   profound    and   frequently   very   un- 
bridled speculations  do  not  constitute  a  steadily  progressive 
ana  regularly-developed  line  of  thought,  but  are  in  many 
respects  mere  plays  of  thought  and  fantasy ;  and  it  is  only 
after  passing  through  these  portions  of  the  work  (which, 
though  treated  with  a  certain  amateur-fondness,  are  yet  really 
very  unfruitful  of  ethical  results,  and  are  presented  in  a  not 
unfrequently  sadly  misused  language),  that  we  enter,  in  the 
third  part,  upon  a  frequently  excellent,  beautifully-presented, 
and  really  ethical  current  of  thought,  though  not  without 
also    occasionally   meeting  with    surprising    eccentricities. 
Rothe's  view  of   ethics  as  a  science  we  have  already  men- 
tioned (§  3,  §  4). — The  moral  task  of  man  is,  by  virtue  of  his 
free  self-determination,  to  appropriate  material  nature  to  his 
own  personality;  hence  the  idea  of  the  moral  is:   "the  real 
unity  of  the  personality  and  of  material  nature,  a  unity  as  im- 
pressed upon  nature  by  the  personality  itself  in  virtue  of  its 
nature-determining  functions,  or,  the  unity  of  the  personality 
and  of  material  nature  as  the  appropriatedness  of  the  latter 
to  the  former."    Morality  is  an  independent  something  along- 
side of  piety,  and  rests  by  no  means  upon  piety, — is  entirely 
co-ordinate  to  and  independent  of  it.     Ethics  falls  into  three 
divisions:  it  considers  (1)  the  moral  as  being  a  product,  that 
is,  the  pure  and  full  manifestation  of  the  moral  in  the  un- 
folded totality  of  its  special  moments  and  of  their  organiza- 
tion into  unity,  that  is,  the  moral  world  in  its  completeness 
— the  doctrine  of  goods.     The  good  is  the  normal  real  unity  of 
the  personality  and  of  material  nature,  the  appropriatedness 
of  the  latter  to  the  former.     Here  Rothe  considers,  first,  the 
highest  good  as  an  abstract  ideal,  irrespective  of  sin ;  (in  this 
connection  are  treated  also  of  six  forms  of  moral  communion, 
of  which  the  highest  and  most  comprehensive  is  the  State, 
which  is  ultimately  destined  to  embrace  all  moral  life,  and 
to  absorb  the  communion  of  piety,  namely,  the  church,  into 


§  48.]  ROTHE.  873 

itself ;  the  church  has  only  a  transitional  significancy,  but  the 
state  a  higher,  permanent  one).  Hereupon  follows  a  com- 
plete treatment  of  eschatology.  The  other,  next-following, 
phase  is  the  highest  good  in  its  concrete  reality ;  here  it  is 
treated,  first,  of  sin,  as  something  inhering  in  human  nature, 
and  hence  necessary  and  originally  co-posited  in  the  divine 
world-plan ;  and,  then,  of  redemption,  where  a  complete  doc- 
trine of  redemption  is  presented.  (2)  The  causality  or  power 
bringing  forth  this  product,  that  is,  virtue,  and  hence  the  doc- 
trine of  virtue,  is  treated  of  in  the  second  part,  and,  in  con- 
nection therewith,  also  the  corresponding  un-virtues.  (3)  As 
this  power  is  a  self-determining  one,  hence  there  is  need  of 
a  determined  formula  of  the  moral  product,  namely,  a  moral 
law,  by  the  observing  of  which,  on  the  part  of  the  producing 
moral  power,  the  real  production  of  the  moral  world  is  con- 
ditioned, namely,  the  doctrine  of  duties,  which  in  turn  falls 
into  the  doctrine  of  self-duties  and  the  doctrine  of  social 
duties. — In  the  two  first  and  rather  speculative  parts  of  the 
work,  Rothe  treats  of  many  things  which  one  would  not  look 
for  in  a  work  on  ethics,  e.  g. ,  of  pure  matter,  of  space  and 
time,  of  extension  and  motion,  of  atomic  attraction  and  re- 
pulsion, of  gravity,  of  fluidity,  of  crystallization,  of  vegeta- 
tion, of  comets,  and  the  like;  these  digressions  into  the 
sphere  of  natural  philosophy  belong  among  the  oddities  of 
the  work.  The  excessively  artificial  schemata  are  repeated 
in  constant  and  very  strange  application,  the  quadropartite 
division  being  throughout  observed,  even  though  the  ob- 
serving of  it  requires  the  invention  of  entirely  new  definitions 
and  new  words ;  and  not  unf  requently  are  found  entirely'  use- 
less and  profitless  splittings  of  ideas.  The  chief  fault  of  this 
work,  however,  seems  to  us  to  lie  in  the  fact,  that  it  unhesi- 
tatingly lays  at  the  foundation  of  Christian  Ethics,  theories 
which  are  utterly  foreign  to  the  Christian  world-theory,  such 
as  that  of  the  philosophical  ethics  of  Schleiermacher,  which, 
however,  Schleiermacher  himself  declared  to  be  inapplicable 
to  Christian  ethics.  Rothe's  notion  of  the  moral  is  endurable 
only  in  a  philosophical  system  such  as  Schleiermacher's ;  and, 
even  there  appearing  only  as  an  oddity,  is  not  only  per  se  en- 
tirely unsound,  but  also  utterly  in  contradiction  to  the  entire 
evangelico-ethical  consciousness.  This  consciousness  has  as 


374  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§48. 

its  moral  goal  something  utterly  other  than  the  appropriating 
of  material  nature  to  the  personal  nature ;  the  kingdom  of  God 
has  with  this  nature  primarily  and  essentially  nothing  to  do. 
The  other  more  recent  writers  on  ethics  keep  themselves 
more  independent  of  recent  philosophy.     The  work  of  Har- 
less:   "  Christian  Ethics  "  (since  1842  in  five  almost  similar 
editions ;  the  sixth  edition,    1864,    greatly   enlarged),    is    a 
brief,  able  and  purely- Biblical  treatise, — practical,   purely- 
evangelical   and  well   written;    but   the   scientific   form  is 
faulty ;  the  ideas  are  not  sharply  distinguished  nor  always 
held  fast  to;  the  clearness  is  more  frequently  appearance 
than  reality ;  the  development  of  thought  is  neither  vigor- 
ous nor  uninterrupted;    the   classification    (salvation-good, 
salvation-possession,  salvation-preservation)  is  not  capable  of 
being  kept  distinct ;  the  second  and  third  parts  overlap  each 
other,  for  there  is  no  possession  without  preservation ;  and 
what  appears  here  as  preservation  is  in  fact  possession ;  the 
general  introduction  is  insufficient,  and  Harless  himself  says 
of  his  book,  that  it  contains  "no  trace  of  a  system."  * — The 
work  of  Sartoriw.  "The  Doctrine  of  holy  Love,  or  Elements 
of  Evangelico-Ecclesiastical  Moral  Theology,"  (third  edition, 
1851-'56),  is  intended  for  the  general  public,  and  is  not  a  sci- 
entific treatise,  nor  yet  a  book  of  edification ;  but  it  goes  be- 
yond the  limits  of  mere  ethics,  and  embraces  love  in  the  wid- 
est sense ;  hence  it  treats  also  of  the  love  of  God  to  himself, 
and  of  its  realization  in  the  Trinity,  and  to  man, — also  of 
creation  and  redemption,  thus  combining  much  dogmatical 
matter  with  ethics.     The  spirit  of  the  work  is  purely  evan- 
gelical, of  ardent'  faith — enlivened  and  enlivening.     The  dis- 
cussion,   however,    remains    mostly  in    the   sphere   of  the 
general;  the  individual  moral  phenomena  are  neither  com- 
pletely nor  closely  examined. — (W.   Bohmer:   "Theological 
Ethics,"    1846~'53).— C.    F.    Schmid's    "Christian    Ethics," 
edited  by  Heller,  1861,  is  of  a  truly  Biblical  spirit, — earnest, 
judicious,  and  giving  evidence  of  Christian  life-experience ; 
the  scientific  classification  and  form  are  not  happy — are  not 
derived  from  the  subject-matter,  but  outwardly  thrown  upon 
it;    many  weighty  points  are  omitted,  and  the  manner  of 
treatment  is  unequal. — Palmer's    "Ethics  of  Christianity," 
*  Varr.  t.  6  Au.  XV. 


§49.]  ROMISH  ETHICS.  876 

1864,  is  an  outline  destined  for  wider,  cultivated  circles; 
the  view  taken  is  sound  and  evangelical,  morally  earnest  and 
judicious,  and  the  style  pleasing,  light,  and  untechnical. — 
T.  Culmanri's  "  Christian  Ethics, "  first  part,  1864,  is  based 
upon  Baader's  theosophy,  and  is  in  sharp  antithesis  to  all 
rationalistic  superficiality,  although,  notwithstanding  its 
many  ingenious  and  even  profound  thoughts,  it  strays  away 
into  many,  and  even  anti- Scriptural,  assumptions  and  dreamy 
brain-fancies. 

SECTION  XLIX. 

The  ethics  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  since 
the  dissolution  of  the  Order  of  the  Jesuits  has  been 
becoming,  even  in  the  circles  which  stood  in  connec- 
tion with  this  Order,  considerably  more  cautious ;  in 
other  respects  it  has  been  treated  (when  not  casuis- 
tical) principally  on  the  basis  of  Thomas  Aquinas. 
The  influence  of  recent  philosophy  has  made  itself 
in  many  respects  apparent ;  in  part,  there  has  been 
also  a  noticeable  approximation  to  the  evangelical 
consciousness,  without,  however,  rising  beyond  a  hesi- 
tating half-way  position.  The  ground-character  of 
the  Romish  church  as  distinguished  from  the  evan- 
gelical, namely,  its  tendency  to  conceive  the  moral 
predominantly  under  the  form  of  law,  whereas  the 
latter  conceives  it  more  as  virtue,  remains  the  same 
even  up  to  the  present. 

During  the  last  two  centuries  the  ethics  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  church  has  made  decided  advances  toward  the  bet- 
ter. The  growing  indignation  against  the  perversion  of  the 
same  by  the  Jesuits  rendered  even  the  Jesuits  themselves 
more  cautious,  although  also  the  works  of  the  earlier  Jesuits 
have  been  very  largely  in  use  up  to  most  recent  times. 
Alphonzo  de  Ligorio's  Theologia  maralis,  since  1757,  (an  en- 
largement of  the  work  of  Busenbaum),  is  yet  to-day  one  of 
the  most  highly  prized  hand-books  of  ethics ;  (on  it  are 


376  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.  [§49. 

based  the  works  of  Waibel:  "Moral  Theology,"  1841-'47, 
and  of  Scavini  :  "  Theologia  Moralis,"  ninth  edition,  1863.) 
The  Jesuit  Stattler  of  Ingolstadt  (Ethica  Christiana  communis, 
1791)  taught,  however,  pretty  boldly  the  old  principles  of  the 
Order ;  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the  opposition  thereto  was 
growing  more  emphatic,  and  has  resulted  in  bringing  about 
a  purer  moral  view.  The  moralists  who  based  themselves 
on  the  Scholastics,  especially  on  Thomas  Aquinas,  have  been 
very  numerous;  (Besombes,  from  and  after  1709;  Amort, 
1789, '58,  who  wrote  also  a  system  of  "Casuistry,"  1733,  '62; 
Tournely,  1726  and  subsequently;  Concina,  1745;  Patuzzi, 
1770 ;  and  others) ;  of  the  large  number  of  ethical  works, 
however,  only  a  few  have  any  thing  original ;  the  majority 
simply  compile  from  their  predecessors. — Under  the  influence 
of  Kant,  wrote  Isenbiehl  (1795),  Muttschelle  (1801,  Schenkl 
(1803),  and  others;  Riegler's  "Christian  Ethics,"  1825,  rests 
in  part  on  Schenkl,  and  is  much  used,  though  scientifically 
unimportant.  Braun,  in  his  "System  of  Christian  Catholic 
Ethics,"  (1834),  and  Vogelsang  in  his  "Compendium"  (1834), 
applied  the  philosophy  of  Hermes  to  ethics.  Sailer's  ' '  Hand- 
Book  of  Christian  Ethics,"  (1818,  '34)  is  of  a  very  mild  and 
generally  evangelical  spirit ;  and  the  approximation  to  a  purer 
evangelical  view,  though  often  somewhat  infected  with 
Rationalism,  shows  itself  also  in  other  more  recent  moralists. 
Hirscher's  "Christian  Ethics"  (1835,  fifth  edition,  1851)  is 
doubtless  scientifically  the  most  important,  and  its  general 
view  is  largely  based  on  essentially  evangelical  principles ; 
distinctively  Romish  views  are  in  many  cases  very  much 
modified  and,  advocate-like,  .idealized  and  brought  nearer  to 
evangelical  views ;  this,  however,  is  not  accomplished  with- 
out some  sophistry.  Also  Stapf  ("Christian  Ethics,"  1841 ; 
Theologia  Moralis,  fourth  edition  1836)  endeavors  to  shape 
the  older  ethics  more  Biblically;  Jocham's  "Moral  Theol- 
ogy," 1852,  is  simple  and  clear;  Martin,  1850-'51 ;  Werner, 
1850. 

These  improvements  of  Romish  ethics  do  not  succeed,  how- 
ever, in  changing  its  ground-character  as  in  contrast  to  evangel- 
ical ethics ;  the  notion  of  the  meritoriousness  of  human  works 
as  co-working  toward  salvation  is  not  yet  overcome, — virtue  is 
not  mere  thanks,  but  it  establishes  claims ;  the  moral  life  is  not 


§49.]  ROMISH  ETHICS.  377 

the  spontaneously-cmt-streaming  radiance  of  the  faith-inspired 
loving  soul,  but  it  is  a  something  yet  distinct  from  faith  and  rela- 
tively independent, — a  laborious  working  upon  salvation  as  only 
associatedly  conditioned  by  faith,  but  not  yet  really  obtained. 
The  divine  will  has  not  as  yet  become  an  inner  property  of  the 
believing  soul  in  spiritual  regeneration,  but  simply  still  hovers 
before  it  as  a  something  other  from  and  objective  to  it ;  hence 
the  largely  predominant  character  of  legality  in  Romish  ethics, 
even  where,  on  the  basis  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  the  form  of 
the  doctrine  of  virtue  is  chosen.  And  here  is  manifestly  the 
reason  why  the  Romish  form  of  theology  has  produced  a  far 
richer  ethical  literature  than  the  Evangelical,  seeing  that  in 
the  Romish  Church  not  merely  the  scientific  but  also  the  prac- 
tical need  for  moral  instructions  and  rules,  is  much  greater 
than  in  the  sphere  of  the  Evangelican  consciousness,  which  lat- 
ter is  no  longer  "  under  the  law,"  and  has  consequently  in  ethics 
less  a  practical  than  a  purely  scientific  interest.  To  the  Cath- 
olic the  Gospel  is  essentially  also  a  newZaw, — simply  a  further- 
development  of  the  Old  Testament  law ;  and  it  is  the  task  of 
ethics  to  digest  this  new  legislation  and  shape  it  more  or  less 
into  a  statutory  form ;  only  to  a  Romish  moralist  is  it  possible 
to  take  up  into  a  treatise  on  ethics  a  civil  criminal  code,  as 
Stapf  has  done,  in  detailed  thoroughness,  with  the  Austrian. 
The  Christian  never  succeeds,  here,  in  bearing  in  himself  the 
Divine  will  otherwise  than  in  a  law  learned  by  study ;  the  law 
and  the  moral  subject  still  continue  exterior  to  each  other,  and 
the  former  is  objective  to  the  latter;  to  act  according  to  the 
authority  of  an  outward  law  appears  as  a  special  merit ;  the 
law  interpenetrates  not  the  human  soul,  and  the  soul  not  the 
law ;  there  remains  between  the  two  an  impassable  gulf;  hence 
the  law  and  the  person  content  themselves,  at  last,  with  the 
outward;  obeying  outweighs  loving;  and  loving  is  never  a 
merit,  as  obeying,  however,  may  be.  Because  of  the  placing  of 
faith  simply  along-side  of  works,  there  lacks  to  the  moral  the 
unitary  center-point  in  the  heart,  and  hence  the  good  appears 
predominantly  as  a  plurality  of  virtues,  and  the  moral  life  pre- 
dominantly as  a  countless  sum  of  single  cases ;  hence  in  Romish 
ethics  the  predominance  of  the  casuistical  treatment,  which  is 
not  yet  thrown  aside  even  in  the  most  recent  treatises;  the 
thought  of  ethics  awakes  at  once  in  the  Catholip's  mind  the 


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378  CHRISTIAN   ETHICS.  [§  43. 

notion  of  a  Summa  casuum ;  also,  in  this  respect,  \ve  see  a 
manifestation  of  the  predominant  character  of  externality. 
The  notion  of  a  Gocl-sonship  manifesting  itself  in  a  new  free 
life  never  comes  to  full  appreciation  in  Romish  ethics ;  the  no- 
tion of  a  son  of  the  Church  is,  in  it,  much  more  familiar;  and 
here  at  once  the  ecclesiastical  State,  with  its  legal  character, 
steps  into  the  fore-ground  of  the  moral  life. 


END   OP  HISTORY   OP  ETHICS. 


